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Preface 
 
 
 
 
 
These proceedings are a collection of papers prepared for and presented at the 65th 
Anniversary Conference of the Institute of Economics, Zagreb, that took place in Zagreb, 
on November 18th and 19th, 2004. The objective was to celebrate the 65th anniversary 
of the Institute by discussing the main economic challenges facing the European 
transition economies (EU entrants and other candidates, with a particular focus on 
Croatia), and by providing fresh insights and ideas on how to approach the common and 
country specific problems. 
 
The topics covered in the papers reflect some of the economic issues of the contemporary 
Europe. On the one hand, the European Union as its dominant part is aiming to become 
a global leader. On the other hand, the countries in its closest neighborhood, i.e. Central 
and Eastern European countries are going through a process of transition that has 
evolved at a varying pace until now. The leaders among transition countries joined the 
European Union as full members in 2004, while the other group of countries is still 
engaged in political and economic restructuring aimed at meeting the EU standards and 
pre-requirements.  
 
The Conference was organized in seven sessions and therefore the contributions 
addressed the following specific issues: Economic growth and development; Fiscal policy, 
unemployment and demographic trends; Financial sector, inflation and monetary policy; 
External balances, capital flows, monetary and exchange rate policies; Innovation 
management; Competitiveness of companies and sectors on the road to the EU; European 
economic space - development problems and accession challenges. The Conference 
Committee was proud to introduce a special poster session for economists under 30, 
named YES! - Young Economists’ Session. Their background papers are also included in 
these proceedings.  
 
All the papers that we received for the conference were subject to a double-blind review 
by international reviewers (from Croatia, Germany, Switzerland, UK, USA). We strongly 
believe to have succeeded in the attempt to select those analytical and empirical studies 
and papers that could provide well-founded and useful recommendations to policy 
makers and the business community alike. 
 
 X
Contributions of the researchers from the Institute of Economics, Zagreb are the outcome 
of the current research efforts on the project entitled "Economic Development of the 
Republic of Croatia on its Road to the EU: macroeconomic, microeconomic and spatial 
aspects", that is supported by the Ministry of Science, Education and Sports of the 
Republic of Croatia. 
 
We would like to express our sincere gratitude to the Government of the Republic of 
Croatia, under whose high auspices the Conference was held, and all the others who 
have contributed not only to its success but also to the publication of this volume. Our 
special thanks go to many sponsors from the Croatian business community. We are also 
grateful to all the authors of the papers that were presented who enriched us with the 
valuable insights, as well as to the anonymous reviewers who took care of preserving the 
high quality of the selected papers. Our invited speakers, Riccardo Cappellin, Fabrizio 
Coricelli, Bruce L. Jaffee, George Kopits, Michael Landesmann, Dubravko Mihaljek and 
Slavo Radošević, held brilliant and provoking keynote speeches while numerous 
discussants contributed to the lively discussion and encouraged new research efforts.  
 
Both the organization of the Conference and the publication of the proceedings would not 
have been possible without exceptional efforts of all the staff of the Institute of 
Economics, Zagreb and Denis Redžepagić, who was doing his civilian military service at 
the Institute at the time the Conference was being prepared.  
 
We hope that the papers presented in this volume will stimulate further research into all 
the challenging areas that the Conference attempted to tackle, both within the local 
community and internationally. 
 
 
 
Zagreb, May 2005                                                                     The Conference Committee 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Growth and Development 
 Economic Reforms and Corruption          
in Transition Countries 
Jelena Budak* and 
Rajeev K. Goel**
 
Abstract 
Whereas the literature on the causes of corruption has ballooned in the last two decades, 
studies on transition nations are still in their infancy. Attention to transition countries is 
important because if some factors unique to these nations can be identified, then blanket 
recommendations for corruption reduction in all countries can be modified to suit 
transition economies. This paper uses annual data over 1998-2002 for 25 transition 
economies to study factors that cause corruption. Two different measures of corruption 
are employed to test the validity of our findings. Among the factors that significantly 
lower corruption, the degree of economic prosperity, economic freedom and progress 
toward transition seem most important.  
 
Keywords: corruption, transition reforms 
JEL Classification: P3, H1 
                                                 
* Jelena Budak, The Institute of Economics, Zagreb, Croatia. 
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We would like to thank Prof. Vojmir Franičević for insightful comments on an earlier version of the 
paper presented at the 65th Anniversary Conference of the Institute of Economics, Zagreb. 
Remaining errors are our own. 
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 1  Introduction 
Corruption in economies reduces economic efficiency and has negative implications for 
growth. Therefore, nations remain interested in reducing, if not eliminating, corrupt 
practices. Researchers have examined various factors that affect corruption. These 
factors include whether the prevalence of corruption in a country is affected by 
government size, judicial system, the degree of economic freedom, relative wages of 
government employees, the degree of red tape, religion, education, prosperity etc. (see 
Bardhan (1997), Jain (2001) and Rose-Ackerman (1999) for surveys of the pertinent 
literature). These studies have used country-specific as well as cross-country data. The 
effects of many of these variables on corruption generally remain inconclusive (see, for 
example, Graeff and Mehlkop (2003)). Micro-level studies, while very insightful and 
desirable, are especially problematic in the case of corruption as the true measure of 
corruption is unobservable, even more so at the individual level. Corrupt officials who 
are never caught have no incentive to reveal their true behavior. Furthermore, bribe-
givers are not always forthcoming because, more often than not, they are benefiting 
either illegally or disproportionately from corrupt practices. 
In this paper we examine the determinants of corruption in transition countries. More 
than two dozen independent nations were formed in the early nineties with the breakup 
of the Soviet Union and the general decline of communism. Attention to transition 
economies is important as many institutions in these new market economies are in their 
infancy. Reducing corruption is also an important assessment in the evaluation of 
political criteria in accessing the European Union (EU). Therefore, it is instructive to see 
what factors lead to corruption in the formative years and whether these factors are 
different from those that are known to lead to corrupt activities in other countries. On the 
one hand, there might be greater arbitrariness (leading to opportunities for corruption) in 
transition economies as institutions are not fully developed and there are fewer checks 
and balances. On the other hand, greater idealism among the public to build a better 
nation might act as a check against corruption. Transition nations might also be able to 
avoid some problems by learning from the experiences of other (mature) countries.  
We use annual data 1998 to 2002 for 25 Eastern European transition economies to 
examine the determinants of corruption. Two different measures of corruption 
perceptions are used to test the robustness of our findings. The results are quite similar 
for both measures. In particular, we find that greater economic prosperity and greater 
economic freedom lead to lower corruption, as does greater progress in transition (i.e., 
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 greater maturity). However, different elements of transition progress have varying 
influences on corruption. Lower levels of corruption is observed in the countries that 
have more success in the process of accession to the EU. Any institutional factors unique 
to the 15 former Soviet republics do not seem to have a significant impact. Implications 
of these findings are discussed. 
 
2  Model, Data and Estimation 
The theoretical underpinnings of studies of corruption may be traced back to the seminal 
work of Becker (1968), where he argued that individuals balance the costs and benefits 
from engaging in illegal activities.1 These incentives are influenced by external factors 
such as government policies. Researchers studying corruption have used various 
measures of costs and benefits of corruption to see which factors are significant. There is 
a lack of a consensus on the determinants of corruption in the literature as the significant 
influences on corruption vary depending on the measure of corruption used, the data set 
employed and the general inability to adequately measure corruption and quantify 
institutional details (Knack and Keefer (1995)). 
The general form of the estimated equation is the following: 
        CORRUPTIONit = f (INCOMEit , EDUCATIONit , GOVT SIZEit , ECONOMIC FREEDOMit , 
(1)                              TRANSITION PROGRESSit, SOVIET INFLUENCE) 
i = 1,..,25; t = 1,...,5 
 
Annual observations are used for 25 transition countries over the years 1998 to 2002. 
Two different measures of the dependent variable are used. One is the widely used 
corruption perceptions index from the Transparency International. This index varies from 
0 to 10, with higher values signifying less corruption. Given the problems with 
adequately measuring the existence of corruption in a country, another corruption 
perceptions index available from The World Bank is used. This index has a smaller range 
from -2.5 to +2.5. However, higher values again represent more “clean” economies.2  
                                                 
1 See also Shleifer and Vishny (1993) and Tanzi (1998). 
2 Note that both indices are technically indices of perceptions of corruption. The Transparency 
International’s index is an average of surveys about corruption perceptions. The World Bank index 
defines corruption as “the exercise of public power for private gain”. 
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 The level of prosperity is given by the per-capita GDP to show that perhaps individuals 
in wealthier nations have lower discount rates and thus would be less eager to offer 
bribes to “jump the queue”. Government officials in wealthy nations are also relatively 
well paid and are thus less willing to accept/solicit bribes. Furthermore, wealthier nations 
generally have better institutional mechanisms to prevent corrupt practices. Greater 
literacy might reduce corruption when the population is better aware of its rights and 
duties and people are likely to be less corrupt themselves. They are also more likely to 
report illegal acts of others.3 It might be easier to publicize the deeds of corrupt officials 
to an educated population and this might act as a deterrent. We use another, broader and 
consistent, measure of prosperity and education in the form of the Human Development 
Index. This index is based on three factors: literacy, GDP and life expectancy. Higher 
values of this index signify more literacy, greater prosperity and a longer life expectancy 
in a country. 
Government size might also affect the level of corruption in a country. The size of 
government can be a deterrent or an inducement to corruption. On the one hand, if a 
larger government spending entails greater deterrence (policing) and enforcement 
measures, it might lead to lower corruption. This might be especially true in transition 
economies because they are in the nation building stages. On the other hand, a larger 
government might signify greater red tape and this is likely to result in greater corruption 
(Goel and Nelson (1998)).  
Greater economic freedom generally signifies less governmental controls and more 
influence of market forces. Fewer governmental controls in turn reduce the discretionary 
power that government officials exercise and thus likely to reduce corrupt practices. 
Some factors unique to transition economies are captured in the transition index. This 
transition index encompasses many aspects including price liberalization, foreign 
exchange liberalization, degree of privatization, banking and enterprise reform and 
infrastructure reform. As these economies mature (i.e., greater transition progress), there 
is likely to be less corruption when institutions are fully developed and checks and 
balances minimize the discretionary powers of government officials. It would be 
interesting to see whether different elements of the transition phase have different 
influences on corruption. To that effect, we use progress toward privatization 
(disaggregated into large-scale and small-scale privatization) and indices of banking and 
                                                 
3 Conversely, one could argue that an educated population might be more adept as devising ways 
to circumvent existing rules. 
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 nonbanking reforms.4 These indices, in general, signify more play of market forces. For 
instance, privatization reduces bribe-seeking opportunities for government officials when 
their discretionary powers are reduced.5 The level of general competitiveness in an 
economy is also used as an explanatory variable. The competitiveness index is also a 
component of the transition index. 
Finally, some institutional factors might be unique to the former Soviet Union and we 
include a dummy variable to capture the influence of these factors.6 For instance, to the 
extent there were some unique government procurement practices in the former Soviet 
Union, the resulting independent nations are likely to reform differently from other 
transition economies (due to the inertia of inherited institutions). This might have a 
significant influence on corruption. On the other hand, the issues facing the transition 
nations might have more to do with their socialist past and any linkages to the former 
Soviet Union might not exert any noticeable influence on corruption. The complete list 
of countries in our data set is in the Appendix and Table 1 provides the details about 
variable definitions and data sources.  
 
3  Results and Discussion 
We start with comparative analysis of the level of corruption in transition countries and 
the institutional assessments of these nations in approaching the European Union (EU). 
Tables 3, 4 and 5 report our estimation results on determinants of corruption. All 
equations were estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and heteroscedasticity-
consistent standard errors are reported. The number of observations across the two 
measures of corruption varies due to missing observations. The general fit of all 
regressions is quite decent as the adjusted-R2 is better than 0.5 in most cases and the F-
value is statistically significant at least at the 5% level. 
                                                 
4 Recognizing some potential simultaneity issues, a one year lag on these indices is employed to 
make them somewhat pre-determined. 
5 However, in some transition countries the privatization processes themselves may be connected 
with corrupt practices. See Kaufmann and Siegelbaum (1996). 
6 However, we recognize that this framework is unable to capture all the factors potentially 
contributing to heterogeneities across countries. 
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 3.1  Corruption and Institutional Development  
A general level of corruption prevalence in transition countries is given in Table 2. We 
used the corruption perception index to compare the assessments of transition countries 
in the accession process to the EU. In the process of accession to the EU, countries are 
evaluated on institutional development and in reducing corruption to satisfy political 
criteria for EU membership. The European Commission (March 2003) reported 
corruption in Albania and Croatia as a (major) problem in the stabilization and 
association process.7 When ranked by the Corruption Index WB (2002), the top seven 
countries with the lowest corruption recently became new EU members, while on the 
bottom of the list is a group of other countries not included in the EU accession process 
(Table 2). Four groups of countries were formed according to their status to the EU. The 
associated average (perceptions) corruption index for each group clearly distinguished 
countries with reduced corruption and more success in accessing the EU and vice versa 
(Figure 1). 
Figure 1.  Corruption and accession to the EU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
New EU 
members
EU 
candidates
EU 
association 
process
Other 
countries
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
3.50
4.00
4.50
5.00
Corruption 
Index2, 2002
 
Source: Governance Matters III: Governance indicators for 1996-2002. Kaufmann et al., The World Bank, 2003. 
Note: Corruption Index2 is an aggregate indicator that measures perceptions of corruption defined as the exercise of
public power for private gain. Higher values correspond to lower corruption on a scale from 1 to 5.  
 
                                                 
7 The stabilization and association process is a contractual relation between a country in the pre-
accession process and the EU. The EU monitors the progress in reforms leading to satisfaction of 
the criteria of political and economic compliance to the EU requirements. 
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 3.2  Education and Prosperity 
Economic prosperity and education are the basic control factors that are included in 
nearly every empirical study of corruption. We find that a higher GDP per-capita leads to 
lower corruption, while the effect of literacy is not statistically significant.8 However, 
since GDP might be capturing some literacy effects, we also employ a Human 
Development Index (HDI) that encompasses education, economic prosperity and health 
conditions. An improvement in the HDI results in lower corruption. This signifies that as 
these nations achieve greater prosperity, the level of corruption will go down and 
corruption is likely to be more prevalent in poorer transition nations. These results are 
consistent across the two measures of corruption (Tables 2 and 3). In an earlier study of 
the shadow economy in transition countries over 1990-97, Eilat and Zinnes (2002) find 
that greater economic prosperity resulted in a smaller shadow economy. 
3.3  Government Size and Economic Competitiveness              
Educing Corruption 
Table 4 examines the influence of government size and competitiveness on corruption. 
GovGDP (or general government expenditure as a percentage of GDP) captures the 
effect of government size on corruption. A larger government might involve better 
monitoring of discretionary powers of government officials or it might involve more 
bureaucratic red tape. It has been found that a bigger government size resulted in greater 
corruption in the case of the United States (Goel and Nelson (1998)). However, greater 
government size for transition countries leads to lower corruption and this effect is 
statistically significant when the Transparency International (TI) corruption perceptions 
index is used as the dependent variable. This suggests that perhaps greater government 
size in transition economies resulted from more expenditure on police (e.g., a larger 
police force and better training) and the judicial system - institutions that are likely to 
reduce corruption.9 Therefore, good governance assessments such as government 
efficiency, rule of law and greater transparency in government policies and procedures 
may explain the corrupt practices better than government size itself. However, May et al. 
(2002) examined the effects of various governance measures on the level of unofficial 
                                                 
8 The low variability in the literacy measure in our sample of high literacy transition countries 
might have some role in the statistical insignificance of the related coefficient. 
9 Although, in certain cases police and judiciary might themselves be corrupt. 
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 economy in transition countries, and found most of these measures to be statistically 
insignificant.  
The effect of greater competitiveness is generally positive (i.e., greater competitiveness 
lowers corruption) and significant under one measure of corruption. The findings with 
respect to the effect of economic freedom are mixed in the literature. On the one hand, 
Goel and Nelson (2004) find that greater economic freedom reduced corruption in a large 
sample of developed and developing nations. On the other hand, Graeff and Mehlkop 
(2003) find that the effectiveness of economic freedom on corruption is sensitive to a 
country’s development level. We also used a broad measure of competitiveness, called 
the transition index to examine its effect. This index is broader than the competition 
index because it includes many factors (e.g, privatization, competitiveness, infrastructure 
and banking reforms, etc.) beyond merely those enhancing competitiveness. An 
improvement in the transition index results in lower corruption and this finding is robust 
across the two measures of corruption. Given the composition of the transition index, this 
implies that comprehensive reforms involving price liberalization, privatization, foreign 
exchange liberalization, banking and infrastructure reforms are likely to result in lower 
incidence of corruption.10  
Finally, to account for the different institutional aspects of former Soviet republics, a 
zero-one dummy variable (SDUM) is included that takes the value of one for the fifteen 
former republics and zero otherwise (see the Appendix). The resulting coefficient was 
not statistically significant in any case, suggesting that institutions unique to the former 
Soviet Union were not having a perceptible impact on the corrupt activities in transition 
countries.11
3.4  Transition Reforms and Corruption 
Since the main contribution of this work is to understand the factors unique to transition 
economies in influencing the prevalence of corrupt activities in these countries, we 
                                                 
10 We also included as explanatory variables key macroeconomic variables such as inflation rate 
and the unemployment rate. The respective coefficients were not statistically significant suggesting 
that these variables did not affect corruption in an appreciable manner in transition economies. 
Details are available from the authors upon request. 
11 However, one should bear in mind the possibility that these institutions might still be prominent 
and that our dichotomous treatment is unable to capture the related complexities. Furthermore, our 
relatively small sample size prevents us from including country-specific dummy variables. 
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 revisit the effect of transition progress in Table 5. Transition progress is disaggregated 
into large scale and small scale privatization and into banking and nonbanking reforms. 
These factors might affect the level of economic freedom to different degrees and can 
thus have varying influences on corruption. The decomposition of the scale of reforms is 
also important for policy purposes. While all the components of transition progress have 
the right sign (i.e., greater progress results in lower corrupt activity), the statistical 
significance of the coefficients varies. Nonbanking reforms seem to significantly lower 
corruption across both measures, while the effect of banking reforms is also positive and 
significant in one case. Greater privatization, however, does not seem to have a 
statistically significant effect. An important policy implication is that if corruption 
reduction is an important goal for policymakers, then attention to nonmarket reforms 
should take precedence over some other initiatives, such as privatization initiatives. 
Again, the broad measure of transition progress (TranIdx) significantly reduces 
corruption in both cases. The effects of the other variables, HDI and SDUM, are 
consistent with our earlier findings in Table 4. 
 
4  Concluding Remarks 
Whereas the literature on the causes of corruption has ballooned in the last two decades, 
studies on transition nations are still in their infancy. Attention to transition nations is 
important because if some factors unique to these nations can be identified, then blanket 
recommendations for corruption reduction in all countries can be modified to suit 
transition nations. This paper uses annual data over 1998 - 2002 for 25 transition 
economies to study factors that cause corruption. The underlying theoretical model 
draws on the seminal work of Becker (1968). Two different measures of corruption 
perceptions are employed to test the validity of our findings. Among the various factors 
that significantly lower corruption, the degree of economic prosperity, economic 
freedom and progress toward transition seem most important. Any lingering legacy from 
Soviet-era institutions does not seem to be having a perceptible effect on corruption.  
The results show that the level of corrupt activity declines with economic prosperity. 
While the findings for transition countries are generally consistent with those found for 
broader samples of countries, our results suggest that a bigger government might not 
necessarily be contributing to greater corruption in transition nations. In fact, the effect 
of a larger government size in transition countries seems in fact to decrease corruption. 
Whether this effect persists as these economies mature remains to be seen. Furthermore, 
 11 
 the coefficient on the transition index is statistically significant in all cases. However, 
when the aggregate transition index is decomposed, the coefficients on the different 
components of the transition index not significant everywhere. This suggests that 
comprehensive efforts toward reform are more effective in reducing corruption, rather 
than piecemeal moves toward reforming some sectors of the economy. In particular, 
banking and nonbanking reforms seem to be relatively more effective at checking 
corruption than efforts toward greater privatization. 
It is hoped that as better data become available further light can shed on the causes and 
effects of corruption in these countries. Possible extensions to this line of research 
include incorporating additional institutional details and to examine potential 
simultaneity issues between corruption and some of its determinants.  
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 Table 1.  Variable definitions and sources 
Variable Definition (average [min; max]) Source 
Corruption Index 
(TI) 
Corruption perceptions 
(scale: 0 to 10);  
higher value, less corruption  
(3.47 [1.5; 6]) 
www.transparency.org 
Corruption 
Index2 
(WB) 
Corruption perceptions (scale: -2.5 to +2.5);  
higher value, less corruption 
(-0.37 [-1.21; 1.08]) 
World Bank 
GDPpc Per-capita GDP (PPP US $);  
(6616.4 [988; 18404]) 
IMF 
Literacy Rate Percent of literate population age 15 and above 
(97.93 [83.5; 100]) 
www.undp.org 
Human Dev Idx 
(HDIdx) 
Human Development Index (simple average of life 
expectancy index, education index and GDP index); higher 
values better  
(0.773 [0.66; 0.88]) 
www.undp.org 
LSprv-1 Index of large-scale privatization (lagged 1 year); higher 
value, more privatization 
(2.92 [1.0; 4.0]) 
EBRD 
SSprv-1 Index of small-scale privatization (lagged 1 year);  
higher value, more privatization 
(3.70 [2.0; 4.3]) 
EBRD 
BNKref-1 Index of banking reforms (lagged 1 year); 
higher value, more reforms (2.46 [1.0; 4.0]) 
EBRD 
NBNKref-1 Index of nonbanking reforms (lagged 1 year); higher value, 
more reforms (2.12 [1.0; 3.7]) 
EBRD 
GovGDP General government expenditure (% of GDP) 
(35.0 [13.9; 56.6]) 
EBRD 
Comp Index of competition policy; 
higher value, more competition  
(2.2 [1.0; 3.0]) 
EBRD 
TranIdx Transition index; 
(scale: 1 to 4)  
Higher value, more progress  
(2.8 [1.3; 3.8]) 
EBRD 
SDUM Dummy variable for former Soviet republics 
(0.6 [0, 1]) 
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 Table 2. Corruption rankings in transition countries, 2002 
             (Less corrupt to more corrupt) 
Country EU status Corruption Index2 (WB) 
Slovenia MC 3.39 
Estonia MC 3.16 
Hungary MC 3.10 
Poland MC 2.89 
Czech Rep. MC 2.88 
Slovakia MC 2.78 
Lithuania MC 2.75 
Croatia SAP* 2.73 
Latvia MC 2.59 
Bulgaria CC 2.33 
Romania CC 2.16 
Armenia none 1.78 
Macedonia SAP 1.77 
Belarus none 1.72 
Kyrgyzstan none 1.66 
Albania SAP 1.65 
Moldova none 1.61 
Russian Federation none 1.60 
Ukraine none 1.54 
Georgia none 1.47 
Uzbekistan none 1.47 
Kazakhstan none 1.45 
Azerbaijan none 1.43 
Tajikistan none 1.43 
Turkmenistan none 1.29 
 
Source: Governance Matters III: Governance indicators for 1996-2002. World Bank, June 2003. 
Note: Corruption Index2 is an aggregate indicator that measures perceptions of corruption defined as the exercise of
public power for private gain. It reflects frequency of paying bribes to get things done, effects on the business 
environment, grand corruption in political arena and state capture by elite. Higher values correspond to better 
outcomes (lower corruption) on a scale from 1 to 5. (Original scale was -2.5 to +2.5).  
 
 
 
MC-member countries: new EU members from May 2004. CC- candidate countries. SAP-countries in stabilization and
association process to EU. None-countries not in the process of accession to the EU (former Soviet republics except 
Baltic states). 
* Croatia is ahead of other countries in SAP, and it is expected that Croatia will become an EU candidate country in
2004.  
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 Table 3.  Determinants of corruption: Effects of education and prosperity 
 Dependent variable: Corruption Index (TI) 
Dependent variable: 
Corruption Index2 (WB) 
GDPpc 0.0002** (0.00003)  
0.0001** 
(0.00001)  
Literacy rate 0.005 (0.16)  
0.01 
(0.007)  
HDIdx  16.05** (3.05)  
10.47** 
(0.84) 
N 50 50 38 38 
adj. R2 0.54 0.39 0.72 0.75 
F-value 29.3** 31.8** 49.1** 114.0** 
 
Notes: All equations included a constant term. The results for the coefficient on the constant term are not reported 
but are available upon request. The number of observations varies between the two measures of corruption due to 
missing data. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses below the parameter estimates. 
** denotes significance at the 5% level. 
 
 
 
Table 4a.  Determinants of corruption: 
                Effects of government size and competitiveness 
 Dependent variable: Corruption Index (TI) 
GDPpc       0.0001** (0.00004) 
0.0002** 
(0.00004) 
Literacy 
Rate       
-0.04 
(0.16) 
0.05 
(0.14) 
HDIdx 10.57** (3.51) 
10.66** 
(3.51) 
9.80** 
(3.23) 
13.01** 
(3.52) 
9.26** 
(2.69) 
10.72** 
(3.22)   
GovGDP   0.03* (0.01) 
0.05** 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.02)    
Comp 1.31** (0.38) 
1.34** 
(0.43) 
1.06** 
(0.38)    
0.69 
(0.41)  
TranIdx     0.94** (0.37) 
1.07** 
(0.43)  
0.75* 
(0.39) 
SDUM  0.04 (0.28)  
0.009 
(0.30)     
N 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
adj. R2 0.52 0.51 0.53 0.45 0.59 0.55 0.55 0.60 
F-value 27.2** 17.7** 19.8** 14.6** 24.4** 31.7** 21.2** 25.3** 
 
Notes: All equations included a constant term. The results for the coefficient on the constant term are not reported 
but are available upon request. SDUM is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for the fifteen former Soviet
republics and zero for all other countries in our sample. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in 
parentheses below the parameter estimates. 
 
** denotes significance at the 5% level; * denotes significance at the 10% level. 
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 Table 4b.  Determinants of corruption: 
                Effects of government size and competitiveness 
 Dependent variable: Corruption Index2 (WB) 
GDPpc       0.0001** (0.00002) 
0.0001** 
(0.00001) 
Literacy 
Rate       
0.005 
(0.009) 
0.01 
(0.008) 
HDIdx 9.11** (1.46) 
9.19** 
(1.54) 
8.17** 
(1.87) 
9.59** 
(1.40) 
6.82** 
(1.50) 
8.05** 
(1.30)   
GovGDP   0.007 (0.006) 
0.007 
(0.01) 
0.009 
(0.006)    
Comp 0.24 (0.20) 
0.25 
(0.20) 
0.24 
(0.20)    
0.31 
(0.21)  
TranIdx     0.37** (0.13) 
0.35** 
(0.14)  
0.41** 
(0.15) 
SDUM  0.03 (0.11)  
0.003 
(0.12)     
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
adj. R2 0.76 0.75 0.75 0.74 0.80 0.80 0.73 0.80 
F-value 58.4** 37.9** 38.9** 36.9** 52.1** 76.1** 34.5** 49.7** 
 
Notes: All equations included a constant term. The results for the coefficient on the constant term are not reported 
but are available upon request. SDUM is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for the fifteen former Soviet
republics and zero for all other countries in our sample. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in 
parentheses below the parameter estimates. 
 
** denotes significance at the 5% level 
 
 
 
Table 5.  Determinants of corruption: Effects of economic reforms 
 Dependent variable: 
Corruption Index (TI) 
Dependent variable: 
Corruption Index2 (WB) 
HDIdx 13.13** (3.61) 
12.87** 
(3.79) 
9.18** 
(2.04) 
10.98** 
(3.29) 
9.72** 
(1.06) 
9.97** 
(1.03) 
6.65** 
(1.40) 
8.32** 
(1.39) 
LSprv-1 0.37 (0.25) 
   0.10 
(0.07) 
   
SSprv-1  0.37 (0.27) 
   0.06 
(0.07) 
  
BNKref-1   0.47 (0.30) 
   0.21** 
(0.10) 
 
NBNKref-1   0.89** (0.25) 
   0.21** 
(0.11) 
 
TranIdx    1.12** (0.47) 
   0.37** 
(0.14) 
SDUM -0.24 (0.31) 
-0.30 
(0.30) 
0.21 
(0.18) 
0.11 
(0.25) 
-0.01 
(0.12) 
-0.01 
(0.12) 
0.04 
(0.08) 
0.07 
(0.09) 
N 50 50 50 50 38 38 38 38 
adj. R2 0.43 0.41 0.72 0.55 0.75 0.74 0.83 0.80 
F-value 13.1** 12.5** 32.3** 20.8** 38.2** 36.3** 45.2** 49.9** 
 
Notes: All equations included a constant term. The results for the coefficient on the constant term are not reported 
but are available upon request. The number of observations varies between the two measures of corruption due to 
missing data. SDUM is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for the fifteen former Soviet republics and zero 
for all other countries in our sample. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses below the 
parameter estimates. 
** denotes significance at the 5% level 
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 Appendix 
List of Transition Economies 
Albania, Armenia*, Azerbaijan*, Belarus*, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia*, 
Georgia*, Hungary, Kazakhstan*, Kyrgyzstan*, Latvia*, Lithuania*, Macedonia, 
Moldova*, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation*, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan*, 
Turkmenistan*, Ukraine*, Uzbekistan* 
Note: * denotes former Soviet republic. 
Data for Bosnia and Herzegovina and for Serbia and Montenegro are not available. 
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Abstract 
Post-communist lawlessness has caused considerable concern and resulted in much 
misguided theorizing. The paper criticizes some of the more common misconceptions. 
Among them are the disregard for private law enforcement, the failure to realize the 
interdependence between the range of rights to be enforced and the cost of enforcement, 
the mistaken view that the rule of law is basically a matter of public choice and the 
preference for administrative remedies over judicial remedies. After discarding such 
attempts at explanation, the paper proposes that the analysis should focus on other issues 
instead. All of them happen to be related to a legacy of communism. These include the 
downgrading of civil and constitutional law, the instability of legal rules, as well as the 
underdeveloped separation of powers and very peculiar causes of court congestion.  
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This paper consists of two parts. The first part criticizes some theories of post-
communist lawlessness that were proposed by economists in recent years. The second 
part presents an alternative view at the example of Croatia. It outlines some preliminary 
hypotheses that may help to understand why progress towards the rule of law has been 
slow. 
A proposition by Hayek (1960, p. 208) may offer a useful starting point: “The 
importance which the certainty of the law has for the smooth and efficient running of a 
free society can hardly be exaggerated. There is probably no single factor which has 
contributed more to the prosperity of the West than the relative certainty of the law 
which has prevailed there.” It may be worth noting that this proposition is meant to refer 
not only to the modern age, but to a part of medieval times as well. This part presumably 
began in the eleventh century, which is widely regarded as the time when the rise of the 
Western World gained momentum.  
Empirical growth theory has made some efforts at pinning down the causality proposed 
by Hayek, but it has not been very successful at that. Gathering relevant data is an 
arduous job, certainty of law is very difficult to measure and all the available measures 
are garbled. Irrespective of their popularity, the qualitative assessments produced by 
various rating agencies and the Freedom House often appear implausible and unreliable. 
The only numbers that are readily available relate to the judiciary rather than to legal 
certainty. And these data may seem to disprove Hayek. One surely can count lawyers 
and other legal professionals. Including the latter is important, e.g. Japan is well-known 
for its small bar but researchers sometimes fail to realize that Japan has more legal 
professionals per capita than the USA1. All developed Western nations keep large 
numbers of legal professionals. However, more legal professionals does not always result 
in more growth, various examples of the contrary are available in the Third World. Quite 
a number of economists even think that more lawyers means less growth, the existence 
of a negative correlation was alleged by some. The statistical analyses undertaken to 
establish this claim are inconclusive for several reasons. Magee, Brock and Young 
(1989) count lawyers instead of legal professionals, so this procedure is likely to be 
misleading. Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991) try to avoid this mistake by taking the 
share of law students in the overall population of college students. However, most of 
                                                 
1 Similarly, observers who point out that in the US lawyers are much more numerous than e.g. in 
Germany or Austria often fail to realize that in these latter countries tax accountants usually are 
business majors, while in the US this legal service is for the most part provided by law school 
graduates. 
 20 
their results are statistically insignificant and their interpretation is rather debatable2. 
Even if the purported negative correlation happens to exist, it should not be interpreted as 
indicating causality or disproving Hayek’s claim. To recognize how the augmentation of 
lawyers may increase social welfare and why this may fail to occur, consider one of the 
possible chains of causation. There is a causal link from lawyers to legal certainty. 
Rational people litigate only if the outcome is uncertain, this uncertainty may be due 
either to legal or factual uncertainty. Lawyers earn their money by identifying such 
uncertainties, legal uncertainty thus results in litigation and a larger body of precedent, 
precedents gradually remove legal uncertainty. This happy outcome, however, is 
achieved only if statute law is sufficiently stable and if an accumulation of precedents is 
appreciated as a legitimate procedure of rule-making. If instead statute law keeps 
changing at a rapid pace, as is still the case in Croatia, the body of precedent is subject to 
a rapid depreciation. The body of precedent may be likened to a capital stock. Changing 
statute law at a rapid pace is like destroying real capital, it deprives the work of lawyers 
of much of its usefulness for the general public3 and thus greatly reduces the return on 
the investment which society makes by educating lawyers. Another reason why the 
return of the Croatian precedent production continues to be deplorably low is that it is 
still fairly difficult to find precedents. Judicial decisions and opinions are often not 
published and even if they are in principle accessible, the development of information 
systems which support research of precedents is still in its infancy4. 
The argument that a large body of precedent is tantamount to more legal certainty may 
appear as strange to those who tend to view civil law systems such as the Croatian as 
systems in which precedent is of minor relevance. The prevalence of this prejudice is to 
                                                 
2 They claim to have found evidence that the allocation of talent provides the crucial chain of 
causation. More law students means that less talent is available for engineering studies, which they 
consider more relevant for economic growth. They do not claim to have revealed any other causal 
nexus, their data actually disprove the (fairly popular) idea that lawyers contribute to rent-seeking 
and thus reduce the efficiency of investment. “….suggests that lawyers reduce growth creating 
activities but not through reducing the incentives to invest.” (ibidem p. 529) It may be significant 
that in their data the combined share of law students and engineering students is only 20 percent. 
The remaining 80 percent of college students should offer a sufficient supply of talents if 
engineering studies really suffer from a shortage of talent as Murphy et al. seem to be claiming. 
Also, law students often have talents that differ considerably from those of engineering students. On 
the other hand, the best talents for engineering might well be found at some other faculties rather 
than among law students.  
3 Increasing the body of precedents and thus legal certainty is a positive externality produced by 
lawyers while working for their private gain. Instability of statute law reduces or eliminates this 
positive externality. 
4 Udruga Sudačka mreža (an association of judges) has undertaken an important initiative to solve 
this problem. It is worth noting that in this regard Croatia is lagging behind Bulgaria.  
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quite some extent a communist legacy that lingers on5 because the proponents of this 
view rarely or never read code commentaries, written in highly developed civil law 
systems like e.g. the German one. If they were to read such commentaries, they could not 
help but realize that they refer to precedents quite frequently and not dramatically less 
often than treatises written in common law countries. Thus, the argument that more 
lawyers means more legal certainty holds, provided that statute law is sufficiently stable. 
However, there is another proviso. The stability of statute law does not translate into 
more growth if the statutory principles whose meaning has been ascertained are such that 
they inhibit economic growth, or if it is not possible to contract around the provisions 
that have these detrimental effects. In other words, if a large portion of inefficient 
provisions are ius cogens, the investment into the judicial system is wasted again. This 
presumably is a major difference between common law and civil law systems; statute 
law often tends to be ius cogens, common law tends to offer more flexibility. Examples 
to illustrate the resulting possibilities of waste may easily be found in the German 
economic history. If legal certainty supports economic growth, this is presumably so 
because it supports the division of labor which has long been recognized as the 
fountainhead of growth. Arguably, a highly developed division of labor is virtually 
unattainable in the absence of the rule of law. However, not all legal systems support the 
division of labor. For instance, Germany had a rather developed judicial system and large 
numbers of well educated lawyers in 1947, but the division of labor in the German 
economy at the time was roughly comparable to the time of Charlemagne6. The legal 
system did not support the division of labor, but rather inhibited and prevented it, thus 
preventing growth. 
 
1  Theories of Post-Communist Lawlessness:                    
a Critical Review 
Presumably, few economists disagree with Hayek’s tenet that legal certainty contributes 
strongly to economic growth. Economists also claim to be experts on issues of economic 
                                                 
5 To be sure, this fallacy is not universally held. For an account that stresses judge-made law see 
e.g. Kačer (2003, p. 445).  
6 This historical comparison is due to Eucken (1950). In 1947, food was rationed in Germany but 
rations were at starvation level. In order to survive, people needed to engage in subsistence 
agriculture or acquire additional food on the black market. This was very time-consuming, town 
dwellers needed to undertake lengthy (railway and bus) trips to the countryside arranging barter 
deals with peasants. In theory, town dwellers were all required to work in their jobs, but foremen 
understood that absenteeism was a necessity to assure survival. 
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growth, thus the fact that they have been inclined to ignore this causality is a bit of a 
paradox. Sometimes they cannot avoid dealing with it as, for example, if problems 
caused by legal uncertainty and missing law enforcement proliferate. After 1995, post-
communism forced economists to face these problems. This was the point when most 
economists lost interest in the economics of transition. Those who remained in the field 
often turned to strange theories. This theorizing of the late nineties tended to take on an 
unduly alarmist tone. Sometimes it was claimed that as a result of weak law enforcement 
most post-communist countries were heading towards total disaster. Nowadays, one can 
easily realize how misguided such alarmism was. Even the post-communist countries in 
which law enforcement continues to be extremely weak such as e.g. Ukraine, Albania or 
Moldova have experienced some economic recovery. These countries have not fallen 
into a bottomless pit; often they have established a viable sort of crony capitalism. There 
seem to be only two “chronically sick” European post-communist countries, they are 
Serbia and Belarus, and even their disease is not as terminal as it is often represented. 
Both of them were relatively affluent in 1990 and this affluence has not been completely 
wasted yet, so their story is more about stagnation than about collapse.  
The alarmist view was based on two misconceptions. The first misconception concerned 
the role of private versus public law enforcement. The second was an exaggeratedly 
negative account of crony capitalism. These misconceptions in turn gave rise to several 
misguided economic theories of law enforcement. This theoretical section of the paper 
first sketches the misconceptions and then turns to three false theories. 
Misconception one is that law enforcement is narrowed down to public law enforcement, 
this is the etatist view of law enforcement which ignores private law enforcement. As an 
empirical matter, however, private enforcement is quite significant even in modern 
economies, with substantial resources spent on various kinds of self-enforcement and self-
protection. Self-enforcement tends to be more cost-effective in protecting contract rights 
than in protecting property rights. Self-enforcement often relies on the building of 
reputations, on reputational capital. For instance, the small share of non-performing loans 
in Western bank portfolios is not due mostly to superb performance of bailiffs but rather to 
the fact that persons who at some point of their careers default on their loans tend to find 
themselves cut off from further lending. Meaningful credit information is available and 
people service their loans as regularly as they can to avoid getting on the black list. In the 
early years of post-communism such reputational capital was largely non-existent, and 
even where it had existed to some extent before – and Yugoslav socialism provided more 
opportunities for building reputational capital than the Soviet-type socialism – the pre-
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existing reputational capital was debased by the dramatic change of circumstances. 
Numerous new enterprises were formed, but their owners were often less interested in 
building reputational capital because they were often struggling for survival and their 
future was extremely uncertain. However, after a couple of years, i.e. in the late 1990s, 
these inhibiting factors became less relevant in the countries that had embarked on 
transition in 1990 and the usual self-enforcement mechanisms that the normal conduct of 
business hinges on started to become more powerful. As a result, those legal rules which 
support business, transactions have increasingly been abided by voluntarily. This 
phenomenon has been observed in most post-communist countries. A prominent example 
is Khodorovsky, the former owner of Yukos, who is now being tried. Most likely he had 
been a great villain, but even he got somewhat more honorable as of late.  
Second, for a while quite a number of economists commented on crony capitalism as if it 
were a recipe for disaster. And what followed after communism was often some sort of 
cronyism. The very negative account of crony capitalism, which has been so popular 
among economists, misses out on an important distinction. Public law enforcement does 
not necessarily mean that the law is enforced as a public good; instead it may be 
enforced as a private good7. Enforcing the law as a private good means that enforcement 
is haphazard and highly selective and that only a very limited number of people can 
actually rely on it. This is cronyism. To be sure, countries characterized by crony 
capitalism will not manage to catch up with the US or affluent Western European 
countries. However, there is some middle ground between affluence and disaster. In their 
celebrated analysis Haber et al. (2003) demonstrated at the example of Mexico that crony 
capitalism can result in rather respectable growth rates, and that it may well improve 
livings standards more significantly than e.g. socialism managed to do. So even if there 
is no rule of law proper, i.e. if a government does not protect the rights of most people, 
but only those of the select few, this may suffice to generate growth provided that at least 
some of these select few have entrepreneurial zeal and talent.  
After these remarks on two widely held misconceptions the stage is set to turn to three 
false theories. The theories will be named according to their best-known proponents. The 
first theory was proposed by Roland (2000), the second by Stiglitz and the third by 
Shleifer and Vishny8. Roland’s theory will be criticized first. He rightly observes that law 
                                                 
7 This distinction seems to have been pioneered by Gambetta’s (1993) analysis of the mafia. 
8 Relevant writings are numerous, but Hoff and Stiglitz (2004) and Glaeser, Johnson and Shleifer 
(2001) are particularly illustrative of the type of arguments presented. 
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enforcement is costly and goes on to argue that post-communist countries often cannot 
afford such costs because they lack sufficient tax revenue. From this he infers that the 
government should protect some part of the economy from competition and keep it under 
its tutelage. He hopes that, as a result of such protection, this part of the economy will be 
profitable enough to generate the stream of tax revenue required to finance law 
enforcement. This theory has several flaws. The most significant flaw in Roland’s 
approach is that he abstracts from the interdependence between the set of rights to be 
protected and the cost of enforcement. However, this interdependence is enormously 
important. Protecting private property, contract rights and personal safety but little else 
does not cost so much, all East European countries can afford it. Enforcement costs, 
however, grow enormously if a much broader set of rights is to be enforced and in 
particular, if this set of rights includes so-called social and economic rights, which to quite 
some extent stand in conflict with private property rights. If a country cannot afford law 
enforcement, the primary reason is that the set of rights which it tries to enforce is too large 
and there is too much conflict between these rights9. By the way, Germany also offers a 
good example of the costs that an overextension of the set of rights, social and economic 
rights in particular, can cause. Germany has been on a decline since the early nineties, but 
the real decline has been less dramatic than the statistically recorded decline. There is an 
indication that the German shadow economy has grown significantly. This means a decline 
of law enforcement, with the costs of enforcing the law growing more and more out of 
proportion to what a society is ready and able to spend on enforcing it.  
A second strand of fallacious theorizing, represented e.g. by Stiglitz, attempts to 
conceptualize the rule of law as a matter of public choice. This is a sort of constructivist 
approach to the issue. Stiglitz contemplates under which circumstances citizens vote for 
the rule of law and which policy measures render it more likely that citizens will vote for 
rather than against it. E.g. Stiglitz conjectures that citizens tend to vote against the rule of 
law if they consider the prevailing distribution of wealth as illegitimate. Moreover, he 
argues that citizens are likely to vote for the rule of law if the return on their investments 
is high. From this he infers that the government should refrain from the policies that tend 
to reduce the return on investment. Stiglitz represents monetary stability as a measure 
which depresses return rates, and argues for a policy of moderate inflation and currency 
undervaluation. This view may be criticized for a number of reasons which are beyond 
the scope of this paper. However, the key flaw of his argument lies in the way he poses 
the problem. Citizens of post-communist countries rarely mean to vote against the rule of 
                                                 
9 See Posner (1995) for a succinct elaboration of this point.  
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law. There have been numerous parties and politicians whose endeavors arguably are 
incompatible with the rule of law but they have rarely advertised this, nor have they 
inserted it in their party programs in an easily discernible way. For instance, it is 
debatable to what extent Putin’s “dictatorship of the law”, which has been one of his key 
slogans, is compatible with the rule of law but one should not assume that these 
cleavages are common knowledge among Russian voters. Presumably, most Russians 
rather think that this so-called dictatorship of the law and the rule of law is one and the 
same thing. Neither are there any anarchist movements attracting a significant number of 
votes anywhere in Eastern Europe. Even if one were to adopt a narrow view of law as a 
concept focusing on private property, one cannot claim that the parties which have been 
explicitly hostile to private ownership have commanded much support among the voters 
since 1995. Enthusiasm for nationalization is largely a matter of the past. The ex-
communist parties including the Russian communists typically no longer make the 
abolishment of private property and terrorizing the bourgeoisie a key program issue. The 
real issue in elections is not whether one is for or against the rule of law; it is more about 
different understandings of the rule of law. In addition, voters often strive for other social 
goals in addition to the rule of law and fail to realize that these other social goals may be 
partly or fully incompatible with the rule of law. Voters often hold onto the 
misconception that the rule of law is tantamount to tough crime-fighting.  
Another problem with how Stiglitz poses the problem is that the real difficulty with the 
rule of law rarely lies in the promulgation of principles; rather it is the host of practical 
problems of implementation. These problems are far too numerous to be solved within 
one legislature, they are a matter of decades. Still, another criticism of Stiglitz’s 
theorizing is that people in real life are more pragmatic, more Coasian than Stiglitz 
thinks. It is not really so important to them whether the big shots acquired their wealth in 
a legitimate way provided that they create jobs, pay their workers well and behave 
decently. E.g. in Croatia people do not really care so much about the origins of Todorić’s 
money provided that he allocates his resources prudently and in ways that promote the 
Croatian economy. Most likely the issue of the legitimacy of privatization policies really 
is much less relevant than Stiglitz tends to believe. To summarize, Stiglitz’s approach is 
quite misleading. Small wonder that his modeling effort results in extremely implausible 
conclusions. E.g. in his model the rule of law becomes the more likely the poorer the 
nation gets. According to him, the rule of law is ultimately unavoidable, those who do 
not have it become more and more impoverished and that will give rise to the rule of 
law. Also, he excludes the very possibility of law enforcement as a private good.  
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A third strand of theorizing, which will be referred to as the Shleifer and Vishny 
approach, focuses on slack and incompetence in the courts and the subversion of courts 
and argues for a partial substitution of judicial procedures by government regulation 
because, in their view, regulatory agencies are less easily subverted and capable of more 
decisive action against wrongdoings. According to them, regulatory authorities need to 
play a key role in creating the rule of law. They focus on three major shortcomings of 
courts, one of them being incompetence. Incompetence of courts, particularly of 
commercial courts that need to deal with new and complicated fields such as e.g. agency 
law, certainly is a major problem and even more so if judges lack sufficient incentives to 
acquire relevant knowledge. However, notice that these disputes can often be put to 
arbitration, so this offers a ready solution for contract disputes, although not for torts. 
Arbiters may be selected according to their competence. Creating a regulatory authority 
may be thought of as a solution for the remaining problems only if the country has a 
sufficient number of experts to fill the key positions of the regulatory authority. 
However, if such experts are actually available, one could just as well create a 
specialized court or a specialized department of an existing commercial court and 
appoint these experts as judges. The latter is the more expedient solution in particular 
because such a specialized need not require such numerous expert staff as does a 
regulatory agency. This is so because in civil litigation the most labor intensive part of 
work, i.e. the gathering and organization of evidence, can be left to the litigants’ 
attorneys and the choice of a sufficiently competent attorney is up to the litigant. 
Attorneys are self-employed; they have powerful incentives to acquire the knowledge 
their clients need. In contrast, a regulatory agency needs to do much of this work of 
gathering and organizing evidence by itself, and it requires considerable staff to 
discharge these duties. Hence, creating a specialized court is much easier than creating a 
regulatory agency capable of handling the issue.  
Shleifer and Vishny are also concerned about slack. In civil litigation the building and 
arguing of a case is largely up to the attorneys10, thus the relevant incentive problem is 
not primarily about providing incentives to judges but about whether litigants and their 
attorneys have sufficiently strong incentives. This may be a problem if gathering relevant 
evidence is difficult (or if there are major problems of market failure in the market for 
                                                 
10 However, in Croatia it is only since the 2003 reform of the civil procedure that civil litigation has 
primarily been based on the adversarial system. Up to 2003, it had strong inquisitorial elements. In 
the inquisitorial system the distinction between courts and administrative regulation is somewhat 
blurred.  
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attorney services11). Quite a number of civil law countries have failed to react to this 
problem. The problem can often be solved if the stakes are increased sufficiently and if 
the attorney is effectively made a co-owner of the stake. This can be done by adding 
punitive damages to compensatory damages and by allowing contingent fees contracts, 
these are well-known incentive devices widely used in common law systems. It is not 
transparent why a civil law country should refuse to adopt them. Awarding punitive 
damages or a multiple of what would be needed to compensate a winning plaintiff, and 
contingent fees, i.e. a contract between the plaintiff and his attorney according to which 
the latter receives a certain share of the award, creates powerful incentives to litigate a 
case. For sure these are not weaker than even the strongest incentives a regulatory 
agency can possibly offer to its employees12. So the second argument of Shleifer and 
Vishny is not much better than the first.  
There is a bit more to their third claim. It concerns corruption in the courts. It is less than 
clear how venal Croatian courts are. Hard evidence is virtually unavailable but extremely 
strange court decisions, that appear explainable only by corruption, are not at all rare. 
Shleifer’s and Vishny’s basic argument is the following: Consider behavior that may result 
in an accident causing large damage, assume that this damage occurs with the probability 
of only one percent. Thus, the expected value of damages is only one percent of the actual 
damage if it occurs. One possible approach of the law is prohibiting this behavior outright 
and employing a police force or a regulatory agency to enforce this prohibition. 
Alternatively, the law can confine itself to entitling the victim of the accident to damages, 
and the stake of the victim may be blown up by allowing punitive damages. If there is no 
police force or regulatory agency supervising the activities that provide the opportunity for 
the potentially damaging behavior, cases will come to court only if there is a victim. And if 
there is, the damage is large by assumption. This creates a strong incentive for the 
defendant to corrupt the court, a lot is at stake for him and, consequently, he will be ready 
to offer a large bribe. The larger the bribes offered, the more likely it is that judges will 
                                                 
11 This seems to be the case in Croatia but not much research has been done on this issue yet. 
Presumably, the key problem is the adequate provision of quality signals. This is a problem in 
much of continental Europe. An adequate treatment of these issues is beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
12 Quite a number of jurists are inclined to shudder at the thought of contingent fees. However, this 
prejudice may need to be reconsidered. In debt-collection, arrangements which are effectively 
equivalent to contingent fees are perfectly common. If a creditor sells a claim to a debt-collection 
agency, he often receives only a fraction of the claim’s face-value, the debt-collection agency in 
essence operates on something like a contingent fee contract. If this works well in debt-collection, 
why not extend such incentive-providing devices to tort law ?  
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turn out to be bribable. If instead, there is a police force or a regulatory agency authorized 
to fine those who engage in the potentially dangerous activity and if the agency employs 
sufficient personnel to catch most of those who do engage in it, a moderate fine may 
suffice to deter people from this activity. If the fine is small, the incentive for bribing is 
small as well, and consequently officials are more likely to resist the temptation to take 
bribes. Notice that this superiority of regulation depends on a crucial condition. The 
personnel employed by the agency must be numerous and competent enough to catch 
misbehavior with a large likelihood, and they must be sufficiently well supervised and paid 
to resist the temptation offered by small bribes. In the countries with rampant corruption 
these conditions are often unlikely to be met, so it may be easier to make sure that courts 
cannot be bribed. In principle, it is not so hard to make the judiciary largely corruption 
free; judicial organization offers numerous opportunities to limit corruption. Devices for 
limiting corruption in courts are trial by jury, having judges sit in panels, a well-defined 
court venue and case-allocation system, publicity of trials, etc. If a country does not use 
such opportunities for limiting corruptions in the face of widespread corruption, this is 
presumably due to a lack of political will. However, if there is no political will to fight 
corruption, regulatory agencies are likely to prove corruptible as well. Key devices for 
fighting corruption in the public administration are paying officials well and back-loading 
their salaries, e.g. granting liberal old-age pensions, which an official will lose if he is 
dismissed because he is found venal. The staff required to run a regulatory agency is much 
larger than the number of judges and court officers such as bailiffs that are required to run 
a specialized court. Hence, paying the required personnel well enough to make them 
unbribable is much more difficult under administrative regulation.  
Thus, in summary, the theories expounded by some economists to explain insufficient 
law enforcement in post-communist countries do not improve our understanding of the 
real issues. It is worth noting that all of these theories largely neglect communist 
legacies. The second part of the paper discusses some issues which are more relevant for 
understanding the real difficulties hindering the rule of law in Croatia. On closer 
inspection, most of these difficulties turn out to be related to communist legacies. Surely 
the list of difficulties presented in this paper is incomplete. Law enforcement is a multi-
faceted affair and there are no panaceas.  
The second part of this paper is organized around the following topics: topic one 
concerns the neglect of constitutional and civil law, topic two is the instability of rules, 
topic three concerns the separation of powers, topic four court congestion and its causes.  
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2  Some Communist Legacies Revisited 
2.1  Relevance of Constitutional and Civil Law  
As has been pointed out by Croatian legal scholars such as e.g. Gavella (2001), Yugoslav 
law was a member of the socialist law family, it was not a hybrid between socialist and 
western law. Two of its most distinctive features were the marginalization of 
constitutional law and of civil law. Yugoslav communism featured a sort of pseudo-
constitutionalism, constitutions for the most were a facade, they had a propagandistic and 
legitimizing function, but they were not meant to limit government and certainly they did 
not limit it in actual fact. Thus, constitutional law proper started only in post-
communism. However, it is not yet taken very seriously. Post-communist Croatia has 
witnessed a flood of unconstitutional legislation and administrative rule-making. Quite 
often the flaws of these rules, their unconstitutionality, could easily have been 
recognized by a lawyer who was ready to think about them. Thus, most of these mistakes 
could have been avoided if one had taken some care. The fact that the constitutional 
court has invalidated thousands of laws and regulations does not indicate judicial 
activism. The constitutional court actually has leaned towards self-restraint. Thus, the 
large number of rules declared unconstitutional testifies to the disregard of constitutional 
principles that has characterized rule-making. Presumably, the framers of these 
unconstitutional rules did not intentionally violate constitutional principles; they just did 
not think of them. Thus, the primary issue has been inertia. To make matters worse, 
rulings of the constitutional court have frequently been ignored, and this is decidedly 
worse than inertia.  
Another feature of communist law was the marginalization of private law; under 
Yugoslav communism private law was only moderately more significant than in Soviet-
type systems. Moreover, in the narrow sphere allowing for private law, its efficiency was 
greatly reduced e.g. by promoting schemes for divided ownership. The best example of 
this, of course, was real estate where the principle of superficies solo cedit was 
abandoned and titling de-emphasized. Symptomatic for this development were the 
illustrious “nekretnine u izvanknjižnom vlasništvu” (Engl. off-register title properties). 
Among the lasting results was a decay of land registers. Unfortunately, there have been 
no vigorous efforts at their improvement until quite recently. Another common feature of 
Yugoslav and Soviet-type law was that the judicial machinery available for enforcing 
civil law claims, e.g. debt collection, was debased and rendered unable to collect major 
amounts of debt within a reasonable time.  
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The impact of these legacies on post-communist Croatia continues to be felt in much 
administrative rule-making. The rules created by public administration and regulatory 
agencies quite frequently amount to nothing less than legislation, in effect they arrogate 
legislative functions and quite often cover ground which in Western Europe is the 
domain of civil law, i.e. they substitute civil law by public law. Public administration 
rather than parliament is the framer of this public law. An example of this sort of 
administrative rule-making is the Croatian National Bank, which in the course of the 
1990s essentially framed a bankruptcy law sui generis for banks. At the time, this may 
well have been unavoidable because both the parliament and the courts failed to fill the 
gaps of existing bankruptcy law or take proper account of the special problems raised by 
defunct banks13. These gaps needed to be filled somehow, or severe damage might have 
occurred. Thus, legislation by the National Bank was presumably necessary to prevent 
worse things from happening, so it became a legislator by default. Note that the National 
Bank thus acted according to the advice offered by Shleifer and Vishny. The most 
serious danger in it is that the assumption of legislative functions by the public 
administration and the substitution of private law by public law comes to be regarded as 
more than an emergency measure, required in the immediate aftermath of communism 
and war. It should be understood that this sort of stopgap is no longer acceptable in more 
settled circumstances.  
 
 
3  Instability of Legal Rules 
Much of Western Europe, e.g. Germany, suffers from instability of legal rules but this 
instability is largely confined to public law, administrative law, tax law and social 
security in particular. In Croatia, however, civil law and criminal law have been highly 
unstable as well. Instability of law is almost by definition incompatible with the rule of 
law; in order to rule, law must be certain, whereas instability reduces or eliminates legal 
certainty. The rule of law means that citizens structure their behavior in a way to avoid 
the violation of laws. This is clearly impossible if they cannot know the law. The rule of 
law is a political ideal, which in reality cannot be approximated more than imperfectly. 
The real danger thus is not that the reality falls short of the ideal, but rather that the ideal 
is lost out of sight or that it ceases to be regarded as a goal of legal policies.  
                                                 
13 Clearly, a run-of-the-mill bankruptcy procedure sometimes is unsuitable for banks, special 
provisions may be required.  
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The persistent legislative over-activism prevailing in Croatia suggests that stability of 
legal rules is not considered desirable; all law including civil law rather tends to be 
regarded either as an instrument of shaping society according to the ever-changing 
priorities and goals of politicians, or as an instrument employed by politicians in order to 
style themselves as doers, men of action. Creating this image of a man of action seems to 
be a nearly infallible recipe for popularity in most democracies, e.g. German chancellor 
Gerhard Schröder has resorted to this device as much as any Croatian politician. 
Rewriting laws and spending money are the actions that the man of action may take to 
prove himself. The resulting damages can be kept within tolerable limits if legislative 
activism is confined to a circumscribed sphere of public law which, hopefully, is of 
limited relevance for much of society. Confining the men of action to such a 
circumscribed sphere may be possible if society at large has abandoned utopian 
inclinations and has become sufficiently skeptical of all grand outlines and holistic 
designs. Whether this prerequisite is fulfilled in Croatia is debatable; e.g. the idea that the 
government should propose grand strategies to guide the economic development still 
seems to enjoy quite some popularity, as illustrated by the frequent calls for a 
development strategy for the country.  
Thus, it may be less than surprising that even civil legislation continues to be amended 
with irritating frequency. Bankruptcy law is a good example. Since the enactment of a 
completely new bankruptcy code in 1996, there have been two amendments already and 
both have been major. Recently, in fall 2004, the Minister of Justice announced the next 
major revision. Since Croatian bankruptcy law is basically similar to German law, it is 
natural to compare the Croatian speed of legislation with that in Germany as well. The 
new German bankruptcy law enacted in 1994 superseded the bankruptcy law dating back 
to 1877; the latter had not undergone much change during the 120 years from its 
enactment. The 1994 law was drafted by a committee formed in 1978; the committee 
worked on its draft for seven years, it was then revised by the ministry of justice and 
discussed by government for another six years. Parliamentary discussion extended for 
two years. Between the enactment of the new law and its taking effect there was an 
interval of five years, during which the old law continued to be applied. This five-year 
interval was thought of as necessary to give judges and lawyers a chance to get familiar 
with the new law. Actually, the new law does not work too well; there have been 
numerous unexpected difficulties when it was finally enforced14. This description may 
suggest to the reader that Germans tend to be overly pedantic, so it may be worth noting 
                                                 
14 On this see e.g. Uhlenbruck (2004). 
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that the grand US bankruptcy law reform of the 1970s proceeded at a slow pace as well. 
This is not to argue that Croatia could and should have taken similarly long, this was not 
possible because much of the legal legacy of Yugoslavia was dysfunctional and needed 
to be substituted by something else. However, this problem was solved in 1996/97, when 
key elements of the new civil law were enacted. The two amendments of the bankruptcy 
code enacted since 1996 have definitely been too much and prepared in too much haste, 
the second amendment in particular was a quick and dirty move and introduced new 
defects15. Nevertheless, it presumably was the minor evil; some had wanted no less than 
a total revision of the code that was avoided. Similar stories can be told about other fields 
of civil law.  
The law of civil procedure has suffered similarly under excessive legislative activism. A 
good example is “ovršni zakon” (Engl. distress/execution act, enforcement statute), 
which since its enactment in 1996 has already suffered two major amendments, both of 
which have been described as sloppy and inconsistent16. In Germany, the key enactment 
regulating execution dates back to 1877, much of this 1877 law is still in force.  
Croatian criminal law was unstable throughout the 1990s as well, since then matters have 
improved.  
The usual pretext for rewriting laws is that there have been some abuses. The possibility 
of curbing these abuses by reinterpreting the law and through judge-made rules rarely 
seems to be considered. However, case law may even be capable of resolving quite a 
number of the incompatibility problems, which inevitably arise if legislation is enacted in 
great haste. Unfortunately, in Croatia judge-made law still tends to be viewed as a matter 
of minor relevance. This neglect of judicial precedent and case law has been reflected by 
the prevailing habit that most appellate court decisions and opinions until quite recently 
have remained unpublished. Contempt of case law, as well as legislative over-activity, 
testifies to a persistent influence of legal positivism. The neglect of constitutional 
principles may similarly be traced to legal positivism since legal positivism amounts to 
denying that all law must be built on a body of more permanent principles. The persistent 
influence of positivism would be easier to understand if Croatia were devoid of a 
tradition of Catholicism. The concept of natural law has been highly important in 
                                                 
15 See Dika et al. (2003) 
16 See Crnić (2004). 
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Catholicism, so in a Catholic country it should be expected to exert some influence and it 
is sort of a paradox that its influence really has been so weak17.  
4  Separation of Powers 
The judiciary is by its very nature a relatively weak power; it depends on support 
provided by other powers and by society at large. If other branches of government are 
essentially united and form a unitary power, the judiciary has little chance of asserting 
itself. Thus, a meaningful separation of powers is crucial. It is rather obvious that in 
Croatia the separation of powers continues to be underdeveloped. This is mostly due to 
the new Croatian centralism, which in some respects mirrors the centralism that – even 
though it had been disguised in various ways – really was a persistent tendency under 
communism. In post-communist Croatia the hazards of centralism have been enhanced 
further by a high degree of politicization, which has prevailed in much of the civil 
service. Understandably, the state of emergency brought about by post-communism and 
war was not the most suitable environment to stress the separation of powers, but this 
emergency has been over for quite a number of years. The constitutional amendments of 
2001 eliminated the predominance of the president and thus paved the way towards de-
concentrating power. However, as of now power is still highly concentrated in the hands 
of the executive branch of government, in particular the prime minister and the cabinet. 
Parliamentarianism proper remains underdeveloped and, as a result, the cabinet is in 
actual fact both the executive branch and the legislator. The weakness of parliament is 
most clearly revealed by the enduring popularity of abridged (“hitno” ) legislative 
procedures18. The power of the cabinet has declined somewhat since 2000, but this has 
only been due to the fortuitous circumstance that all governments since then have 
depended on fragile coalitions of a multitude of parties. This has been a blessing in 
disguise. Still, this circumstance is no more than a mediocre substitute for an 
institutionalized separation of powers. Notice the economic substance of this argument: 
it applies anti-trust analysis to government. The underlying presumption is that 
monopoly in government is the most dangerous sort of monopoly.  
In modern democracies parties often impose discipline on their parliamentary deputies, 
deputies usually vote with their party leadership. In Croatia this discipline is even further 
                                                 
17 It is no less of a paradox that most economists are unfamiliar with the idea of the law of nature. 
This idea was central for classical economic thought, as even a casual reading of “The Wealth of 
Nations” reveals. Or see e.g. Hume (1998[1753], p. 92). 
18 For some material illustrating the weakness of parliament see Bratić (2004). 
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enhanced by the autocratic structures within most if not all parties. As a result, the 
traditional separation of powers between executive and legislative branches is bound to 
be less meaningful than it used to be in the nineteenth century and there is a need for 
supplements. The most effective supplement is decentralization, federalism. A further 
group of elements that effectively enhance the separation of powers in EU-members are 
European institutions, Brussels and the European courts of justice. Although many of the 
critical remarks raised against Brussels are justified, it seems difficult to understand why 
so many people fail to realize that Brussels has one overriding advantage: in many EU-
members the separation of powers is underdeveloped and EU-institutions make up for 
this defect. Croatia’s current state as a prospective EU-member already provides it with 
some of these benefits.  
While centralism could be justified during the war, it may seem like a paradox that Croatia 
has done so little to de-emphasize centralism since 1996. This is so because it runs counter 
to Croatian traditions, Croatia differs from most Central European and East European 
countries by its lack of a centralist tradition. The absence of such a tradition is a distinction 
which post-communist Croatia has so far failed to derive an advantage from.  
A peculiar circumstance relevant for the topic of this paper is that the Croatian judiciary 
in some sense has been a victim of centralism twice. First, because centralism tends to 
promote the unity of powers and legislative over-activism, a continuous reshaping of 
rules according to the ever-changing priorities of politicians. If, instead, the pursuit of 
certain goals by means of legislation required lengthy negotiations and difficult 
compromises with sub-national authorities, the speed of rule-making by parliament and 
the executive branch of government would be much reduced. And this is precisely what 
is desirable for enhancing the real role of the judiciary19.  
                                                 
19 This is not the only reason to oppose centralism. Another problem, which also concerns the 
judiciary and is even more important than the arguments presented in the text, is the paradox of 
power. The only stable solution to this paradox known is limited government. For an admirably 
lucid presentation of the issue the reader may again be referred to Haber et al., op cit. who write 
on p. 5 of their text: „The literature is just beginning to specify the exact configuration of the 
institutions that force limited governments to respect their own laws regarding individual political 
and economic rights. ...The literature suggests...that what is key is that individual political actors 
cannot exceed the authority granted to them by the law. If they do so, they are subject to sanctions 
that are imposed by other branches or levels of government...These sanctions are not imposed in 
arbitrary or ad hoc fashion: the sanction mechanisms are themselves prescribed by the law. In the 
United States, for example, the president is limited by a bicameral legislature, an independent 
judiciary, state and local governments, and a professionalized civil service....”  
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Second, as paradoxically as it may seem, the judiciary has suffered from centralism also 
because – unlike in most other parts of government – the administration of justice was 
effectively decentralized along county lines and it occurred in a way that (until the 
amendment of the code of civil procedure enacted in 2003) concentrated the legislative 
functions of the judiciary at the county level. This is so because in most civil litigation the 
chain of appeals ended at the appellate court, appeals to the Supreme Court were so 
severely limited in number that its case-load was amazingly small. In every developed 
legal system, irrespective of whether it is of common law or civil law origin, appellate and 
supreme courts are to some extent legislators. In post-communist Croatia this legislative 
function was to an unusual extent concentrated on the appellate rather than on the Supreme 
Court level. However, most counties are simply too small to allow for the development of 
a sufficiently detailed case law. This arrangement has thus resulted in a lack of legal 
certainty.  
It may seem that this argument is inconsistent as it calls for and rejects federalism at the 
same time. However, there is no contradiction. The legislative and the executive powers 
are in need of a more meaningful separation of powers that can be brought about by 
federalism. The judiciary, in contrast, is weak; there is no good reason to weaken it even 
further by federalizing it, this is counterproductive and reduces rather than strengthens the 
separation of powers.  
 
5  Court Congestion 
Most economists and similarly a large part of the Croatian society seem to think of the 
judiciary as overloaded, complaints about court queues are commonplace. This appears to 
be the most popular complaint about courts, it is thought of as the most serious obstacle to 
the rule of law. If this were really true, we would be facing a puzzle. If the court queue is 
the key problem, traders should be expected to exploit the available opportunities to avoid 
the queue i.e. they should opt for arbitration, but in reality they rarely do so. This is an 
observation suggesting that much of the common thinking about court queues is somewhat 
superficial. Moreover, the proposition that the judiciary is overwhelmed by excessive 
litigation is not really confirmed by the available statistics. This fact is obscured by the 
habit to represent judicial workload in terms of “matters” (Croat. predmeti). “Predmeti” is 
a broad term that includes e.g. a broad variety of actions undertaken in the course of a 
distress procedure as well as making entries in public registers such as the commercial 
register and the land register. Making such entries usually does not involve a dispute, this 
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work does not normally necessitate the involvement of judges, it can be delegated to 
auxiliary personnel provided that appropriately skilled auxiliary personnel is available in 
sufficient numbers. That this is not yet the case is a major problem of the Croatian 
judiciary, similar to many other post-communist countries. Data on the speed of the 
judiciary often report the time needed to process the average “predmet”, this measure 
suggests optimistic conclusions which are much more positive than what the public thinks 
so the average time needed for processing a “predmet” is not at all long. However, it seems 
that this measure of judicial efficiency is garbled by the small share of litigation in the 
overall number of “predmeti” which amounts to millions per year and keeps growing20.  
Rather than focusing on the compositum mixtum of “predmeti”, it seems more useful to 
distinguish between different kinds of activities undertaken by courts and investigate them 
separately. In subdividing court activities it seems natural to view litigation, and civil 
litigation in particular, as an important subdivision since a free enterprise economy is 
primarily ordered by civil law that is why it is more appropriately referred to as a civil law 
society. Some data on civil litigation are available in the statistical yearbook21. 
Unfortunately, these data do not cover commercial disputes. However, presumably an 
upper bound on the number of commercial disputes can be found by comparing the 
available figures on judges in the various jurisdictions and assuming similar case loads. 
When comparing the resulting estimates on overall civil litigation, including commercial 
disputes, with East Central European countries two observations are striking. Firstly, the 
Croatian per capita civil case load is not too high. Secondly, a disproportionate share of 
civil litigation is accounted for by disputes concerning employment contracts, their share is 
much larger than in most, if not all East Central European countries. With regard to this 
share Croatia is similar to Germany, which suggests that Croatian and German 
employment law are suffering from similar defects22. Disregarding employment-related 
disputes, the civil case load per capita of the Croatian population stands at little more than 
                                                 
20 For such data see e.g. Crnić (2001). 
21 See e.g. Statistički ljetopis Republike Hrvatske 2002 p. 529. It is a pity that more detailed judicial 
statistics have not yet been made accessible to the public, even though they do exist.  
22 Both Croatian and German labor law essentially allow for discharges of workers only for „good 
cause”. Clarifying the meaning of the expression “good cause” and proving in court that the 
requirement is fulfilled often amount to a demanding or even impossible task, even if the worker 
clearly misbehaved. The Croatian labor statute attempts to specify “good cause” to some extent, 
but in a way which is unlikely to solve the dilemma. Moreover, Croatian and German labor law 
take a rather restrictive attitude towards temporary contracts, which in some other European 
countries e.g. Denmark are quite widespread and help avoid many of the problems caused by the 
“good cause” doctrine.  
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half of e.g. the Slovak load. In terms of its per capita civil case load, Croatia is more 
similar to Bulgaria or Russia than to Slovakia23. Thus, contrary to a widespread view 
(expounded even by the Minister of Justice) Croatians are not very litigious, they tend to 
avoid courts except if they have a dispute with their employer. In this perspective, it seems 
difficult to argue that Croatia has arrived at a civil law society. The limited amount of civil 
litigation suggests an even more limited use of contract remedies. This is symptomatic for 
the underdevelopment of a civil law society, since contract is the most important 
instrument supplied by the law supplies to an individual to shape his own position.  
Another significant sub-group of “predmeti” is constituted by enforcement procedures 
under the law of civil procedure i.e. under the enforcement statute (Croat. ovršni zakon). 
While data on civil litigation indicate that the use of judicial remedies is of rather 
moderate frequency, the number of “ovrhe” is high indeed, “ovrhe” are a multiple of the 
number of civil judgments. According to Crnić (2004, p. 4), there are about 300,000 
“ovrhe” per year. Part of this incongruity is due to the fact that final judgments provide 
only a fraction of the enforceable titles, giving rise to an “ovrha”. According to Crnić, 
their share is only about 20 percent. Comparing the resulting figure of 60,000 “ovrhe” 
with the figures on overall civil litigation (114,900 suits in 200124) it turns out that civil 
judgments in a majority of cases are not complied with voluntarily. Since it seems 
unlikely that all defendants are genuinely insolvent – and initiating an “ovrha” would 
not make much sense either – such a large number of “ovrhe” suggests that judgment-
debtors as well as most other debtors often expect to get away with non-compliance. 
Thus, high insecurity about the success of an “ovrha” even against a solvent debtor 
seems to be the only way to explain their large number. Presumably, this is one of the 
key problems of the Croatian legal system. 
Searching for the proximate cause is not an overly difficult assignment. The 1996 reform 
of civil procedure abandoned some of the debtor-friendly features of Yugoslav 
enforcement law, but it represented less than a radical shift towards empowering 
creditors. Well-informed critics such as Crnić (2004) stress the lack of procedural 
                                                 
23 For Slovak data see e.g. Štatistická ročenka Slovenskej republiky 2000 p. 555. Russian resp. 
Bulgarian data are not readily accessible through their national statistical yearbooks, but some 
data have been collected from various sources by Varese (2001) resp. Schönfelder (2005). 
24 As mentioned above, this figure does not include commercial disputes. However, notice that it 
refers to disputes, not to judgments. Since the number of judgments is surely smaller than the 
number of disputes and since some civil litigation does not involve problems of enforcement (think 
of a divorce which does not result in alimony claims), 115,000 appears like a reasonable upper 
bound for the number of judgments potentially giving rise to enforcement problems.  
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efficiency, characterizing much of “ovršni zakon”, and point out that it reduces the 
chances of creditors to collect25 considerably. If debt collection procedures were less 
tedious and more efficient, solvent debtors usually would prefer to comply voluntarily 
and quite a number of allegedly insolvent debtors would suddenly find out that they are 
solvent. The Supreme Court has suggested changes towards more procedural efficiency 
upon several occasions. As mentioned above, there have been two major amendments 
but they did not proceed along the lines suggested by the Supreme Court. These two 
amendments were somewhat ambivalent, in some respects they strengthened (judgment-
)creditors, in some others they strengthened debtors, and it is difficult to strike a balance. 
Probably the overall effect on the debtor-creditor balance of powers was not much 
different from zero. Since this occurred under both HDZ- and SDP-led governments, it 
seems difficult to avoid the conclusion that protecting debtors’ interests rather than 
creditors’ rights continues to be a more pressing concern for most politicians and 
presumably for numerous voters as well. As long as this state of affairs persists, progress 
will be limited. One of the unfortunate consequences of this situation is that it makes a 
fool out of judges and earns them much undeserved criticisms. If a judgment is not 
complied with and enforceable titles turn out to be effectively unenforceable, the public 
tends to blame the courts even if they are not at fault because they are powerless. 
Ultimately, this state of affairs tends to discredit the very idea of the rule of law.  
 
 
6  Concluding Remarks 
Some of the announcements recently made by the Minister of Justice seem to suggest 
that judicial policies may be continuing on a zigzag course. Apart from announcing a 
number of welcome changes, which among others would relieve judges from much 
clerical work and allow them to focus their attention on litigation, her promise to amend 
bankruptcy law in a way to facilitate reorganization suggests that debtors may actually be 
strengthened. It also neglects the fact that for the vast majority of bankrupt companies an 
effort at reorganization is simply a waste of time and resources, they should be liquidated 
promptly. Among the Minister’s favorite ideas is that Croatians litigate too much and 
should instead engage in out-of-court settlement, which may be facilitated e.g. by 
mediation. However, mediation seems to be flunking the market test virtually anywhere 
                                                 
25 Marković (2003, p. 404) put it like this: „Sudska praksa pokazuje da su ovršni postupci, u 
pravilu, predugi i da vjerovnici teško ostvaruju svoja prava.” (Court practice shows that 
enforcement procedure, in principle, takes too long, making it very difficult for (judgment-
)creditors to collect.) 
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in the world. Croatians are not litigating too much. The problem rather is that the value 
of litigation is greatly debased by the fact that enforcement of judgments is so unreliable. 
If the latter problem were fixed, Croatians would presumably litigate more but courts 
would have less work with “ovrhe” because debts would more often be served 
voluntarily. Then, courts could allocate most of their resources to litigation and this 
would seem like a very reasonable priority. 
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1  Introduction 
 
After a long period of transformational recession CEE countries seem to enter a new 
phase of development, that of catching-up with the rest of Europe. Having recognized 
this development, many politicians and many citizens are starting to feel, partly in 
response to political campaigns, that after a successful political and economic system 
change time has come for a “welfare system change”. People have suffered enough from 
the recession prompted by reforms, it is time to consume more now. As most countries 
have no net external reserves to use – on the contrary, Hungary for example embarked 
on the transformation with large debts – the source of excess consumption could be 
future output. This high future output, the prospect of a rapid catching-up process is the 
main argument that incites people into an exuberant demand for higher wages and 
higher consumption. 
 
The rationale behind such an intertemporal reallocation of consumption depends on the 
time preference of consumers. We do not dare put a numerical value to this preference 
either in the aggregate or for individuals. What we try instead is to calculate the 
opportunity cost of switching future consumption for present consumption. Or putting it 
another way, we try to determine the real return of aggregate savings around the current 
level of net savings in Hungary. Although we had Hungary in mind when calibrating the 
model, the differences among CEE countries are not so large that our qualitative 
conclusions would not hold for other countries in the area as well. 
 
The lessons to be learned from the simulations of the model are related to fiscal policy. 
Our assumption is that foreign capital in Hungary – similarly to other catching-up 
countries – has a positive external effect on productivity. Similarly, personal or 
government savings have a positive external effect on the risk premium component of 
interest rates. Therefore, the decentralized decisions of agents will not lead to an 
optimum and fiscal policy has the task of correcting the market failure. This correction 
has an obvious target in a higher stock of resources that produce the externalities. Our 
model does not provide a recipe for the tools that should be used to correct the market, or 
to what extent. Basically, the government can influence intertemporal allocation in two 
ways: by using the tax structure and – in a non-Ricardian world – making savings itself. 
In our model these tools are not specified. We do not model how the tax system affects 
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consumption1 or how government savings affect aggregate savings. In addition, we do 
not consider any other effects of the fiscal policy on output. We know, for example, that 
fiscal debt has distortionary effects on future working incentives that may lead to future 
losses of output.2 We add only one element to the evaluation of the fiscal policy. This 
element is based on the fact that whatever the channel the fiscal policy uses in correcting 
market failures, governments have to give account of whether they did their job well. The 
social opportunity cost that a society faces as a consequence of personal and government 
choices might be used as a yardstick of their performance. 
 
In Chapter 2 we give a verbal description and justification of the main assumptions, in 
Chapter 3 we present the equations, in Chapter 4 the simulation results and in Chapter 5 
the conclusions. 
 
 
2  Main Assumptions and Features 
 
The model is classical, assuming market clearing. The economy is a small open economy 
where capital flows are unconstrained but their speed is dampened by adjustment costs. 
Tradables and non-tradables are distinguished in an implicit way. The model is classical, 
the price level is not determined, variables are expressed in real terms, the real exchange 
rate is the price of non-tradables in terms of tradables, normalized with the similar ratio 
abroad. 
 
The catching-up process is modeled in the following stylized way. Labor supply is 
constant – more or less in accordance with actual demography. The growth rate of the 
total factor productivity (TFP) is equal to the world rate in the long run. During the 
catching-up period the additional growth originates partly from capital accumulation and 
partly from an additional TFP growth, arising from externalities produced by the inflow 
of foreign direct capital. 
 
                                                 
1Valentinyi (2000) analyzed the effect of the tax system directly on the catching-up process. His 
model differs from ours as he does not assume externalities and the catching-up process consists of 
an accumulation of real and human capital. 
2The literature is too rich for referring to it. Blanchard (1990) summarizes the problem in a simple 
model, Alesina–Ardagna (1998), and Perotti (1999) are some of the recent empirical works on the 
topic. 
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The speed of the catching-up process depends on the speed of the capital accumulation 
process. Capital stocks (foreign and domestic) reach their steady state anyway, but the 
speed depends on the country risk premium and the real exchange rate movements. The 
higher the country risk and the weaker the exchange rate, the faster the capital 
accumulation. 
 
 
2.1  The Externalities of Foreign Direct Capital 
 
The external effect of FDI is various. It is difficult to separate these effects but we might 
distinguish two kinds. 
 
1) The agglomeration effect is a well-known concept of regional economics. Economic 
growth is not smooth geographically, because geographic concentration brings 
savings (savings in transport, communication, or other transactional or 
informational costs) in production and sales.3 This means that each investment 
improves the profitability of the next entrant, i.e. it produces externality. This 
phenomenon exists independently from the country of investment origin. Foreign 
direct investment flows add to this externality only by their net value. 
 
2) In a catching-up country FDI may incorporate a higher level of know-how. This 
know-how does not remain within a firm but spreads through contacts with other 
firms: suppliers will be trained or forced to a quality and discipline that comes with 
a higher production culture of the entrant foreign firm. This external effect – in 
contrast to the agglomeration effect – depends on the gross FDI inflow. 
 
We do not model the agglomeration effect, the productivity effect of this process is 
considered in the exogenous TFP term of the production function. We model only the 
external effect of FDI as a free supplier of know-how. 
 
It is clear that with an increase in the share of foreign capital the know-how supplier 
effect of foreign capital diminishes. We reflected this feature in our model by specifying 
the production function in a way that when approaching the steady state, the external 
effect of FDI approaches 0. 
 
                                                 
3See Krugman (1990) and Venables (1996). 
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2.2  The Saving-Investment Link in an Open Economy 
 
In the introductory economics textbook version of the open economy model, with the 
opening up of capital markets the period-by-period budget constraint that establishes a 
link between consumption and investment disappears and the two flows become more 
independent. We know that capital markets are not perfect and therefore a strong 
separation of the two systems is not justified.4 Risks, information constraints and 
adjustment costs create virtual walls across countries. Capital adjustment is not only 
gradual, but it does not lead to an equalization of returns either. Country returns contain 
differing country risk premiums. These premiums depend on the same factor that 
influences the return in closed capital markets: the level of savings. This brings us back 
to the feature of the closed capital market economy. 
 
Saving behavior affects the return on capital through two channels: (a) in the medium 
run a drop in demand weakens the real exchange rate (and decreases the real interest 
rate) (b) a decrease in the debt level decreases the country risk premium 
 
Let us examine these two factors in more detail. 
 
 
2.3  Demand and the Real Exchange Rate 
 
The idea of the concept of real effective equilibrium exchange rate5 builds on Dornbusch 
(1980) who says that an increase in demand makes relative costs of non-tradables higher 
because tradables demand is met by imports, while output has to switch to non-tradables 
in order to meet increased demand. This means that the real exchange rate will 
appreciate. Because of the real interest rate parity this means a higher interest rate. This 
way an increase in consumption crowds out investment like in the closed capital market 
economy. 
 
This feature is included into our model but it works only in the medium run. In the long 
run, the real exchange rate is independent from demand. In the long run, relative costs in 
the non-tradable sector will not increase because there are no sector-specific production 
factors by assumption, allowing for factor flows to equalize relative returns across 
                                                 
4See Feldstein–Horioka (1980) for the first demonstration of this ''puzzle''. 
5See for example Faruqee (1995), Stein (1999). 
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sectors at the starting rates. This adjustment process leads to the purchasing power 
parity (PPP) or the Balassa-Samuelson path as the more general case.6 The half-life of the 
adjustment process is about 4-5 years according to the “international consensus” view.7 
 
This way our model combines the PPP and the “sustainability” approach to the 
equilibrium real exchange rate. The difference between the two approaches lies in the 
assumption about the speed of adjustment of production factors. The sustainability 
approach considers the convergence to PPP to be too slow to be taken into account at all. 
In our approach the half-life of 4-5 years is too short to be disregarded. As a 
consequence, the real exchange rate and the trade balance are related only in the 
medium run, while in the long run PPP (Balassa-Samuelson equilibrium) holds. 
 
Stein (1999) defines a concept of the long-term equilibrium real exchange rate in his 
NATREX8 model. In this definition, in the long run, capital stock is in a steady 
equilibrium state. This definition would be useful for conclusions about the real 
exchange rate only if the adjustment process of capital stocks were faster than the 
adjustment process of production factors across tradable and non-tradable sectors. 
Otherwise, PPP is the long-term equilibrium. Economic history shows that the processes 
leading to debt accumulation are very slow, they may take decades.9 The process towards 
PPP may be slow, but in any case faster than this. 
 
We calibrated the model to take into account these differences in the speed of 
adjustment. This way a fiscal shock appreciates the real exchange rate in the short run, 
in the long run however – in contrast to the NATREX model – the rate is determined not 
by a drop in demand because of the debt burden, but by the convergence process to the 
Balassa-Samuelson path. In the long run, there is no direct interaction between net 
exports and the real exchange rate. If demand depreciated the real exchange rate, this 
                                                 
6According to the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis, productivity in the tradable sector increases faster 
than that in the non-tradable sector and the gap between the productivity rates depends on the rate 
of aggregate productivity growth. Therefore the real exchange rate of fast growing economies 
strengthens. 
7See Rogoff (1996) about the international consensus. 
8NATREX (Natural rate of equilibrium exchange rate) and similar concepts are based on the classical 
assumption of zero output gap (called internal equilibrium), and the equilibrium real exchange rate 
is defined as the common slope of the production possibilities frontier and the utility function. While 
these models consider the strictly convex production possibilities frontier as given even in the long 
run, in our model the elasticity of substitution between sectoral outputs becomes infinite in the long 
run. 
9A formal model for this behavior is given in Simon-Várpalotai (2001). 
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could happen only because the accumulated debt leads to a higher country risk interest 
premium. This in turn suppresses investments and the suppressed foreign component of 
investments affects TFP and the real exchange rate through the Balassa-Samuelson 
effect. 
 
 
2.4  The Country Risk Premium 
 
As discussed before, the existence of country risk constrains the wedge between 
consumption and investment in a country, partly taking over the role of an 
instantaneous budget constraint. This allows the interest rate and capital returns to 
differ from international rates permanently, preserving the feature of the closed economy 
Ramsey-model, where impatient consumer behavior leads to a lower steady state capital 
stock and output.10 
 
The country risk has to be an important issue in macroeconomic policy as individual risk 
taking renders negative externalities.11 Each borrower adds to the country risk premium, 
but the cost of additional risk caused to others is not internalized in his/her own 
calculations. Macroeconomic policy has the task of correcting this market failure. 
 
Before discussing the calibration of the impact of risk, let us make some remarks about 
the nature of the risk premium before and after joining the currency union. Indebtedness 
leverages an economy and thus magnifies the relative variance of its income. For foreign 
investors who sell in the country this means a higher demand risk and accordingly a 
higher revenue risk. For lenders of financial assets this means a higher default risk and 
exchange rate risk. 
 
Upon joining the currency union, the currency risk disappears but the leverage of the 
economy does not change. The total risk depends on whether the flexible exchange rate 
system itself added to the aggregate risk or not, and whether it was a stabilizing or a 
destabilizing factor on the economy. We do not take up this issue of discussion. In the 
model we take a middle road by assuming that the total risk of investments does not 
change by this system change. Technically, we do not distinguish between financial and 
                                                 
10In our model the risk of higher consumption today is taken into account only as a country risk 
premium, which means practically a default risk. The risk for the consumer should have been 
specified in the consumption function, if we had used a structural formulation. 
11See Harberger (1986). 
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direct investment risk, rather all the risks are considered simply as a source of interest 
rate premium. In case of modeling the effect of the currency union, we had to give 
account of the distribution of risk between financial and physical capital. 
 
 
3  Model Equations 
 
As our model describes an infinitely growing economy, we normalize growing variables 
by output. This way we analyze the path towards a steady state of the rates of variables 
to output. Normalized variables are given in small letters, while steady state values are 
denoted by a bar above the variable. 
 
 
3.1  Output 
 
Output is determined by a Cobb-Douglas production function homogenous at first degree: 
 
 
where L labor supply is fixed ( L = 1 ), Kf and Kd are foreign and domestically owned 
capital, At productivity, including the external effect of foreign capital ratio:  
 
 
where A0 is a scaling factor of output, :tfp is the exogenous constant component of TFP 
growth, and                is the output generating externality, implied by the ratio of foreign 
owned capital.12 For the sake of easier calculation we transformed capital stock variables 
to rates:  
 
(D1) 
 
Growth rate of output:  
 
(D2) 
 
                                                 
12We can easily check whether the production function is homogenous at first degree by multiplying 
the explanatory variables by a constant.  
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The change in Yt /Ytw , the output level relative to the world, depends on the difference 
between gt domestic and gw (assumed constant) world growth rates :  
 
(D3) 
 
 
 
3.2  Capital Accumulation and Investment 
 
Equations for capital accumulation are standard, where ∗ is the depreciation rate:13  
 
(D4) 
 
 
(D5) 
 
The dynamics of  if,z  and  id,t  investments are described in the spirit of Tobin-q theory 
similarly to a model with quadratic adjustment costs                                . 
Accordingly, investments have a positive correlation to profits over alternative returns 
cumulated into the future ( Αf,t and Αd,t ) 
 
(D6) 
 
 
(D7) 
 
where                  and                   are parts of investment that maintain an unchanged 
capital-output ratio at a      growth rate. 
 
 
                                                 
13Written in level form: 
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3.3  Consumption 
 
We use a reduced form equation for describing consumption behavior. c t consumption is 
a linear function of ytlab labor income and wt net wealth. This functional form is standard 
in econometric models. Its advantage is that it is easy to estimate and it leads to a finite 
and positive steady state consumption-output ratio. Calibration models are often based 
on the Euler equation that assumes a representative consumer living infinitely. The 
advantage of the latter is that in this case the model is built on the structural parameters 
of behavior of the representative consumer (Chatterjee, Sakoulis and Turnovsky, 2003) 
use this approach when simulating the effect of capital flows on growth in open 
economies). We discarded this approach because recent results in theory show that the 
assumption of a homogenous consumer and infinite horizon simply does not give a good 
description of aggregate consumption (see Carroll, 2001). The behavior of the rich differs 
from the behavior of the poor so much that taking averages is not a fruitful approach. 
Although the interest rate does affect consumption even in the new models of 
consumption, the impact is so small that we took the liberty of disregarding it for the 
sake simplicity.  
 
(D8) 
 
In the above equation the coefficients of ∃w and ∃y have been calibrated in a way that the 
consumption ratio converges to its w¯    steady state value with a half-life of 0 14:  
 
 
(P1) 
 
 
 
(P2) 
 
 
                                                 
14See Appendix A. for a detailed derivation. 
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3.4  Incomes, Asset balances, Returns 
 
Βf,t and Βd,t the return on capital is determined by the Cobb-Douglas consumption 
function by profit maximizing behavior. Production factors get a fixed share from 
income:15  
 
(D9) 
 
 
(D10) 
 
 
The ytlab labor income is the rest of income after deducting capital income:  
 
(D11) 
 
rtd, domestic real interest rate is determined by the interest rate parity corrected for the 
risk premium:  
 
(D12) 
 
 where rw is the constant “world interest rate”, Δt the country risk premium, qt the real 
exchange rate (price of non-tradables in terms of tradables), 2 a constant weight 
parameter that converts a change in the relative price of the two sectors into a change in 
the relative price of non-tradables to the aggregate of both sectors. This makes the right-
hand side consistent with the definition of the real interest rate.16 
 
The Δt country-risk premium depends on net financial assets (nfat ):17  
 
                                                 
15The profit maximization condition: 
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(D13) 
 
The definition of variables Αf,t and Αd,t used in equations (D6) – (D7): 
 
(D14) 
 
 
(D15) 
 
When substituting from equation (D12), we see that an investment decision depends on 
the foreign interest rate, risk premium, and the real exchange rate as cost factors. The 
latter in a way that expected appreciation increases expected return. 
 
Net foreign financial assets:18  
 
(D16) 
 
where trt is the trade balance, and if,t – Βf,t kf,t-1 /(1+gt ) the net foreign capital related 
flows (FDI minus profit flows). 
 
For the sake of simplicity we assume that local residents do not directly invest abroad. A 
net wealth of the country (wt ) is then:  
 
(D17) 
 
The return on net wealth is the sum of the return on net financial and net real assets:  
 
(D18) 
 
Identity of the trade balance:  
 
(D19) 
 
                                                 
18Written in a level form: 
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3.5  The Real Exchange Rate 
 
We assume that during the catching-up process the real exchange rate appreciates 
because of the Balassa-Samuelson effect. The rate of this appreciation depends on the 
growth difference to the world rate: 
 
(D20) 
 
where higher qBS,t means appreciation and limt→∞ qBS,t = 1 . This constraint makes the 
domestic relative price equal to the world rate in a steady state. The defined qBS path is 
an equilibrium path that actual rate converges to along the path described below. 
 
The distribution of consumer and investment demand between tradables and non-
tradables is determined by maximizing a CES function:  
 
 
(D21) 
 
where tr and ntr subscripts denote the tradable and non-tradable sectors, ∃d , Atr , and 
Antr are parameters of the CES function. From the first order conditions:  
 
(D22) 
 
Let us assume that consumer and investor CES functions are the same:  
 
(D23) 
 
 
(D24) 
 
 
The composition of the total output in terms of tradables, 
 
(D25) 
 
is determined by a CET (constant elasticity of transformation) production function: 
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                                        , where Btr,t , Bntr,t are parameters changing in time and ∃s is a 
constant parameter. The marginal rate of transformation is equal to the real rate of 
exchange:  
 
(D26) 
 
where                . 
 
The condition that the non-tradable market is closed:  
 
(D27) 
 
In the CET function the           ratio is not constant. The reallocation of production factors 
from one sector into another may be interpreted as a change in the weighting 
parameters. There is a “Balassa-Samuelson weighting parameter” path, which equates 
the actual qt to the qBS,t real exchange rate path:19  
 
(D28) 
 
 
Various shocks result in the differences in sectoral wages and profits, but the adjustment 
process of factor allocation in the weights of supply change and the real exchange rate 
converges to the Balassa-Samuelson path. We use a reduced formulation without 
explicitly modeling the adjustment process: 
 
(D29) 
 
 
3.6  Calibration of the Parameters 
 
The model has 29 variables, Yt , Yt /Ytw , gt , kd,t , kf,t , id,t , if,t , ct , Βd,t , Βf,t , ytlab , rtd , Δt , 
Αd,t , Αf,t , nfat , wt , rtpf , trt , qBS,t , qt , cntr,t , intr,t , ctr,t , itr,t , ytr,t , yntr,t , btBS , bt in 29 
equations. There are two additional equations that determine the values of ∃w and ∃y .  
                                                 
19See Appendix B for the derivation. 
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Parameters of the model: A0, ∀ , ∀f , :tfp , ( , (kf , (kd , ∃kf , ∃kd , ∗ , 2 , rw , gw , ∃Δ , ∃BS , 
       , ∃d , ∃s , 8s , 0 , w¯    . 
 
For the starting value of capital ratios we used the estimates of Darvas and Simon (1999) 
and Pula (2003), the share of foreign capital was estimated from accumulating FDI data: 
kd = 1.1 , kf = 0.4 . The rest of stock values for the beginning of 2003 were taken from 
the national income accounts: nfa = -0.25 and w = 0.85 comes from an identity. For the 
Yt /Ytw relative level of income we assumed Y /Yw = 50%, which is the Hungarian level 
relative to the average of the European Union. 
 
The rw world interest rate was taken to be 4%, the depreciation rate 9%. The 2 relative 
weight of tradables was assumed as 0.5. The coefficient of the country risk, measured as 
the rate of debt, is ∃Δ = 0.1, meaning that a 10 percent increase in debt raises the 
interest rate by 1 percentage point.20 The w¯    steady state wealth ratio was chosen by the 
assumption that                The 0 half-life parameter is 10 years. 
 
The production function. A0 = 0.932438 was chosen so that in the first year of 
simulation output equals 1. Capital share is the international usually observed ∀ = 0.3. 
Total factor productivity growth rate was calibrated in a way that in a steady state 
growth equals the world rate, gw = 2% , therefore                                            . 
 
The external effect of foreign capital was calibrated in a way that actual GDP growth 
should fit the values calculated from the calibrated model in the period of 1996-2003. 
This criterion gave a coefficient of the external effect ( = 0.4, meaning that a 1 percent 
increase in the foreign capital ratio increases TFP by 0.4 percentage point. This figure is 
higher than the 0.21 estimated by Jakab and Kovács (2002) on the Central East European 
panel data. Barrell and Pain (1997) made an estimation for Great Britain. In Great Britain 
the role of foreign capital as a supplier of know-how externality might be small, and 
instead the estimated coefficient reflects the agglomeration effect (Krugman, 1991; 
Venables, 1996) – as it is assumed by the authors as well. Thus their coefficient of 0.27 
is not comparable to our figure, especially because in our model the agglomeration effect 
is included in the exogenous component, while they do not specify an exogenous TFP at 
all. 
                                                 
20Edwards (1984) arrived at a half-elasticity of 0.6-1.0 in a panel estimation. At a level of about 2% 
this is roughly the corresponding figure to our linear coefficient of 0.1. Our figure is definitely more 
cautious than the assumed 0.4 in Fagan, Gaspar and Pereira (2002). The relation between risk and 
debt is presumably non-linear, but in our simulations we do not depart so far from the base scenario 
to take this into account. 
tr
ntr
A
A
.0=nfa
( ) 01396.011 1 =−+= −αμ g
  58
Figure 1.  Contribution to GDP growth of production factors, exogenous TFP 
              and externalities (1996. = 100 %) according to (D1) 
              production function with calibrated parameters 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 shows how various components contributed to GDP growth. 
 
We assumed that in the steady state Hungarian productivity is at the 80 percent level of 
the European average. This is in line with the arguments of Darvas and Simon (1999). 
 
Investment behavior is explained in line with the Tobin-q theory. In order to estimate the 
speed of adjustment, very much empirical work can be found in the literature. The 
estimated parameters are in a broad range. In the model ∃kf and ∃kd is the parameter 
determined by adjustment costs. Estimates in the empirical literature on the adjustment 
cost parameter range between 1.4 and 16.1.21 We chose a value between the two 
extremes, assuming ∃kf = ∃kd = 10. 
                                                 
21Summers (1981) estimated a value of 16.1, Eberly (1997) arrived at a range of between 1.4 and 3 
using micro data. Cummins, Hasset and Oliner (1997) using US company data estimated parameters 
of between 5 and 10. 
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In the real exchange rate block the Balassa-Samuelson appreciation effect of additional 
growth, ∃BS = 0.5,              We chose the exchange rate elasticities of demand and 
supply, ∃d = 2 , ∃s = -3 to make a 1 percentage point deterioration of the trade balance 
consistent with a 2 percent appreciation of the real exchange rate. This number is in line 
with the estimations of Jakab and Kovács (2002) for exports and imports. At the starting 
date the real exchange rate is in equilibrium by assumption. This assumption is 
indifferent for the policy lessons derived from the model and it has no relevance to the 
actual real exchange rate either, as the real exchange rate in our model is the rate of the 
hypothetical case when the output gap equals 0. In the short run, for example during a 
disinflation process, this assumption is probably untenable. 
 
In the supply function the 8s parameter that determines the speed of adjustment across 
sectors was chosen to be consistent with the 5 years half-life of the convergence to the 
Balassa-Samuelson equilibrium, 8s = 0.87055. 
 
In Table 1 we summarized the assumptions on parameters, starting values, and the 
implied steady state values. 
 
Table 1.  Parameters, starting and steady state values 
Parameters    Calculated coefficients   
 0 = 10   ∃y = 0.70981 
 w¯ = 1.56923   ∃w = 0.16204 
 ∀ = 0.3     
 ∀f = 0.1     
 ( = 0.4     
 :tfp = 0.01396     
 ∃kf = 10     
 ∃kd = 10     
 ∗ = 0.09     
 2 = 0.5  Steady state values   
 rw = 0.04   r¯  d = 0.05 
 gw = 0.02   g¯ = 0.02 
 ∃Δ = 0.1   Δ¯ = 0 
 ∃BS = 0.5   c¯ = 0.74615 
   
 = 1   i¯  f + i¯  d = 0.23077 
 ∃d = 2   t¯ r¯ = 0.02308 
 ∃s = -3   y¯   lab = 0.7 
 8s = 0.5   Β¯ = 0.13 
     r¯   pf = 0.05 
Starting values       
 kd = 1.1   k¯   d = 1.56923 
 kf = 0.4   k¯   f = 0.78461 
 nfa = -0.25   n¯f¯ a¯ = 0 
 Y/Y w = 0.5   Y¯  /¯  Y¯  ¯¯w = 0.77172 
.1=
tr
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A
tr
ntr
A
A
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4  Simulations 
 
4.1  Catching-up Paths 
 
Firstly, we show growth (catching-up) paths implied by the parameters of Table 1. We 
calculate 4 alternative scenarios. In the case that we consider the most probable, both the 
externality of foreign capital and the risk premium are important factors. In the other 
variants we show what will happen if one of the two factors or both are omitted. By 
showing the alternatives, we try to give a picture of the sensitivity of the results on 
critical assumptions of the model. 
 
In the first column we show the paths calculated on the assumption that foreign capital 
has an external effect. The two paths differ on the assumption whether indebtedness 
increased the risk premium. In the absence of a risk premium the catching-up process is 
faster. 
 
In the second column we calculated with a model where productivity growth is entirely 
exogenous. This exogenous productivity growth is equal to the sum of exogenous and 
externalities-driven growth, calculated in the baseline case where both externalities and 
risk premium exist. Here again the existence of risk constrains the speed of catching-up. 
However, as in this case the role of foreign capital is minor, the existence of the risk 
premium does not make much difference. 
 
Figure 2.  Catching-up paths in four variants 
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Figure 2.  continued 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: In the right-hand column the assumption holds that foreign capital has an external effect, while this 
assumption is dropped from the left-hand column. Black curves indicate variants where endogenous risk premium 
is absent, while gray curves show variants with an endogenous risk premium. 
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4.2  Effects of Consumption Shocks 
 
None of the four paths can be interpreted as an optimum, in the sense that it maximizes 
the value of consumer utility functions. We discarded this approach when bringing the 
consumption function from outside into the model. We could have chosen to calculate 
the intertemporal optimum with a representative consumer or a social preference 
function in mind, then calculate a “suboptimum” as the solution of the decentralized 
task with the distortions created by externalities and calculate the optimal tax system 
that leads to the social optimum. Although we do not deny that the theoretical rigor of 
such an approach is a merit, we believe that the parameters of a social preference 
function are rather uncertain so it is better to keep the model used for drawing policy 
lessons simple because its results are easier to interpret. Therefore, we simply made a 
present value calculation that answers the question of what the intertemporal rate of 
substitution at the baseline path between consumption is today and tomorrow. 
 
The consumption shocks need not be interpreted as fiscal consumption shocks. However, 
if we want to draw policy conclusions, it is natural to consider them as consumption 
shocks forced out by the fiscal policy. It is reasonable to assume this possibility because 
Ricardian equivalence exists only in the infinite horizon representative consumer case. 
We calculated the effect of two kinds of shocks: 
 
1) In a transitory consumption shock the consumption ratio increases by 1 percentage 
point in the first period (year) but the steady state wealth ratio does not change. 
 
2) In a permanent consumption shock the consumption ratio increases by 1 percentage 
point in the first period (year) and the steady state wealth ratio decreases by the 
same 1 percentage point. 
 
The consumption shock exerts its influence through the following channels. A transitory 
shock increases demand that appreciates the currency and – because of the interest rate 
parity – it raises the interest rate. At the same time, interest rates are affected by the 
resulting increase in the risk premium. A higher interest rate decreases expected net 
profits and investments including FDI will be lower, reducing productivity growth. Later 
consumption adjusts to meet the targeted wealth ratio and investments rebound to put 
the economy onto the original steady state level. In case of a permanent shock the 
targeted wealth ratio is lower, which means a permanently higher risk premium and 
lower output and productivity level in the steady state. 
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A summary indicator of the shock impact is the internal interest rate. When used as a 
discount factor, the present value of future foregone consumption equals the gain in 
present consumption, or putting it another way, the sum of differences to the baseline in 
consumption flows equals 0. As Table 2 shows, if we do not believe in externalities and 
risk premiums, we arrive at a 4.2%–5.0% interest rate. This is significantly higher than 
the world real interest rate adjusted with the Balassa-Samuelson effect,22 but not so high 
that it could not easily be explained by a high time preference. However, if we assume 
the existence of a risk premium, the implicit interest rate increases to more than 7.4 
percent, and the inclusion of externalities brings the interest rate to the level of 17.2-18.1 
percent. This is a shockingly high rate, higher than anything observed on the markets 
normally. 
 
Table 2.  Implicit interest cost (return of aggregate saving) 
             at the present level of indebtedness 
With foreign capital externalities Without foreign capital externalities  
With risk premium Without risk premium With risk premium Without risk premium 
Transitory shock 17.2% 6.3% 10.0% 5.0% 
Permanent shock 18.1% 5.1% 7.4% 4.2% 
 
 
We tested the robustness of the results in a sensitivity analysis. We changed the 
parameter values by 50 percent one by one and calculated the results again. The 
differences from the baseline are shown in Table 3. 
 
As we see for most of the parameters, even a 50 percent change does not result in a 
change in the internal interest rate higher than 1 percent. In the variants without country 
risk premium the sensitivity is even lower. The parameters that have the strongest 
impact on the interest rate are the parameters influencing capital accumulation and 
productivity directly, such as (, the external effect of foreign capital, ∃kd and ∃kf , the 
adjustment costs of investment, and ∃Δ , the risk premium coefficient. Even these 
parameters cause changes in the range of 2 percent only and the highest value is 3.2 
percent. 
 
Summing up the results from the sensitivity analysis, we can say that the figures in 
Table 2 are robust, the conclusions do not change qualitatively even if some parameters 
change considerably. 
                                                 
22In the presence of the Balassa-Samuelson effect real interest rate parity holds only in terms of the 
tradable sector, while the basket will appreciate. 
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5  Summary and Assessment 
 
Fiscal discipline has a large role in the real convergence process of Central and East 
European Countries. Fiscal policy aimed at cutting indebtedness by restraining 
consumption creates higher macroeconomic stability and an incentive for investors. This 
attracts foreign investment in a period when this increases productivity through external 
effects. Estimates of the model show that additional saving may bring an 18 percent 
return for consumers. 
 
This rate is higher than any reasonable market rate but this is not surprising when the 
external effects incorporated into the model are considered. The question is whether this 
rate is consistent with the preferences of society? Is it reasonable for the government not 
to decide to increase savings if additional saving brings an 18 percent real yield? 
 
We know that the social utility function is not the sum of individual utility functions. 
Part of the population has a very high time preference,23 resulting in a behavior that 
considers savings a buffer stock against short-term income losses at best. Some of these 
“liquidity constrained” consumers are willing to take loans at a real rate even higher 
than 18 percent. These consumers might be satisfied with a policy strategy that 
reallocates future consumption into the present at an opportunity cost of 18 percent. 
However, whether such a policy should be seen as serving social welfare is questionable. 
Namely, there are many who would consider a borrowing at an 18 percent interest 
unreasonable. However, as this interest rate is not internalized for them, they have no 
direct free choice of making such a return by saving. 
 
In this paper we did not discuss how the government could internalize this return. We set 
it as our task only to calculate the magnitude of a return that would allow policy makers 
to make choices on the basis of correct information. 
  
                                                 
23The idea of a high rate of time preference had come up as early as in Friedman (1957), and Carroll 
(1992) was one of those who contributed most to the rigorous analysis of the consequences. Most 
empirical econometric models use the related concept of Mankiw, who perceives the majority of 
consumers to be liquidity constrained, consuming as much as they earn. (The fiscal implications of 
this behavior are discussed in Mankiw (2000).) 
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Appendix A:  Derivation of the Parameters 
                   in the Consumption Function 
 
In the ct = ∃wwt-1 /(1+gt ) + ∃yytlab consumption function ∃w and ∃y have been determined 
by the constraint that consumption should converge to a w¯    steady state wealth ratio 
with 0 half-life. Let us first write the equation for wt wealth accumulation, using   
                                     and                                                      equations.24 Thus: 
 
 
 
 
 and by using definitions                                    and                                                – 
equations (D11) and (D19) –, after rearranging: 
 
                                                                                                                 , 
 
and by substituting rtpf and the definition of the wealth ratio (wt = nfat + kd,t ) we get  
 
                                                                                            . 
 
The consumption block in a narrow sense is a difference equation system for ct and wt :  
 
 
 
                                                                                             . 
 
 
After substituting ct into the second equation and rearranging:  
 
(F1) 
 
Disregarding from the interaction among ytlab , gt , rtpf and wt around steady state the 
half-life of the differential equation is determined by                . If we want to calibrate 
the model to a given 0 half life, then by determining ∃w  from                                       we 
 
                                                 
24See equations (D6) and (D16). 
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get the (P1) formulation. From a given w¯     we can express ∃y from equation (F1), because 
                                           , and by rearranging we get the form (P2) that determines ∃y . 
 
 
Appendix B: Derivation of the Equations 
                  in the Real Exchange Rate Block 
 
We give here the derivation of equation (D28) that determines the bt changing variable. 
Let us write qBS,t everywhere instead of qt and replace cntr,t + intr,t in equation (D22) by the 
accounting identity (D27), and substitute the budget constraint of consumption and 
investment (D21) for ctr,t + itr,t :  
 
(D30) 
 
 
Rearranging for yntr,t and using ct + it = 1 – trt :  
 
(D31) 
 
In equation (D26) by using equation (D25) we write 1 – qBS,t yntr,t instead of ytr,t and 
plugging in for yntr,t :  
 
(D32) 
 
 
Expressing bt and rearranging we get the formula (D28). 
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 1  Introduction 
The ten new Members States (NMS)1 of the EU have to comply with the budgetary 
objectives stipulated in the Maastricht Treaty (MT) and the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP), and are subject to the EU budgetary surveillance framework including, where 
relevant, the activation of the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP). However, as long as 
they have not adopted the euro, the NMS will not be subject to the so called enhanced 
budgetary surveillance under the EDP, nor to the sanctions foreseen for the members of 
the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)2. The NMS have the obligation to enter the 
EMU and therefore to meet the Maastricht criteria of public finance, inflation, interest 
rate and exchange rate, but they have the freedom of choosing the timing of the adoption 
of the euro. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the fiscal characteristics of the new members in 
the light of the requirements of the SGP and the criticisms levelled against the Pact and 
to see in what ways the initial conditions of the NMS differ from those faced by the 
current euro zone countries in the run-up to EMU. The paper is organized as follows. 
Section II briefly summarizes the main features and criticisms of the SGP, as well as the 
principal proposals for improvement of the Pact found in the literature. Section III 
examines the fiscal characteristics of the NMS from the perspective of meeting the 
Maastricht criteria on the road to EMU and from the broader perspective of the SGP 
framework. This section ends with a summary of our findings. Section IV discusses 
some of the policy implications of our findings. 
 
2  The Stability and Growth Pact 
2.1  Features 
The SGP and its rules are well known and well documented and we briefly recall only its 
main features and the rationale behind them3. A unique feature of EMU is that monetary 
policy is centralized in the hands of the European Central Bank (ECB) while fiscal 
policy remains decentralized in the hands of the governments of the individual member 
                                                 
1 Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia. 
2 For a description of the EDP, see Gros et al. (2004) and Cabral (2001). 
3 A good description of the SGP and how it works can be found in Gros et al. (2004), Fatás et al. 
(2003), HM Treasury (2004), European Commission (2000, 2002, 2003) and ECB (1999). 
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 states. It was therefore recognized that to support the ECB’s responsibility to maintain 
price stability and to prevent free-riding, fiscal policy had to be subject to rules in order 
to ensure discipline of public finances. These rules consist of two pillars. First, to 
become a member of EMU, a country’s general government deficit/GDP ratio cannot 
exceed 3 percent and its general government debt/GDP ratio cannot exceed 60 percent; 
in case the latter ratio is exceeded, the country has to demonstrate that its debt is being 
reduced and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace. Second, Member 
States have to respect the medium-term budgetary objective of ’close to balance or in 
surplus’ in order to allow for normal cyclical fluctuations, while keeping the deficit 
within the reference value of 3 percent of GDP. The 3 percent reference value for the 
deficit can be breached only under exceptional circumstances, when the excess results 
from an unusual event outside the control of the Member State and which has a major 
budgetary impact, or when it results from a severe economic downturn, defined as an 
annual fall of real GDP of at least 2 percent. A smaller, at least 0.75 percent decline in 
GDP, can be considered as exceptional taking into account the abruptness of the 
downturn and the accumulated loss of output relative to past trends. 
It is a legitimate question to ask how the reference values of 60 percent of GDP for the 
government debt and 3 percent of GDP for the fiscal deficit were chosen. It has been 
suggested (Thygesen, 2002) that 60 percent was the average debt ratio of the EU 
members around 1990 (the MT was signed in 1992) and if countries kept their deficit at 
the 3 percent limit, their debt would converge to 60 percent, assuming that nominal GDP 
is rising at a trend rate of approximately 5 percent per year: 3 percent real growth 
(assumed to be the potential output growth in the EU) plus 2 percent inflation (in line 
with the ECB’s inflation target of 2 percent or less). While these reasonings have not 
been made officially public as far as we know, it is widely assumed that they lay behind 
the selection of the reference values. 
2.2  Criticisms of the SGP 
The main criticisms levelled against the SGP can be grouped under the following 
headings on the basis of what the Pact is seen as lacking: strong enough analytical 
foundations, symmetry, flexibility, incentives for good quality fiscal consolidation, and 
enforceability4. We discuss these in turn below. 
                                                 
4 There is a good review of the criticisms of the SGP in Buti et al. (2003a). 
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 a)  Lack of Clear Analytical Foundation 
A frequently mentioned criticism which seems to have dented the most the credibility of 
the SGP in the eyes of academics is that its main provisions lack a clear analytical 
foundation. The rationale behind the ’close to balance or in surplus’ rule is debt 
sustainability, which means that the government cannot run a Ponzi scheme where debt 
grows forever, but it has to satisfy its intertemporal budget constraint, that is to say, the 
present discounted value of its expenditures must equal the present discounted value of 
its revenues. However, as pointed out by Perotti et al. (1997), debt sustainability thus 
defined is of little practical use, since the intertemporal budget constraint has an infinite 
time horizon that does not sufficiently constrain government policies: anything can be 
assumed about the future. The intertemporal budget constraint depends on GDP growth, 
inflation and real interest rates, but the SGP does not take into account the differences in 
these areas across countries. Typically, catching-up economies such as the NMS have 
higher potential growth and higher inflation due to the Balassa-Samuelson (BS) effect, 
which is an equilibrium phenomenon5. Thus, catching-up economies could, ceteris 
paribus, run higher deficits than more developed countries without jeopardizing the long-
term sustainability of public finances. 
Furthermore, the SGP does not address the critical issue of what is the optimal level of 
debt and treats low and high debt countries identically. Implicitly, the ’close to balance 
or in surplus’ rule over the cycle means that eventually the debt will be run down to zero. 
Zero debt may not be an optimal solution since it ignores the benefits of the 
intergenerational distribution of taxes to finance, for example, infrastructural investments 
and reforms in the pension and health care systems that will benefit future generations6. 
The optimal level of debt depends, inter alia, on whether the interest payments on the 
debt crowd out worthwhile investments and whether the disincentive effects of higher 
distortionary taxes to cover the interest payments are important or not (Aiyagari and 
McGrattan, 1998). From that perspective, low debt countries have more room for 
                                                 
5 Kovács (2004) reports estimates in the literature of the BS effect that vary from less than one 
percent to up to 6.9 percent per year, and von Hagen and Zhou (2004) report estimates varying 
between about 2 and 4 percent.  
6 Buiter and Grafe (2002) make the intriguing point that the ’close to balance or in surplus’ rule 
could possibly mean that the EU governments will become net creditors. This would lead to the 
ironic result of the (partial) socialization of the means of production in the long-run, as 
governments will have to invest their cash surpluses in bonds and stocks of the private sector. Here 
we note that running a surplus in normal times was originally intended for countries with high debt 
ratios (above 60%) and therefore the government becoming a net creditor in the long-run is more a 
theoretical possibility than a real threat. 
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 maneuver than high debt countries. The uniform deficit rule does not take into account 
the higher need for infrastructural investments in countries where the initial stock of 
public capital is insufficient, as in the catching-up NMS. Furthermore, the uniform 
reference value of the debt does not explicitly take into consideration the contingent 
liabilities due to population ageing and the state of pension reform that can vary from 
one country to another. 
A further criticism from an analytical standpoint is that the SGP disregards the aggregate 
fiscal stance of the EMU. In a monetary union, what matters from the point of view of 
macroeconomic stability is the fiscal stance of the union as a whole and not the fiscal 
stance of individual countries. The fiscal policies of large countries have a greater impact 
on the fiscal stance of the union than the fiscal policies of smaller countries. 
b)  Lack of Symmetry 
Two issues are relevant under this heading. First, for countries which have not yet 
reached the ’close to balance or in surplus’ position, the requirement that they reduce 
continuously the deficit may entail procyclical policies in an economic downturn. This 
problem has been mitigated by the European Council decision of March 2003, specifying 
that the above requirement will be judged on the basis of the cyclically adjusted budget 
position. However, countries which have not yet reached the 3 percent deficit level and 
are therefore outside of the euro zone have to satisfy the Maastricht reference value in 
nominal and not cyclically adjusted terms in order to be able to join EMU. In the run-up 
to EMU, these countries may therefore confront a situation in which they have to follow 
a procyclical policy. Second, while the SGP sets a limit on the maximum deficit and 
foresees penalties for breaking it, the Pact does not specify surpluses and does not 
otherwise provide enough incentives for reducing the deficit and/or accumulating 
surpluses during boom periods. The failure of sufficiently reducing the deficits in the 
upswing of 1998-2000 is seen as the major reason for the breaking of the deficit criterion 
by several Member States in 2002 and 20037. 
c)  Lack of Flexibility 
The loss of independent monetary policy within the EMU calls for the preservation of 
fiscal flexibility to cope with asymmetric shocks or the asymmetric effects of common 
shocks. This means that countries should have enough room to let the autonomic 
                                                 
7 See Fatás et al. (2003). 
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 stabilizers operate fully or, if necessary, to use discretionary policy to respond to shocks. 
The question then is whether the 3 percent deficit reference value provides the needed 
flexibility. The answer to this question depends on the starting level of the deficit and the 
output smoothing capacity of the automatic stabilizers. Some studies have found 
(Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 1998 and Kiander and Virén, 2000) that the deficit limit 
might not provide enough flexibility for some of the EU-15 countries. 
d)  Quality of Fiscal Consolidation 
The quality of fiscal consolidation matters because taxes and expenditures affect output 
differently due to their different impact on income distribution and incentives. Empirical 
research has demonstrated that consolidation relying on current expenditure cuts rather 
than tax increases are likely to last longer and are thus more successful (Alesina and 
Perotti, 1995 and 1997; Perotti et al. 1997; Buti and Sapir, 1998; von Hagen et al. 2001). 
The SGP, by defining the fiscal target in terms of deficit numbers, neglects the quality of 
fiscal adjustment. Von Hagen et al. (2001) provide empirical evidence that high debt to 
GDP ratio and weak domestic and international economy induce governments to 
undertake expenditure-based rather than revenue-based consolidation strategies. This 
proves that governments will undertake quality adjustment under economic constraints, 
but the SGP does not explicitly provide incentives for undertaking quality consolidation. 
e)  Enforceability 
The major criticism in this area is that the fines and penalties foreseen within the SGP 
framework are difficult to enforce, because the decision to subject a country to the 
penalties lies in the hands of the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) 
which is composed of politicians who are more understanding of and therefore more 
indulgent toward the problems faced by their peers. The decision of November 25, 2003 
to hold the EDP for France and Germany in “abeyance for the time being” is an 
unmistakable sign of such indulgence. The frequent recourse to one-off measures and 
creative accounting has also undermined the seriousness of the enforcement procedures. 
Most importantly, the long time lags involved in the enforcement procedure mean that 
the penalties, even if enforced, will come too late to trigger timely responses. Prior to 
EMU, there was an incentive to adjust in order to join the currency union, but inside 
EMU that carrot disappears and the stick remains of dubious efficiency. 
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 2.3  Proposals for Improvement Found in the Literature 
There have been many proposals for improvement of the SGP and even its usefulness 
has been questioned (De Grauwe, 2002)8. Nonetheless, there is broad consensus among 
academics and opinion makers that as long as fiscal policy remains decentralized, there 
is a need for fiscal rules in the EMU. Buti et al. (2003a) review the EU fiscal rules 
against the criteria of Kopits-Symansky and Inman9 and conclude that overall these rules 
perform quite well with respect to these compliance criteria, except with regard to 
enforcement. Generally, the proposals for improvement try to address one or several of 
the criticisms discussed above, although none of the proposals represent a Pareto 
improvement, in that none of them solve all problems outlined above and may even 
aggravate some of them (Buti et al., 2003a). Buiter and Grafe (2002) propose the 
’permanent balance rule’ that takes into account different initial positions (debt level, 
stock of public sector capital, stage of pension reform) and different future development 
paths (GDP growth, inflation). The rule requires that the inflation-and-real-growth-
adjusted permanent government budget is in balance or in surplus. This rule is attractive 
theoretically, but it requires estimating future growth and inflation which could become a 
contentious issue and hence would be difficult to enforce. Another analytically attractive 
proposed rule is the one that would consider the fiscal stance of the euro area as a whole 
and would allocate “deficit shares” to individual countries. These shares could be 
assigned by a decision of ECOFIN (the French proposal)10, or by the markets through a 
system of tradable budget deficit permits (Casella, 2001). The main arguments against 
such a scheme is that the risks of triggering a financial crisis are not uniform across 
governments (Buti et al. 2003a) and that the allocation of deficit shares, whether by 
bureaucratic/political decision or by the markets, requires a degree of political 
coordination and cooperation that seems to be lacking for the time being. 
Other proposals aim at applying the “golden rule”, whereby investment expenditure is 
excluded from the deficit calculation. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2004) propose to exclude 
net investment (gross investment less depreciation) from the deficit on the grounds that 
depreciation of public capital is equivalent to current expenditure. The rationale for the 
golden rule is that borrowing should be allowed to finance investments since their return 
                                                 
8 There is a review of the various proposals in Buti et al. (2003a) and also in HM Treasury (2004). 
9 Kopits and Symansky (1998) and Inman (1996). See also Kopits (2001). 
10 Proposal put forward by the Minister for Finance of France at the informal Ecofin Council in 
Dresden in April 1999 (Buti et al., 2003a). 
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 will occur in the future and hence their cost should be distributed over time. Excluding 
investment from the deficit would remove the financial constraint on public investment 
under the SGP and could also help avoid procyclical tightening of fiscal policy in a 
downturn. Although intuitively appealing, the arguments advanced against the golden 
rule11 are that it is difficult to determine what constitutes investment, it could lead to a 
bias in favor of physical assets, it would provide new incentives for creative accounting, 
and that it could undermine the efforts to consolidate the public finances. 
A final set of proposals which we would like to mention deals with institutional reforms. 
Wyplosz (2002) proposes to establish in each country Fiscal Policy Committees 
entrusted with the responsibility to set annual deficit targets consistent with long-run 
debt sustainability. Fatás et al. (2003) argue for the creation of a Sustainability Council at 
the level of the euro area, with the task of monitoring the sustainability of Member 
States’ public finances12. The idea behind these proposals is to find in the fiscal area a 
counterpart to national central banks or the ECB that could bring governments to better 
adhere to fiscal discipline. The idea is appealing but a lot depends on the political will of 
elected governments to respect more strictly the recommendations of the proposed 
national Fiscal Policy Committees or the euro area Council than they currently respect 
the recommendations of the Commission. 
This objection could be raised against the proposal by Eichengreen (2004), although it 
clearly has the advantage of addressing the problem with the SGP at its roots. According 
to this proposal, only those member states would be subjected to numerical fiscal rules 
has weaknesses in its budgetary and labor market institutions or pension systems, 
carrying the risk of chronic fiscal deficits. However, in order to evaluate the progress 
made in structural reforms, the setting up of an independent, yet legitimate body would 
become necessary, which is hardly imaginable in the present framework of cooperation 
between member states. Furthermore, an excessive deficit procedure was initiated in 
2002-2003 against the same countries that the author categorized as having weak 
institutions, so the proposal would in fact not bring considerable practical changes to the 
SGP. 
                                                 
11 See, for instance, European Commission (2003) and Buti et al. (2003a). 
12 Others, for instance Gros et al. (2004), have also made similar proposals. 
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 3  Fiscal Characteristics of the New Member States 
The fiscal characteristics of the NMS have to be assessed from two perspectives: (1) 
from the narrower perspective of meeting the numerical deficit and debt Maastricht 
criteria on the road to euro adoption; and (2) from the broader perspective of the SGP 
framework in the light of the criticisms of the Pact and the proposed improvements 
discussed above. Although the issues are linked, it is useful from a policy point of view 
to approach the assessment separately from the above two perspectives. Such an 
assessment has to consider the initial conditions faced by the NMS, as well as the 
challenges lying ahead. We undertake this exercise by comparing the situation of the 
NMS with the experiences of the current euro zone members. 
3.1  The Road to EMU 
On their way toward adopting the euro, the NMS face the task of reducing their fiscal 
deficits to the Maastricht criteria of 3 percent of GDP. Several NMS have announced that 
they want to enter the EMU by 2008 or earlier, while others plan to join later. On the 
whole, a distance of five years from EMU entry appears to be a good benchmark to 
which to compare the starting positions of the current euro zone members with the 
starting positions of the NMS. Figure 1 shows the deviation from the 3 percent deficit in 
2003 for the NMS and five years prior to entry into the EMU for the current members 
(1996 for Greece and 1994 for the others). With the exception of Malta, the deviations 
for the NMS are about the same or less than were the deviations for the majority of the 
current EMU members. The starting deficit conditions of the NMS are thus not worse 
than the conditions faced by the current members five years prior to joining the EMU. In 
fact, for the three Baltic states and Slovenia the conditions are significantly more 
favorable. 
As regards government debt, it is generally lower in the NMS than it is in the euro zone 
countries currently or five years prior to EMU entry (Figure 2). The exceptions are 
Cyprus, Malta and Hungary. There are several reasons behind the low debt levels in the 
NMS from Central and Eastern Europe. First, the Baltic States did not inherit any of the 
liabilities of the former Soviet Union while Poland obtained partial debt forgiveness. 
Second, some countries (e.g. Hungary) used privatization receipts to reduce the 
government debt. Third, a part of the social safety net expenditures were borne by state 
enterprises, most notably in the form of within-the-gate unemployment. When these 
enterprises were privatized, the new owner often took over their debts, which was then 
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 reflected in a lower purchase price. There were also developments in the opposite 
direction, most notably when the government assumed the debts of state-owned banks 
and enterprises in order to consolidate them prior to privatization13. 
 
Figure 1.  Deviations from the Maastricht deficit criterion 
               of 3 percent of GDP prior to EMU entry* 
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* For the euro zone members, five years prior to EMU entry: 1996 for Greece and 1994 for the other members. For
the new Member States, the data refer to 2003. General government net borrowing as a ratio of GDP on the basis of
ESA95. The figure for the Czech Republic does not include debt assumptions. 
 
 
                                                
Source: EUROSTAT and Ministry of Finance of the Czech Republic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 P. Kiss and Szapáry (2000) review the impact of debt assumptions on Hungary’s public finances. 
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 Figure 2.  Debt ratios prior to EMU entry and in 2003* 
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* For the euro zone members, in 2003 and five years prior to EMU entry: 1996 for Greece and 1994 for the other 
members. For the new Member States, the data refer to 2003. General government consolidated budget debt as a 
ratio of GDP. 
Source: EUROSTAT. 
 
 
 
The lower level of debt has implications for the way in which the fiscal consolidation 
needed to reach the 3 percent Maastricht deficit criteria can be achieved. Together with 
the greater convergence of bond yields already obtained by the NMS (Figure 3), the new 
member countries will be able to rely less on the gains from interest rate convergence to 
reduce the deficit than were the current euro zone countries (Figure 4). During the last 
five years prior to EMU entry, such gains represented between 2.4 to 5 percent of GDP 
in half of the current euro zone members, while among the NMS only Hungary and 
Poland can expect to have gains over 1 percent of GDP14. The greater convergence of 
bond yields in the NMS is a result of the progress with disinflation and the markets’ 
expectations that these countries will join the EMU in the not too distant future, which 
have contributed to a reduction of the risk premia. Another factor reducing the potential 
gains from yield convergence is that in some of the NMS a large portion of the 
government debt is in foreign currency where the scope for interest rate convergence is 
limited. 
                                                 
14 In estimating the gains for the NMS, we assumed that the debt/GDP ratios remain constant. The 
interest rates used were effective yields calculated as interest payments divided by the debt ratio of 
the previous year. 
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 Figure 3.  Bond yield convergence in the run-up to EMU 
                and scope for convergence in the new member states* 
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* For EMU countries, convergence criterion bond yields: the difference in yields between March 1995 and March 2000
for Greece and between March 1993 and March 1998 for the other EMU countries. For new Member States, the 
difference between domestic convergence criterion bond yields and the convergence criterion euro bond yield in 
January 2004. 
 
Source: EUROSTAT. 
 
 
 
Figure 5 shows the required changes in the primary balance to reach the 3 percent 
Maastricht deficit limit. A negative value shows the required improvement and a positive 
value the “permissible” deterioration. For the high-debt NMS (Cyprus, Hungary, Malta) 
and the Czech Republic, the required improvements are significantly higher than were 
necessary for most of the euro zone members, owing to the smaller gains from yield 
convergence in the former group. Only high-debt Italy and France, where the yield 
convergence five years prior to EMU was already nearly complete, needed primary 
balance improvements similar to those of the above mentioned new members. In these 
latter countries, therefore, most of the adjustment to reach the 3 percent limit will have to 
be made in the primary balance. 
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 Figure 4.  Gains in interest payments due to bond yield convergence 
               in the run-up to EMU* 
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correspond to the actual improvements in the interest payment balances in the case of current eurozone members 
due to changes in the debt/GDP ratios during the period considered. 
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Sources: Authors’ calculations using data from EUROSTAT. 
 
 
 
This brings us to examine the size and composition of government spending in the NMS. 
The adequate size of government spending is difficult to determine since it depends on a 
country’s social preferences. One benchmark that can be used to judge the relative size 
of government is per capita income: when incomes rise, the demand for certain publicly 
provided services, such as education, R&D, infrastructure services tend to increase so 
that low income countries might need extra room to accommodate these higher 
expenditures as per capita incomes rise. 
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 Figure 5.  Required improvements in the primary balances to reach 
               the Maastricht deficit criterion of 3 percent taking account 
               of gains from bond yield convergence* 
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deterioration in the primary balance in order to meet the 3 percent deficit limit. 
Sources: Authors’ calculations using EUROSTAT data for debt ratios and Magyar Nemzeti Bank for euro bond yields. 
 
 
 
Figure 6 plots the level of government expenditure as a ratio of GDP against per capita 
income on a purchasing power parity basis. What the Figure illustrates is that in the 
Visegrád countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) the spending 
levels are about the same as in those EU members where the levels of expenditure are the 
highest, even though the per capita income is much smaller in the Visegrád countries. 
Thus, using per capita income as a benchmark, the governments in these new member 
countries appear to be oversized. Von Hagen (2004) comes to the same conclusion using 
regression analysis where, in addition to per capita income, he also takes into 
consideration the openness of the economy on the grounds that more open economies are 
more exposed to external shocks and therefore need larger government sector as a buffer. 
It is necessary to point out though that both per capita income and openness are 
imperfect benchmarks to judge the adequacy of the size of the public sector, because 
they ignore the important question of which sector, public or private, can provide most 
efficiently the services. 
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 Figure 6.  Per capita income and government spending 
               in the EU and the CEEs, 1998-2003 averages* 
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* Luxembourg and Slovenia are not included. 
Source: EUROSTAT. 
 
 
 
The above findings about the level of expenditure in the NMS have to be looked at in 
conjunction with the special needs for additional spending in these countries. It is 
common wisdom that transition economies need to strengthen their infrastructure. Since 
the early 1990s, average government investment has been consistently higher in the 
Central and Eastern European transition countries than in the EU (Figure 7). This is 
normal, since the social marginal productivity of infrastructural investment will tend to 
be higher in less developed countries. For the period ahead, the transition countries will 
need to maintain a relatively high level of public investment expenditure given their 
relatively low stock of public capital. 
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 Figure 7.  Average government investment ratios 
               in the EU-15 and the CEEs*, 1993-2003 
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* Slovenia is not included. Figures are unweighted averages. Data for 2003 are preliminary. 
Sources: AMECO database and Magyar Nemzeti Bank. 
 
 
Furthermore, EU accession will involve additional government expenditure and some 
revenue loss for the new members, which will be offset only partly by transfers from the 
EU. The net effect will be negative in the initial years of membership due to the 
combination of the following main factors: (1) the new members have to pay 
immediately after accession their contribution to the EU common budget; (2) a part of 
the EU transfers to finance projects are channeled directly to private sector recipients 
with no positive direct effect on the budget; (3) those transfers that are channeled to the 
budget for project implementation have to be pre-financed by the government; (4) the 
EU transfers cannot be used to finance projects which, in the absence of the transfers, 
would have been financed from the budget (the principle of additionality); (5) there is a 
domestic co-financing requirement of EU-financed projects; (6) there will be increased 
administrative burden associated with the implementation of EU financed projects; and 
(7) the removal of custom duties on imports from EU members and the sharing of 
customs receipts on imports from third countries involve a loss of revenue. These 
negative effects will be partly compensated by the phasing out of domestic agricultural 
subsidies which will be replaced by EU subsidies.  
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 Several authors have estimated the net direct budgetary effects of accession (see Table 
1). All the authors have come up with a net negative direct effect on the budget during 
the first years of membership. The estimates range between 1 and 4.75 percent of GDP 
per year. The rather wide range of these estimates reflects the differences in the 
underlying assumptions regarding absorption capacity and the space and cost of 
financing the acquis communautaires, such as environmental protection and 
infrastructure. These estimates concern only the direct budgetary effects, which may be 
mitigated by favorable indirect effects that are difficult to quantify, such as those 
resulting from accession-driven private sector activity. However, these favorable effects 
will come on stream only gradually and the assessment that accession will lead initially 
to a higher burden on the budget is not questioned. 
 
Table 1.  Net budgetary effect of accession 
Authors Net Annual Negative Effect (percent of GDP) 
Kopits and Székely (2004) 3-4.75 
Antezak (2003) 1.7-3.1 
IMF (2004) 1.0-1.5 
 
 
 
3.2  The SGP Framework 
Two issues are relevant from the perspective of the SGP framework: the cyclical 
sensitivity of the budgets and debt sustainability. 
a)  Cyclical Sensitivity 
In the SGP framework, the automatic stabilizers are to be allowed to operate fully 
without breaching the 3 percent deficit limit. The European Commission has calculated 
cyclical safety margins for each of the EU-15 countries15, showing the size of the 
deterioration in the budget balance in case output falls below potential. Subtracting these 
safety margins from the reference value of 3 percent, we obtain the so-called “minimal 
benchmark” which a country should at least achieve over the cycle in order to avoid 
breaching the 3 percent limit in a downturn. 
                                                 
15 European Commission (2000, 2002). 
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 Using the methodology of the European Commission (2000), we calculated the safety 
margins for the eight new members from Central and Eastern Europe (CEEs) (Table 2)16. 
Despite somewhat higher output volatilities17, the cyclical safety margins are generally 
lower in the CEEs than in the EU-15, as a result of lower sensitivity of the budgets of the 
CEEs to the economic cycle. The lower sensitivity is explained essentially by the smaller 
reliance on cycle-sensitive direct taxes and the significantly lower shares in total 
spending of cycle-sensitive expenditures on unemployment benefits18. One reason for the 
smaller reliance on direct taxes and the correspondingly higher reliance on indirect taxes 
is that tax evasion has been a widespread problem in the CEEs and the collection of 
indirect taxes has proved to be more efficient. Other reasons are tax holidays and the low 
level of corporate taxes, which have been used as an incentive to attract foreign 
investment. The smaller share of expenditures on unemployment compensation is due to 
the generally less generous benefits. 
The lower cyclical safety margins mean that the “minimal benchmark”, i.e. the 
maximum deficit to be respected over the cycle without running the risk of breaching the 
3 percent limit, is higher in the CEEs19 than in the EU-1520. This finding has to be looked 
at in conjunction with the smoothing capacity of the automatic stabilizers. Many authors 
have researched and calculated the output stabilization effects of automatic stabilizers in 
                                                 
16 As discussed in the Annex, this methodology, which estimates the output gap by an HP-filtered 
trend approach, has several weaknesses and has been improved by the Commission by using a 
production function approach (European Commission, 2002). We used the former methodology 
because of the lack of readily available production function calculations for the CEEs. For 
Hungary, P. Kiss and Vadas (2004) estimate cyclical sensitivities and output gaps using three 
different methods: that of the European Commission (2002), the ECB (Bouthevillain et al., 2001) 
and a methodology developed by the authors to take into account the specific fiscal and economic 
characteristics of Hungary. For the sake of comparability, we did not use the P. Kiss and Vadas 
(2004) estimates for Hungary. 
17 See Darvas and Szapáry (2004) for a discussion of output volatilities in the EMU and the CEEs. 
18 Direct taxes as a ratio of GDP averaged 14 percent in the EU-15 and 10 percent in the CEEs in 
the period 1992-2002. Unemployment benefit payments to GDP averaged 1.73 percent in the EU-
15 and 0.68 in the CEEs (Sources: AMECO and Riboud et al. 2002). 
19 Our estimates of the cyclical safety margins of the budgets of the CEEs are fairly close to those 
calculated by IMF (2004), but are substantially lower than those calculated by Coricelli and 
Ercolani (2002). These authors estimate the safety margins for Hungary and Poland to be over 3 
percent, mainly because they find output to be more volatile. This may be due to the inclusion of the 
years 1990-1994 which were characterized by high transition-induced output volatility. For this 
reason, we excluded those years from our calculations. 
20 For the EU-15, the output gaps are those calculated by European Commission (2002) using the 
more sophisticated production function methodology, while for the CEE-8 we used the HP-filtered 
trend approach. The HP-filter approach yields even smaller minimal benchmarks for the EU-15. 
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 the EMU21. Calculating these effects for the CEEs is beyond the scope of this paper and 
should be the subject of future research. One factor which tends to weaken the smoothing 
capacity of automatic stabilizers in the CEEs is that they are small open economies 
(except Poland) where the smoothing capacity is reduced by the leakages through 
imports. The lower cyclical budget sensitivity together with the openness of the CEEs 
imply that these countries may have to rely more on discretionary measures to smooth 
the economic cycle. There are, however, risks involved in using discretionary changes 
and one has to ensure that the discretionary measures are reversible and do not lead to a 
deterioration of the underlying budget position (see European Commission, 2002). 
 
Table 2.  Cyclical budget sensitivity and minimal benchmarks 
 Cyclical budget 
sentsitivity 
The largest value
of output gap 
Cyclical safety 
margin 
Minimal 
benchmark 
  in percent in percent in percent 
EU-15 0.50 3.83 1.97 -1.03 
Austria 0.30 5.17 0.90 -2.10 
Belgium 0.60 3.83 2.30 -0.70 
Denmark 0.80 5.14 2.70 -0.30 
Finland 0.70 3.00 3.80 0.80 
France 0.40 3.25 1.30 -1.70 
Germany 0.50 3.38 1.40 -1.60 
Greece 0.40 5.43 1.30 -1.70 
Ireland 0.35 3.75 1.70 -1.30 
Italy 0.45 3.25 1.50 -1.50 
Luxemburg 0.60 4.86 3.10 0.10 
Netherlands 0.65 3.33 2.30 -0.70 
Portugal 0.35 3.54 1.80 -1.20 
Spain 0.40 2.80 1.50 -1.50 
Sweden 0.70 3.14 2.20 -0.80 
United Kingdom 0.50 3.60 1.80 -1.20 
CEE-a 0.41 4.26 1.68 -1.32 
Czech Republic 0.40 4.20 1.70 -1.30 
Estonia 0.41 4.78 1.95 -1.05 
Hungary 0.44 3.65 1.62 -1.38 
Latvia 0.33 4.22 1.39 -1.61 
Lithuania 0.33 6.05 2.01 -0.99 
Poland 0.49 3.87 1.88 -1.12 
Slovakia 0.40 3.87 1.55 -1.45 
Slovenia 0.45 3.44 1.54 -1.46 
 
Sources: EU-15: European Commission (2002); CEE-8: see Annex. 
 
                                                 
21 Buti et al. (2003b); Buti and van den Noord (2003 and 2004); Brunila et al. (2002); European 
Commission (2002); Barrell and Pina (2000); Kiander and Virén (2000); van den Noord (2000). 
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 b)  Debt Sustainability 
As seen earlier, the debt levels in the NMS are generally lower than in the EMU 
members. As catching-up economies, they also have a higher potential growth rate, as 
well as higher BS-induced inflation and hence lower real interest rates once they are in 
EMU and face similar nominal interest rates. The combination of these factors would, 
ceteris paribus, imply that the NMS could run higher deficits and still maintain the long-
run sustainability of public finances. However, when assessing debt sustainability, one 
also has to take into account future liabilities. The most important of these are future 
pension payment obligations and health care outlays for the elderly due to population 
ageing. 
As can be seen in Table 3, the old-age dependency ratios in the CEEs are somewhat 
below those of the EU-15, but the fertility rates are also smaller which, combined with an 
increase in life expectancy that will accompany the growth in per capita income in the 
CEEs, will sharply raise the dependency ratios. In the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland these ratios are projected to double or more than double by 2050. The burden that 
these population trends implies for the government budgets can be reduced by reforming 
the pension systems, such as introducing a second pillar funded scheme (but the 
transition cost of exiting from the pay-as-you-go system remains), raising the level of 
retirement age, tightening eligibility for early retirement or reducing the replacement 
rate. About half of the CEEs have already introduced a multi-pillar system and others 
plan to do so (European Commission, 2003). A second element of future liabilities that 
can burden the budgets of the CEEs in the years ahead is the overall stock of guarantees 
granted mostly for enterprise borrowings in the sectors of public transportation and 
energy. Although the stock of guarantees has been substantially reduced as a result of 
privatization, it remains important in some countries. 
It is difficult to judge the optimal target for public debt. It depends, as said, on the 
crowding out effect of interest payments and the negative output effect of distortionary 
taxes to finance these payments. Furthermore, it also depends on the future rate of return 
of the expenditures that are financed by borrowing, such as investments and reforms that 
benefit future generations, or reforms that reduce future liabilities (e.g. pension reforms). 
IMF (2004) suggests a prudent public debt ratio of around 45 percent of GDP for the 
CEEs. The UK Government’s fiscal policy objective is to maintain net debt below 40 
percent of GDP over the economic cycle. Using these numbers as a benchmark for 
illustrative purposes – but without suggesting that this is an appropriate debt level for all 
countries under all circumstances – we show in Table 4 the improvement in the primary 
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 balances needed to reach a 40 percent debt/GDP ratio within ten years in the CEEs. A 
positive value in Table 4 shows in percent of GDP the size of the improvement in the 
primary balance needed now and to be kept constant in order to reduce the debt/GDP 
ratio to 40 percent in ten years in case the current level of debt exceeds 40 percent, or the 
improvement needed in order not to exceed the limit in case the current level of debt is 
less than 40 percent. A negative value indicates the “permissible” deterioration in the 
primary balance without exceeding the debt limit. As can be seen from Table 4, Cyprus, 
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Malta need significant improvements in the primary 
balances in order to avoid that their debt levels exceed 40 percent of GDP by 2013. This 
is because both the debt levels and the primary deficits are high in these countries. 
Poland and Slovakia need only a small improvement, while the Baltic countries and 
Slovenia could in principle let their primary balances deteriorate, since they have low 
debts and low primary deficits or have surpluses. 
Table 3.  Dependency ratios and fertility rates22
Old-age dependency ratios total fertility  
(in percent) Rate 
 2000 2050 2003 
EU 25.95 51.40 1.57 
Belgium  28.10 49.50 1.62 
Denmark 24.20 40.30 1.72 
Germanyy 26.60 53.20 1.31 
Greece n.a. n.a. 1.25 
Spain 27.10 65.70 1.25 
France 27.20 50.80 1.89 
Ireland 19.70 45.70 1.97 
Italy 28.80 66.80 1.26 
Luxembourg n.a. n.a. 1.63 
Netherlands 21.90 44.90 1.73 
Austria 25.20 58.20 1.40 
Portugal 26.70 50.90 1.47 
Finland 25.90 50.60 1.72 
Sweden 29.40 46.30 1.65 
United Kingdom 26.60 45.30 1.64 
NMS-10 22.00 53.30 1.29 
Cyprus n.a. n.a. 1.49 
Czech Republic 21.90 57.50 1.17 
Estonia n.a. n.a. 1.37 
Hungary 23.70 47.20 1.30 
Latvia n.a. n.a. 1.24 
Lithuania n.a. n.a. 1.24 
Malta n.a. n.a. 1.46 
Poland 20.40 55.20 1.24 
Slovakia n.a. n.a. 1.19 
Slovenia n.a. n.a. 1.21 
Sources: OECD (2003) and EUROSTAT. 
 
 
                                                 
22 Old-age dependency ratio is equal to (persons aged 65+)/(persons aged 20-64). Total fertility 
rate is defined as the average number of children who would be born alive to a woman during her 
lifetime. In more developed countries, a rate of 2.1 is considered to be replacement level. 
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 Table 4.  Primary deficit gaps to reach 40 percent debt/GDP ratios 
              in ten years under different assumptions for growth 
              and real interest rates (in percent of GDP) 
        
 Cyprus    Czech Rep.     
  Real interest rates  Real interest rates  
 GDP-growth 2% 4% GDP-growth 2% 4%  
 3% 5.66 6.78 3% 3.08 3.84  
 4% 5.12 6.22 4% 2.72 3.46  
 5% 4.59 5.67 5% 2.35 3.09  
        
 Estonia    Hungary     
  Real interest rates  Real interest rates  
 GDP-growth 2% 4% GDP-growth 2% 4%  
 3% -6.53 -6.12 3% 3.21 4.19  
 4% -6.74 -6.32 4% 2.74 3.70  
 5% -6.95 -6.52 5% 2.27 3.22  
        
 Latvia    Lithuania     
  Real interest rates  Real interest rates  
 GDP-growth 2% 4% GDP-growth 2% 4%  
 3% -1.70 -1.12 3% -1.80 -1.28  
 4% -1.99 -1.41 4% -2.06 -1.54  
 5% -2.28 -1.70 5% -2.32 -1.79  
        
 Malta    Poland     
  Real interest rates  Real interest rates  
 GDP-growth 2% 4% GDP-growth 2% 4%  
 3% 8.64 9.76 3% 1.12 1.96  
 4% 8.10 9.20 4% 0.72 1.54  
 5% 7.58 8.65 5% 0.32 1.13  
        
 Slovakia    Slovenia     
  Real interest rates  Real interest rates  
 GDP-growth 2% 4% GDP-growth 2% 4%  
 3% 1.08 1.88 3% -1.71 -3.93  
 4% 0.68 1.48 4% -2.03 -4.10  
 5% 0.30 1.08 5% -2.34 -4.27  
      
 
Source: Authors' calculations based on EUROSTAT data. 
 
3.3  Summary of Findings 
Our main findings regarding the fiscal characteristics of the NMS from the perspective of 
the Maastricht criteria and the SGP can be summarized as follows. 
There are large differences among the NMS as to their starting fiscal positions. The 
budget deficits of the Baltic states and Slovenia were already smaller than 3 percent of 
GDP in 2003 and these countries have also the lowest debt/GDP ratios among the NMS, 
well below 60 percent of GDP. Estonia scores the highest, with practically no 
government debt and an overall budget surplus. Those countries which have recorded the 
largest deficits in 2003, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Malta, have also the 
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 highest debt levels. Clearly, the NMS cannot be regarded as a group but have to be 
looked at on a case-by-case basis. 
The new members, particularly those with less favorable starting fiscal positions, face 
great challenges on the road to EMU because the potential budgetary gains from yield 
convergence are limited and EU accession will have a net negative impact on their 
budgets in the initial years of accession. At the same time, pension and other needed 
reforms, as well as the necessity to keep up with the higher level of infrastructure 
investment, imply additional budgetary burdens.  
The level of debt is generally lower in the NMS than in the EMU members. They also 
have higher potential growth and will face lower real interest rates within EMU due to 
the higher BS-induced inflation, which improve their prospects of debt sustainability. 
However, they also face considerable budgetary pressures in the medium to long-run 
because of the high stock of government guarantees in some countries and ageing related 
future pension and health care payment obligations.  
 
4  Policy Implications 
The main ideas that we would like to communicate in this paper which have a policy 
implication are the following:  
1) From a debt sustainability perspective, the lower debt and the prospect of faster 
growth implies that those NMS where the deficit is significantly below 3 percent 
could be given a longer period of time to reach the ’close to balance or in surplus’ 
position. This would be also justified because the NMS need more infrastructural 
development and EU accession will put additional burden on the budgets in the 
initial years of membership. We should remember that in the run-up to EMU, the 
current cohesion countries were the recipients of much larger EU transfers than 
what the NMS are expected to receive in the coming years. More research should be 
undertaken to define debt sustainability taking also into account future liabilities, so 
that more concrete guidelines could be issued for the required speed of adjustment.  
It has been sometimes suggested that the SGP or its interpretation need to be 
modified to take into account the special circumstances of the new Member States. 
The large differences in the initial conditions of the NMS do not support that 
argument. Indeed, several current EMU members have lower debt than some of the 
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 NMS and the less developed current euro zone members have also higher potential 
growth than the other members. The improvement of the SGP is needed not because 
of enlargement, but because it makes good economic sense to take into account the 
differences in initial conditions for all countries. Enlargement only highlights the 
need for improvement by widening the differences among countries subject to the 
provisions of the SGP. 
A misconception has to be corrected in this regard. In many documents and 
declarations reference is made to the “equal treatment” of members when talking 
about the uniform application of the provisions of the SGP. Equal treatment in an 
economic sense would mean that one differentiates according to initial conditions 
and future liabilities. Uniformity in this case is not equal treatment. One can, 
therefore, support those suggested improvements in the SGP that would take into 
account more explicitly differences in debt levels, economic growth, demographic 
trends and reforms that reduce future liabilities. 
2) There are good reasons for keeping the 3 percent limit even from the perspective of 
the NMS, because those new members which exceed that limit are also those which 
have the highest debt levels. They have, therefore, an interest in reducing the deficit 
to below 3 percent earlier rather than later so that they can benefit from a reduction 
in debt service payments which would free resources for other purposes − and that 
irrespective of when they plan to join EMU. 
There is another reason why the high-deficit NMS have to reduce the fiscal deficit. 
As long as they are not within the EMU, they are exposed to speculative capital 
movements triggered by market perception about the sustainability of the external 
payments position23. While the rate of investment in the NMS will remain high, they 
also face the prospect of an erosion of net household savings as a result of credit 
booms. Household credit is typically very low in the CEEs and one can expect a 
rapid growth in such credit as a result of the declining interest rates, the prospect of 
higher permanent income levels, and the greater willingness of banks to lend to 
households as they move into retail banking, an area which the banks have 
eschewed so far because of the higher perceived risks. Hungary has already 
experienced a sharp reduction in net household savings in recent years. Under these 
circumstances, the burden falls on the budget to maintain an external position which 
is seen as viable by the markets. If the cyclical upturn that has just started proves to 
                                                 
23 Barnhill and Kopits (2003) discuss the fiscal vulnerabilities faced by emerging markets. 
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 be durable, this would be an ideal time to accelerate the consolidation in the high-
deficit NMS, thus reducing the risk of having to pursue procyclical policy in a 
downturn. Since the government sector in most high-debt NMS is already oversized 
relative to their per capita income, consolidation should be done through cutting 
current primary spending, while leaving room for those expenditures that are 
necessary for the building up of the stock of public capital and for the 
implementation of reforms that will bring long-term benefits. 
3) More emphasis should be placed on improvements in budgetary procedures. 
Budgetary practices vary a great deal from one country to another: the forecasting, 
planning, implementing, accounting and monitoring procedures are not the same. 
Deficiencies in these areas can lead to forecasting errors and ex-post revisions of 
data that make enforcement difficult and eventually undermine credibility. 
Guidelines for best practices in budgetary procedures could be issued by the Council 
and included in the monitoring under the SGP. 
4) Finally, we have to remind ourselves that the Maastricht-related constraints have led 
to a significant reduction in the deficits and debt levels of the current euro zone 
members and there is no evidence that it has impaired the stabilization role of fiscal 
policy or that it had negatively affected public investment (Gali and Perotti, 2003). 
While rules are necessary to ensure the proper functioning of the single monetary 
policy, the need for rules goes beyond that: fiscal rules are justified in their own 
rights as an instrument to foster budgetary discipline. Markets will eventually 
penalize the sinners but markets react generally too late, by which time the cost of 
adjustment is already high. Enlargement strengthens the need for rules, since one 
can observe in several NMS mounting popular pressure for relaxing fiscal policy as 
expectations have been heightened with EU accession and the appetite for reforms 
has weakened. The rules have to be respected by all, however. It will be difficult to 
muster the critically important political support in the new Member States for the 
commitment to meet the 3 percent deficit requirement to join the monetary union 
while current members continue to breach that limit. 
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 Annex:  The Calculation of Cyclical Safety Margins 
The cyclical safety margin shows the size of the deterioration in the budget balance in 
case output falls short of potential output. Subtracting these safety margins from the 3 
percent reference value of the Maastricht Treaty, we obtain the so-called “minimal 
benchmark”, which is the cyclically adjusted deficit consistent with the 3 percent limit. 
The calculation of cyclical safety margin consists of two steps: the calculation of the 
largest output gap that a country is likely to encounter and the sensitivity of its budget to 
the economic cycle. The budget sensitivity indicator is an elasticity of the budget deficit 
to the output gap, calculated as a weighted average of elasticities of the following budget 
items: direct taxes, indirect taxes and social security contributions on the revenue side, 
and unemployment benefits on the expenditure side. 
 
1  The Largest Value of Output Gap  
We followed the methodology used in European Commission (2000). The output gap is 
obtained as the logarithmic difference of actual and trend output:  
(1) 
tititi yyOG ˆ−=
where OGti stands for the output gap for the i-th country in period t, yti is the log of actual 
output for country i in period t, and ŷti is the trend of log output y for the i-th country in 
period t. 
The largest output gap that country i is likely to face (GAPi) is calculated as a 
combination of three sub-indicators: a) the absolute value of the largest negative output 
gap recorded in country i over the whole sample period (1995-2002 in our case); b) the 
unweighted average of the three largest negative output gaps in all countries studied (the 
10 new Member States in our case) over the whole sample period; and c) the average 
volatility of the output gap in each new Member State, measured as twice its standard 
deviation. The largest value for the output gap is calculated as the mid-point of the worst 
two of these three sub-indicators. We excluded from our calculations the years before 
1995, a period of a transformation recession when GDP fell sharply in the CEEs.  
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 2  The Budget Sensitivity Indicator 
The sensitivity of the budget (SENS) to the output gap is a weighted average of the 
elasticities of budget items for each country: 
(2) ubscitdtSENS UBSCITDT εεεε −++=
where εDT, εIT, εSC, are the output elasticities of revenue from direct taxes, indirect taxes 
and social security contributions; εUB is the output elasticity of unemployment benefits, 
and dt, it, sc are the ratios of revenue received from direct taxes, indirect taxes and social 
contributions to GDP. ub is the ratio of unemployment benefits to GDP. 
 
3  Cyclical Safety Margins and Minimal Benchmarks 
Cyclical safety margins (CSM ) are calculated as a product of the largest output gap and 
the budget sensitivity indicator: 
(3) iii SENSGAPCSM ×=
The value of CSM shows the extent to which the budget balance in a given country is 
likely to deteriorate in times of severe economic downturn. 
Finally, the minimal benchmark (MB ) is the gap between the cyclical safety margin and 
the Maastricht reference value of 3 percent:  
ii CSMMB −= %3(4) 
The minimal benchmark shows the cyclically adjusted deficit consistent with the 3 
percent reference value. 
 
4  Sources and Description of Data 
The Commission uses annual GDP figures since 1960 for the calculation of trend GDP 
and output gaps. In the Central and Eastern European countries, the sample period is 
very short due to structural changes and severe transformation recessions in the early 
nineties, so we took seasonally adjusted quarterly data since 1995 (on constant 1995 
prices). For the sources of quarterly data refer to Darvas and Szapáry (2004). Following 
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 the methodology of the Commission, we obtained trend output using the Hodrick-
Prescott filter with the standard parameter of 1600 for quarterly data24. 
For the relative weight of each revenue item we used the AMECO database. As for the 
expenditure side, in the absence of readily available data across countries for a 
sufficiently long period of time, we used the data for unemployment benefits from 
Riboud et al. (2002); for the output elasticity of unemployment benefits, we used the 
estimate for the Czech Republic calculated by the Czech Ministry of Finance which can 
be regarded as an approximation of the elasticities in the CEEs. 
 
5  Assumptions and Limitations of the Methodology 
There are some implicit assumptions in the Commission’s methodology of calculating 
cyclical safety margins which limit its applicability and require caution when interpreting 
the results, as pointed out also by the Commission itself. Namely, constant values are 
assumed for (1) the share of the relevant budget items in the total budget (in our case 
these were 10-year averages); (2) the cyclical elasticities of the relevant budget items; 
and (3) the structure of GDP so that a 1 percentage point change in output gap is 
assumed to affect all tax bases in the same way25. We did not attempt to estimate the 
income elasticities of the revenue items due to the shortage of readily available data. 
Instead, we assumed that they are equal to one. This is very close to the average value 
estimated for the OECD countries (see van den Noord, 2000). 
 
                                                 
24 European Commission (2000) calculated the output gap as a deviation of output from trend 
obtained using the HP-filter. However, in its latest calculation (European Commission, 2002), the 
Commission estimated potential output using the production functions approach. 
25 This assumption was relaxed in the more sophisticated approach of Bouthevillain et al. (2001). 
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Demographic changes altering size and age-profile are recognised in many countries, 
including within the EU, as an important determinant of both the size and the structure 
of government expenditures and revenues in the long run. In Croatia, having a negative 
population growth rate and total fertility rate below 2.0, projected demographic trends 
are quite similar to those in the rest of Europe. Therefore, significant budgetary 
implications of the so-called ageing population phenomenon can be expected. 
 
The aim of this paper is to use the standard methodology developed by the European 
Commission in order to assess the long-term implications of ageing population on the 
sustainability of public finances in Croatia. The results of the analysis show that 
demographic changes could, in the long-run, place Croatian public finances on an 
unsustainable path, and imply the necessity of adopting fiscal policy actions aimed at 
avoiding the negative budgetary consequences of an ageing population. 
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1  Introduction 
 
In recent decades, in almost all developed countries, similar demographic trends can be 
observed. Extended life expectancy coupled with low fertility rates have changed 
demographic images, leading to a rising population of the elderly, and a diminishing 
population of those in younger age cohorts. The result of such trends is the so-called 
ageing population phenomenon, the economic, fiscal and social consequences of which 
deserve increased attention. 
 
Both the OECD and EU countries recently developed similar methodologies aimed at 
assessing the fiscal consequences of ageing populations. The methodologies are focused 
on long-term projections of age-related expenditures, whereby the age-related 
expenditures mainly relate to public pension expenditures, health and long-term care 
expenditures and education expenditures. The impact of ageing populations on tax 
revenues, however, is generally not taken into consideration. 
 
The available demographic projections indicate that in Croatia, having a negative 
population growth rate and total fertility rate below 2.0, the ageing population 
phenomenon will be more and more pronounced, posing a great challenge to the 
sustainability of government finances.  
 
In this paper, standard methodology developed by the European Commission’s Economic 
Policy Committee working group on ageing populations is used in order to assess the 
long-term implications of an ageing population on the sustainability of public finances in 
Croatia. In some details, however, the analysis in this paper departs from the standard 
methodology for different reasons which will be explained later.  
 
The paper is divided into five sections. Following the introduction, the second section 
presents the main demographic trends until 2050. These come from United Nations’ 
demographic projections. It also indicates the implication of these developments on the 
evolution of the working-age and elderly populations. The long-term effects of 
demographic developments on pensions and health-care expenditures, and social 
security contributions are assessed in the third section of the paper. After that, in the 
fourth section, the evolution of debt levels is extrapolated assuming that the tax burden 
and non-age related primary expenditures remain constant as a share of GDP at the 2005 
level over the projection period, the interest-growth rate differential remains around zero, 
and age-related expenditures evolve in line with the projections. The assumptions 
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regarding age-related expenditures, initial budget position and the interest-growth 
differential from the baseline scenario is then relaxed in order to test the sensitivity of 
results to the underlying assumptions. Synthetic indicators of required adjustment effort 
are also calculated. The results made it possible to verify whether, in the long-run, the 
sustainability of public finances can be preserved in light of the ageing population. The 
final section concludes and indicates the avenues of possible improvements in the 
assessment of long-term analysis of public finance sustainability in light of population 
ageing in Croatia. 
 
 
2  Demographic Projections 
 
2.1  Underlying Assumptions 
 
The age-related expenditure and social security contribution projections presented in the 
paper are based on demographic projections prepared by the United Nations (United 
Nations, 2003). Although criticized by Croatian experts, these are still the only available 
official demographic projections for Croatia, which explains their use in the paper1. 
Within the EU, budgetary implications posed by ageing populations used to be assessed 
on the basis of the demographic projections prepared by national statistics institutes, and 
the most recent assessments are made using the demographic projections prepared by 
Eurostat (Economic Policy Committee 2003, 2001). The same source of data for 
demographic projections should guarantee the use of the same methodology and thus the 
comparability of demographic projections for all of EU member states. In the near future, 
Eurostat should make demographic projections for all EU countries, both old and new, as 
well as Bulgaria and Rumania, and four EFTA countries (Economic Policy Committee, 
2003.) Unfortunately, Eurostat has no plans to produce demographic projections for 
Croatia as a new candidate country yet. 
 
The United Nations have prepared six demographic projection variants, four of which are 
available on the web. These four variants – medium variant, high variant, low variant 
and constant-fertility variant, will be used in this paper when assessing the fiscal 
implications of demographic changes, with medium variant taken as a starting point for 
the baseline scenario. The demographic projection variants differ among themselves with 
                                                 
1 There are, however, several demographic projections carried out by independent experts, e.g. 
Mrđen (2004), Grizelj (2004) and Rozga (2003). 
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respect to the assumptions made regarding the future course of fertility (United Nations, 
2003). 
 
The different projection variants can be described by the underlying assumptions, and 
the most important of them are presented in Table 1. It can be seen that in all the 
variants, except the high variant, fertility rates are too low to ensure a natural 
replacement of the population or to stabilize its age structure. In the medium variant, the 
fertility rate will, in the period 2005-2010, stand at 1.7, and will go up to 1.9 in the 
period 2045-2050. These fertility rates are similar to ones in the EU, where the average 
fertility rate stood at 1.5 in 2000, and is projected to rise to 1.8 in 2050 (Economic Policy 
Committee, 2001.) 
 
Life expectancy at birth is expected to increase over the projection period from 74.1 years 
for men and 78.6 years for women in the period 2005-2010 to 76.6 years for men and 
82.6 years for women in the period 2045-2050. For the EU, average life expectancy at 
birth for men is projected to rise from 75.3 in 2000 to 80.5 years in 2050, and for women 
from 81.4 in 2000 to 85.5 years in 2050. 
 
Table 1.  Demographic projections, underlying assumptions for all variants 
Medium variant High variant  
2005-2010 2045-2050 change 2005-2010 2045-2050 change 
Total fertility rate1 1.67 1.85 0.18 1.81 2.35 0.54 
Life expectancy (both sexes) 74.9 79.6 4.7 74.9 79.6 4.7 
Male life expectancy 74.1 76.6 5.5 74.1 76.6 5.5 
Female life expectancy 78.6 82.6 4.0 78.6 82.6 4.0 
Population growth rate (%) -0.26 -0.58 -0.32 -0.16 -0.11 0.05 
Net migration (thousands) -5 -5 -5 -5 -5 -5 
 
Low variant Constant-fertility variant  
2005-2010 2045-2050 change 2005-2010 2045-2050 change 
Total fertility rate1 1.53 1.35 -0.18 1.60 1.60 0.00 
Life expectancy (both sexes) 74.9 79.6 4.7 74.9 79.6 4.7 
Male life expectancy 74.1 76.6 5.5 74.1 76.6 5.5 
Female life expectancy 78.6 82.6 4.0 78.6 82.6 4.0 
Population growth rate (%) -0.35 -1.04 -0.69 -0.31 -0.85 -0.54 
Net migration (thousands) -5 -5 -5 -5 -5 -5 
 
Note: 1children per woman. 
Source: UN, 2003. 
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Unlike in EU countries, for which the net inward migration of 0.2% of total population 
throughout the projection period is predicted, Croatia is expected to have a permanent 
net outward migration of more than 0.1% of its total population2.  
 
 
2.2  Main Trends 
 
As result of these demographic developments, the size of the Croatian population falls in 
all the demographic projection variants, with the size of the population being almost 20 
percent lower in 2050 than in 2005, according to the medium demographic projection 
variant (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2.  Total population and evolution of demographic 
             dependency ratios for all demographic projection variants 
Medium variant High variant  
2005 2050 change 2005-2010 2045-2050 change 
Total population 4405 3581 -824 4420 4022 398 
Median age 40.2 44.9 4.7 40.0 40.6 0.6 
Elderly1  
(as % of total population) 17.0 25.0 8.1 16.9 22.3 5.4 
Working age population2 
(as % of total population) 66.5 59.1 -7.4 66.2 58.0 -8.2 
Old age dependency ratio3 25.5 42.3 16.8 25.5 38.5 13.0 
Share of older workers in 
working age population4 16.8 21.2 4.4 16.8 19.3 2.5 
Very old as % of elderly5 18.1 30.4 12.3 18.1 30.5 12.4 
  
Low variant Constant-fertility variant  
2005 2050 change 2005-2010 2045-2050 change 
Total population 4391 3192 -1199 4398 3355 -1043 
Median age 40.3 49.2 8.9 40.2 47.3 7.1 
Elderly1  
(as % of total population) 17.0 28.3 11.3 17.0 26.8 9.8 
Working age population2 
(as % of total population) 66.7 59.9 -6.8 66.6 59.6 -6.9 
Old age dependency ratio3 25.5 46.9 21.4 25.5 44.9 19.4 
Share of older workers in 
working age population4 16.8 23.5 6.7 16.8 22.4 5.6 
Very old as % of elderly5 18.1 30.5 12.4 18.1 30.5 12.4 
 
Notes: 1Population aged 65+; 2Population aged 15-64; 3Population aged 65+ as % of population aged 15-64; 
4Population aged 55-64 as % of population aged 15-64; 5Population aged 80+ as % of population aged 65+. 
Source: UN, 2003; author's calculations. 
 
                                                 
2 Contrary to that, some authors e.g. Mrđen (2004) argue that net inward migration can be expected 
in Croatia in next three decades. 
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The number of elderly persons aged 65 and above will rise by almost 20 percent, as 
presented in Graph 1, and their share in the total population will grow from 17 percent 
in 2005 to 25 percent in 2050 (in the medium variant). For the sake of comparison, the 
increase in elderly persons in EU member countries is projected to be much higher, or 
some 70 percent.  
 
At the same time, the working age population (persons aged between 15 and 64) is 
projected to fall by almost 30 percent and its share in the total population to decline from 
67 percent in 2005 to 59 percent in 2050. The labour force itself is going to be older, too, 
with the share of workers aged between 55 and 64 in the total workforce increasing by 4 
percentage points. The drop in the working age population in the EU between 2000 and 
2050 is projected to be some 18 percent. 
 
Graph 1.  Projected size of the working age and elderly population 
              for the medium demographic projection variant (in thousands) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Working age population refers to persons aged 15 to 64. 
Elderly population refers to persons aged 65 and above. 
Source: UN, 2003; author’s projections. 
 
 
The old-age dependency ratio (defined as persons aged over 65 as a percentage of the 
working age population) is, according to the medium variant, going to rise from 26 
percent in 2005 to 42 percent in 2050, a development which is quite similar to the 
European average, where the old-age dependency ratio is projected to grow from 24 
percent in 2000 to 49 percent in 2050. This means that in Croatia, the number of persons 
of working age for every elderly person aged 65 and over will go down from 4 to 2.4 and 
in the EU the same number will go down to only 2 persons. 
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The number of the very old (population aged 80 or more) is, according to the medium 
variant, going to double (from 135 thousand in 2005 to 272 thousand in 2050). 
Although this rise could have a significant impact on public spending on health and 
long-term care for the elderly, this development is far less dramatic than in the EU, 
where the number of very old is projected to triple from 2000 to 2050. 
 
It has to be stressed that long-term population projections must always be taken with 
caution. In the special Croatian case, were there is only one official source of 
demographic projections, and where the projections it offers cannot be compared to data 
from other sources, even greater caution is needed when using the data. Therefore, the 
development of national demographic projections currently underway within the 
Croatian Bureau of Statistics must be welcomed, and the assessment of the fiscal 
implications of demographic changes should be revised once the population scenarios 
developed by the national statistics institution become available3.  
 
 
3  Effects of Demographic Changes on Government  
    Revenues and Expenditures 
 
The Economic Policy Committee working group on ageing populations assesses possible 
effects of demographic changes on government revenues and expenditures by making 
long-term projections of the so-called age-related expenditures, such as public pension 
expenditures, health and long-term care expenditures and education expenditures. For 
the sake of consistency, it also includes unemployment benefit in its assessment, 
although this is not considered to be related to ageing.  
 
In this paper, Croatian long-term fiscal sustainability will be assessed by projecting 
elements of both expenditures and revenues. Among the expenditure items, the analysis 
will include public pension expenditures and health expenditures, and among the 
revenue items pension contributions and other social security contributions.  
 
The standard methodology does not take account of the development of public revenues 
in light of ageing populations, since the age structure of the population is not seen as the 
key determinant of their size and evolution. The reasoning behind this is as follows. 
Firstly, pensioners pay income taxes which can increase collected tax revenues. Secondly, 
                                                 
3 This information can be found in Grizelj (2004). 
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it is argued that older workers, whose share in the working-age population rises, earn 
higher wages than young workers, thereby compensating for the negative effect of the 
decreasing working-age population on taxes. Recent studies on consequences of ageing 
populations on tax revenues confirm that population ageing can have ambiguous effects 
on tax revenues. Finally, the experience shows that the level of public spending is the 
main determinant of tax revenues as a share of GDP4. 
 
There are, however, two reasons for taking into account the development of social 
security contributions in the Croatian case, the first one being the fact that social security 
contributions are paid only by those employed, and not by pensioners. In addition, even 
if the older workers earned higher wages in the future, the amount of collected social 
security contributions would probably not be high enough to offset the loss of 
contributions due to the falling number of younger employees, since, unlike taxes, social 
security contributions are regressive in their nature. In addition, a projection of pension 
contributions should be made to capture the effects of pension reform on collected 
pension contributions. 
 
There are some other expenditure items in Croatia that could be sensitive to demographic 
changes, such as expenditure on unemployment benefit, child benefit and maternity 
leave, and also education expenditures, but at the moment it seems that their projection 
would have to consider non-demographic factors driving public spending, which are very 
hard to project. Therefore, the projection of these expenditure items is left for some other 
projection exercise.  
 
 
3.1  Macroeconomic Assumptions 
 
Long-run projections of government expenditures and revenues are based on 
macroeconomic assumptions regarding labour force participation rates, unemployment 
rates, real GDP rates and CPI inflation.  
 
Labour force participation rates up to 2010 are, in accordance with the EPC working 
group on ageing populations methodology, based on projections by the ILO (1997). 
Participation rates for men are constant for all age groups. The participation rate for 
                                                 
4 Review of the main findings of studies on consequences of ageing populations on government 
revenues can be found in Economic Policy Committee (2003, p. 20). 
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women in the 15-54 age group are assumed to converge by 2050 to within 10 percentage 
points of the participation rate for men in the same age group. The participation rates for 
women in the 55-64 age group is allowed to converge by 2050 to within 20 percentage 
points of the participation rate for men in the same group (see Table 3). 
 
Table 3.  Labour market participation rates used in projections 
15-54 55-64 65+  
2005 2050 change 2005 2050 change 2005 2050 change 
Male 82.3 85.0 2.7 41.3 45.0 3.7 14.6 12.0 -2.6 
Female 69.0 75.0 6.0 18.5 25.0 6.5 7.0 6.0 -1.0 
 
Note: Participation rate = active population as a % of working-age population. 
Source: ILO, 1997; author’s projections. 
 
 
Unemployment rates are assumed to fall from 17 percent in 2005 to 7 percent in 2050. 
In EPC working group on ageing populations methodology, unemployment rates are 
assumed to fall to their structural level, as defined by the OECD, by 2005 and to stay 
constant thereafter (Economic Policy Committee, 2001). For Croatia, there are no 
estimates of structural unemployment rate available. It is assumed that by 2050 Croatia 
could reach an unemployment level of 7 percent, equal to the structural unemployment 
rate of EU member countries with the highest structural unemployment rates. 
 
Higher participation rates and lower unemployment rates will offset some of the impact 
of demographic developments on the balance between economically active and inactive 
persons who must be supported. Therefore, the potential fiscal influence of ageing does 
not so much depend on the old-age dependency ratio, but more on the potential and 
effective economic dependency ratios, the potential economic dependency ratio being the 
number of potentially inactive persons as a percentage of the total labour force, and the 
effective economic dependency ratio being the number of unemployed persons as a 
percentage of the number of persons employed. These dependency ratios are calculated 
for Croatia, based on labour force assumptions, and presented in Graph 2.  
 
As is shown in the graph, the effective economic dependency ratio is projected to fall 
until 2020, and then to rise reaching its initial level in 2050. In the same period, the old-
age dependency ratio is expected to rise throughout the projection period, and at the end 
of the projection period to increase by two-thirds compared to the initial level.  
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The real gross domestic product is projected to grow 3.5 percent annually, and the labour 
market productivity in the baseline scenario is projected to grow by 2.8 percent on 
average annually. It is expected that the annual inflation rate will remain stable at 2.5 
percent.  
 
Graph 2.  Projected demographic and economic dependency ratios 
              for the medium demographic projection variant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Potential economic dependency ratio = population aged 15+ not in the labour force as a % of the number of 
persons in the labour force. 
Effective economic dependency ratio = persons aged 15+ who are not employed as a % of number of persons 
employed. 
Source: UN, 2003; author’s projections. 
 
 
3.2  Effects of Demographic Changes 
       on Public Pension Expenditures 
 
As for the possible effects of demographic changes on public pension expenditures, 
Croatia has a rather unique position in Europe, since it launched pension reform in 1998 
aimed at reducing fiscal pressure resulting from the existing PAYG system, and 
introduced a three-pillar pension system in 2002. The pension system in Croatia now 
consists of a downscaled PAYG pension pillar, a mandatory fully-funded pillar, and a 
voluntary fully-funded pillar5. Due to pension reform, in the future, one can expect 
diminishing public spending on pensions expressed as a share of GDP, in spite of the 
rising number of elderly. However, in the same period, due to the reduction of the rate of 
                                                 
5 More information on Croatian Pension Reform can be found in Anusic, O'Keefe, Madjarevic-Sujster 
(2003). 
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pension contributions for those that entered the second pillar (individuals below the age 
of 40 as of July 2000 and employees between the ages of 40 and 50 as of July 2000 who 
chose to join the multi-pillar system), the revenues from pension contributions will also 
go down, so that this effect should not be neglected when projecting future fiscal trends.  
 
The starting point for the projection of public pension expenditures was the projection of 
the number of pensioners. In the last decade, the Croatian pension system has faced a 
huge inflow of pensioners, and the immense resulting deterioration of the so-called 
system dependency ratio (the ratio between contributors to the pension system and 
pensioners). The inflow of pensioners was not driven by demographic factors, but was 
predominantly influenced by economic (transition and privatisation influenced 
restructuring) and political factors (war). In the future, it is expected that economic and 
political forces driving early retirement will vanish and, in addition, that new legislation 
regulating normal retirement and early retirement age, as well as access to the system of 
disability and survivors pension, would put further restrictions on the retirement of 
persons of younger age groups. The share of pensioners younger than 55 is assumed to 
diminish gradually from 11 percent in 2005 to 3 percent in 2050, and the share of 
pensioners younger than 65 is expected to fall from 44 percent in 2005 to 30 percent in 
2050. As a result of such assumptions, the number of pensioners should first rise until 
2015, and then fall since the reduction in the number of early retired persons is projected 
to counterbalance the rise in the number of pensioners stemming from the population 
aged 65 and over (see Graph 3). 
 
This projection is much more optimistic than the one found in Anusic, O’Keefe and 
Madjarevic-Sujster (2003), and which projects a constant rise in the number of 
pensioners, and is slightly more optimistic than the one that can be found in Marušić 
(2001), which expects a decline in the number of pensioners after 2020. The idea behind 
the optimism regarding the development of the number of pensioners in this paper is 
that one cannot expect high inflows of pensioners in the next few years, since many of 
those who would reach the normal retirement age during this period, have already been 
retired through various pension buy-out schemes, early retirement schemes or as war 
veterans.  
 
For the projection of public pension expenditures it was also necessary to incorporate in 
the projection the number of persons aged 40 to 50, as of July 2000, who did not opt for 
the multi-pillar pension system and will, therefore, receive a pension from the first pillar. 
For this purpose, this projection exercise made use of the information that 77 percent of 
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employed persons aged 40 to 50 as of July 2000 did not opt for the multi-pillar pension 
system. 
 
Graph 3.  Projected number of pensioners (in thousands) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: UN, 2003; author’s projections. 
 
 
The projection of public pension expenditures is based on the projection of the number of 
pensioners, both those in the first pillar and those in the multi-pillar system. It also takes 
into account the corresponding formulas for the calculation of benefits6 as well as the 
indexation at wages introduced at the beginning of 2004. The average gross pension in 
the initial period is expected to be some 2,200 kuna. 
 
Public pension expenditures are calculated for the baseline scenario, in which average 
gross wages grow 6 percent annually, and for two alternative scenarios. In the high 
average wage growth scenario, wages are assumed to grow at 7 percent annually, i.e. the 
rate of average wage growth is higher than the nominal GDP growth. In the low average 
                                                 
6 For those insured only in the first pillar, the following formula is applied:  
(1) Amount of pension = actual pension value ∗ personal points ∗ pension factor.  
For those insured in both mandatory pillars, a two part formula is applied. For years of service 
in the old system, the benefit is calculated in the same way as for those insured only in the 
first pillar, and for years of service in the new system the so-called basic pension is calculated 
in accordance with the following formula:  
(2)  Basic pension = 0.25 ∗ actual pension value ∗ personal points ∗ personal factor + 0.0025 ∗ 
average wage in Croatia in 1998 indexed at the same rate as the actual pension value ∗ years 
of service in the new system. 
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wage growth rate scenario, average wage growth is 5 percent annually. Results of the 
projection are presented in Table 4. 
 
Table 4.  Projected public pension expenditures 
             in different scenarios (as % of GDP) 
 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 change 
Baseline scenario 13.1 13.6 13.5 13.1 12.0 10.4 9.2 8.0 7.0 6.3 -6.8 
High average wage 
growth scenario 13.2 14.4 14.9 15.1 14.1 12.9 11.8 10.5 9.4 8.7 -4.6 
Low average wage 
growth scenario 13.0 12.8 12.2 11.3 10.0 8.4 7.1 6.1 5.3 4.7 -8.3 
 
Source: Author's estimates. 
 
 
Projected public pension expenditures are expected to fall in all scenarios, the decreases 
ranging from 4.6 to 8.3 percentage points of GDP. Such developments result from the 
application of new legislation introduced with pension reform. The projection exercise 
presented in this paper projects public pension expenditures in 2040 to reach 8 percent of 
GDP, while in the projection made by Anusic, O’Keefe and Madjarevic-Sujster (2003), the 
comparable figure is 8.2 percent of GDP, while in the projection made by Marusic (2001), 
public pension spending is projected to be around 6 percent. 
 
In the EU, public pension expenditures are at the same time expected to grow around 5 
percentage points of GDP on average (Economic Policy Committee, 2003). Such a 
difference in results between Croatia and the EU can be explained by two factors. Firstly, 
most EU countries rely on PAYG pension schemes. Secondly, EU countries expect a large 
inflow of pensioners belonging to the so-called baby-boom generation in the next decade, 
while in Croatia the members of the baby-boom generation are mostly already retired.  
 
To discern the effect of population ageing on public pension expenditures from other 
factors, it is useful to decompose the results of the pension spending projection according 
to the four explanatory factors driving the projected changes in its share of GDP. These 
four factors are population ageing effect measuring changes in the ratio of persons aged 
55 and over to the population aged 15 to 64, employment effect measuring changes in 
the share of the population of working age that are employed, eligibility effect measuring 
the share of the population aged 55 and over that receive a pension, and benefit effect 
measuring changes in the average pension relative to output per worker.  
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Table 5 compares the changes in each of these ratios between 2005 and 20507. It is 
obvious that the ageing effect is the only force driving public pension expenditures 
upwards, and, with other ratios remaining at their initial level, the pure effect of 
population ageing will result in an increase in pension spending in terms of GDP by 6.5 
percentage points.  
 
Table 5.  Four key ratios to decomposing the growth 
             in pension expenditures in the baseline scenario 
 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 % change 
Dependency ratio1 42.3 45.1 50.4 51.5 53.6 54.4 58.4 60.9 62.7 63.5 50.1 
Inverse of 
employment ratio2 163.2 161.1 152.1 147.7 145.0 144.2 145.0 145.7 145.0 143.6 -12.0 
Benefit ratio3 21.9 21.8 21.7 21.5 19.7 17.5 14.5 12.1 10.2 9.0 -58.7 
Eligibility ratio4 86.7 85.7 80.9 79.8 78.1 75.7 74.9 74.1 75.3 75.9 -12.4 
 
Notes: 1Dependency ratio = population aged 55+ as % of population aged 15-64; 2Inverse of employment ratio = 
population aged 15 to 64 as % of number of persons employed; 3Benefit ratio = average pension as % of GDP per 
person employed; 4Eligibility ratio = number of pension beneficiaries as % of persons aged 55+. 
Source: Author's estimates. 
 
 
3.3  Effects of Demographic Changes on Public Expenditures 
       on Health and Long-Term Care 
 
The expenditures on health and long-term care are considered to be highly related to age 
and therefore are projected within the assessments of long-term fiscal implications of 
ageing. According to the standard methodology, public expenditures on health and long-
term care should be projected separately. In the case of Croatia, however, it is not 
possible to disentangle long-term care expenditures and total healthcare expenditures. 
Therefore, long-term care expenditures will be for the purpose of this paper considered as 
part of health expenditures. For the sake of simplicity, it will also be assumed that the 
age profiles for public expenditures on long-term care correspond to those for public 
expenditures on healthcare.  
 
Since there are, unfortunately, no data available on age profiles for public expenditures 
on healthcare in Croatia, this exercise will be based on the assumption that average 
                                                 
7 The following equation is used:  
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Employment
Population
Population
Population
Population
Pensioners
EmploymentGDP
tsionBenefiAveragePen
GDP
endingPensionsSp )6415(*
)6415(
)55(*
)55(
*
/
−
−
+
+=
. 
For further information see Dang et al. (2001). 
  119
expenditures per head on healthcare for different age groups (expressed as a share of 
GDP per capita) correspond to the typical age distribution of healthcare expenditures in 
EU member countries. Justification for such an assumption can be found in the fact that 
average expenditures per head on healthcare for different age groups are quite similar 
across EU countries, so that one can believe that the age distribution of healthcare 
expenditures in Croatia could not significantly differ from the European pattern.8 Due to 
the fact that projections started from an estimation of the age profiles for public 
expenditures on health and long-term care, and not from the exact data, in order to avoid 
the stacking of miscalculations, it is taken that there are no significant differences 
between the age profiles for males and females. 
 
The distribution of average expenditures per head on healthcare in Croatia is estimated 
on the basis of the average distribution in EU countries, but applying this distribution to 
total expenditures on health and long-term care in Croatia. The figure for the total 
expenditures on healthcare refers to 2001, since this is the most recent year for which 
official data on healthcare expenditures are available. In 2001, the total expenditures on 
health and long-term care in Croatia were as high as 8.2 percent of GDP, which is rather 
high compared to the European weighted average of 6.6 percent of GDP in 2000. The 
estimated age profiles for public expenditures on health and long-term care in Croatia are 
presented on Graph 4. 
 
The projection of public expenditures on health and long-term care in Croatia is carried 
out using the assumption that expenditures per head on health and long-term care grow 
at exactly the same rate as GDP per capita. The relative magnitudes of expenditures per 
head across age groups are considered to be the same in all projection years, and to be 
the same as in the base year profiles. Projections are made for all the four demographic 
projection variants and presented in Table 6.  
 
According to the results obtained, the pure consequence of demographic changes on 
expenditures on health and long-term care over the projection period would be around 
1.3 percentage points of GDP in the medium variant, i.e. between 0.8 and 1.8 percentage 
points in other demographic projection variants. The result is somewhat more optimistic 
than the one obtained for the EU countries, where ageing is projected to raise health and 
long-term care expenditures between 2000 and 2050 from 1.7 to 3.2 percentage points of 
                                                 
8 In the recent study by Bezdĕk, Dybczak and Krejdl (2003) on fiscal implications of population 
ageing, we can see that the age distribution of healthcare expenditures in the Czech Republic is also 
very similar to the typical age distribution of healthcare expenditures in the old EU countries.  
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GDP or 2.2 percentage points on average, when calculated using the same approach as 
the one in the projection of health and long-term care expenditures for Croatia (European 
Policy Committee, 2003). 
 
Graph 4.  Estimated age profiles for public expenditures 
              on health and long-term care 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author's estimates. 
 
 
Table 6.  Projected public expenditures on health and long-term care 
             for all demographic projection variants (as % of GDP) 
 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 change 
Medium variant 8.2 8.4 8.7 8.7 8.8 8.9 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.5 1.3 
High variant 8.2 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.7 8.9 9.0 9.1 9.1 9.0 0.8 
Low variant 8.2 8.4 8.6 8.8 8.9 9.2 9.4 9.7 9.8 10.0 1.8 
Constant-fertility 
variant 8.2 8.4 8.6 8.7 8.9 9.1 9.3 9.5 9.7 9.8 1.6 
 
Source: Author's estimates. 
 
 
It should be stressed that the projections of the development of health and long-term care 
costs in Croatia should be taken with caution, since they result from the application of a 
large number of assumptions. It would therefore be important that institutions in Croatia 
(e.g. the Croatian Institute for Health Insurance) provide data that are necessary for 
better quality results of such analysis, in particular data on health and long-term care 
expenditures by age groups.  
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The approach used in this exercise is relatively simple, but has at least one drawback. It 
ignores the concentration of health expenditures at the end of life irrespective of age at 
death, and tends to overestimate the impact of demographic changes on overall 
expenditure level. Therefore, the Economic Policy Committee working group on ageing 
populations suggests producing the optional scenario that takes account of the 
concentration of health expenditures towards the end of life. Such a scenario implies 
running projections which include estimates of so-called death-related costs. Although 
the results of such projections would be interesting for Croatia, their production requires 
a higher reliability of input data than in the Croatian case, and they cannot be carried out 
within the current exercise.  
 
 
3.4  Effects of Demographic Changes on Revenues 
       From Social Security Contributions 
 
As previously mentioned, in the case of Croatia it also seems reasonable to run 
projections of the long-term effects of ageing on revenues from social security 
contributions. Two projections have been made, one for the contributions for pension 
insurance, and one for all other types of contributions. The contributions for health and 
unemployment are treated together because they share the same calculation base and 
differ only in the rates applied.  
 
As for the revenues from pension contributions, they are based on the projection of the 
number of employees in the first pillar only, for which a 20-percent rate is applied, and 
on the projection of the number of employees in the multi-pillar system, for which a 15-
percent rate is applied. It is assumed that average gross wages will develop 
proportionally for both groups of insured persons. It is also assumed that the compliance 
of contributions will gradually improve from the initial 85 percent to 94 percent in 2050 
(a similar assumption is made by Anusic, O’Keefe and Madjarevic-Sujster, 2003). 
 
The results of the projection presented in Table 7 reveal that the decrease in collected 
pension contributions, resulting from both changes in legislation and demographic 
developments, could be as high as 3.6 percentage points of GDP, i.e. between 3.1 and 4 
percent if the alternative demographic projections are also taken into account. 
 
The projection of revenues from other social security contributions is simple, and consists 
in applying statutory rates to the average gross wage of employed persons. It is also 
based on the assumption of gradually improved collection of contributions from 85 
percent in 2005 to 94 percent in 2050. 
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Table 7.  Projected revenues from pension contributions for all demographic 
             projection variants (as % of GDP) 
 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 change 
Medium variant 7.6 7.5 7.1 6.5 6.0 5.7 5.2 4.7 4.4 4.1 -3.6 
High variant 7.7 7.7 7.2 6.7 6.2 5.8 5.5 5.1 4.8 4.6 -3.1 
Low variant 7.7 7.7 7.2 6.6 6.0 5.6 5.1 4.6 4.1 3.7 -4.0 
Constant-fertility 
variant 7.7 7.7 7.2 6.6 6.1 5.6 5.2 4.7 4.3 3.9 -3.8 
 
Source: Author's estimates. 
 
 
Due to the reduction in the number of employed persons caused by demographic factors, 
other revenues from social security contributions will also fall according to the projection 
(see Table 8). In the scenario based on the medium demographic projection variant, the 
projected fall in collected revenues from other social security contributions amounts to 3 
percentage points of GDP over the projection period, and in alternative scenarios between 
2.5 and 3.5 percent. 
 
Table 8.  Projected revenues from other social security contributions 
             for all demographic projection variants (as % of GDP) 
 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 change 
Medium variant 7.7 7.8 7.6 7.4 6.9 6.6 5.9 5.4 5.0 4.7 -3.0 
High variant 7.8 8.0 7.8 7.5 7.1 6.7 6.3 5.9 5.5 5.3 -2.5 
Low variant 7.8 8.0 7.8 7.4 6.9 6.4 5.8 5.3 4.8 4.3 -3.5 
Constant-fertility 
variant 7.8 8.0 7.8 7.5 7.0 6.5 5.9 5.4 4.9 4.5 -3.3 
 
Source: Author's estimates. 
 
 
These simple calculations show that the pure effect of demographic changes together 
with the effect of the changes in legislation regulating pension contributions could lead 
to a significant reduction in collected social security contributions, which currently 
provide approximately one third of total general government revenues.  
 
Although the simulations of developments carried out in this exercise should not be 
considered as forecasts, but rather projections of possible outcomes, they may indicate 
that demographic changes could lead to important changes in the size and structure of 
government revenues and expenditures. The next section will try to assess the effects of 
these changes on the overall sustainability of public finances.  
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4  Assessment of the Sustainability of 
    Public Finances in Light of Ageing Populations 
 
After the so-called age-related expenditures are projected, as well as the revenues that 
could be treated as being determined by demographic developments in the Croatian case, 
it is possible to assess the long-run sustainability of public finances. For this purpose, 
standard methodology developed by the Economic Policy Committee working group on 
ageing populations will be applied. This methodology consists of a two-step procedure. 
In the first step, the evolution of the budget balances and debt levels is extrapolated on 
the basis of baseline projections. The second step consists of the calculation of different 
synthetic indicators of the required adjustment effort. Both sets of sustainability tests 
will be done for Croatia.  
 
 
4.1  Extrapolation of Debt and 
       Budget Balance Developments up to 2050 
 
First, the long-term sustainability of public finance will be assessed by extrapolating debt 
and budget balance developments up to 2050. As suggested by the EPC working group, 
sustainable public finances will be defined as those complying with the budgetary 
requirements of EMU, i.e. avoiding excessive deficits, keeping debt levels below the 60 
percent of GDP reverence value, and respecting the “close to balance or in surplus” 
requirement of the Stability and Growth Pact (European Policy Committee, 2001). A 
breach of the reference values for either budget balance or debt during the projection 
period indicates that there may be a risk of budgetary imbalances emerging due to ageing 
population and that measures may be required to ensure the sustainability of public 
finances (European Commission, 2003.) 
 
In order to verify whether current fiscal policy in Croatia meets the sustainability 
requirements in the long-run, several tests have been undertaken: a baseline test and 
seven stress tests. In accordance with standard methodology, a baseline test is run by 
extrapolating budget balances and debt levels on the basis of the baseline projections of 
age-related expenditures and revenues. The starting position in terms of the current 
budget balance, level of debt, primary spending and revenues other than social security 
contributions are the figures for 2005 reported by the Ministry of Finance in its Fiscal 
policy guidelines for 2005-07 period (“Načela fiskalne politike za razdoblje 2005. – 2007. 
godine”, Ministry of Finance, 2004). 
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It is further assumed that revenues other than social security contributions as well as 
non-age related primary expenditures will remain stable as a share of GDP at the 2005 
level over the projection period, interest-growth differential remains at around zero9, and 
age-related expenditures and social security contributions evolve in line with previously 
presented projections. Seven stress tests have been carried out in order to test the 
sustainability of public finances under different circumstances. Three stress tests are run 
using different demographic projection variants. The other two stress tests are done by 
setting the initial total and primary budget balance at a level 1 percentage point 
more/less favourable compared with the baseline scenario. The remaining two stress 
tests assume the interest rate-growth rate differential as being higher/lower by 1 
percentage point.  
 
The budget balances that result from the extrapolation up to 2050 are presented in Table 
9, and the debt levels in Graph 5. It is obvious that in every scenario the fiscal balance, 
already rather unfavourable in the initial period, deteriorates even further as a 
consequence of pure demographic changes. In the baseline scenario, the budget balance 
resulting from the projections reaches a level of 11.8 percent of GDP, and a level of debt 
of 167 percent of GDP in 2050.  
 
Table 9.  Projected budget deficits in different scenarios (as % of GDP) 
 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
Baseline scenario -3.7 -5.5 -6.9 -8.1 -9.0 -8.9 -10.0 -10.5 -11.1 -11.8 
High demographic variant -3.7 -5.1 -6.2 -7.3 -7.9 -7.8 -7.8 -7.8 -7.6 -7.5 
Low demographic variant -3.7 -5.1 -6.3 -7.6 -8.6 -9.0 -9.6 -10.3 -11.2 -12.3 
Constant-fertility demographic 
variant -3.7 -5.1 -6.3 -7.6 -8.4 -8.7 -9.2 -9.8 -10.4 -11.3 
Higher interest-growth 
differential -3.7 -7.0 -8.9 -10.7 -12.4 -13.4 -15.2 -17.0 -18.9 -21.2 
Lower interest-growth 
differential -3.7 -4.2 -5.1 -5.7 -5.9 -5.2 -5.5 -5.4 -5.3 -5.4 
Better initial budget balance -2.7 -4.6 -5.6 -6.3 -6.7 -6.1 -6.4 -6.4 -6.4 -6.5 
Worse initial budget balance -4.7 -6.6 -8.2 -9.4 -10.4 -10.4 -11.2 -11.8 -12.3 -13.0 
 
Source: Author's estimates. 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 A nominal interest rate of 6 percent is assumed, and a nominal growth rate of 6.1 percent resulting 
from the assumption of 2.5 percent inflation and 3.5 percent real growth rate. A 6 percent nominal 
interest rate is also assumed in EPC working group projections. 
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The budget balance remains negative throughout the projection period in all scenarios 
even though the simulations are based on a projection of the budget balance for 2005 
that assumes fiscal consolidation and improvement of the budget balance compared to 
the preceding year. The most dramatic developments can be expected if the interest rate 
increases above the level of the nominal growth rate, in which scenario the budget 
balance could reach 21 percent of GDP in 2050. Very high levels of deficit would also 
result from a higher initial budget balance and fertility rates lower than in the medium 
demographic projection variant.  
 
Graph 5.  Projected public debt ratio in different scenarios 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author's estimates. 
 
Starting from 56 percent of GDP in 2005, the debt ratio breaches the debt requirement of 
60 percent of GDP already in 2010 in all the scenarios except the low interest-growth rate 
differential scenario, where the requirement is breached in 2015. The sustainability is at 
highest risk in the alternative scenario assuming a higher interest rate-growth rate 
differential, and this scenario leads to a debt ratio of 255 percent of GDP in 2050. High 
risk is also coupled with a worse initial budget balance and demographic developments 
resulting from low or constant fertility rates.  
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4.2  Synthetic Indicators of the Required Adjustment Efforts 
 
In accordance with standard methodology, there are different measures that provide an 
estimate of the scale of budgetary adjustment required for a sustainable public finance 
position to be reached.  
 
A first synthetic indicator considers the difference between the projected primary surplus 
based on the projections and the primary surplus necessary to ensure a balanced budget 
in all the years of the forecasts. Such a synthetic indicator is calculated for Croatia for the 
baseline scenario. The calculated required primary balance and the projected primary 
balance are shown in Graph 6. As can be seen from the graph, the difference between 
them is large over the entire projection period, and amounts to 2.7 to 4.7 percentage 
points of GDP.  
 
Graph 6.  Projected and required primary balance in the baseline scenario 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author's estimates. 
 
 
A second synthetic indicator is the measure of the tax (financing)10 gap. This measures 
the difference between the current tax ratio and the constant tax ratio over the projection 
                                                 
10 The EPC working group previously called these indicators “tax gaps”, but in its recent documents 
it suggests using the term “financing gap”, since the previously used term could lead to the wrong 
conclusion that it is the tax ratio that should be changed if the public finance position proves to be 
unsustainable in the long-run. Instead, the positive financing gap should be considered as an 
indication that an appropriate combination is needed of changes on both the revenue and the 
expenditure side of the budget. 
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period necessary to achieve a pre-determined debt level at a specified date in the future. 
The EPC working group calculates three gaps. T-1 measures the difference between the 
current and constant tax ratio required to reach the same debt level in 2050 that would 
result from a balanced budget position being maintained over the entire projection 
period. T-2 measures the difference between the current and constant tax ratio required 
to reach a debt level of 40 percent of GDP in 2050. The T-3 measure is similar to tax gap 
measures found in economic literature based on the present value budget constraint. It 
indicates the change in tax revenues as a share of GDP that would guarantee compliance 
with the intertemporal budget constraints of the government. It equates the actualised 
flow of revenues and expenditures over an infinite horizon (Economic Commission, 
2003; Economic Policy Committee, 2003). 
 
For Croatia, all three financing gap measures are calculated. In addition, a fourth 
financing gap measure is included, measuring the difference between the current and 
constant tax ratio required to reach a debt level of 60 percent of GDP in 2050. The 
calculated indicators measure the required change in government revenues (as a 
percentage of GDP) other than revenues from social security contributions, since those 
revenues are projected separately and treated as being dependent on demographic 
changes.  
 
The results of the calculation of financing gaps are shown in Table 10.11 A positive 
financing gap implies that revenues other than social security contributions should be 
increased, or that non-age related expenditures should be reduced, or that further 
                                                 
11 The applied formula for the T-1 to T-3 financing gaps is as follows: 
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where gNAR is the actual share of non-age related expenditures on GDP (assumed to remain 
constant), ssc is the share of social security contributions on GDP, gAR the share of age-related 
expenditures on GDP, b debt ratio, r is the nominal interest rate, and n is the nominal growth rate 
(both assumed to be constant). 
The formula for the T-4 gap is as follows: 
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where τ is the actual share of tax revenues on GDP (assumed to remain constant), and gP is a share 
of primary expenditures on GDP (assumed to remain constant after 2050). 
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reforms of the pension or healthcare system should be undertaken in order to reduce the 
impact of ageing on government expenditures.  
 
Table 10.  Financing gap indicators in different scenarios (as % of GDP) 
 T-11 T-22 T-33 T-44 
Baseline scenario 3.7 2.9 2.3 2.4 
High demographic variant 3.1 2.2 0.7 1.8 
Low demographic variant 3.9 3.1 3.6 2.6 
Constant-fertility demographic variant 3.7 2.9 3.0 2.5 
Higher interest-growth differential 4.3 3.8 4.9 3.5 
Lower interest-growth differential 3.2 1.9 -1.1 1.2 
Better initial budget balance 2.6 2.8 1.3 1.3 
Worse initial budget balance 4.7 3.9 3.3 3.4 
 
Notes: 1T-1 = difference between the current and constant tax ratio required to reach the debt level in 2050 that 
would result from a balanced budget position over the entire projection period, 2T-2 = difference between the 
current and constant tax ratio required to reach a debt level of 40 percent of GDP in 2050; 3T-3 = difference 
between the current and constant tax ratio required to reach a debt level of 60 percent of GDP in 2050; 4T-4 = 
change in tax ratio that would ensure the intertemporal budget constraints of the government were respected.  
Source: Author's estimates. 
 
 
The financing gaps, assuming positive values in all scenarios, indicate the necessity of 
fiscal adjustment if the sustainability of public finances is to be maintained in the long-
run. The size of the adjustment varies depending on the definition of sustainability, i.e. 
the choice of the reference value. If the goal of fiscal policy is a debt ratio in 2050 of the 
same size as that in the initial period, a fiscal adjustment of the size of 2.6 to 4.7 
percentage points of GDP (depending on the underlying assumptions) throughout the 
projection period is required. If the targeted debt ratio in 2050 is to meet the reference 
value of 40 percent of GDP, the required adjustment effort would be between 1.9 and 3.9 
percentage points of GDP. The third calculated financial gap suggests that the flow of 
revenues and expenditures would be equalized over an infinite horizon if a fiscal 
adjustment of 0.7 to 4.9 percentage points of GDP took place in all the years in the 
projection period. Only in the case of a negative difference between the interest and 
growth rate, could the intertemporal budget constraint of the government be obeyed even 
without any fiscal adjustment. The sustainability gap measured by the T-4 indicator is 
less strict than the one measured by the T-2 indicator, requiring the debt level to 
converge to 60 percent of GDP in 2050. As is shown in Table 8, an adjustment of the size 
of 1.2 to 3.4 percentage points of GDP would be needed for public finance to comply with 
such a sustainability requirement.  
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5  Conclusions 
 
The analysis presented in this paper indicates that, in spite of the introduction of pension 
reform, Croatian public finances are highly sensitive to demographic changes. The long-
term sustainability tests reveal a clear risk of emerging budgetary imbalances caused not 
only by demographic changes, but also by the initial budgetary set-up. To insure 
sustainability, an improvement in the budget balance and debt reduction as soon as 
possible are essential. In order to minimize the negative budgetary implications of 
ageing, healthcare expenditures as a share of GDP should be reduced and better control 
should be achieved over public expenditures on health, especially by controlling the 
evolution of age-related expenditures. Efforts should be made to increase compliance of 
social security contributions. 
 
The budgetary implications of ageing should be permanently assessed, and efforts should 
be made in order to develop methodology and to include other age-related budgetary 
items in the assessment. In future assessments, non-demographic factors influencing the 
evolution of government expenditures and revenues should also be considered. It will be 
necessary to improve the statistical basis for the analysis, and also to take into 
consideration qualitative information while reaching policy conclusions. Additional 
sensitivity tests should also be carried out.  
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The Determinants of Wages in Croatia: 
Evidence from Earnings Regressions 
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Abstract 
The paper explores the determinants of wages in Croatia by using individual record data 
from the Labor Force Survey for the second half of 2003. Both ordinary least squares 
and quantile regression estimates of the returns to education, experience and gender are 
presented. The paper also presents occupation and regional effects on remuneration 
differentials. Special attention is given to the public-private sector wage gap and its 
variation across the wage distribution. The study finds that the average public sector 
wage premium is around 9%. Relatively low-paid workers benefit more from working in 
the public sector than high-paid workers do. The premium decreases with the education 
level. Conditional wages of the employees in education sector show that they are the 
worst positioned among public sector industries. Variance decomposition reveals 
education and occupation as two major observable causes of wage differentials in 
Croatia.  
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1  Introduction  
This paper analyzes the structure of wages in Croatia in the early 2000s using both OLS 
and quantile regression techniques. It aims to assess the returns to various individual 
characteristics, as well as the effect of observed job and employer attributes upon wages. 
Within this background, the emphasis is given to the returns to education and the public-
private sector wage gap.  
The determinants of wages estimated by earnings regressions have been under 
examination in developed countries for a long time. In the last decade, empirical research 
on the topic has been accompanied with studies for transition countries (see e.g. Orazem 
and Vodopivec, 1995; Rutkowski, 2001; Skoufias, 2003). In the case of Croatia, a 
majority of earnings analyses has been performed by looking at average wages, their 
evolution in time and cross-section comparisons, without explicit estimation of wage 
regressions. For example, Nestić, Lovrinčević and Mikulić (2001) compare average 
wages in public administration and manufacturing industry in Croatia and observe higher 
average wages in public sector. They conclude that one of the reasons for that is higher 
education of employees in that sector, but they did not estimate the impact. The only 
formal estimation of earnings functions for Croatia was undertaken by Bisogno (2000), 
with the input data for 1998 and by the use of OLS technique.  
Another strand of earnings analyses in Croatia was related to the public sector wages in 
the context of public administration reform and fiscal consolidation. World Bank (2002) 
reported that public sector wages in Croatia absorbed around 12% of GDP, much more 
than the average for the Central and Eastern European countries, and that this was more 
attributable to relatively high wages in public administration than to overstaffed public 
sector. One of the policy recommendations that followed was to contain public sector 
salaries. On the other side, unions claim that public sector employees are underpaid and 
that their relative position, compared to the private sector, has worsened recently. The 
main argument for the claim is found in the comparison of average wages in industry 
and pubic administration. The factors behind differences in the averages of private and 
public sector wages were completely left aside in this discussion.  
This paper goes well beyond average wages for certain groups of employees. It uses 
individual record data from the Labor Force Survey as a base for wage regressions and is 
intended to provide a detailed description of the determinants of wages in Croatia. 
Moreover, quantile regression techniques employed in the study allow for exploring the 
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effect of each of the explanatory variables across the whole distribution, rather than just 
the effect upon the mean like in least squares estimates. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the data sources and preliminary 
evidence on wage distribution in Croatia. Section 3 contains model specification. Section 
4 comments on the major findings in wage equation estimate such as the effects of 
education, experience, gender, occupation, firm size and location. The impact of each of 
the explanatory variable on the dispersion of conditional wage distribution is estimated 
as well. Section 5 is devoted to the public-private sector wage gap. In addition to the gap 
estimated in general case, gap is also estimated at various education levels, for males and 
females separately, for different coverage of public sector and for several most common 
occupations. The return to education is presented in the Section 6. Section 7 provides the 
results of variance decomposition aimed at estimation of relative importance of the 
different factors explaining wage inequality. Section 8 offers concluding comments. 
 
 
2  Data Description 
The data employed in this study was obtained from Labor Force Survey (LFS) for the 
second half of 2003. The survey was carried out by the Central Bureau of Statistics 
(CBS) and administered to a random sample of Croatians living throughout the country. 
It covered 7,070 households and 19,529 resident individuals of all ages and employment 
status. For the purpose of this study, the sample was restricted to those over 15 years of 
age, who were in paid employment and were not self-employed. The latter is because 
entrepreneurial skills and capital invested in self-employment generate remuneration that 
cannot be separated from payment for work. Occasional and family workers were 
excluded also as their earnings exhibit an unclear link to human capital attributes. A total 
of 4,825 individuals were left in the sample. The survey collects information on usual 
monthly wages on the main job (net of contributions and taxes) and hours of work 
usually performed per week, thus making it possible to obtain hourly wage rates. Hourly 
wages were preferred so as to compensate for possible differences in wages stemming 
from variations in working hours. There is also abundant information on individual 
characteristics such as gender, age, actual work experience and education but also on 
employer and job characteristics, among which we use firm size, industry, ownership 
status, occupation and working conditions.  
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Table 1.  Summary statistics of wage distribution 
 No. of obs. Mean wage per hour Std. dev. 
Median wage 
per hour q0.9/q0.1 q0.75/q0.25 
All 4825 21.26 11.25 18.75 2.80 1.77 
       
Females 2211 20.00 10.03 18.13 2.82 2.00 
Males 2614 22.32 12.09 20.00 2.89 1.73 
       
Public sector 2182 23.86 9.70 22.50 2.50 1.58 
Private sector 2643 19.11 11.98 15.63 2.96 1.75 
       
Unfinished primary 84 15.67 7.25 13.75 2.33 1.56 
Primary 632 15.92 7.86 14.88 2.19 1.50 
Voc. secondary 1630 17.94 7.95 16.25 2.57 1.75 
Gen. secondary 1501 20.84 8.81 20.00 2.40 1.60 
2-year college 372 27.13 13.39 25.00 2.14 1.43 
College graduate 563 32.96 13.83 30.00 2.63 1.50 
Postgraduate 43 46.80 20.37 43.75 2.67 1.36 
 
Data source: LFS 2003/II. 
 
 
 
Table 1 presents summary statistics of wage distribution for sampled individuals while 
means and standard deviations of variables used in the study can be found in Table A1 in 
the Appendix. There are 46% of women in the sample, and around 45% of employees are 
working in the public sector. It has to be noted that public/private sector distinction here 
is based on the ownership status.1 In that way, public sector is defined in a wide sense, 
enterprise included. About 15% of workers have got only primary school education or 
lower, while on the other hand, some college or postgraduate degree accounts for 21% of 
workers in the sample. Secondary education obviously prevails among Croatian workers.  
The average wage for workers from the sample is a little over 20 kuna per hour. The 
wage rate is, on average, higher for men than for women, and higher for public sector 
employees as compared to private sector employees. As expected, the higher the 
educational level, the higher the average wage rate associated with it. It can be noted that 
all the averages considered here are unconditional means, meaning that none of the 
                                                 
1 Such a classification follows from the survey questionnaire, where surveyed individuals 
(employees) are asked to position themselves among those “working in state-owned enterprises, 
institutions and organizations”, “working in enterprises undergoing the process of privatization”, 
and “working for employers in the private sector”. In this study, the first two categories (of which 
the second one is minor) are considered the public sector. Regardless of definition, relatively high 
portion of employment in the state-owned sector reminds once again on the disproportionate role 
of the Government in the economy, and to the need to give stronger role to the private sector as 
still-standing policy goal in Croatian transition to full-flaged market economy. 
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differences in the stock of human capital or job characteristics of selected groups were 
taken into account. The means are, however, sensitive to outliers. Therefore, median 
wages are also presented as well as selected quantile (percentile) ratios for specific 
groups. The median wage is lower than the mean wage for all groups, indicating that the 
distributions are skewed to the right. Quantile ratio 0.9/0.1 of 2.8 for the total sample 
seems rather low by the standards of industrialized countries, suggesting rather 
compressed distribution of hourly wages.2 Also, this may indicate a problem of 
underreporting, presumably more pronounced at the upper tail of the distribution. It 
seems that there are no striking differences in 0.9/0.1 and 0.75/0.25 quantile ratios 
between wage distributions for males and females, or between wage distributions for 
workers with different educational attainment. However, public sector wages seem less 
dispersed than private sector wages.  
A more informative comparison of distributions can be provided by quantile-quantile 
plot. This kind of graph relates quantiles of the variable on the vertical axis to quantiles 
of the variable on the horizontal axis. A point at the symmetry line indicates that a 
quantile of one distribution has the same value as the corresponding quantile of the other 
distribution. Figure 1 contains two plots of wage distributions separated by gender and 
sector. The upper panel of the figure provides quantile-quantile plot of distributions of 
log hourly wages for male and female workers. Most of the observations are slightly 
above the diagonal line, implying that wages for male workers are a bit higher than 
wages for female workers for comparable quantiles of wage distributions. At lower to 
middle quantiles the difference is quite small, but when approaching higher quantiles, the 
male/female wage gap becomes larger. In other words, among higher-paid workers there 
is a larger relative discrepancy between male and female wages than among lower-paid 
workers. The lower panel of Figure 1 shows a quantile-quantile plot of log wage 
distributions for public and private sector workers. It can be seen that public sector 
wages are higher than private sector wages at lower and middle quantiles, while at higher 
quantiles private sector workers are generally paid more. This evidence illustrates the 
importance of investigating wages at different points of distribution. 
 
                                                 
2 Gini coefficient of hourly wages calculated from our sample is 0.25, which is lower than in other 
transition countries, where it is around 0.30 as reported in Rutkowski (1991). Compressed wage 
distribution in Croatia is observed also in Rutkowski (2003). 
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Figure 1.  Quantile-quantile plots of empirical distributions 
 
(a)  Distributions of log wages for males and females 
 
 
 
 
(b)  Distributions of log wages for public and private sector workers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The observed (unconditional) wage differential between male and female or between 
public and private sector employees could be due to a difference in the stock of human 
capital, which further implies different productivity. As part of the preliminary evidence, 
Table 2 suggests that formal education could be an important factor in explaining sector-
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based wage differences. Observed higher wages in the public sector may be due to the 
fact that public sector employees are better educated than their counterparts in the private 
sector, at least if judged by the share of post-secondary education. However, it seems that 
education differences could not help much in explaining gender-based wage differentials 
as employed women are generally better educated than employed men. 
 
Table 2.  Educational attainment of employees by sector and gender (in %) 
 Private sector State sector Male Female 
Unfinished primary 1.8 1.7 2.3 1.1 
Primary 13.6 12.5 12.9 13.3 
Vocational secondary 41.8 24.1 42.8 23.2 
General secondary 30.7 31.6 25.9 37.3 
2-year college 4.7 11.4 6.3 9.4 
College graduate 7.2 17.0 8.8 15.0 
Post-graduate 0.2 1.7 1.0 0.8 
 
Data source: LFS 2003/II. 
 
 
 
3  Model Specification 
The earnings functions used in this study follow the standard Mincer-type specification 
(Mincer, 1974), where the log wage rate is regressed to the set of variables representing 
individual characteristics of workers, but also job and company characteristics. In 
addition to the model estimated by OLS, the quantile regressions are run to enable 
further insight into the structure of wages.  
Quantile regression techniques allow exploring the effect of each of the explanatory 
variables across the whole distribution, rather than just the effect upon the mean like in 
least squares estimates.3 An estimation procedure in the quantile regression model can be 
viewed as the problem of minimizing a sum of absolute residuals.4 To put it simply, the 
solution at different quantiles is found by asymmetrical weighting of absolute residuals. 
                                                 
3 The quantile regression model was originally introduced by Koenker and Bassett (1978). For the 
notion of quantile regressions, see Koenker and Hallock (2001), while for a more detailed 
exposition of recent advances in the technique see Bushinsky (1998). 
4 Quantile regression models are also known as least absolute value models (LAV or MAD) and 
L1-norm (from minimizing L1-norm of vector of deviations) models. Historically, the method of 
least absolute deviations was first proposed by renowned Croatian scientist Ruđer Bošković (aka 
Ruggero Giuseppe Boscovich) in his observations on the Earth’s flattening in 1757, even before the 
least squares work of Gauss in 1809. For a brief exposition of Bošković’ method see, for example, 
Teunissen (2000). 
 137 
For the estimation at lower quantiles, the higher weights are given to the negative 
residuals, and the opposite is done at upper quantiles. Unlike some other estimation 
procedures aimed to characterize different parts of distribution, here the estimation is 
performed using all available observations. 
The quantile regression model is formulated as 
(1) ,)|(lnQuant,ln θiiiiθii βXXWuβXW ′=+′= θθ
where ln Wi denote the log wage of worker i, Xi is a vector of explanatory variables, Xi1 ≡ 1, 
and βθ is a vector of coefficients. Quantθ ( lnW |X ) denotes θth conditional quantile of 
lnW, conditional on the regressor vector X. Partial derivative of the conditional quantile 
of lnW with respect to regressor j, ∂Quantθ ( lnW | X ) / ∂xj could be interpreted as the 
marginal change in the θth conditional quantile due to marginal change in the j th 
element of X. When X contains a set of distinct variables, than every one of these 
derivatives is given just by βθj , measuring marginal change mentioned above. An 
interesting case would appear if the βθ coefficients vary systematically across θ’s, 
indicating that the marginal effect of particular explanatory variable is not uniform 
across different quantiles of the conditional distribution of lnW.  
Quantile regressions are estimated at five points of the log (hourly) wage distribution; 
0.10, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75 and 0.90 quantiles. In order to take into account a correlation 
among the various quantile regressions, the quantiles are estimated simultaneously, thus 
allowing a formal comparison of coefficients describing different quantiles. Estimations 
of standard errors are obtained via bootstrapping using 50 replications.5  
Vector X used in the empirical estimation in this section includes variables representing 
education, experience, occupation, company size and region, and dummy variables for 
women, immigrants, non-regular working hours, rural area and public sector employees.  
Education is defined by a set of seven dummy variables, describing the highest degree 
obtained.6 A dummy takes the value 1 if a person holds a degree and 0 otherwise. In 
                                                 
5 In quantile regressions, the bootstrap standard errors could be preferable to those calculated 
analytically as suggested by Rogers (1992). In this study, estimation procedures are performed 
using STATA software package. 
6 Concerning educational attainments, an alternative was to use the number of years of formal 
education. However, preliminary runs including quadratic specification showed lower explanatory 
power of this variable. 
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regressions, unfinished primary school dummy is omitted. Work experience is defined as 
the total years of actual employment, including experience with former employers. 
Occupation is represented by a set of dummy variables for each of the ten occupation 
categories defined according to standard (ISCO) classification. The omitted category is 
elementary occupation. There are four dummies for company size, defined with respect 
to the number of employees. The dummy for firms with the less than 10 employee is 
omitted in regressions7. The region variable consists of five dummies for territorial units 
defined according to a NUTS-2 proposal for Croatia that was made by a CBS-appointed 
task group in 2004 (not yet officially adopted). Each regional dummy takes the value 1 if 
an individual lives in the region and 0 otherwise. The dummy for Northern Croatia is the 
referent category. The dummy variable for living in a rural area takes the value 1 if an 
individual lives in a rural area and 0 otherwise. The dummy for immigrants takes the 
value 1 if someone has come from abroad to the current place of residence since 1991, 
the year when Croatia declared its independence and when war operations in the wider 
region began.8 The dummy variable for non-regular working hours is defined in order to 
pick up the effect of bad working conditions and takes the value 1 in two cases: (i) if one 
always works nights, and (ii) if one sometimes works nights and sometimes on Saturdays 
and sometimes on Sundays.9 In all other cases this dummy takes the value 0. The public 
sector dummy takes the value 1 if an individual works in state-owned institutions and 
enterprises, and 0 otherwise. A set of fourteen dummies for industry affiliation is 
                                                 
7 Oi and Idson (1999) find that the wage gap in large enterprises over small firms is rather large. 
They provide several theoretical explanations that might be also relevant for Croatia, from 
monitoring costs and efficiency wages to some productivity hypotheses. However, the aim of this 
variable in our study is not just to account for possibly different practices in the wage setting 
among companies of different size, but also to check for bias in underreporting. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that the practice in small privately-owned firms is to pay a portion of the earning in a 
regular way, including taxes, and another portion in cash without proper documentation or tax 
obligations. In that case, one can imagine that an employee interviewed within LFS reports only a 
regular part of the earnings, for she might consider only this part of the earnings the “usual 
monthly wage on the main job”. 
8 “Immigrant” is possibly not a fully correct term since most of individuals entering Croatia in 
post-1991 period are ethnic Croats having Croatian citizenship and arriving from neighboring 
countries, without need to go through any specific administrative procedure usually connected with 
immigration. This variable is chosen to account for some specific problems of adoption that can be 
reflected in wage differentials. 
9 This criterion might seem rather weak in describing “bad” working conditions, but only 16 
percent of Croatian workers were exposed to such conditions. Apart from the 
always/sometimes/never distinction in working at nights and weekends, other indications of 
working conditions were not available in the Labor Force Survey. 
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included in only one regression specification, aimed at exploring industry wage 
variations. Otherwise, the industry variable is not used.10  
 
4  Wage Function Estimates 
Table 3 presents the coefficients obtained in OLS and quantile regression estimates of 
wage function in Croatia. The overall explanatory power of the regressions seems 
satisfactory. Most of the coefficients are significant at a 5% level. A log-linear 
specification of the wage function allows us to treat the coefficient (if multiplied by 100) 
as a percentage change in conditional hourly wage that was due to marginal change in a 
corresponding regressor. Since explanatory variables are mostly defined as dummy 
variables, interpretation of the coefficients should be done relative to the omitted 
category. For instance, coefficients for general secondary education in the OLS estimate 
indicate that average wage for a worker who completed general secondary school is 
expected to be 21% higher than wage of a worker who did not finish primary school, all 
other characteristics being equal.  
Some of the estimated coefficients are quite uniform over the whole range of distribution 
(i.e. similar at different quantiles of the conditional wage distribution) and consistent 
with the least squares result. However, some coefficients are largely different for various 
quantiles. The statistically significant difference in the coefficients at the lower and 
upper quantiles suggests that a corresponding variable is associated with an increase or a 
decrease in the dispersion (inequality) of conditional wages. Table 4 reports on the 
“coefficients” that are in fact the differences between the 0.9 and 0.1 quantile 
coefficients, and the 0.75 and 0.25 quantile coefficients. For a variable with significant 
and positive differences, its marginal effect increases as one moves along the distribution 
that further implies spreading out the conditional wage distribution, and vice versa. 
Interpretation of the results presented in Table 4 will be parallel to that referring to Table 
3. 
 
                                                 
10 Although industry wage differentials might be substantial, inclusion of the industry variable to 
account for unobserved differences in ability is questioned by Krueger and Summers (1988). 
However, industry wage differentials in Croatia might be affected by ownership, since there are 
industries that are clearly dominated by state-ownership such as utilities, education, health care 
and public administration. Since this study is more interested in ownership effect and wants to have 
it distinguished from industry effect, variables for industry affiliation are not used in the analysis, 
unless otherwise stated. 
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Table 3.  OLS and quantile regressions (dependent variable: log wage per hour) 
Quantile  
OLS 
0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 
Constant 2.361 1.929 2.169 2.332 2.546 2.761 
 (0.043) (0.073) (0.046) (0.047) (0.053) (0.120) 
Education (vs. unfin. primary)       
   Primary 0.067 0.101 0.042 0.085 0.084 0.109 
 (0.039) (0.062) (0.046) (0.043) (0.045) (0.116) 
   Voc. secondary 0.133 0.158 0.107 0.166 0.156 0.184 
 (0.039) (0.067) (0.045) (0.040) (0.046) (0.124) 
   Gen. secondary 0.215 0.232 0.218 0.242 0.225 0.257 
 (0.040) (0.068) (0.047) (0.041) (0.048) (0.122) 
   2-year college 0.334 0.351 0.312 0.355 0.372 0.390 
 (0.044) (0.076) (0.046) (0.045) (0.058) (0.123) 
   College graduate 0.463 0.403 0.405 0.471 0.562 0.608 
 (0.052) (0.081) (0.057) (0.047) (0.065) (0.139) 
   Post-graduate  0.690 0.552 0.624 0.658 0.816 0.816 
 (0.071) (0.121) (0.076) (0.078) (0.111) (0.153) 
Experiance 0.012 0.015 0.014 0.011 0.014 0.010 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Experiance sq. (/100) -0.019 -0.028 -0.025 -0.016 -0.024 -0.014 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) 
Female -0.153 -0.095 -0.126 -0.158 -0.180 -0.205 
 (0.010) (0.019) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.021) 
Immigrant -0.061 -0.054 -0.096 -0.095 -0.086 0.007 
 (0.030) (0.043) (0.044) (0.028) (0.035) (0.063) 
Occupation (vs. elementary)       
   Plant&machine oper. 0.063 0.019 0.044 0.069 0.095 0.079 
 (0.022) (0.042) (0.027) (0.021) (0.027) (0.037) 
   Craftsman 0.176 0.184 0.175 0.169 0.174 0.188 
 (0.022) (0.033) (0.025) (0.019) (0.019) (0.042) 
   Farming -0.004 0.062 0.024 -0.010 0.056 0.094 
 (0.056) (0.238) (0.058) (0.070) (0.061) (0.057) 
   Service&sales 0.064 0.064 0.074 0.082 0.072 0.049 
 (0.021) (0.035) (0.028) (0.024) (0.023) (0.035) 
   Clerk 0.226 0.266 0.219 0.223 0.259 0.238 
 (0.021) (0.037) (0.027) (0.022) (0.022) (0.034) 
   Technician 0.343 0.352 0.369 0.349 0.324 0.313 
 (0.024) (0.045) (0.026) (0.024) (0.028) (0.041) 
   Professional 0.391 0.481 0.421 0.379 0.322 0.407 
 (0.041) (0.064) (0.045) (0.045) (0.055) (0.069) 
   Management&adm. 0.703 0.616 0.597 0.638 0.718 0.877 
 (0.062) (0.121) (0.072) (0.080) (0.103) (0.116) 
   Military 0.384 0.555 0.455 0.389 0.347 0.321 
 (0.048) (0.052) (0.044) (0.043) (0.033) (0.058) 
Non-regular hours 0.080 0.037 0.030 0.085 0.113 0.140 
 (0.014) (0.029) (0.019) (0.016) (0.017) (0.027) 
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Table 3.  (Continued) 
Quantile  
OLS 
0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 
Firm size (vs. <10 empl.)   
   10-50 empl. 0.069 0.067 0.061 0.062 0.049 0.023 
 (0.015) (0.027) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.025) 
   50-200 empl. 0.065 0.081 0.053 0.043 0.029 0.026 
 (0.015) (0.027) (0.016) (0.014) (0.018) (0.021) 
   >=200 empl. 0.101 0.072 0.075 0.102 0.092 0.073 
 (0.016) (0.033) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.021) 
Region (vs. north)   
   West  0.069 0.045 0.042 0.057 0.057 0.066 
 (0.018) (0.028) (0.018) (0.018) (0.024) (0.027) 
   Central 0.070 0.032 0.046 0.083 0.082 0.083 
 (0.015) (0.025) (0.021) (0.016) (0.019) (0.027) 
   East -0.038 -0.086 -0.072 -0.032 -0.027 0.005 
 (0.017) (0.025) (0.020) (0.017) (0.022) (0.026) 
   South 0.046 0.014 0.016 0.059 0.040 0.048 
 (0.017) (0.028) (0.022) (0.019) (0.022) (0.033) 
Rural -0.041 -0.038 -0.029 -0.030 -0.046 -0.033 
 (0.010) (0.019) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.019) 
Public 0.086 0.182 0.164 0.114 0.053 -0.011 
 (0.011) (0.023) (0.014) (0.011) (0.013) (0.016) 
   
(R2) Pseudo R2 (0.466) 0.255 0.310 0.320 0.300 0.291 
 
Notes: The numbers in parentheses are standard errors computed using bootstrap estimator. The standard errors for
the least-squares estimates are computed using White method. Bold letters indicate significance at a 5%-level, 
whereas italics indicate significance at a 10%-level. 
 
                                                
 
 
 
Having a regression specification shown in Table 3, the constant may be interpreted as 
the conditional quantile of the log wage distribution (or the conditional expectation of 
log wage in case of the OLS estimate) for a male employee with unfinished primary 
school and no experience, who is engaged in some elementary occupation, working in a 
private firm with less than 10 employees with regular working hours and living in an 
urban part of Northern Croatia. For example, the median of the conditional wage 
distribution for this group of employees is around 10 kuna per hour.11
 
 
 
 
11 Conditional distribution is the distribution of wages that would result in a sample of individuals 
who are all identical with respect to the observed attributes. 
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Table 4.  Impact upon dispersion of conditional log wage distribution 
 0.90-0.10 Interquantile 
regression 
0.75-0.25 Interquantile 
regression 
 Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. 
Education (vs. unfin. primary)     
   Primary 0.007 0.116 0.042 0.056 
   Vocational sec. 0.026 0.119 0.049 0.060 
   General sec. 0.026 0.124 0.006 0.062 
   2-year college 0.039 0.121 0.060 0.070 
   College graduate 0.206 0.142 0.157 0.072 
   Postgraduate 0.264 0.183 0.192 0.127 
Experiance -0.005 0.003 -0.001 0.002 
Experience sq.(/100) 0.015 0.010 0.001 0.006 
Female -0.110 0.025 -0.054 0.013 
Immigrant 0.060 0.084 0.010 0.045 
Occupation (vs. elementary)     
   Plant&machine operator 0.060 0.059 0.052 0.036 
   Craftsman 0.004 0.048 -0.002 0.026 
   Farming 0.032 0.225 0.032 0.070 
   Service&sales -0.016 0.041 -0.002 0.030 
   Clerk -0.028 0.043 0.040 0.036 
   Technician -0.039 0.048 -0.045 0.036 
   Professional -0.074 0.080 -0.099 0.060 
   Management&admin. 0.261 0.159 0.120 0.111 
   Military -0.233 0.068 -0.108 0.041 
Non-regular hours 0.102 0.040 0.083 0.020 
Firm size (vs. <10 empl.)     
   10-50 empl. -0.044 0.041 -0.011 0.020 
   50-200 empl. -0.055 0.033 -0.024 0.021 
   >=200 empl. 0.001 0.034 0.017 0.020 
Region (vs. north)     
   West 0.022 0.040 0.016 0.029 
   Central 0.051 0.031 0.036 0.024 
   East 0.091 0.042 0.045 0.026 
   South 0.034 0.041 0.024 0.025 
Rural 0.005 0.022 -0.017 0.016 
Public -0.193 0.028 -0.111 0.019 
 
Note: Standard errors are computed using bootstrap estimator. Bold letters indicate significance at a 5%-level 
whereas italics indicate significance at a 10%-level. 
 
 
 
The effect of education on wages increases with education level. At the 0.5 (median) 
quantile, wage for a worker who completed primary school was 8.5% higher than for 
someone who did not complete primary school, while for a worker with a post-graduate 
degree the difference over unfinished primary school is around 65%, other things being 
equal. The effect of education is a bit stronger in median regression estimates than in 
OLS estimates of the mean effect, except for the postgraduate education. Completed 
primary education does not necessarily ensure an increase in wages when compared to 
unfinished primary school, since a positive value of the coefficient is not significant at 
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the usual 5% levels (except at the medium of conditional wage distribution). It seems 
that the Croatian economy values unfinished and finished primary school roughly the 
same, and what makes a difference in the quest for higher wages is secondary and higher 
education. It also appears that general secondary education could provide higher wages 
than vocational secondary education. 
The pattern of the education effect across different quantiles of conditional wage 
distribution is not very clear, although the effect seems stronger at higher quantiles. The 
results of formal testing for difference between coefficients presented in Table 4 suggest 
that education beyond primary school is not associated with higher dispersion of wages 
in a statistically significant way. The only exception is college education that 
significantly affects the 0.75-0.25 quantile spread of conditional wage distribution, as 
compared to the distribution for unfinished primary school. One interesting policy 
implication could be depicted here. An increase in the education level of the Croatian 
labor force that might be achieved in the future would not necessarily lead to a greater 
wage inequality.  
 
Figure 2.  Effect of experience 
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The impact of experience on wages was assessed by means of coefficients for both a 
linear and a quadratic term of the years of experience. The cumulative effect of the two 
experience variables estimated at different points of the conditional wage distribution is 
depicted in Figure 2. The pattern of the effect is concave, increasing for less experienced 
workers, peaking at experience of around 30 years and decreasing thereafter. An 
employee with actual work experience of 30 years can expect, on average, almost 20% 
higher wages than a new entrant. However, the return to any additional year of 
experience after working for more than 30 years is negative. The experience-wage 
profiles at the various quantiles are not distinct in any particular order.  
The Croatian labor market allows some disparity between wages for males and females, 
particularly at the right tail of the distribution, as revealed by the coefficients on dummy 
variable for female shown in Table 3. At the 0.1 quantile of the conditional wage 
distribution, employed women earn about 10% less than men, but at the 0.9 quantile the 
difference is higher and their wage is 20% lower. In other words, in high-paid jobs, women 
are relatively more disadvantaged then in low-paid jobs. On average, women earn some 
15% less than men with the same observed characteristics. It can be noted that disclosed 
gender wage gap in Croatia is substantial, but comparable to many other countries.12  
Workers who moved to Croatia after 1991 are faced with certain wage penalty, as 
compared to workers residing in the country for a longer period. The effect is estimated to 
be significant only at the central part of conditional wage distribution. At the lower and 
upper tails of the conditional distribution, the difference in wages between native and non-
native workers was not statistically significant. However, on average (estimated by OLS), 
immigrants can expect to earn some 6% less than other comparable workers do. 
Occupation of the worker is an important factor in wage determination. Having controlled 
for other observed characteristics shown in Table 3, it can be seen that all other 
occupations yield higher wages than elementary occupations (except farming), especially 
management and administration related jobs. No systematic behavior of the occupation 
effects can be revealed for different quantiles at which regressions are estimated.  
                                                 
12 Machado and Mata (2001) report on resembling (in level, but also in pattern across wage 
distribution) gender wage differential in Portugal in mid 1990s, just as Garcia, Hernandez and 
Nicolas (2001) for Spain. Rutkowski (2001) finds gender-based differential in transition countries 
in the late 1990s in a range of 20-30%. Orazem and Vodopivec (1995) estimated the gap in 
Slovenia at around 10% in the early 1990s.  
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Working at night and on weekends can produce higher wages, as revealed by the 
coefficient for non-regular working hours dummy. The effect is much more relevant at 
the upper tail of the conditional wage distribution. For example, the wage premium for 
non-regular working hours at the 0.9 quantile of the conditional distribution is 14%, 
much higher than at the median. Relatively low-paid workers hardly can benefit from 
unpleasant timing of work, since the positive effect on wage is rather low, and it is not 
statistically significant at usual levels.13  
Larger companies tend to pay more to workers with the same characteristics. The 
average hourly wage for a worker in a company with more than 200 employees can be 
some 10% higher than for someone with the same attributes working in a firm with up to 
10 employees. The effect of the company size does not appear to exert a clear pattern 
along the conditional wage distribution.  
The regional-based differences in wages in Croatia are notable. Otherwise comparable 
worker in Central Croatia can earn some 10% more than a worker in Eastern Croatia. 
Such a difference is not very sensitive to the choice of the quantile at which we estimate 
regression. Moreover, a worker’s residence in a rural area is usually associated with 
lower wages. 
The marginal effect of regressors on the dispersion of conditional wage distributions 
shown in Table 4 is informative for further elaboration. Similar to education, it can be 
seen that occupation, company size and region generally exhibit no significant 
differences in the marginal effects at the upper and lower tail of the distribution. It 
appears that these variables exert only a pure location shift effect on the conditional 
wage distribution. For this effect, the quantile regression results are mostly compatible 
with the OLS results. However, the effects of gender, ownership and irregular working 
hours are not constant across the conditional distribution of log wages. For these three 
variables, quantile regression results do a good job representing a whole range of effects 
along the wage distribution. For example, the conditional wage distribution for women is 
less dispersed than that for men, implying that the gender pay gap should be significantly 
different at higher quantiles than at lower quantiles. Non-regular working hours spread 
out the conditional wage distribution meaning that their effect on wages is stronger for 
highly paid jobs. State ownership tends to compress the wage spread. 
                                                 
13 It can be noted here that an additional job holding was not proved to be significant determinant 
of wages in main job. This might suggest that acceptance of a low-paid regular job was not 
motivated by an additional job holding.  
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5  Public-Private Sector Wage Gap 
The regression coefficients for the public sector dummy variable shown in Table 3 
describe the wage premium related to work in state-owned institutions and enterprises, as 
compared to work in private sector. A positive value implies wage premium for working 
in public sector, while a negative one depicts existence of wage penalty. It can be seen 
that the public sector wage premium varies with the quantile of conditional wage 
distribution; it is substantial at the lower tail but it gradually ceased out as we move 
along the distribution. That premium is statistically insignificant at the higher tail. For 
example, at the 0.10 quantile, a public sector worker is estimated to be paid about 18% 
percent more than a worker with the same attributes but working in the private sector. At 
the 0.75 quantile, a public sector wage premium is around 5%, while at the 0.9 quantile 
we find negative premium (penalty), but not statistically significant at usual levels. In 
other words, relatively low-paid workers benefit more from working in the public sector 
than high-paid workers do.  
The OLS estimate suggests that a worker in the public sector can expect some 9% higher 
hourly wage than a worker with the same characteristics in the private sector. 
Presumably high underreporting of wages in private sector may challenge this finding. 
However, the estimated model controls for the company size, so it might account for 
underreporting in small, predominantly private firms. The problem of relatively high 
wages that are underreported remains and it is probably more pronounced for private 
sector wages. However, there are several factors working in favor of observed public 
sector premium. First, the choice of the hourly wage as a dependent variable takes into 
account longer working hours of private sector workers.14 The most usual comparison of 
wages in Croatia is made for wages on a monthly level, thereby overlooking working 
hours as an important factor for wage determination. Second, unions are more pervasive 
in the public sector, and this could be putting upward pressure on wages. Third, high 
unemployment in Croatia allows private sector employers to find workers they need even 
when they offer poor wages. Fourth, for state-owned sector there is political pressure to 
behave as a “good” employer providing relatively high wages, especially because the 
cost-cutting market pressures are mostly lacking. 
                                                 
14 The data from our sample shows that an average public sector worker is engaged 40.7 hours per 
week, while for a private sector worker the average is 42.3 hours. 
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The public/private sector wage gap observed in Table 3 is estimated in a model 
specification that constrains the gap to be the same, regardless of education level. It is 
interesting to employ the alternative specification that allows the coefficients to change 
across the various education levels. This is done by interacting the set of educational 
dummies with the indicator variable for the public sector and by including these 
interactive dummies in the previous specification.15 Table 5 presents resulting 
coefficients for interactive variables that are to be interpreted as public sector wage 
premiums by education level. 
 
Table 5.  Public sector wage premia by educational attainment 
Quantile  
OLS 
0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 
Unfin. primary 0.061 0.140 0.205 0.158 0.010 -0.340 
 (0.070) (0.124) (0.075) (0.082) (0.081) (0.238) 
Primary 0.106 0.097 0.139 0.161 0.099 0.030 
 (0.028) (0.038) (0.034) (0.032) (0.032) (0.053) 
Voc. secondary  0.085 0.129 0.142 0.126 0.087 0.029 
 (0.018) (0.044) (0.026) (0.022) (0.022) (0.030) 
Gen. secondary  0.097 0.219 0.193 0.109 0.056 -0.038 
 (0.017) (0.042) (0.025) (0.023) (0.021) (0.025) 
2-year college  0.084 0.366 0.232 0.113 -0.052 -0.146 
 (0.041) (0.060) (0.047) (0.047) (0.061) (0.079) 
College graduate 0.057 0.280 0.161 -0.013 -0.055 0.007 
 (0.034) (0.067) (0.047) (0.048) (0.045) (0.068) 
Post-graduate  -0.219 0.296 -0.148 -0.317 -0.339 -0.181 
 (0.183) (0.468) (0.403) (0.204) (0.159) (0.142) 
 
Notes: The numbers in parentheses are standard errors computed using bootstrap estimator. The standard errors for
the least-squares estimates are computed using White-Huber method. Bold letters indicate significance at a 5%-level, 
whereas italics indicate significance at a 10%-level. 
 
                                                
 
 
 
The quantile regression results suggest two findings. First, the level of premium is 
sensitive to the choice of the quanile at all education levels. With only a few exemptions, 
there is a much higher premium associated with working in the public sector at low than 
at high quantiles. In other words, the premium is higher for low-paid workers than for 
high-paid workers at all education levels. Higher educated public sector workers are 
often faced with a negative premium (penalty), especially those at high quantiles. This 
further implies that the conditional wage distribution for public sector workers is more 
compressed than for private sector workers, and this seems to be valid for every 
 
15 This approach is applied by Poterba and Rueben (1994). 
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education level. However, results for unfinished primary school and postgraduate 
education exhibit certain problems with the statistical significance that is related to the 
small sample. Second, the public sector wage premium is substantial at a lower to middle 
level of education and it turned negative (penalty) at college and post-graduate 
education, as suggested by the estimation at the middle of the distribution (0.50 
quantile). The OLS estimate mostly confirms the second finding, but with still positive 
public sector wage premium for college graduates. 
Labor market situation in Croatia can explain observed pattern of the premium. There is 
rather high unemployment among workers who obtained primary and secondary 
education that allows private sector employers to set wages for these workers well below 
public sector ones. For relatively scarce highly educated workers, however, private 
sector employers need to ensure higher wages than public sector to attract them to move 
in. 
Gender-based differences in the public sector wage premium are also explored. Separate 
wage equations for males and females were run with the interest in the coefficients for 
public sector dummy evaluated at various points of the conditional wage distribution. 
Figure 3 shows the result. On average (OLS estimate) the public sector wage premium is 
higher for a female worker than for a male worker. For both, males and females, the 
premium diminishes as we move along the distribution and it became negative at the 
upper tail. For low-paid jobs, i.e. at the lower quantile, the premium is a bit higher for 
females than males.16 At the 0.90 quantile, males employed in the public sector are faced 
with substantially lower wages than otherwise comparable males employed in the private 
sector. For high-paid female workers, such a wage gap between sectors is statistically 
insignificant. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 The similar finding is documented in Mueller (1998), and Disney and Gosling (1998). 
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Figure 3.  Public-private sector wage gap by gender 
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Our definition of the public sector as state-owned institutions and enterprises may be 
challenged with the alternative in the quest for the difference in wage determination 
between state-owned enterprises and state-owned institutions. Since the Labor Force 
Survey does not allow direct distinction between the two parts of the wider public sector, 
a combination of employer’s ownership status and the industry is employed. State-owned 
employers in public administration, education and health care are considered “budgetary 
public sector”, and state-owned employers in other industries are considered “state-
owned enterprises”. The first term is chosen since the central government budget in 
Croatia in fact provides for wages of employees in public education, public health care 
and, of course, public administration. The wage function is re-estimated by using the 
same set of explanatory variables as previously but two public sector dummies, for 
budgetary public sector and for state-owned enterprises. The estimated coefficients for 
these dummies can be interpreted as the wage premium over the private sector. The 
result is presented in Figure 4.  
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Figure 4.  Public-private sector wage gap 
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On average, the budgetary public sector pays higher wage premium over the private 
sector than state-owned enterprises do. A worker in the budgetary public sector can 
expect an hourly wage of almost 10% over the wage of a worker with the same 
observable characteristics but working in the private sector. However, there is a 
difference in the premium at various points of the conditional wage distribution. 
Budgetary public sector pays rather high premium at the lower tail of the distribution, 
and a negative one at the upper tail. In other words, in the budgetary public sector, low-
paid workers are relatively better off compared to high-paid workers. For state-owned 
enterprises, the variation in premium along the distribution is smaller than for the 
budgetary public sector. At the 0.9 quantile, there is no statistically significant difference 
in conditional wages between workers in state-owned enterprises and workers in the 
private sector. State-owned enterprises managed to keep track in wages with the private 
sector for high-paid workers, and even to provide the premium for low- and middle- paid 
workers.  
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Table 6.  Industry effects 
OLS Median regression  
Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. 
Industry (vs. agriculture) 
Mining 0.044 0.052 -0.044 0.075 
Manufacturing 0.013 0.029 -0.037 0.047 
Utilities 0.158 0.033 0.128 0.044 
Construction 0.116 0.033 0.075 0.047 
Retail&wholesale 0.012 0.030 -0.021 0.045 
Hotels&restaurants 0.049 0.034 -0.005 0.054 
Transport&comm. 0.182 0.032 0.152 0.046 
Fin. intermediation 0.267 0.038 0.238 0.049 
Real estate 0.045 0.039 0.003 0.051 
Public admin. 0.174 0.030 0.117 0.046 
Education 0.054 0.030 0.020 0.044 
Health 0.132 0.031 0.078 0.047 
Community services 0.088 0.039 0.054 0.049 
 
Notes: Variables controlled for in the regressions are education, experience, gender, occupation, region, firm size, 
non-regular working hours, and gender. The standard errors for the least-squares estimates are computed using 
White-Huber method, while for median regression they are computed using the bootstrap method. Bold letters 
indicate significance at a 5% level, whereas italics indicate significance at a 10%-level. -
 
 
 
The interest in the public sector wage premium is sometimes more specific and directed 
towards differences among wages in public administration, education and health care. 
Therefore, we estimate a wage function that includes a set of industry dummies along 
with other explanatory variables such as education, experience, occupation, firm size, 
region and other factors, but excludes the public sector dummy. In that way we cannot 
explicitly estimate a public sector wage premium, but rather an industry-related 
premium. However, public administration, education and health care are industries 
dominated by state-owned institutions, meaning that any industry-related premium in 
these sectors can be interpreted, at least partially, as the public sector wage premium of a 
particular industry.  
The coefficients for industry variables and associated standard errors estimated in OLS 
and median regressions are presented in Table 6. The results of other quantile regressions 
are not shown since they are similar to median regression. The omitted industry was 
agriculture, meaning that coefficients are to be interpreted in relation to it. The ordering 
of the industry-related wage differentials is of particular interest. The OLS estimate 
reveals that, after controlling for education, experience, occupation and other factors, the 
best-paid workers are occupied in the financial industry. Other “premium” industries are 
transport and communications, public administration, utilities and health care. 
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Interestingly, in the Croatian economy all these industries, besides financial one, can be 
considered “public”. While public administration and health care are directly dependent 
on the government budget, transport and utilities are industries dominated by state-
owned enterprises in the field of public transport, postal service, energy, water and gas 
distribution. Obviously, employees of these state-dominated industries have higher 
wages than employees with comparable characteristics working in agriculture, 
manufacturing industry and retail trade. Comparable wages of employees in education 
show that they are the worst positioned among public sector industries. The same 
conclusion can be drawn from median regression results.  
 
Table 7.  Occupation-specific public sector wage premia 
No. of obs. Premium  
Private Public  
Elementary occ. 229 222 0.086 
   (0.034) 
Service&sales 578 224 0.201 
   (0.030) 
Clerk 321 359 0.137 
   (0.022) 
Technician 333 513 -0.038 
   (0.030) 
Professional 139 345 -0.005 
   (0.037) 
 
Notes: Public sector wage premium was obtained as the coefficient on public sector dummy in earnings regression, 
estimated by OLS for each occupation separately. Variables controlled for in the regressions are education, 
experience, experience squared, region, firm size, non-regular working hours, and gender. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses. Bold letters indicate significance at a 5% level. 
 
-
 
 
 
An additional illustration of the public-private sector wage gap can be made with respect 
to occupations. To address this issue, we estimate wage equations separately for several 
occupations that are common in both the public and the private sector. The coefficient 
for the public sector dummy variable in each regression can be treated as a public sector 
wage premium. The resulting coefficients estimated by OLS and presented in Table 7 
show that the public sector wage premium is most pronounced in medium-skill 
occupations. For a worker in services and sales, the wage premium for the public sector 
is around 20 percent. For clerks, the premium is about 14 percent. However, for high-
skill occupations such technicians and professionals, the difference between public and 
private sector wages is statistically insignificant.  
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6  Returns to Education 
The discussion that follows shifts the focus on education. Marginal effects of education 
on conditional wages that are discussed above should be interpreted in relation to the 
omitted education level i.e. unfinished primary school. However, one may wish to assess 
the effect of education between adjacent levels. For example, what is the effect on wages 
of the general secondary school graduation, as compared to holding a primary school 
degree. Having results from Table 3, one should calculate the difference in the marginal 
effects (i.e. coefficients) between two adjacent education levels. The mentioned example 
gives an effect of 15.7% in median regression, depicting an increase in the conditional 
wage at the median due to general secondary school graduation. This effect is sometimes 
called return to education. However, the most common interpretation of the return on 
education is in terms of the wage effect of one additional year of education. Therefore, 
calculation of the returns of education at different levels of education should be done by 
dividing the increase in the marginal effect of education between two adjacent education 
levels by the length of schooling between those levels. For example, the return to general 
secondary education at the θth quantile is defined as 
PrimGenSec
PrimGenSeced
GenSec ss
R −
−= ,,, θθθ ββ(2) 
where βθ, GenSec and βθ, Prim are the coefficients on general secondary education and 
primary education estimated for the θth quantile regression, and sGenSec and sPrim are years 
of schooling usually needed to complete general secondary and primary education. 
Analogous calculation can be performed for other education levels. As “usual” schooling 
time for accomplishing primary, vocational secondary, general secondary, 2-year 
college, college and postgraduate education we took 8, 11, 12, 14, 16, and 18.5 years, 
respectively. These figures are close to actual averages calculated from the sample.  
Table 8 presents estimated returns on education. As can be seen, a return to additional 
year of education increases with the education level. This conclusion is robust to the 
choice of quantiles and holds also for the least squares estimate.17 This finding can be a 
motivation for private investment in human capital in Croatia, since it obviously pays off 
more and more as one raises the education level. 
                                                 
17 There are only two deviations from the observed pattern, one at the 0.1 quantile for graduate 
education and the other at the 0.9 quantile for post-graduate education.  
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Table 8.  Returns to education by level 
              (as per year, relative to the previous level) 
Quantile  
OLS 
0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 
Voc. secondary  
(relative to the primary) 
0.022 0.019 0.022 0.027 0.024 0.025 
Gen. secondary  
(relative to the primary) 
0.037 0.033 0.044 0.039 0.035 0.037 
2-year college  
(rel. to the gen. secondary)  
0.059 0.060 0.047 0.057 0.074 0.066 
College graduate  
(rel. to the 2-year college) 
0.065 0.026 0.046 0.058 0.095 0.109 
Post-graduate  
(rel. to the coll. graduate)  
0.091 0.060 0.088 0.075 0.102 0.083 
 
Note: Return to education is calculated as the increase in the marginal effect of education between two adjacent 
education levels divided by years of schooling usually performed between that levels. The result is based on 
regressions presented in Table 3. Further description is provided in the text.  
 
 
 
Psacharopoulos (1994) in his work on returns to education criticized the inclusion of too 
many variables in the earnings function, other than human capital variables, especially 
the estimation of earnings functions within occupations that results in artificial 
downward bias in the returns to education. Following this objection, Table 9 reports the 
return on education derived from the same earnings regressions as before, but without 
occupation dummies. It is not surprising that resulting returns on education are now 
higher because education and occupation are often closely related, for education provides 
the qualifications for more skill-demanding and higher-paying occupations. An 
additional year of schooling in post-secondary education (2-year college, college 
graduates and post-graduates) can increase wages by about 10 percent, as estimated by 
OLS.18 Similar results are obtained by median regression estimates. Results for other 
quantiles are not shown since they are not significantly different from the median 
regression. A distinct difference in returns to education is seen between general 
secondary, and vocation secondary education in favor of the former. In addition to the 
observed effect, general secondary school degree in the Croatian education system 
allows one to continue education at higher schools, while vocational education does not. 
Evidently, general secondary education pays off more than vocation secondary 
education.  
 
 
                                                 
18 Observed effect is close to the average of the European and Middle East countries, and the 
average of upper middle income countries, as reported by Psacharopoulos (1994).  
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Table 9.  Returns to education by level – alternative specification 
              (as per year, relative to the previous level) 
 Overall Private sector State sector 
 OLS Median OLS Median OLS Median 
Voc. secondary  
(relative to the primary) 
0.043 0.052 0.040 0.046 0.045 0.056 
Gen. secondary  
(relative to the primary) 
0.075 0.083 0.068 0.068 0.080 0.086 
2-year college  
(rel. to the gen. secondary)  
0.109 0.111 0.103 0.114 0.111 0.113 
College graduate  
(rel. to the 2-year college) 
0.103 0.081 0.126 0.144 0.090 0.069 
Post-graduate  
(rel. to the coll. graduate)  
0.101 0.092 0.216 0.178 0.086 0.086 
 
Note: See Table 8, except that here results are based on regressions without occupation dummies as regressors.  
 
 
 
Returns to education calculated for public and private sector separately reveal a distinct 
valuation of education by these two sectors. Graduate and post-graduate education is 
substantially more valued in the private sector, while secondary education pays off more 
if engaged in the public sector.19 In the private sector, the return to additional year of 
schooling increases with the education level, while in the public sector education beyond 
a 2-year college decreases the yearly return. However, if we take into account completed 
college education (a 4-year college) and assess the return relative to the general 
secondary education, the return to college graduation is higher than return to secondary 
education, even in the public sector20.  
 
7  Accounting for Wage Differentials 
The relative importance of the different set of variables in explaining wage variations can 
be estimated by the variance decomposition technique. Starting with the estimates of 
wage function, and following Fields (2003), the log-variance of wage is decomposed as  
)(ln
]ln, cor[*)(*
)(ln
]ln, [cov
)(ln 2
j
W
WXX
W
WX
Ws jjjjj σ
σβ
σ
β == (3) 
 
                                                 
19 Šošić (2004) reports on the average return to education in Croatia of 10.5% in 2001, which was 
lower in the public sector.  
20 The public sector return to additional year of schooling in college education, relative to the 
general secondary education is around 10% in OLS estimation, and around 9% in median 
regression. 
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where sj (lnW ) denotes the share of the log-variance that is attributable to the j’th 
explanatory factor. Note that R2(lnW ) is the fraction of the log variance that is explained 
by all the X’s taken together. The fraction of the explained variance that is attributable to 
the j’th factor can be calculated as sj (lnW )/R2(lnW ). The log variance decomposition is 
applicable only at the conditional mean, i.e. the least squares estimate. 
 
Table 10.  Contribution of selected factors to log-wage inequality 
Equation 1 (incl. occupation) 
contribution as a percentage of: 
Equation 2 (excl. occupation) 
contribution as a percentage of: 
 
Total variance Explained variance Total variance Explained variance 
     
Education 15.2 32.6 27.2 65.5 
Experience 3.0 6.4 3.8 9.1 
Gender 2.0 4.4 2.3 5.5 
Ownership 2.9 6.3 3.5 8.5 
Location 2.4 5.2 2.6 6.4 
Occupation 18.8 40.4 - - 
Firm size 1.5 3.3 1.5 3.7 
Other 0.6 1.3 0.6 1.4 
     
Total explained (=R2)  46.6 100.0 41.6 100.0 
Unexplained  53.4 - 58.4 - 
Total  100.0 - 100.0 - 
 
 
 
As can be seen from the first two columns of Table 10, education and occupation are 
prevailing factors explaining the differences in log hourly wages. The difference in 
education levels explains around 15% of wage variations, representing 1/3 of the 
inequality explained by the wage regression that includes occupation regressors. 
Occupation differences account for 19% of the total variance in wages and 40% of the 
explained variance. Other measurable factors are less important in explaining wage 
differentials. Expirience, gender, ownership, location, and company size account each for 
less than 3% of the total variance of hourly wages. 
A strong influence of occupations on wage inequality can be questioned by the objection 
that education is often a prerequisite for high paid occupations and therefore an ultimate 
source of observed inequality. The second wage equation that is estimated without 
occupation variables and used for the variance decomposition, shows a much stronger 
contribution of education. It seems that the contribution of occupation is now almost 
entirely attributed to education, since minor changes occurred in other observable 
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factors. Therefore, it can be concluded that education is the key factor in explaining 
wage variations in Croatia.  
A comparison of these results to the variance decomposition of wage inequality in 
Bulgaria, Hungary, Macedonia and Poland in mid 1990s (Rutkowski, 2001) reveals that 
education in Croatia is a stronger contributor than elsewhere, but close to the result for 
Hungary. The wage gap between public and private sector in Croatia is responsible for a 
much higher portion of variance in wages than in above transition countries. The log 
variance decomposition for Croatia in 1998 (Bisogno, 2000) produced broadly consistent 
results with these in Table 10.  
 
 
8  Concluding Remarks 
This paper offers a detailed description of the conditional wage distribution in Croatia in 
2003. The results of wage regressions point that wages are increasing with the education 
level, that there is a certain wage gap between males and females and that unpleasant 
work hours can increase wages of high paid workers, but not of those at the bottom part 
of the distribution. It appears also that larger firms provide higher wages and that there 
are notable regional differences in wages of otherwise comparable workers. However, 
the most striking findings are related to the public/private sector wage gap.  
The analysis shows substantial public sector wage premium paid to the majority of its 
employees. The existent premium is robust to the definition of public sector used: public 
administration, state-owned enterprises, budgetary public sector, and wider enterprise-
included public sector. The premium over private sector is highest for low-paid, low- to 
medium-skilled and female employees. It diminishes for highly educated males, 
especially those at the higher tail of the wage distribution. If looked by industries, it 
seems that education is the least privileged part of the public sector. Wages paid for 
workers in budgetary public sector are of special policy interest due to regular wage 
negotiations between the Government and unions, the fiscal implications of the wage 
agreements and the reform in the public administration system. In that respect, evidences 
from this study may be important for some policy decisions. A differentiated policy 
treatment might be needed for various groups within public sector if aimed to achieve 
more equitable returns to education and other worker’s attributes across public sector, 
and between the public and private sector. The compressed wage structure in public 
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sector, especially at the upper end of the distribution might be released as to increase 
incentives for work and prevent migration of senior administration to private sector.  
Further improvement of the study could be directed towards accounting for sample 
selection problem and analyzing in more details some specific elements of wage 
differentials (for example, returns to education, gender wage gap or wage discrimination 
in general). Adding the time dimension to the study should be the natural next step in the 
analysis.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1.  Means and standard deviation of variables  
Variable Mean Std. dev. 
Net monthly wage (in kunas) 3508 1905 
Wage per hour (in kunas) 21.26 11.25 
Log wage per hour  2.95 0.44 
Education&other individual characteristics   
Unfinished primary 0.02 0.13 
Primary 0.13 0.34 
Vocational sec. 0.34 0.47 
General sec. 0.31 0.46 
2-year college 0.08 0.27 
College graduate 0.12 0.32 
Postgraduate 0.01 0.09 
Years of schooling 11.83 2.49 
Experience 16.88 10.56 
Age 39.16 10.64 
Immigrant 0.03 0.18 
Female 0.46 0.50 
Employer characteristics (size&sector)   
<10 empl. 0.19 0.39 
10-50 empl. 0.25 0.44 
50-200 empl. 0.25 0.43 
>=200 empl. 0.31 0.46 
Agriculture 0.03 0.18 
Mining 0.01 0.09 
Manufacturing 0.23 0.42 
Utilities 0.03 0.16 
Construction 0.09 0.29 
Retail&wholesale 0.15 0.35 
Hotels&restaurants 0.06 0.23 
Transport&comm. 0.08 0.27 
Fin. intermedietion 0.02 0.15 
Real estate 0.04 0.20 
Public admin. 0.08 0.27 
Education 0.07 0.26 
Health 0.07 0.26 
Community services 0.04 0.19 
Public sector  0.45 0.50 
Job characteristics (occupation&conditions)   
Elementary occupation 0.09 0.29 
Plant&machine operator 0.13 0.34 
Craftsman 0.16 0.37 
Farming 0.01 0.09 
Service&sales 0.17 0.37 
Clerk 0.14 0.35 
Technician 0.18 0.38 
Professional 0.10 0.30 
Management&admin. 0.01 0.12 
Military 0.01 0.09 
Non-regular hours 0.16 0.37 
Region   
North 0.15 0.36 
West 0.13 0.34 
Central 0.36 0.48 
East 0.17 0.37 
South 0.19 0.39 
Rural 0.39 0.49 
 
Note: Means of indicator variables (such as educational attainment, firm size, sector of activity, occupation, region 
etc.) should be considered as proportions of total.  
Data source: LFS 2003/II.  
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Human Capital and Unemployment         
in Transition Economies:                      
The Case of Kosova 
 
Avdullah Hoti*
 
Abstract 
The paper explores human capital issues in Kosova, a country characterised with high 
rate of unemployment and large-scale emigration. With the help of data from the 
Riinvest Labour Force and Household Survey (December 2002), we estimate the 
probability of unemployment for the population of working age, who are active in the 
labour force and reside in Kosova. Furthermore, we estimate also the probability of 
emigration for the population of working age. There seems to be some systematic 
patterns: (i) those who are unemployed are not randomly selected from the labour force; 
(ii) those who emigrate are not randomly selected from working age population. The 
empirical results show that the individuals residing in rural areas face higher probability 
of being unemployed. Consequently, they tend to emigrate more compared to those 
residing in urban areas. Second, males and married people face lower probability of 
being unemployed. But they also tend to emigrate more compared to their respective 
counterparts. Third, although the more educated persons face lower probability of being 
unemployed in Kosova, they tend to emigrate more than less educated individuals. These 
research findings might be used for developing policy proposals. 
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1  Introduction 
Growth and schooling are highly correlated and human capital, along with other factors, 
determines the economic growth (Bils and Klenow, 2000, Hanushek and Kimko, 2000). 
Moreover, an individual’s human capital influences his/her productivity, and therefore 
earnings, and it explains to a great extent earning differentials among individuals. The 
human capital, as such, influences the probability of becoming and remaining 
unemployed. The study of the human capital accumulation and related issues are crucial 
for a successful transformation of former command economies of Central and Eastern 
Europe. In the early stages of transition, the opinion whereby the level of human capital 
in transition countries was thought to be quite high prevailed. Notwithstanding, using 
firm level data for transition countries, it was revealed that these countries stand worse in 
terms of the quality of the work force.  
Kosova is one of the last countries to embark on the road of transition to a market 
economy. Unemployment is still high, though it has been decreasing. It is particularly 
high for young people and women. The labour market in Kosova has some distinctive 
characteristics, such as being a very young population and having a large-scale 
emigration. The effects of emigration on the labour market are of particular interest 
given its scale and the level of remittances. Though a noticeable progress has been 
achieved in reforming the education system in Kosova, much remains to be done. The 
development and reform of the education and training systems should reflect these 
developing labour market needs. 
There seems to be a systematic pattern regarding the unemployed individuals and the 
emigrants as well. That is to say that the unemployed are not randomly selected from the 
labour force. Similarly, the emigrants are not randomly selected from the working age 
population either. If there was not a particular pattern, than we would not detect any 
significant relationship between one’s unemployment or an emigrant status and some 
other characteristics such as the level of education , residence, gender, age etc. The fact 
that there are such relationships, points to the need for policy considerations to tackle 
these issues. This paper explores these patterns in Kosova, a country which is 
characterised by high unemployment and large-scale emigration.  
The structure of the paper is as follows: in Section 2, we discuss the structural 
adjustment during the transition process and, in particular, we comment on the trend and 
pattern of the unemployment. In Section 3, we discuss the ongoing debate on the human 
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capital in transition economies. Here we review the literature that deals with the impact 
of human capital on economic growth and comment on the value of human capital in 
transition economies. In Section 4, we turn to Kosova describing briefly the transition 
process, the labour market and the emigration patterns. Due to the lack of studies, this 
paper provides a comprehensive study of issues related to human capital and the working 
of labour market in Kosova. We discuss these issues in the context of South-Eastern 
European countries. The data and methodology are described in Section 5. The data used 
in our analyses are from the Household and Labour Force Survey undertaken by the 
Riinvest Institute in December 2002, as well as the data and reports from the Kosova 
Education Centre. The probability of unemployment and the probability of emigration 
are estimated employing a Logit model. In Section 6 some concluding remarks are given. 
Research findings might be used for developing policy proposals. 
 
 
2  Structural Adjustment and                        
Unemployment During the Transition 
The transition process that started with the breakdown of the command economy in 
Central and Eastern European countries brought about deep changes in the life of people 
residing there. These changes were both unique and very profound. They are still going 
through the process of transforming economies after more than a decade that passed 
since the communist system was abandoned. Some of these countries have made 
significant progress, whereas some of them still lack the necessary steps for the 
foundations of a market economy. Recently, the output has recovered to the pre-
transition level (at least in most of the Central European countries), but employment is 
still lagging behind. The unemployment rate remains high though it has been decreasing. 
Transition from a command to a market economy is being shaped by two main 
mechanisms, i.e. reallocation and restructuring (Blanchard, 1997). First, as transition 
started the governments cut down subsidies and introduced hard budget constraints to 
state-owned firms. Consequently, there was a disruption in the production process in 
large industrial state enterprises and a gradual increase in the private sector. Therefore, 
the behaviour of output during the transition can be described as having a U-shape – a 
decline initially and a recovery later on (Figure 1). Prices were liberalised making it even 
harder for these firms to operate. New employment moved toward the growing sectors, a 
process called reallocation. Part of the decline in activity was due not so much to 
reallocation, but rather to de-organisation. In the pre-transition period, firms were 
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organised differently, around a central plan rather than markets: they had only one 
supplier for each of their inputs and one buyer (or a certain number) of output. As 
transition started, these bilateral relations were destroyed, leading to a disruption in the 
production process. 
 
Figure 1.  Growth in real GDP in transition countries 
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Source: EBRD (1999). Years are not in calendar term, year 0 is the year before the transition process started and GDP
in that year is equal to 100. This is important since not all countries started the transition process in the same year. In
this way we can compare the behaviour of the GDP across countries during the transition. 
 
 
 
 
 
The second process that shapes transition is restructuring. It implies that some of those 
currently employed will lose their job either because of their obsolete human capital or 
because of the closure of some plants. Therefore, it is expected that under restructuring 
some employees will be laid off. On the other side, restructuring leads also to an increase 
in productivity of the remaining employees. 
Full employment (zero unemployment), centrally set wages and overstaffing characterise 
the labour market in the pre-transition period. As the transition process started both 
supply and demand for labour were affected. Sectoral reallocation of labour was evident 
as a result of the shrinkage of some sectors (heavy industry) and the development of 
others (services and light manufacturing). Given these adjustments, full employment was 
no longer sustainable. Some six million people became unemployed in Central and 
Eastern Europe. Many withdrew from the labour force. (Boeri et al. 1998; Svejnar, 1999 
etc.).  
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Table 3 provides the unemployment rates for the CE, SEE and the Baltic countries 
against time. The SEE countries had higher unemployment rate during most of the 1990s 
compared to the CE and Baltic countries.  
Burda (1993) argues that unemployment is not just a by-product of transition; it is 
necessary for transformations. In his study, he gives three reasons to support this claim: 
(i) with unemployment, the bargaining power is biased toward employers; indeed, 
unemployment will provide a worker-disciplining device; (ii) unemployment may be 
necessary to control the growth of real wages; and (iii) unemployment is necessary to 
allow the emergence of the private sector. He contends that for a new job to be created 
other have to be destroyed and concludes that neither ’big-bang’ nor ’go-slow’ is the best 
approach. 
 
Table 1.  Unemployment rate in transition countries (1990-2001) 
Countries 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
SEE (ave.) 9.75 11.1 18.5 19.8 17.7 17.7 10.4 16.4 17.3 13.1 19.7 19.62 
Albania 9.5 8.9 27.9 28.9 19.6 16.9 12.4 14.9 17.8 18.0 16.8 15.2 
Bulgaria 1.7 11.1 15.3 16.4 12.8 11.1 12.5 13.7 12.2 14.1 17.9 17.3 
Croatia 9.3 13.2 13.2 14.8 14.5 14.5 10.0 9.9 11.4 13.5 20.6 23.0 
Macedonia 18.5 19.2 27.8 28.3 31.4 37.7 na 36.0 34.5 na 32.2 34.0 
Romania na 3.0 8.2 10.4 10.1 8.2 6.5 7.4 10.4 6.8 10.8 8.6 
The Baltic 
(ave.) 
0.55 0.45 2.6 6.57 9.37 15.1 15.3 12.9 12.4 13.4 11.4 na 
Estonia 0.6 na na 6.6 7.6 9.8 10.0 9.7 9.9 11.7 14.8 na 
Latvia 0.5 0.6 3.9 8.7 16.7 18.1 19.4 14.8 14.0 14.5 8.4 na 
Lithuania na 0.3 1.3 4.4 3.8 17.5 16.4 14.1 13.3 14.1 11.1 na 
CE (ave.) 2.55 8.28 8.98 11.1 10.7 9.7 9.34 8.42 9.78 10.4 11.7 12.6 
Czech Rep. 0.7 4.1 2.6 3.5 3.2 2.9 3.5 5.2 7.5 8.7 8.8 9.0 
Hungary 1.8 8.2 9.3 11.9 10.7 10.2 9.9 8.7 7.8 7.0 6.5 6.0 
Poland 6.5 12.3 14.3 16.4 16.0 14.9 13.2 8.6 10.4 12.5 16.7 17.0 
Slovakia 1.2 9.5 10.4 14.4 14.6 13.1 12.8 12.5 15.6 16.2 18.9 19.0 
Slovenia na 7.3 8.3 9.1 9.1 7.4 7.3 7.1 7.6 7.4 7.5 12.0 
 
Source: 1990-98 OECD (2000); 1999-2000 KILM, ILO (2002); 2001 WIIW, Vienna (2002).  
 
 
 
Boeri et al. (1998) show that the most vulnerable groups to become unemployed are 
those with low education. The unemployment rate for older workers is lower than the 
rate for young ones, because many older workers took early retirement and, therefore, 
withdrew from the labour force. Burda (1993) and Nesporova (1999, 2001) argue that 
one of the causes of unemployment during the transition is ’skill mismatching’ – many 
skills have become obsolete due to changes in production, advanced technologies and 
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new forms of organisation. Therefore, the unemployment prevails since adjusting 
occupational distribution of unemployed workers takes time.  
 
 
3  Human Capital and Transition Economies 
The role of human capital in economic growth is widely recognised in economics 
literature. Hanushek and Kimko (2000) show that labour force quality has a consistent, 
stable, and strong relationship with economic growth. The macro effects of human 
capital have been analysed by regressing the economic growth on human capital, as well 
as on other variables. Bils and Klenow (2000) show that growth and schooling are highly 
correlated across countries. Using empirical data, they show that greater schooling 
enrolment in 1960 consistent with one more year of attainment is associated with 0.30% 
faster annual growth over 1960-1990. Moreover, human capital accumulation seen from 
an individual viewpoint explains to a great extent earning differentials among individuals 
in the labour market. Consequently, the level of human capital is important from both 
macro and micro aspect. Given these facts, governments throughout the world pay 
increasing attention to the quality of education delivered by schools.  
As the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries progress with their reforms toward 
market economies, the role that human capital has to play gains importance. While the 
progress toward the market economy in the early stages of transition depended on the 
willingness and commitment of governments to implement reforms, the long run 
adjustment of transition economies depends primarily on the ability of human capital to 
absorb and to exercise the knowledge that is necessary to compete internationally. 
Human capital that is able to adjust to technological changes and to the principles of 
market economy is a prerequisite to bring economic prosperity for the nation as a whole. 
Moreover, as Micklewright (1999) argues, the education system [i.e. human capital] is 
also vital to a wider process of social change that both underpins economic reforms and 
is needed in its own right, because transition involves the development of new nations. 
The twenty-seven countries in the region today (including former Soviet republics) were 
born from only eight countries that existed at the beginning of the 1990s.  
In the early stages of transition, the opinion whereby the level of human capital in 
transition countries was thought to be quite high prevailed (Druska et al., 2001; Spagat 
,2001). This opinion was grounded on simply comparing enrolment rates in educational 
institutions in transition countries to those in the developed countries. Duczynski (2001), 
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using the data set from Barro and Lee (1993) based on a research that evaluates the 
educational attainment internationally, shows that the average years of schooling in the 
population aged over 15 in transition countries is found to be 9.31, with a standard 
deviation of 1.1. In 21 developed countries the average is 8.7 and the standard deviation 
is 1.8. These data reveal two facts: (i) the transition countries have higher educational 
attainment (the average years of schooling is higher compared to the developed 
countries); and (ii) inequality in educational attainment among different groups in 
transition countries is lower compared to that in the developed countries. Micklewright 
(1999) shows that comparing enrolment rates (or, in this case, the average years of 
schooling) provides limited information, since it neglects the quality of education 
obtained by the learning actually achieved. Hanushek and Luque (2002) show that one 
academic year of schooling in the USA is not directly comparable to one academic year 
in, say, the developing or transition countries and that schools and tertiary educational 
institutions are far from being the only avenue for education. However, it is apparent that 
the stock of human capital inherited from the socialist period was high compared to other 
countries at similar levels of economic development. The point is whether the transition 
countries can maintain this positive element inherited from the previous system and 
make further improvements. As Micklewright (1999) contends, this should constitute a 
major priority for economic policy.  
Education acquired during the previous system is not of the type required under the open 
market system, and much of the skills inherited were obsolete. Spagat (2002), making 
use of data from an EBRD report from 2000, concludes that firms in transition countries 
lag behind advanced industrialised countries in terms of the quality of their workforce. 
The lack of successful reforms and high unemployment mean that over time there will be 
a continuing loss of skills, leading to an even greater gap in the quality of workforce. The 
educational system under the communist regime was biased toward producing graduates 
with very narrow skills. Those who graduated from vocational schools were generally 
over-represented among the number of total graduates. When the transition started, it 
was revealed that the marketability of these types of skills was low, with diplomas from 
vocational schools often being very poorly rewarded (Boeri and Terrel, 2002, Orazem 
and Vodopivec, 1997). This was reflected, as Boeri and Terrell (2002) and Micklewright 
(1999) show, by a decline in enrolment in vocational and technical schools throughout 
the region, and a rise in enrolment in general secondary schools and in tertiary education. 
This is a reflection of a mix of demand and supply factors, ranging from enterprise-based 
schools closing down (i.e. where graduates from vocational schools were trained for 
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particular enterprises) to children opting for other types of skills or dropping out of the 
education system altogether (Micklewright, 1999).  
To sum up, much of the human capital in the transition economies would have low 
market value, since it was acquired under communism when priorities were very 
different from what they are today. Nevertheless, the human capital in the transition 
countries has an ’intergenerational’ value in terms of passing the inherited human capital 
across generations and creating better chances and choices for the young generation. 
Therefore, it is crucial to note that “while a Russian rocket scientist might earn very low 
wages, he still can do much to facilitate his children’s human capital” (Spagat, 2001).  
 
 
4  Kosova Among Other South-East European Countries 
The countries of South Eastern Europe, including Kosova, are described as latecomers 
on the stage of transition. Among them are: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Kosova, Macedonia, Romania, and Serbia and Montenegro. The transition 
process in these countries is described as a ’retard transition’, since it was disrupted by 
conflicts throughout the 1990s. With the total GDP of US$50 billion and 50 million 
people, this is the poorest region in Europe. The labour market in these countries has 
been affected substantially by recent conflicts and the resulting movements of people. 
The combined effect of industrial decline, privatisation and economic restructuring 
caused a dramatic reduction of opportunities for employment. Added the limited access 
to the capital market, the situation becomes even worse (Grootings, 2001). New 
employment has been driven mainly by self-employment, such as small businesses and 
farms. The informal sector’s share in employment is not to be neglected either.  
A double-digit unemployment rate has become an accepted reality, especially among the 
young and less-educated people. The concern is that unemployment seems to stabilise at 
high levels, though data on unemployment are not very reliable especially when the 
informal economy is taken into account. Participation rates have been affected by ageing 
of population in some countries (Croatia, Bulgaria etc.), and by a high birth rate in others 
(Albania and Kosova). To sum up, in terms of labour market developments, the SEE 
countries are experiencing what the CE countries went through in the early 1990s, but on 
a much more dramatic scale (Grootings, 2001).  
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Kosova has a unique recent history reflected in its current uncertain status (Adnett and 
Hoti, 2003). It is one of the last countries to embark on the road of transition to market 
economy (Hashi, 2001). The reason is twofold: first, the occupation by Serbia during the 
period 1989-1999, which started with the abolishment of the Kosova’s Constitution in 
1989. Kosovar experts and an ILO report claim that some 145,000 workers (managerial 
staff in enterprises, teachers and university professors) had been dismissed from their 
jobs. During this period, the Albanians in Kosova established their own institutions, 
including government at central and municipal levels, which functioned until 1999. The 
international isolation of Serbia and, together with that, of Kosova aggravated the 
economic situation furthermore. During the period 1990-1995, GDP contracted by 50%, 
fell to less than US$400 per capita.  
Second, the war in 1999 displaced some 800,000 people to the neighbouring countries 
and to the Western Europe. After the war, the reconstruction, stabilisation and 
transformation policies became the responsibility of the UN Mission to Kosova based on 
Resolution 1244. Some progress has been achieved in terms of establishing new 
institutions, though their competencies are limited. GDP is recovering and was increased 
by 11% and 6% in 2001 and 2002, respectively, reaching the level of more than 
US$1,000 per capita. The reconstruction process absorbed a considerable number of 
unemployed people. Some 65,000 people are working in the newly established state 
institutions and in the public sector.  
Given the trend toward the knowledge-based economy, the human capital embodied in 
the Kosovan population is the nation’s most important economic asset. As in other 
countries, the success of the Kosovan education system in developing high levels of 
attainment in the key competences will be an important determinant of future national 
economic development. Equal access to a modern education system is also a major factor 
in promoting equity and social welfare, as well as raising the well-being of minority and 
disadvantaged groups. 
 
4.1  The Labour Market in Kosova 
Activity rates in Kosova are very low by European standards, with only 58% of the 
resident population of working age out of 1,210,000 economically active (Riinvest, 
2003). This is largely due to the low activity rate among women (just over 40%). Such 
low activity rate, in turn, reflects very high unemployment rate (49%). When adjustments 
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for seasonal factors and the existence of the informal sector are made, the estimated 
unemployment rate falls below 40%. Currently, these rates are approximately three times 
the rates of Albania and Bulgaria. The unemployment rate is especially high for women 
(estimated at 64%), with only the Czech Republic and Albania approaching this degree 
of a gender gap in unemployment rates in the CEECs. Kosova faces chronic youth 
unemployment, estimated at 72% for those aged between 15-24, and with over 40% of 
all unemployed coming from this age group this problem is more severe than in any 
other CEE country. The lack of job creation and the resulting strongly negative duration 
dependence of unemployment is reflected in Kosova by having the highest proportion of 
long-term unemployed (estimated at 83%), with this proportion even higher for women 
(Adnett 2003).  
Out of the estimated 36% of the population aged between 15-64 who are employed, 
about two-thirds are now in the private sector. Agriculture accounts for nearly a quarter 
of total employment; other main sectors are wholesale/retail trades (12%), health and 
education (14%) and construction (7%), where manufacturing accounts for less than 4% 
of employment. There are over 300 state-owned enterprises employing approximately 
30,000 workers with a further 30,000 on unpaid leave. Riinvest estimates that informal 
employment accounts for about a fifth of the total employment.  
 
4.2  Education System in Kosova 
Based on the data from the Riinvest Households and Labour Force Survey (December 
2002), only 13% of the Kosovan population in the 25-64 age range hold higher education 
qualifications (18% of men and 8% of women), compared to 23% of men and 20% of 
women in the EU, 36% of men and 32% of women in Japan, and 37% of the US overall 
population. Such low percentage of people with higher education qualifications and an 
increasing demand in the labour market for these qualifications will put pressure on the 
education system in Kosova to increase its capacities. 
The education system in Kosova is undergoing a reform involving every level of the 
system. Reforms are being undertaken in a number of key areas, with various 
international bodies acting as lead agents. Apart from the curricula, the reform involves 
the organisation of education as well as the institutions. The new 5+4+3 educational 
structure (primary, lower secondary and upper secondary education, respectively) is 
being introduced, with additional 3+2 for higher education (university and postgraduate 
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respectively). Less in known for the participation rate in education. According to the data 
from the Riinvest Labour Force and Households Survey (December 2002), the 
participation rate in secondary education is around 70% of the relevant cohort. Due to the 
growing importance of higher education for economic development, policies that target 
increasing participation in education in general, and in secondary and higher education 
(HE) in particular, are urgently needed. For the sake of comparison, the enrolment in 
higher education institutions in Kosova in 2003 was around 10-12%, whereas in a post-
communist country such as Poland it was 30% (in the USA 80% and in the OECD 
countries 54%, (see Part A, Figure 2 below). There are roughly 1,000 students per 
100,000 inhabitants enrolled in higher education in Kosova (Riinvest 2004), compared to 
1,350 students in Macedonia and 4,243 in Slovenia (see Part B, Figure 2 below). Both of 
these countries have similar populations to Kosova’s. Due to the fact that the majority of 
new jobs require a higher education degree, it is even more important to increase the 
number of students. The increase of enrolment in higher education should be given 
priority if it is to raise the competitiveness of the Kosovan economy.  
 
Figure 2.  A) Students’ enrolment in global comparison; and 
               B) Number of students per 100,000 inhabitants  in South-East 
                    European countries in 2000 
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The majority of the new jobs created in Kosova during the last four years have been 
created in the sector of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), for which the 
entrepreneurship skills are essential. Consequently, an education system that equips the 
new graduates with such skills ensures faster employment, and economic growth. 
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Kosova has now a 5 + 4 +3 system of primary and secondary schooling from the age of 
6. Recent structural changes have been introduced with the objective of making the 
Kosovan education system compatible with education systems in the EU and of other 
developed countries. Nearly a quarter of the Kosova’s population is participating in 
education. In the 2002/2003 school year there were 973 primary schools with 315,089 
students enrolled and 20,352 teachers. In that year there were 140 secondary schools (in 
72.5% of these schools the teaching is provided in Albanian, in 22% in Serbian, in 4.5% 
in more than one language, and in one secondary school in Turkish which makes 0.7%). 
The total number of students enrolled in the secondary education is 86,830 (55.1% are 
men). The University of Prishtina had 23,175 students enrolled in 2002/2003. There are 
also some private providers of higher education, but they are still in the initial stage of 
development.  
Several previous reports on the Kosovan education system describe the system and point 
out the key characteristics and weaknesses before the 2001 elections (OECD 2003a). In 
short, the system offered little pre-school provision, suffered from high pupil 
absenteeism in compulsory schooling, and low participation rate in post-compulsory 
secondary and tertiary education. Buildings and equipment were in poor condition, and 
low salaries of teachers and lecturers and the lack of in-service training resulted in 
multiple job-holding, and a slow and uneven implementation of modern curricula and 
teaching and learning methods. In the old system the evaluation and assessment was not 
carried out centrally, all the responsibility for these was devolved to schools. There was 
no standardisation of assessment to enable comparison between schools and teachers, 
respectively. The undergraduate studies lasted for a minimum of four years; only 1,600 
students graduated in 1999/2000, a quarter of these in science and engineering. Such low 
graduation rate, together with high non-completion rates and a long average duration of 
studies have been persistent characteristics of the University of Prishtina. Tuition fees 
were introduced in 2002/2003 and a commitment was made to reform structures and 
curricula in line with the Bologna process.  
The education in Kosova is mainly public, and participation in private education is still 
low. Secondary and primary education is financed through grants from the central 
budget, which are transferred to the municipalities; higher education is financed directly 
by the Kosovan budget and by students’ contributions in the form of tuition fees. Private 
secondary education, such as private colleges licensed by the Ministry of Education, 
Science and Technology, are financed through private sources. Until now there have not 
been developed any mechanisms that would enable a broader portfolio of financial 
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sources for education, such as combined private and public financing, partnership forms 
and use of external financial sources. Education expenditure in the 2004 Kosova budget 
accounts for about 15% of the total budget expenditures. Table 3 shows how spending in 
education in Kosova has evolved during the period 2000-2004. Spending in education is 
presented in absolute figures and as percentages of the total public expenditure (Hoti et 
al., 2004).  
 
Table 2.  Government expenditures in education in Kosova 
              2000-2004, (in ‘000 Euros) 
 2000 % 2001 % 2002 % 2003 % 2004 % 
Preschool, primary 
and secondary 49,493 87.3 52,241 87.0 61,740 83.5 61,444 76.8 72,814 78.6 
Special needs 
education 
institutions 
642 0.2 469 0.8 816 1.1 956 1.2 1,112 1.2 
Higher education 6,155 10.9 6,395 10.6 9,891 13.4 11,591 14.5 12,943 14.0 
National University 
Library 140 0.2 242 0.4 265 0.4 1,125 1.4 1,385 1.5 
Education 
administration 251 0.4 732 1.2 1,012 1.4 4,499 5.6 2,812 3.0 
Teacher training    192 0.3 230 0.3 1,280 1.4 
Curriculum 
Development       65 0.1 200 0.2 273 0.3 
Total 56,681 100.0 60,079 100.0 73,981 100.0 80,043 100.0 92,620 100.0 
Total Kosova Budget 285,600   288,200  383,708  556,900  619,000   
% of total budget 20%   21%  19%  14%  15%   
 
Source: MEF and Riinvest (2004). 
 
 
 
4.3  Emigration in Kosova 
Emigration and the following impacts, both economic and social, have been widely 
analysed. It is shown that decisions about emigration depend on: (i) the cost of 
emigration; (ii) relative wage levels at home and abroad; (iii) the level of, and eligibility 
criteria for, unemployment benefits and social assistance; (iv) the unemployment rate at 
home; and (v) the level of education of those tending to emigrate. 
Restrictions on people’s movement both within and across countries prevailed in almost 
all of the former socialist countries. In some countries, for example in Albania, every 
movement was strictly supervised and allowed only with a special permit. The 1974 
Constitution of the former Yugoslavia introduced some elements of market economy, the 
reforms that made it thus different from other socialist countries. People were allowed, to 
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a considerable degree, to move freely and to choose their residence according to their 
preferences. Nonetheless, other constraints prevailed, such as financial and cultural ones, 
attitudes etc.  
As a consequence of having young population and persistently high unemployment rate, 
Kosova has experienced both temporary and permanent mass emigration over the recent 
years, with approximately half a million Kosovars living abroad and whose remittances 
account for about a quarter of the national income. Emigration in Kosova took place 
during two distinctive time periods. The first one started in the 1980s and continued 
during the 1990s until the 1999 war, estimated at around 250,000 people. The second 
wave of emigrants consisted of massive emigration/movements of population; it started 
during the 1988 conflict and culminated during the open war in 1999.  
The emigration in Kosova had a strong impact on two aspects. First, the emigration 
waves of the 1980s and 1990s had an impact on the population growth, which decreased 
from 46,000 persons per annum in the early 1980s to 36,000 in the 1990s. Second, in 
terms of the labour market and private sector development, the emigration can be 
thought of as having two effects: (i) it puts downward pressure on unemployment since it 
reduces the labour supply for a given level of labour demand and, assuming there is a 
fixed number of vacancies, those who remain in Kosova have a higher chance of getting 
a job; (ii) emigration induces private employment creation due to remittances that 
emigrants send back home not only in cash but also in the form of machinery. It is 
estimated that such remittances sent by emigrants working in Western European 
countries amount to around $500 million per annum. This amount is approximately a 
quarter of Kosova’s GDP and, given the lack of social benefits/assistance, remittances 
are an important source of income for families residing in Kosova as well. 
 
 
5  Data and Methodology 
5.1  Data and Some Descriptive Statistics 
The data used in this analysis are from the Household and Labour Force Survey 
conducted in December 2002 by Riinvest Institute. The survey was run to provide data 
for the labour market in Kosova, as well as to provide some demographic and household 
expenditure data. The unit of observation in the survey was a household, but data were 
collected for each family member. In total, there are data for 8,552 individuals, of whom 
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some 4,937 are of working age and reside in Kosova (i.e. they are not emigrants), while 
2,861 of latter group are in the labour force. Table 1 summarises the main characteristics 
of the labour force in Kosova in general as well as of the employed and the unemployed, 
in particular.  
 
Table 3.  Descriptive statistics for the labour force in Kosova 
 Labour force Employed Unemployed 
Employment status (%)  1 0.510 0.490 
   (0.500) (0.500) 
Urban residence (%) 0.500 0.588 0.444 
 (0.500) (0.493) (0.497) 
Men (%) 0.639 0.745 0.532 
 (0.480) (0.436) (0.499) 
Age (average years) 33.519 38.082 29.659 
 (11.561) (11.126) (10.411) 
Age less or equal 30, (%) 0.481 0.310 0.624 
 (0.500) (0.463) (0.485) 
Married (%) 0.635 0.773 0.509 
 (0.482) (0.419) (0.500) 
Education (%)    
     No education (%) 0.017 0.009 0.019 
 (0.129) (0.096) (0.137) 
     Primary education only (%) 0.252 0.152 0.324 
 (0.434) (0.359) (0.468) 
     Secondary education (%) 0.572 0.553 0.580 
 (0.495) (0.497) (0.494) 
     College education (%) 0.073 0.135 0.034 
 (0.261) (0.342) (0.182) 
     Higher education (%) 0.081 0.150 0.036 
 (0.273) (0.357) (0.186) 
Private business ownership (%)  0.490  
  (0.500)  
Working experience    
     Working experience (up to 1 year) (%)  0.181  
  (0.385)  
     Working experience (1 to 5 years) (%)  0.463  
  (0.499)  
     Working experience (over 5 years) (%)  0.357  
  (0.479)  
Business sector    
     Agriculture (%)  0.043  
  (0.202)  
     Industry (%)  0.173  
  (0.379)  
     Transport and services (%)  0.484  
  (0.500)  
     Education and health (%)  0.200  
  (0.400)  
     Other (%)  0.094  
  (0.291)  
 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. 
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The first observation derived from Table 2 is a high unemployment rate (49%). 
Unemployed individuals are concentrated in rural areas (56% of the total number of 
unemployed live in rural areas compared with just 45% of the employed). The 
unemployed are younger than the employed and, as discussed below, they are also less 
educated. Men are over-represented, both among the labour force and the employed, the 
former reflecting low female activity rate. Almost two-thirds of the unemployed are 
under the age of 31. Nearly half of those who are employed work in the private sector. 
Employment is concentrated in transport and services.  
In Table 3 we present some descriptive statistics for all Kosovan emigrants residing in 
other countries, and for emigrants aged 16-64 (i.e. working age emigrants). From this we 
can get some insight about the nature and reasons for emigrating.  
 
Table 4.  Descriptive statistics for emigrants 
 All emigrants Emigrants aged 16-64 
Urban Resident (%) 0.37 0.38 
 (0.48) (0.49) 
Men (%) 0.66 0.70 
 (0.47) (0.46) 
Age (average years) 26.37 31.36 
 (13.69) (9.45) 
Married (%) 0.60 0.62 
 (0.49) (0.49) 
Education   
     No education (%)  0.03 
  (0.17) 
     Primary education only (%)  0.24 
  (0.43) 
     Secondary education (%)  0.62 
  (0.49) 
     College education (%)  0.10 
  (0.30) 
     Higher education (%)  0.004 
  (0.07) 
 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
 
 
Just above one third of the Kosovan emigrants are from urban areas. This is an indication 
that people from rural areas are induced to emigrate more that those from urban areas, 
and higher unemployment rate in urban areas might be one of the explanations for this 
pattern. Another observation from Table 3 is that the average age of the working age 
emigrants is lower than that for the labour force in Kosova. If we look at education, we 
can notice that the emigrants are more educated than the labour force in Kosova (Figure 
2), which indicates that the more educated persons tend to emigrate more.  
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Figure 3.  The education level for the labour force in Kosova 
               and for emigrants age 16-64 
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Source: Data from Riinvest Labour Force and Household Survey (2002). 
 
 
 
5.2  Methodology 
Our primary objective in this analysis is to explore what is happening to the human 
capital in the post-war Kosova. Due to the data limitations we cannot analyse many 
aspects of human capital formation and deterioration in Kosova. We have, in particular, 
explored the probability of being unemployed and emigrating. Our analysis, therefore, 
consists of two parts.  
First, using the data for 2,861 working age individuals, who are active in the labour force 
(either employed or unemployed) and reside in Kosova, we estimated the probability of 
being unemployed. We employed a Logit specification, which is expressed as the odds 
ration in favour of being unemployed (i.e. the ratio of the probability that a person in the 
labour force will be unemployed to the probability that that person will not be 
unemployed). The dependent variable is the probability of one being unemployed and the 
independent variables are: residence (urban/rural), gender, age, marital status and level 
of education. Due to data limitation we could not discriminate between types of 
education (vocational, general etc). This would have allowed us to see whether there is 
any difference in one’s employment status depending on whether he/she has finished a 
vocational or general-type of education. Our first model is presented below. 
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P(U)i = β1 + β2Resid i + β3Gender i +β4Age i + β5Ageless31i + β6Married i + 
(1) β7NoEdu i + β8SecEd i + β9UniEdi + β10PostUniEdu i + u i
 
where the i subscript stands for an individual, while other variables are defined as 
follows: 
Resid = 1 if living in urban areas, 0 if living in rural areas 
Gender = 1 if male, 0 if female 
Age in years  
Ageless31 = 1 if age is less than 31, 0 if 31 and older 
Married = 1 if married, 0 otherwise 
NoEdu = 1 if the individual did not complete any education level, 0 otherwise 
SecEd = 1 if the individual has completed secondary education, 0 otherwise 
UniEdu = 1 if the individual has completed university education, 0 otherwise 
PostUnivEdu = 1 if the individual has completed post-university education, 
    0 otherwise 
 
In the second part of our analysis we estimate the probability of emigration. The model is 
the same (Logit Model) and the independent variables are: residence (urban/rural), 
gender, age, marital status and level of education. The data used for this analysis consist 
of data for 2,301 individuals of working age (16-64), regardless whether they are in the 
labour force or not, of whom 456 are emigrants (19%). 
P(E)i = β1 + β2Resid i + β3Gender i +β4Age i + β5Ageless31i + β6Married i + 
(2) β7NoEdu  + βi 8SecEd  + βi 9Uni.&post-uni.Ed  + u i i
 
where the i subscript stands for the individual, while other variables are defined as 
follows: 
Resid          = 1 if living in urban areas, 0 if living in rural areas 
Gender          = 1 if male, 0 if female 
Age in years  
Ageless31          = 1 if age is less than 31, 0 if 31 and older 
Married          = 1 if married, 0 otherwise 
NoEdu         = 1 if the individual did not complete any education level, 0 otherwise  
SecEd         = 1 if the individual has completed secondary education, 0 otherwise 
Uni.&post-uni.Ed = 1 if the individual has completed university or post- 
             university education, 0 otherwise 
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Schooling in both models is measured by the level of education completed and, as 
showed above, we cannot distinguish between different types of schooling. It would be 
expected that those with vocational education face higher probability of being 
unemployed compared to those with general education qualifications. The omitted 
category for education in both models is primary education. Note that in the second 
model we have combined both university and post-university types of education.  
 
 
6  Empirical Findings 
Prior to the assessment, we expected that those who are less educated, reside in rural 
areas and are young face higher probability of becoming unemployed. Regression results 
for Equation (1) are presented in Table 4 below. In addition, Equation (1) is estimated for 
all persons in the labour force who reside in Kosova (column 1) and for men and women 
separately (column 2 and 3, respectively).  
All coefficients in column 1 have the asterisk sign and all the coefficients except those in 
’age less that 31’ and ’no education’ are not significant. Based on these results, it can be 
said that the probability of being unemployed is lower if a person is an urban resident, 
and a married male. This probability decreases also with age and with the level of 
education. These results are consistent with other statistics whereby the unemployed are 
concentrated in rural areas, among females, youth and less educated individuals.  
The regression results presented in column 2 and column 3 for men and women 
respectively show mainly the same pattern as those in column 1, except that the 
coefficient on urban residence for women is not significant and has the wrong sign.  
In general, all coefficients in three columns show consistency that the probability of 
unemployment is lower for urban residents, for men and for married individuals. It 
decreases with age and with the level of education. 
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Table 5.  Probability of being unemployed 
             using logit maximum likelihood estimation 
 Dependent variables 
Regressors Incidence of unemployment (all) 
Incidence of 
unemployment (men) 
Incidence of 
unemployment (women) 
 1 2 3 
Constant 3.17* 2.37* 3.27* 
 (10.20) (6.33) (5.95) 
Urban resident -0.27* -0.44* 0.10 
 (-3.18) (-4.22) (0.65) 
Male  -0.80*   
 (-9.06)   
Age -0.05* -0.04* -0.06* 
 (-6.96) (-5.28) (-4.51) 
Age less than 31 -0.12 -0.16 -0.09 
 (-0.79) (-0.86) (-0.37) 
Married -0.48* -0.66* -0.28** 
 (-4.70) (-4.82) (-1.74) 
No education -0.17 -0.30 -0.04 
 (-0.51) (-0.63) (-0.09) 
Secondary -0.62* -0.54* -0.84* 
 (-6.13) (-4.25) (-4.86) 
Uni. Education -1.41* -1.39* -1.54* 
 (-7.19) (-5.20) (-5.18) 
Post-Uni. Educ. -1.59* -1.33* -2.01* 
 (-8.25) -5.39 -6.61 
Sample size 2861 1829 1032 
Goodness of fit 0.692 0.690 0.696 
Pseudo-R2 0.145 0.123 0.110 
 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5% level of significance; ** significant at 10% level of significance. 
 
 
 
The second part of our analysis consists of estimating the probability of being an 
emigrant from Equation (2). The results from a Logit Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
are presented in Table 5. All coefficients have the asterisk sign, though not all of them 
are significant. From the regression results, the following observations can be made: (i) 
urban residents are less likely to emigrate than rural residents; (ii) men are more likely to 
emigrate than women; (iii) the probability of emigration decreases with age, but there is 
no significant difference in the probability of emigration between those aged under 31 
and those of 31 and above; (iv) married people are more likely to emigrate; and (v) the 
probability of emigration increases with education. 
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Table 5.  Probability of emigration using logit maximum likelihood estimation 
Regressors Incidence of emigrating 
Constant -1.45* 
 (-3.86) 
Urban resident -0.38* 
 (-3.40) 
Men 0.82* 
 (6.83) 
Age -0.03* 
 (-3.41) 
Age less than 31 0.04 
 (0.19) 
Married 0.50* 
 (3.59) 
No education 0.30* 
 (0.91) 
Secondary 0.47* 
 (3.60) 
Uni. & post-uni. education 0.33** 
 (1.658) 
Sample size 2,301 
Goodness of fit 0.806 
Pseudo-R-Squared 0.053 
 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5% level of significance; ** significant at 10% level of significance. 
 
 
 
6  Conclusions  
In this paper we have analysed the human capital, unemployment and emigration in 
Kosova. Two issues were analysed in particular. First, with the help of the data from the 
Riinvest Labour Force and Household Survey (December 2002), we estimated the 
probability of unemployment for those who are of working age, who are active in the 
labour force and reside in Kosova. Empirical findings show that the probability of 
unemployment is lower for urban residents, for men and for married people. It also 
decreases with age and with the level of education. From these results we can show that 
the human capital of women, young and less educated individuals is deteriorating. 
Unless necessary steps are taken to reintegrate these people into the employment world, 
they will become a burden to the society.  
In the second part we have explored the probability of emigration. The empirical results 
show that the probability of emigration is lower for urban residents compared to rural 
residents and that men and married people tend to emigrate more. On the other side, it is 
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also shown that more educated people have higher propensity to emigrate. This is 
primarily due to the fact their chances of finding a better job and life abroad are higher 
along with lower emigration costs (included are searching costs). These results point to 
the issue of “the brain drain”, which is becoming a real concern for some of the transition 
countries. In Albania, nearly 1,000 academics who emigrated during the 1990s created a 
vacuum in the academic life there. Although in Kosova this phenomenon is still not 
strong, there are signs that as time passes it will become a real concern. More educated 
people constitute the most productive part of the society and their emigration has a 
strong impact on domestic economy. From this point of view, the government should 
create better environment for the highly-educated people in order to stimulate them to 
stay and to work in their home country.  
The debate over the right emigration policy is still going on. It seems that this debate is 
balanced stating both positive and negative aspects of emigration. Given the high 
unemployment rate in Kosova, emigration is playing an important part in financing the 
consumption expenditure of the families in Kosova, as well as financing investment 
expenditure by the private sector. We did not explore the latter issue and this might be an 
interesting topic for another research.  
If we reconcile the results from two regression equations than some interesting 
relationships can be found. Firstly, the individuals residing in rural areas face higher 
probability of unemployment. Consequently, they tend to emigrate more compared to 
those residing in urban areas. Secondly, men and married people face lower probability 
of unemployment. But they also tend to emigrate more compared to their respective 
counterparts. There is no straightforward explanation for this, although one might say 
that emigration is also a function of the family size (i.e. individuals from larger families - 
married people - tend to emigrate more). Thirdly, although more educated individuals 
face lower probability of unemployment in Kosova, they tend to emigrate more than less 
educated individuals.  
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Abstract 
During the 1980’s and 1990’s, financial liberalization became an almost universally-
accepted policy prescription. Large numbers of countries eased licensing, deregulated 
interest rates and dismantled systems of directed lending. However, banking system 
crises, first in the southern cone of Latin America in the early 1980’s and later in the 
U.S., Scandinavian countries and a large set of emerging market economies, raised 
questions about the links between financial liberalization and instability. In particular, 
Hellman, Murdoch and Stiglitz (2000) question the wisdom of complete deregulation of 
deposit interest rates, arguing that this can facilitate “purchasing market share” to fund 
“gambling.” 
The transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe provide an interesting laboratory 
to test these arguments. Starting in the early 1990’s, these countries rapidly liberalized 
their banking markets, removing restrictions on entry, asset composition and interest 
rates. For this reason, the experience of such countries may help confirm whether the 
U.S. experience of the 1980’s was typical. 
In this paper, we examine the experience of Croatia, which liberalized its banking 
regulations in the early 1990’s. After the end of the wars surrounding the break-up of 
former Yugoslavia, Croatia experienced rapid growth in the number of banks, strong 
deposit growth and substantial increases in deposit interest rates in the period 1995-98. 
This buoyant period was punctuated by the failures of numerous medium-sized banks in 
1998 and 1999.  
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Our argument is that high deposit interest rates helped fund the expansion of risk-loving 
banks, and had important negative external effects on healthy banks, thus making a 
strong contribution to the banking crisis of 1998-99. We proceed in two steps. First, 
using panel regression techniques, we show that banks were able to increase deposit 
growth, and thus fund rapid expansion, by raising interest rates in the pre-crisis period. 
We also show that the interest-elasticity of deposits completely vanished during the 
banking crisis. 
Second, we provide a set of predictive models of bank failures. These models show that 
deposit interest rates were one of the most significant variables predicting bank failures. 
High risk banks—the ones that eventually failed—often offered higher deposit interest 
rates than low risk banks. 
Having shown that high deposit interest rates were a source of funding for risky banks, 
and that high deposit interest rates are correlated with eventual failure, we end the paper 
with a discussion of policy implications.  
Keywords: interest rate regulation, banking crisis, bank failure models, financial 
liberalization 
JEL Classification: G21, G28 
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1  Introduction 
During the 1980’s and 1990’s, financial liberalization became an almost universally-
accepted policy prescription. Large numbers of countries eased licensing, deregulated 
interest rates and dismantled systems of directed lending. However, banking system 
crises, first in the southern cone of Latin America in the early 1980’s (Diaz-Alejandro, 
1985), and later in the U.S., (White, 1991; Kane, 1989) Scandinavian countries (Nyberg 
and Vihriala, 1994; Vihriala, 1996) and a large set of emerging market economies, raised 
questions about the links between financial liberalization and instability (for cross-
country econometric evidence see Demirguc-Kunt and Detriagache, 1998; 1999). While 
there are strong arguments and some evidence to argue that financial liberalization is 
beneficial in the long-term (Allen and Gale, 2003; Ranciere, Tornell and Westermann, 
2003) there is much controversy about the medium-term costs and the optimal approach 
to regulation under liberalized conditions.  
A crucial component of financial liberalization is the liberalization of interest rate 
setting. With the lifting of Regulation Q in 1980 in the United States, intellectual fashion 
moved against the regulation of deposit interest rates. However, in the decade that 
followed the lifting of regulation Q, the U.S. experience provided considerable anecdotal 
evidence about the negative effects of unlimited freedom to set deposit interest rates. 
Some aggressive banks used high deposit interest rates to fund their risky lending 
strategies. And the high deposit interest rates of these banks created a negative 
externality by forcing less risk-loving banks to raise their deposit rates to retain deposits, 
thus squeezing bank profits and creating a secondary impulse for less risky banks to 
actually increase the riskiness of their portfolio. Despite this, deregulation of deposit 
interest rates became a standard element of the financial liberalization package adopted 
by large numbers of countries. 
Keeley (1990) argues that the increase in risk-taking following deregulation was the 
result of the combination of unrestricted competition with fixed-premium deposit 
insurance. Increased competition erodes franchise value. Under fixed-premium deposit 
insurance, this increases the attractiveness of added risk, since greater probability of 
failure is not reflected in higher premia and thus does not increase the extent of losses 
suffered by the owner under failure. At the same time, added risk implies higher earnings 
under favorable outcomes, and thus increases the bank’s capital conditional upon 
survival. Keeley demonstrates that banks with greater market power maintain higher 
market-value capital-asset ratios and enjoyed lower interest rates on large, uninsured 
 193 
certificates of deposit. Reversing this, the erosion of franchise value caused by 
deregulation would lead to higher deposit interest rates. 
Hellman, Murdoch and Stiglitz (2000) provide a theoretical argument to show that, in an 
environment with only capital adequacy regulation and no regulation of interest rates, 
banks may have an incentive to bid up deposit interest rates so as to gain the funding to 
“gamble” (increase asset risk). Only a combination of capital adequacy regulation and 
deposit interest rate limitations can implement the Pareto-optimal allocation under all 
circumstances. Capital adequacy regulation alone tends to fail when competition is 
strong, i.e precisely in deregulated banking systems. Hellman et al consider systems with 
and without deposit insurance, but they only consider fixed-premium insurance, and 
acknowledge that “sophisticated fee schemes can be used to reduce moral hazard”. 
This leaves open the question of whether the levying of risk-adjusted deposit insurance 
premia could eliminate incentives to excessive risk-taking. Chan, Greenbaum and 
Thakor (1992) argue that both incentive and information problems make fairly-priced 
deposit insurance unfeasible. This question has been hotly debated since then, but the 
thrust of the literature seems to lean against the feasibility of completely eliminating risk-
taking via risk-adjusted deposit insurance premia (see, for example, Flannery, 1991; John 
and John, 1991; Crane, 1995; Kupiec and O’Brien, 1997; and Freixas and Rochet, 1998; 
Galac, 2004 provides an overview). Based on this, we hold that risk-adjusted premia, 
although possibly desirable, cannot be a panacea that wholly eliminates the problem of 
“market-stealing” increases of deposit interest rates to fund “gambling.”  
Taken together, all this points to a connection between “excessive” competition in the 
deposit market and suboptimal increases in risk taking. The transition countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe provide an interesting laboratory to test these arguments. 
Starting in the early 1990’s, these countries rapidly liberalized their banking markets, 
removing restrictions on entry, asset composition and interest rates. For this reason, the 
experience of such countries may help confirm whether the U.S. experience of the 
1980’s was typical. 
In this paper, we examine the experience of Croatia, which enacted rather liberal 
regulations regarding entry, asset composition and interest rates in the early 1990’s. 
After the end of the wars surrounding the break-up of former Yugoslavia, Croatia 
experienced rapid growth in the number of banks, strong deposit growth and substantial 
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increases in deposit interest rates in the period 1995-98. This buoyant period was 
punctuated by the failures of numerous medium-sized banks in 1998 and 1999.  
Our argument is that high deposit interest rates helped fund the expansion of risk-loving 
banks, and had important negative external effects on healthy banks, thus making a 
strong contribution to the banking crisis of 1998-99. We proceed in two steps. First, 
using panel regression techniques, we provide evidence to show that banks were able to 
increase deposit growth, and thus fund rapid expansion, by raising interest rates in the 
pre-crisis period. We show that the interest-elasticity of deposits was positive and 
significant, so that “market-stealing” behavior a la Hellman et al was feasible. We also 
show that the interest-elasticity of deposits completely vanished during the banking crisis 
as a flight to quality occurred. 
Second, we provide a set of predictive models of bank failures. These models show that 
high deposit interest rates were one of the most significant variables predicting bank 
failures. That is, high risk banks – the ones that eventually failed – often offered higher 
deposit interest rates than low risk banks. 
Having shown that high deposit interest rates were a source of funding for risky banks, 
and that high deposit interest rates are correlated with eventual failure, we end the paper 
with a discussion of policy implications. We argue that some form of market-conforming 
regulations to prevent “market-stealing” would be an appropriate safeguard. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the liberalization 
of the banking market in Croatia in the 1990’s and the dynamics of growth and crisis. 
Section 3 offers an econometric analysis of deposit growth. Section 4 presents models of 
failure and elucidates the role of deposit interest rates in failures. Section 5 provides a 
discussion of policy options and conclusions. 
 
 
2  Liberalization, Growth and Crisis                                  
in the Croatian Banking Sector 
The liberalization of the banking system in Croatia started while Croatia was still part of 
the former socialist Yugoslavia in 1989-90. A new banking law was enacted, allowing 
relatively free entry, and interest rates were deregulated. Bank supervision was 
established, but its effectiveness in the early years was limited.  
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Liberalization took place under conditions of war, accompanied by high inflation and 
sharp declines in output. A macroeconomic stabilization program implemented in 
October 1993 succeeded in bringing inflation under control, and real GDP growth began 
in 1994. Decisive military actions in May and August 1995, and the signing of the 
Dayton Peace Agreement in neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina in November 1995 
and the Erdut Agreement in late 1996 ended the period of conflict and brought about a 
sharp decline in political risk. 
The number of banks grew rapidly, even during the war, rising from 22 in 1991 to some 
61 in 1997. In addition, by 1997, 36 savings banks, with limited licenses, were also 
operating. Deposits began growing strongly in 1995. Growth came partly as a result of 
the return of deposits placed in foreign banks by Croatian citizens during the war. In 
addition, growing confidence in the banking system began to attract deposits held “in 
mattresses”.  
 
Table 1.  Banking and macroeconomic overview 
 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Number of banks 22 54 58 60 60 53 46 44 46 42 
Foreign banks 0 1 5 7 10 13 20 24 23 19 
Foreign bank assets share 0 1.0 1.0 4.0 6.7 39.9 84.1 89.3 90.2 91.0 
Real GDP growth, %  6.8 6.0 6.8 2.5 -0.9 2.9 4.4 5.2 4.3 
Inflation, %  3.8 3.4 3.8 5.4 4.4 7.4 2.3 1.9 1.7 
 
 
 
1996 in particular witnessed a substantial increase in deposit interest rates at some banks. 
Interest rates on domestic currency deposits rose dramatically in late 1995 and early 
1996 (see Figure 1). However, it should be noted that these deposits accounted for a very 
small portion of the total. Interest rates on fx deposits, the bulk of deposits, rose 
substantially later in the year. A number of banks offered interest rates on deposits in 
Deutschmarks that exceed comparable rates in Germany by some 800 to 1000 basis 
points (see Kraft, 1999 for details). 
Deposits grew explosively in this period, with annual growth rates exceeding 50% 
through most of 1996 and all of 1997 (see Figure 2). Both kuna and fx deposits grew 
rapidly.  
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Figure 1.  Average bank deposit interest rates 
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Figure 2.  Rate of growth of non-transactions deposits, % yoy 
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At the same time, lending surged, reaching a peak growth rate of 44% in 1997. Such 
rapid growth suggested the presence of increased risk taking, and indeed, in 1998, 
several bank failures occurred. The failures continued into 1999, with a total of 16 banks 
accounting for approximately 20% of 1997 total banking assets failing in 1998-99. 
Deposit growth came to a halt, and aggregate deposits actually fell during the height of 
the crisis in February-May 1999. During the crisis, there were signs of a reallocation of 
deposits towards the foreign banks, as some domestic banks experienced substantial 
withdrawals. 
The crisis was overcome through a combination of bankruptcies, lender-of-last resort 
actions by the central bank, and a turnaround in the macroeconomic situation starting in 
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the second half of 1999. The sale of four banks that had been seized by the government 
to foreign strategic partners in late 1999 and early 2000 helped further consolidate the 
situation. 
 
 
3  Econometric Analysis of Deposit Growth 
The brief background sketched out in section 2 suggests that risk-loving banks used 
increases in deposit interest rates in the expansionary period of 1995-97 to fund rapid 
lending growth. However, once bank failures began, a flight to quality occurred, in 
which interest rates were no longer the decisive factor in deposit allocation. 
To test whether this picture is accurate, in this section we build a panel model of 
depositor behavior and test it on the Croatian data. Our dependent variable is the 
quarterly rate of growth of deposits at individual banks. Depositors’ decision to make 
deposits in a particular bank should be affected by the interest rate offered by the bank 
relative to interest rates offered by other banks. For this reason, we use the difference 
between the interest rate of the individual bank at a given time from the average for all 
banks at this time, rather than simply the interest rate of the individual bank. 
 Also, we focus on one particular interest rate, the interest rate of foreign currency time 
deposits. We do this for two reasons. First, by using a narrow category of deposits, we 
make sure that shifts in deposit composition do not contaminate the interest rate series. 
Second, foreign exchange time deposits are overwhelmingly the largest category of 
deposits, and thus it makes sense that savers would choose to make deposits on the basis 
of this interest rate (if interest rates are crucial to their choice of bank). 
In addition, bank characteristics may affect depositor perceptions. However, it should be 
noted that disclosure about bank performance was fairly limited in Croatia in the 1990’s. 
Banks were required to publish audited annual reports, and banks offers of interest rates 
and other deposit conditions were also public knowledge. However, banks were not 
required to provide any higher frequency information about themselves, and the Croatian 
National Bank, the regulatory institution, did not publish any further bank data. Central 
bank analysts did publish two overviews of bank performance during 1997, one of which 
used peer group data (Kraft and George, 1997) and the other of which pointed out the 
dangers of rapid growth and singled out a set of rapidly-growing banks (Šonje, 1997). 
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A crucial element in depositor behavior towards bank risk is the existence of deposit 
insurance. A Law on Deposit Insurance was passed in 1994 (Government Gazette 44, 3, 
June 1994). However, enabling legislation was only passed much later, providing for the 
collection of the first insurance premia in mid-1997 and the introduction of limited 
insurance (full coverage of all household savings deposits up to 30,000 HRK, and 75% 
of the amount of deposits between 30,000 and 50,000 HRK) was announced for January 
1, 1998. Thus, while insurance was not in place in 1996 and 1997, it was expected in the 
immediate future. 
Furthermore, the experience of the early 1990’s could easily have lead savers to believe 
that the government would not tolerate bank failures. The second, third, fourth and fifth 
largest banks in the country were clearly insolvent as of 1995, and were taken over and 
recapitalized by the government in 1995 and 1996. This, and the rather politicized 
banking environment, could well have created expectations either that banks would not 
be allowed to fail, or that an implicit government guarantee was available. Only in 
March 1999, when four banks were sent to bankruptcy, did it become entirely clear that 
failures would happen and that deposit insurance coverage was limited. 
Given this situation of a perception of strong government guarantees, one would expect 
that depositors would be relatively indifferent to bank risk in allocating their deposits. 
However, it still seems important to control for bank characteristics in modeling deposit 
allocation. For one thing, bank size could impact on the convenience of making deposits 
and on name recognition. For another, even if a relatively limited number of depositors 
chose banks on the basis of perceived soundness, indicators of solvency would be 
relevant. We therefore include Tier 1 capital to asset ratios as a way of seeing whether 
this very broad indicator of soundness affected depositors’ behavior, with the caveat that 
depositors would only have had the previous year’s end-year figure to work with. 
However, capital asset ratios change slowly in quarterly data. 
We intentionally avoid using asset quality data as an indicator of bank soundness for two 
reasons. First, such data was not available at all to the public, since it was not disclosed 
in annual reports or in central bank publications. Second, the data before 1999 was 
clearly unreliable. In several bank failures, asset quality was found to be very poor upon 
failure, but previous call reports indicate minimal problems. Bank supervisors had been 
unable to ensure accurate reporting in many cases. 
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A last bank characteristic variable is a dummy variable for foreign banks. Casual 
empiricism suggests that foreign banks enjoyed reputational advantages over domestic 
banks that allowed them to gather deposits more rapidly. 
In addition, we control for macroeconomic conditions that would shift the rate of growth 
of deposits from quarter to quarter. We use the rate of growth of real GDP and inflation 
to pick up changes in income and activity. 
Finally, we use dummy variables for the period before, during and after the banking 
crisis. These dummies are interacted with the interest rate differential term to allow us to 
pick up the changes, if any, in deposit interest elasticity over the three periods. 
Before proceeding to describe the regressions, it should be noted that we are testing the 
interest elasticity of deposits and not the relationship between perceived bank risk and 
interest rates on uninsured bank liabilities. The latter relationship is indicative of the 
potential level of market discipline. Martinez Peria and Schmukler (2000) have analyzed 
this effect for a set of Latin American countries, and Ellis and Flannery (1992), Brewer 
and Monschean (1994) and Keeley (1990) have analyzed this effect for U.S. banks. We 
argue that interest rate differentials at Croatian banks in the pre-crisis period were mainly 
generated by aggressive banks’ desire to grow rapidly, and not by depositors’ “punishing” 
perceived risk-takers. However, to test for such “market-discipline” behavior, we have 
included the bank characteristic variables, log total assets and Tier 1 capital ratio, in our 
specification. Given the low credibility of deposit insurance in Croatia, we cannot a priori 
dismiss the hypothesis that depositors “punished” risky banks with higher deposit interest 
rates even after the introduction of deposit insurance in the beginning of 1998. 
The regressions are run on quarterly data spanning the third quarter of 1996 and the third 
quarter of 2003 using pooled least squares. The bank-by-bank data are taken from 
Croatian National Bank call reports, while the macroeconomic data are taken from the 
CNB Bulletin and the Bulletin of the Central Bureau of Statistics. Interest rate variables 
are contemporaneous, but the bank characteristics variables are lagged one quarter. This 
effectively means using the value at the end of the previous quarter, immediately before 
the start of the current quarter. 
The results are shown in Table 2 below. Column 1 shows the results without 
macroeconomic control variables, and Column 2 shows the results with macroeconomic 
control variables.  
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Table 2.  Determinants of growth rate of foreign exchange time deposits 
 (1) (2) 
Constant 0.205 0.213 
 (2.74)** (2.83)** 
Interest differential 0.032 0.032 
 (3.70)** (3.81)** 
Interest differential x -0.062 -0.062 
Crisis dummy (5.78)** (5.78)** 
Interest differential x -0.038 -0.037 
Post-crisis dummy (3.86)** (3.82)** 
Deposit growth (-1) 0.105 0.104 
 (2.17)** (2.14)* 
Foreign bank dummy 0.071 0.072 
 (3.77)** (3.76)** 
Log total assets (-1) -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.85) (0.83) 
Tier 1 capital/assets (-1) -0.011 -0.008 
 (0.24) (0.17) 
Crisis dummy -0.054 -0.057 
 (2.12)* (2.21)* 
Post-crisis dummy -0.057 -0.060 
 (2.72)** (2.87)** 
Euro-effect dummy 0.100 0.096 
 (3.29)** (2.71)** 
Real GDP growth  0.091 
  (0.99) 
Retail price inflation  -0.870 
  (1.00) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.173 0.167 
F-statistic 25.81 21.796 
(probability) 0.000 0.000 
 
Note: Number of cross-sections: 29. Total observations: 1243. ** Significant at 1%, * significant at 5%, 
+ significant at 10%. 
 
 
 
 
The most important message is this: the interest-elasticity of deposits is positive during 
the rapid expansion period, and then actually becomes negative during the crisis period. 
This negative value is confirmed by a Wald test, which shows that the estimated value -
0.019, and the probability of this value being equal to 0 is p=0.0005. Furthermore, after 
the crisis, the interest-elasticity rises relative to the crisis period but the point estimate 
remains slightly negative. A Wald test shows that we cannot reject the hypothesis that 
the post-crisis elasticity is zero (p = 0.2596). 
To complete the picture, note that the dummy for foreign banks is significant for the 
whole period, indicating that foreign banks showed more rapid deposit growth. We 
tested for changes in the foreign bank effect by interacting the foreign bank dummy with 
the crisis and post-crisis dummies (results not shown). During the crisis period, the 
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foreign bank dummy seems to rise, but the interacted crisis-foreign bank dummy is not 
significant at conventional levels (t=1.29). However, this is not the whole story, since 
foreign banks offered lower deposit interest rates than domestic ones (Galac and Kraft, 
2000). The significant negative interest-elasticity during the crisis period thus implies an 
even larger differential between deposit growth at foreign banks and that at domestic 
banks during the crisis period. 
The interaction of the foreign bank dummy with the post-crisis dummy was highly 
insignificant, suggesting that there was no change in the foreign bank effect after the 
crisis was over. 
Thus, the story of a sharp shift from a situation in which deposits had a high positive 
interest elasticity to one in which high deposit interest rates were taken as a sign of 
heightened risk is confirmed. In addition, we can note that both the log total assets and 
capital-adequacy ratio variables proved insignificant, further adding to the argument that 
depositors did not perceive differences in bank risk as important in their deposit 
allocations before the crisis. 
At the same time, the zero interest elasticity of deposits in the post-crisis period suggests 
that depositors remained concerned that high deposit rates might signal greater risk. 
Furthermore, this zero elasticity suggests that deposit insurance was not considered 
credible. This is hardly surprising, since deposit insurance payouts were extremely slow 
during the 1998-99 bank failures. In some cases, the period between the blocking of the 
bank’s accounts and the payment of insurance was almost two and half years. Even if 
interest were paid on deposit liabilities, liquidity-constrained depositors would certainly 
not be indifferent to failure in such a situation. 
We also tested for changes in depositors’ risk-perceptions by interacting the dummies for 
the crisis and post-crisis period with the bank characteristic variables, log total assets and 
tier 1 capital ratio (results not shown). The interacted variables also were insignificant. It 
would be hasty, however, to conclude from this that Croatian depositors did not “punish” 
banks perceived to be risk in the crisis and post-crisis periods. Rather, a more plausible 
interpretation of the findings would be that Croatian depositors presumed foreign banks 
to be less risky throughout the whole period, and that they perceived banks offering high 
interest rates to be risky during the crisis and to an extent after it. The continued 
perception by at least some depositors that high deposit interest rates are a sign of risk 
could help explain the estimated zero interest elasticity in the post-crisis period.  
 202 
4  Deposit Interest Rates and                                        
the Causes of Bank Failures 
Now that we have shown that banks were able to gain increased access to funding by 
raising deposit interest rates, we can examine whether there was a connection between 
high deposit interest rates and bank failure. Most research suggests that bank failures 
occur as a result of credit boom and bust cycles (see Logan, 2000), recklessness and 
fraud, and poor management. All other frequently cited reasons can be classified as 
belonging to the latter category (see Honohan, 1997). 
Furthermore, bank failures are rare events. This makes it hard to study their causes and 
consequences using econometric techniques. Actually, they appear in clusters during 
times of political or economic instability or transition, and then they are reasonably 
referred to as a "banking crisis" (Hardy, 1998). This is why most empirical studies 
examining causes of bank failures are cross-section analyses of pre-banking crisis bank 
characteristics that can be reasonably conjectured to have caused the failures during the 
crisis. 
The empirical literature on leading indicators of bank failures suggests that leading 
indicators can be roughly categorized into five classes: CAMELS grades, international 
agencies' ratings, market prices of bank stocks and subordinated debt, (standard) 
balance-sheet and income statements financial ratios, and other (non-standard) measures 
of bank risk and financial strength. 
Regarding the first two classes, there is increasing evidence that traditional CAMELS 
grades and especially international credit ratings have limited bank failure prediction 
capabilities in emerging market countries. (Rojas-Suarez, 2001). Furthermore, there is 
some empirical evidence on the weakness of market prices in predicting bank failures not 
only in the less developed financial systems such as South-East Asian (Bongini et al., 
2001), but also in the most developed banking systems with deep and liquid markets 
such as that of the US (Gilbert et al., 2001). This evidence contests the logical 
expectation that CAMELS grades, international agencies' ratings, and market price risk 
premia - all containing implicit assessments of the probability of a bank's failure by the 
most informed market participants – should be closely correlated with the probability of 
bank failure.  
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In the case of Croatia, this discussion is somewhat academic due to lack of data. Only 
one Croatian bank had been rated by an international agency prior to 1998, and only a 
few banks have ever had their stocks or bonds listed on the market. Also, there is no 
market for CD's. Furthermore, even though the interbank market is active in Croatia, it is 
concentrated on trading in very short term instruments whose prices carry little 
information on individual banks' risk premia. Finally, the Croatian National Bank, which 
supervises commercial banks, had not introduced CAMELS grades prior to the banking 
failures studied here.  
The remaining two classes of potential explanatory variables for our bank failure 
prediction model are standard balance sheet and income statement ratios and other non-
standard indicators of banks' financial condition and risk profile. Among them, the ones 
most commonly found in empirical studies1 can further be categorized according to 
specific risks or strengths that they measure or proxy (see Appendix Table 1). We 
included most of these indicators in our initial analysis, and added some additional ones 
to measure or proxy specific risks faced by Croatian banks of the mid-90's (for more 
information see the detailed discussions of these risks in Kraft, 1999; Šonje and Vujčić, 
1999; and Jankov, 2000).  
We compiled a list of 38 potential explanatory variables for bank failure prediction, 
including 33 ratios, 2 interval values, and 3 dummies. The three dummies are: new 
(founded after 1989), foreign (founded as a foreign subsidiary), and "too big to fail" (by 
our own expert judgment). Two interval-type variables, eventually to be used for control 
purposes, are total assets and total off-balance sheet assets. The remaining 33 "ratios" 
include standard financial ratios for banks, such as return-on- average-assets and Basel-
type capital adequacy ratios, but also a number of less standard measures and "quasi-
ratios" (see Appendix Table 2). 
Choice of the dependent variable required making several expert judgments. The first 
decision was whether to include both distressed and failed banks. Since the definition of 
distress is intrinsically subjective, and in practice often based on perceived levels of the 
very variables that are included in the candidate explanatory variables list, we chose to 
consider only effectively failed banks, i.e. those banks that eventually entered into a 
bankruptcy or a liquidation process (14 banks) or had been taken into state receivership 
                                                 
1 See for example Logan (2000), Gonzalez-Hermosillo (1999), Hanousek (1999) and Rojas-Suarez 
(2001). 
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and rehabilitated at taxpayers’ expense (2 banks). Exceptionally, we also consider one 
bank as failed that does not formally meet these criteria, but is known to have been 
insolvent in 1999-2000.2
A second, related decision was to extend the time horizon for failure of bankrupt and 
liquidated banks, since most actually entered into bankruptcy or liquidation only after the 
1998-99 crisis period, due to the unusually slow legal process of bank closure in Croatia. 
To be precise, we labeled as failed all banks operating at the beginning of 1998 that 
ceased operations before 2003 due to observable effects of the banking crisis. 
Since all of the failed banks were in operation by 1996, and all but one were in operation 
by 1995, all of the failed banks are included in our analysis. Two foreign owned 
subsidiaries that only started their operations in 1997 and the one foreign branch 
established were excluded from the analysis, since their operations were unusual enough 
to produce extreme outliers on most candidate variables. This resulted in a sample of 17 
failed and 40 surviving banks. Also, since not all candidate variables were measured in 
all three years of interest, and some banks started operating during this period, not all 
variables that are measured in all three years have measurements on all banks for all 
years.  
To develop bank failure prediction models, we began by running normality tests on the 
candidate explanatory variables. Ex-ante, such ratio variables are expected to be highly 
non-normal. We used nonparametric methods to select those variables that had 
statistically significant discriminatory power in separating failed from survived banks. 
Then, considering the binary nature of the dependent variable, we examined various 
specifications of logistic (logit) regression models combining the variables from this 
reduced set, and selected the best model for each year separately, based on statistical 
properties and parsimony. 
We used the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for normality with Lilliefors' significance 
correction, and the Shapiro-Wilk test for variables on which there were fewer than 51 
observations (see Appendix Table 3). The tests found that normality could not be 
rejected at the five percent significance level for only 5 of 35 variables tested. Even 
                                                 
2 The bank was found to be insolvent by central bank examiners. A central bank administrator was 
appointed, and the announcement of his appointment led to a bank run. The bank was temporarily 
closed, and then recapitalized by government payment of back interest on certain government 
securities held by this bank and others. Later the bank was sold. 
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among these variables, this result held true in two years for only 2 variables, and it did 
not hold for any variable for all three years. Therefore, we concluded that by and large 
the explanatory variable data set contains variables that are non-normally distributed, and 
as such require the use of nonparametric techniques in further analysis. 
To select variables with statistically significant discriminatory power for bank failure 
prediction we used the Mann-Whitney U-test (see Table 4 in the Appendix) for the 
difference in medians between the group of failed banks and the group of survived 
banks. At the ten percent (two-tailed) significance level, the test found four variables that 
were statistically significant in every year in which they were measured. It found an 
additional three variables that were statistically significant in two out of three years, and 
seven variables that were significant in only one of three years. The seven variables and 
their group medians with respect to the dependent variable are shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3.  Bank failure final sample variables 
Year Group DR LIQ CAR RLAR LR OHER CM 
F=0 3.9 0.1   24.5 47.8 103.1 
F=1 6.4 -0.1   26.4 52.6 99.3 
y=1995  
Total 4.4 0.0     24.9 50.2 101.0 
Mann Whitney U Test p 0.0001 0.0035     0.1330 0.2755 0.4294 
F=0 3.2 12.7 35.4 3.8 21.6 52.7 95.4 
F=1 7.4 -13.3 20.2 10.2 26.2 49.9 86.4 
y=1996 
  
  
Total 4.4 8.2 31.2 5.5 22.7 50.6 95.1 
Mann Whitney U Test p 0.0000 0.0009 0.0126 0.0533 0.0143 0.0752 0.0494 
F=0 3.0 13.2 26.8 2.9 15.0 55.9 74.2 
F=1 5.8 -2.3 15.2 11.5 18.7 43.4 57.0 
y=1997 
  
  
Total 3.5 8.4 24.4 3.6 16.2 50.9 72.6 
Mann Whitney U Test p 0.0001 0.0002 0.0024 0.0455 0.0066 0.0396 0.0347 
 
 
 
DR represents the annual average of monthly volume weighted average deposit rates on 
new or renewed foreign currency denominated deposits. LIQ is the annual average of 
daily ratios of non-borrowed excess reserves to required reserve deposit base. CAR 
(capital adequacy ratio) is just a year-end standard Basel I type regulatory capital to risk 
weighted assets ratio. RLAR is a year end risky loans to total assets ratio, where risky 
loans are defined as large and very large loans as well as total exposure to connected 
parties. Computed analogously to DR, the LR variable represents the loan rate on 
domestic currency denominated new loans. The only income statement indicator among 
the selected variables, OHER is the year-end proportion of overhead expenses in total 
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expenses. Finally, the only balance-sheet variable in the selected group, CM (currency 
mismatch indicator) is the ratio of total foreign currency assets and foreign currency 
deposits. 
Before analyzing the possible causal relationships between the bank characteristics 
measured by the selected variables and bank failures, it is surprisingly informative to 
examine some of the standard bank analysis ratios that did not make it to that list. For 
instance, in 1996 both the median ratio of (reported) impaired claims to total assets and 
the median ratio of (reported) nonperforming assets to total assets are actually lower for 
failed banks than for survived banks. In 1997 this relationship is reversed, but even then, 
the two ratios are statistically highly insignificant in both years. Similarly, we find the 
standard measures of profitability also statistically highly insignificant in 1995 and in 
1997. At a same time the medians of these ratios, return on average assets (ROA) and on 
average equity (ROE), are indeed (slightly) lower for the failed banks in those two years, 
as expected. Surprisingly, both variables are statistically significant in 1996, the only 
year for which the medians are noticeably different.  
On the one hand, these results could indicate that the failed banks split into two camps – 
banks that reported (more realistic) low profits and banks that reported (unrealistically) 
high profits, compared to the overall median. If this is correct, then they also point 
towards overvaluation of asset quality by failed banks as a cause for overestimation of 
profits. On the other hand, the results could imply that the distribution of profitability 
measures is similar across the failed and across the survived banks (except in 1996), 
which would point to factors other than profitability (or asset quality) as responsible for 
the bank failures. 
Another group of standard bank analysis variables that is omitted from the final selection 
are measures of growth. Unlike the profitability and asset quality measures, all three 
growth measures from the initial variable set were only mildly insignificant in most 
years, and two of them were significant in one of three years. However, contrary to 
expectations, the median credit growth for the failed banks is lower than for the survived 
banks in 1997, the only year for which the credit growth variable showed discriminatory 
power. By contrast, the median off-balance sheet asset growth is, as expected, much 
higher for failed than for survived banks in the only significant year, 1995. Finally, the 
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total balance sheet growth variable has no predictive ability in any period. These results 
suggest that there is no simple relationship between bank growth and bank failure.3
Having eliminated simple explanations of 1998-99 bank failures in Croatia, one must 
turn to the selected seven variables: DR, LIQ, CAR, RLAR, LR, OHER and CM. 
Representing the features most closely associated with the observed bank failures, these 
variables also offer hope of explaining why "natural" candidate predictors of bank 
failures - low profitability, high levels of bad assets, and rapid growth – are not useful for 
explaining 1998-99 bank failures in Croatia. Looking back to Table 3 it is easy to see 
that the first four variables all have the expected relative values in all years. Thus, the 
failed banks as a group have higher deposit rates, lower non-borrowed excess reserves, 
lower capital adequacy and higher levels of risky loans. They also have higher loan rates 
in all three years, which is consistent with the anecdotal evidence that these banks 
attracted riskier clients and at the same time mispriced their risk. This contrasts with the 
more prevalent cross-country finding that low spreads are strongly associated with bank 
failures (Rojas-Suarez, 2001), perhaps because sudden appearance of fierce competition 
for deposits raises deposit rates, thus squeezing the margins and causing failures of the 
internally most inefficient banks. 
The remaining two variables, OHER and CM, are both insignificant in 1995, and in 
1996-97 their relative values are difficult to interpret. It is not clear whether the fact that 
the failed banks had a lower proportion of overhead expenses in total expenses indicates 
that their failure is in some way connected with a lower quality of employees and 
infrastructure. It is perhaps more likely that this result simply mirrors a higher proportion 
of interest expenses in total expenses at those banks, pointing to inefficient liability 
management. Even more confusing is the lower coverage of foreign currency 
denominated deposits with foreign currency assets at the failed banks. This result could 
reasonably be directly related to bank failure only if conditions existed that prevented 
banks from transforming domestic currency assets into foreign currency cash in order to 
meet higher demand for savings deposits during the crisis. Since this was not the case, it 
is possible that this variable indirectly measures some other risky behavioral pattern of 
the failed banks, for instance lower holdings of liquid reserves that are often held in the 
form of foreign currency deposits at foreign banks. 
                                                 
3 For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Kraft and Jankov (2004). 
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Returning to the first four variables, each highly significant and with expected and 
persistent sign, it is worthwhile to try to interpret possible causal relationships between 
them and bank failure. The most likely explanation of the causality between high deposit 
rates and bank failures has already been suggested: aggressive banks used high deposit 
rates to fund their excessively risky business strategies, which eventually led them to 
failure. The negative relationship between the narrow measure of liquidity (provided by 
the non-borrowed reserves ratio) and the failure variable can be explained by a 
temporary failure of the domestic money market during the early stages of the banking 
crisis, or in a wider context, by the poor liquidity of all economic agents preceding the 
1999 recession (Šonje, Faulend and Šošić, 2001) that made it difficult for illiquid banks 
to raise funds in those times of need. Alternatively, it can be explained by the generally 
accepted notion that, for banks, chronic illiquidity is almost always a sign of (hidden) 
insolvency (De Juan, 1996). For chronically illiquid banks, failure is just a question of 
"when". 
It is worth mentioning that deposit rates and narrow liquidity are by far the most 
significant predictors of bank failure in our sample, with Mann Whitney U test 
significance levels well below one percent. The other two important variables are capital 
adequacy and risky loans, neither of them measured in 1995. Nevertheless, significant 
expected relationships with the failure variable in 1996 and 1997, and trivial 
interpretation makes these variables equals with the measures of deposit rates and 
liquidity. 
Further confirmation of an unusually strong connection between deposit rates and bank 
failures in Croatia comes from the best logit model selection process that was performed 
separately for each of the three years in the sample. All variables found significant by the 
Mann Whitney U test for a particular year were considered for inclusion in the final 
model. All intermediate models were estimated using the approximate proportion of the 
number of failed banks in the sample (30-35%, depending on the year) as the logit model 
cutoff probability, emphasizing the importance of correctly predicting as many failed 
banks as possible. All models were estimated with the constant included, and only those 
with stable parameters, i.e. with the 95-percent confidence interval for the estimated 
odds-ratio not including the unity, were considered in the final step of the selection 
process. 
Before the final step in the selection process, both forward and backward automatic 
selection procedures were performed to select several non-nested alternative 
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specifications with good statistical properties. The automatic procedures were based on 
the significance of the increase/decrease of the -2LL (log-likelihood) statistic when going 
from one nested model to another. Variables whose addition resulted in a significant 
reduction in the -2LL statistic at the 5 percent level were added to the model, and those 
whose deletion did not result in a significant increase in the -2LL statistic were dropped 
from the specification. Finally, for choosing between two non-nested models with similar 
in-sample classification results, the more parsimonious model was chosen, or in the case 
of a tie, the one with less influential observations or outliers. The best models by year are 
presented in Table 4. 
 
Table 4.  The "best" logit specifications 
Y=1995  
  Cut = 0.35 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 95.0% C.I.for EXP(B) 
         Lower Upper 
  DR95 1.13 0.363 9.72 1.00 0.00 3.1 1.5 6.30 
  Constant -6.24 1.827 11.68 1.00 0.00 0.0   
* Total obs. = 57, missing = 12; Total outliers = 1, missclasified = 1; Total error = 24.4%, for failed = 
33.3%, for survived = 20% 
Y=1996 
  Cut = 0.3 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 95.0% C.I.for EXP(B) 
         Lower Upper 
  CAR96 -0.05 0.025 3.94 1.00 0.05 1.0 0.9 1.00 
  DR96 1.00 0.293 11.75 1.00 0.00 2.7 1.5 4.84 
  Constant -4.38 1.459 9.01 1.00 0.00 0.0   
* Total obs. = 57, missing = 5; Total outliers = 1, missclasified = 1; Total error = 17.3%, for failed = 
11.8%, for survived = 20% 
Y=1997 
  Cut = 0.3 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 95.0% C.I.for EXP(B) 
         Lower Upper 
  DR97 0.57 0.191 8.79 1.00 0.00 1.8 1.2 2.56 
  RLAR97 0.06 0.032 3.55 1.00 0.06 1.1 1.0 1.13 
  Constant -3.85 1.040 13.68 1.00 0.00 0.0   
* Total obs. = 57, missing = 3; Total outliers = 3, missclasified = 3; Total error = 20.4%, for failed = 
17.6%, for survived = 21.6% 
 
 
 
The DR variable entered the best model in each of the three years. More importantly, 
only two other variables contributed to the model fit when added to the DR variable: the 
CAR variable in 1996 and the RLAR variable in 1997. The second best individual 
predictor of bank failure, variable LIQ did not enter any of the best models due to its 
high degree of correlation with the DR variable in each year. This relationship has been 
already documented and interpreted in earlier studies (Kraft 1999). Furthermore, the DR 
variable is highly correlated with most of the other variables in most of the years, except 
for the CAR and RLAR variables. But, CAR and RLAR themselves are highly 
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correlated, which explains why only one of them enters into a single model (see 
Appendix Table 5).  
Furthermore, it seems that deposit rate variable DR is not only the best individual 
predictor of 1998-99 failures of Croatian banks, but it is a better predictor than all viable 
combinations of other good individual predictors. To test this we repeated the logit 
model selection process, this time without the DR among the variables considered. The 
comparison of the model specification containing only the DR variable, and the 
specification containing the best model not containing the DR variable, for each year 
separately, shows that the DR model is superior to all non-nested alternatives, as is 
evident from Table 5 (actually, the best model for 1997 has a lower -2LL statistic, but it 
lacks parsimony, it has two more outliers, and it is only better in identifying survived 
banks, so it can be considered inferior to a simple DR model). Though seemingly 
extreme, this result is not unprecedented, but rather it is strikingly similar to a similar 
finding from a study of bank failures during mid-nineties in the Czech Republic 
(Hanousek, 1999). 
 
Table 5.  Comparison of DR models with "best" non-nested alternatives 
No. of obs. Outliers Class. error, % 
Variables in the 
model 
Total Missing Total Miscl. Total 
for 
Failed 
for 
Survived 
-2LL 
Y=1995 
DR 45 12 1 1 24.4 33.3 20.0 33.62 
LIQ 48 9 1 1 31.3 43.8 25.0 52.62 
          
Y=1996 
DR 52 5 2 2 19.2 23.5 17.1 40.20 
ROA, LR 52 5 2 2 25.0 23.5 25.7 45.45 
          
Y=1997 
DR 54 3 3 3 24.1 23.5 24.3 53.64 
LR, OHAR, RLAR, CAR 56 1 5 3 19.6 23.5 17.9 44.89 
 
 
 
In the last step, we verified that the DR variable measures a unique characteristic of bank 
behavior in the 1995-97 period, by reestimating the DR model for each year and for each 
of the five control variables (balance sheet size BS, off-balance sheet size OBS, foreign 
subsidiary dummy FOR, too-big-to-fail dummy TBTF, and new bank dummy NEW). As 
expected, including any of the size variables in the regressions was fruitless. Their 
individual Wald statistics were highly insignificant, while the overall model fit did not 
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change. Also, all interactions between the DR variable and the three dummies were 
highly insignificant, as were the main effects of the dummies in those regressions. 
These findings strongly suggest that high bank deposit rates in the 1995-97 period are the 
most powerful predictors of bank failures during the 1998-99 banking crisis in Croatia. 
Moreover, their individual predictive power cannot be exceeded even by a carefully 
chosen combination of other strong individual predictors of bank failure. Also, no other 
strong individual predictor can significantly contribute to the predictions based solely on 
deposit rate levels. Finally, there are no interactions between deposit rates and other 
important measurable qualitative bank characteristics that can further contribute to bank 
failure predictions. 
 
 
5  Conclusions 
The findings in this paper lead us to the following conclusions: 
1) “Market-stealing” via high deposit interest rates can be an effective strategy in 
banking markets characterized by substantial competition. In Croatia, depositors 
appear to have been relatively slow to link high deposit rates with increased 
portfolio risk. We suggest that this was due to perceptions of an implicit government 
guarantee, along with depositor inexperience. We would stress that such 
circumstances are common in newly-liberalized financial markets and are unlikely 
to have been unique to Croatia. 
2) Gaining credibility for deposit insurance after a bank crisis can be difficult. In the 
Croatian case, where long delays in deposit insurance payout caused substantial 
problems for depositors, it is clear that credibility has not been fully restored even 
four years after the bank crisis, as is suggested by zero interest elasticity of deposits. 
3) Foreign banks from advanced countries enjoy a reputational advantage that allows 
them to raise deposits despite offering lower interest rates. They were perceived by 
Croatian depositors as “safe havens” during the 1998-99 banking crisis. This, of 
course, is one of the reasons for the rapid expansion of foreign banks’ market share 
in Croatia and almost all of the transition countries. 
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4) The link between high deposit interest rates and portfolio risk predicted by theory is 
confirmed in Croatia. Although deposit interest rates are not the only predictor of 
failure, they are in fact the best predictor of failure in the Croatian case.  
5) Our findings therefore lend strong support to the Hellman-Murdock-Stiglitz 
argument for deposit interest rate control. The Croatian case confirms the 
effectiveness of “market-stealing” and the links between this and risk-taking. 
6) At the same time, the Croatian case shows the inability of newly created supervisory 
authorities to effectively limit risk-taking. Deposit interest rate limitations are much 
easier to implement than sophisticated supervisory assessments of portfolio risk, and 
thus seem to be a theoretically justified and practically feasible means to limit the 
dangers of financial liberalization without preventing reforming countries from 
enjoying the benefits.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 1.  Typical leading indicators in bank failure prediction research 
Credit risk indicators: 
• loan growth, provisions to assets ratio, balance sheet growth, classified to total assets, non-
performing loans to total loans 
 
Liquidity risk indicators: 
• short term assets to short term liabilities, inter-bank loans to total liabilities, loans to deposits, loans 
to assets 
Concentration risk indicators: 
• large exposures to total assets, large deposits to total deposits, sectoral loan shares, net interest 
income to total income 
Capital strenght: 
• total assets, capital adequacy ratio, capital to assets, return on assets, return on equity 
Efficiency: 
• net-interest margin, interest rate spreads, overhead expenses to assets 
Other strengths and hazards: 
• age, «too big to fail» dummy, strong «parent» dummy, «foreign» dummy, deposits rates, loan 
rates, insider loans to assets 
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Table 2.  Definition of variables 
Type No. Code Description Measured risk 
Expected 
sign 
Dependent      FNAR Narrow failure indicator – bankrupt, liquidated, 
rehabilitated ---- ---- 
  1 NEW Founded after 1989 indicator Control + 
  2 FOR Founded as foreign daughter indicator Control - 
Dummy 
  3 TBTF Too big to fail by expert judgement indicator Control - 
  4 BS Total balance sheet size Control - Interval 
  5 OBS Total size of off-balance sheet items Control + 
  6 CAR Basel 1 capital adequacy ratio Capital strength - 
  7 RLAR Very risky loans/total BS assets Risk-aversion + 
  8 RIAR Very risky investments/total BS assets Risk-aversion + 
  9 ROBAR Uncollateralized off-bs assets/total BS assets Risk-aversion + 
10 RMBAR Mortgage backed BS&OBS claims/total BS assets Risk-aversion + 
11 NPAR Non-performing BS&OBS assets/total BS assets Asset quality + 
12 IMPAR Imapired BS&OBS assets/total BS assets Asset quality + 
13 CM Foreign currency assets/fc deposits Foreign 
exchange 
- 
14 MM Short term assets/st deposits Liquidity - 
15 SDI 1 – Sum (sector ass. square)/Total ass. square Sectoral - 
16 NCSSR Non-core sources/sources Liquidity + 
17 FAAR Fixed assets/assets Liquidity + 
18 PIAR Permanent investment/assets Liquidity + 
19 AARER Accruals&arrears/revenues&expenses Liquidity + 
20 ROA Return on end-year assets Profitability - 
21 ROE Return on end-year equity Profitability - 
22 PAR Provisions/assets Asset quality +/- 
23 PCR Provisions/equity Asset quality +/- 
24 LTIAR Long-term investment/assets Liquidity + 
25 LDR Loans/deposits Liquidity + 
26 DLR Deposit placements/loan sources Liquidity + 
27 MGPPR Money & gov. paper/core sources Liquidity - 
28 NIM Net interest margin Efficiency - 
29 OHAR Overhead exp./assets Efficiency + 
30 OHER Overhead exp./expenses Efficiency + 
31 OBBR Off-bs assets/bs assets Control +/- 
32 BSAG Annual balance sheet growth rate Growth + 
33 OBSAG Annual off-balance sheet growth rate Growth + 
34 LR Interest rate on credits in national currency, ann. 
avg. 
Adverse 
selection 
+ 
35 DR Deposit rate on foreign currency savings, ann. 
avg. 
Moral hazard + 
36 SPR LR-DR Efficiency - 
37 LIQ Non-borrowed excess reserves/req. res. deposit 
base 
Liquidity - 
Ratio 
38 CRAG Annual loan growth rate Growth + 
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Table 3.  Median descriptives for initial predictors 
Median statistics Tests of Normality* (Pooled)  
N Total N F=0 N F=1 Statistics df Sig. 
NIM95 51 14.03 35 13.96 16 15.64 0.10 51.00 0.200 
OHAR96 57   9.32 40 9.02 17 9.57 0.07 57.00 0.200 
OHER95 52 50.24 36 47.78 16 52.56 0.09 52.00 0.200 
OHER96 57 50.60 40 52.75 17 49.92 0.06 57.00 0.200 
DR96 52   4.38 35 3.25 17 7.38 0.11 52.00 0.154 
MBAR96 57 25.04 40 23.40 17 31.40 0.11 57.00 0.087 
DR97 54   3.51 37 2.98 17 5.78 0.12 54.00 0.066 
PAR95 52   7.47 36 8.76 16 4.88 0.12 52.00 0.044 
LR96 54 22.74 37 21.56 17 26.21 0.13 54.00 0.035 
SPR97 54 12.17 37 12.04 17 14.00 0.13 54.00 0.029 
MGPPR95 51 20.89 35 19.64 16 21.60 0.13 51.00 0.026 
LR97 56 16.17 39 14.97 17 18.66 0.13 56.00 0.024 
MBAR97 57 26.78 40 27.88 17 21.52 0.13 57.00 0.022 
SPR96 52 18.38 35 18.31 17 18.45 0.14 52.00 0.013 
SDI96 57 56.31 40 54.09 17 61.09 0.13 57.00 0.012 
BS94 48 245,573 32 313,404 16 188,477 0.39 48.00 0.010 
OBS94 48  41,187 32 47,763 16 31,251 0.33 48.00 0.010 
CM95 50  100.96 34 103.11 16 99.35 0.45 50.00 0.010 
DLR95 44  131.22 29 124.00 15 138.44 0.42 44.00 0.010 
DLR96 46  118.87 30 111.86 16 150.13 0.75 46.00 0.010 
BSAG95 48    15.90 32 12.93 16 42.95 0.54 48.00 0.010 
OBSAG95 48    95.79 32 65.82 16 214.96 0.50 48.00 0.010 
DR95 47   4.40 32 3.95 15 6.44 0.91 47.00 0.010 
SPR95 48 20.24 33 20.20 15 20.93 0.77 48.00 0.010 
CRAG95 48 21.58 32 19.23 16 44.98 0.58 48.00 0.010 
PAR96 57   5.87 40 6.57 17 4.60 0.14 57.00 0.010 
OBBR96 56 26.08 39 29.08 17 18.83 0.14 56.00 0.008 
IMPAR97 57   7.38 40 7.09 17 10.20 0.14 57.00 0.005 
SDI97 57 62.87 40 64.27 17 58.43 0.15 57.00 0.003 
ROBAR97 57   7.48 40 7.04 17 12.38 0.15 57.00 0.003 
FAAR95 52   4.92 36 4.92 16 4.63 0.16 52.00 0.003 
IMPAR96 57   8.50 40 9.26 17 7.21 0.15 57.00 0.003 
NCSSR97 57   8.01 40 6.83 17 10.57 0.15 57.00 0.002 
OBBR95 52 25.07 36 27.32 16 22.67 0.16 52.00 0.002 
PAR97 57   4.80 40 4.60 17 4.80 0.16 57.00 0.001 
MGPPR96 55 24.46 38 29.62 17 19.47 0.16 55.00 0.001 
RIAR96 57   7.82 40 8.18 17 7.00 0.16 57.00 0.001 
RIAR97 57   7.45 40 6.87 17 7.51 0.16 57.00 0.001 
MGPPR97 57  16.56 40 16.56 17 16.24 0.17 57.00 0.000 
OHAR95 52    9.30 36 9.13 16 10.12 0.17 52.00 0.000 
OHAR97 57   7.32 40 6.95 17 8.22 0.18 57.00 0.000 
FAAR96 57   5.65 40 6.06 17 5.07 0.18 57.00 0.000 
FAAR97 57   5.09 40 5.02 17 5.09 0.18 57.00 0.000 
AARER97 57 25.39 40 24.27 17 28.68 0.18 57.00 0.000 
NPAR96 57   3.10 40 3.18 17 2.72 0.18 57.00 0.000 
ROA95 52   1.29 36 1.29 16 1.28 0.20 52.00 0.000 
OBBR97 57  30.66 40 29.55 17 30.95 0.19 57.00 0.000 
CAR97 57  24.38 40 26.79 17 15.16 0.19 57.00 0.000 
ROBAR96 57    6.81 40 6.56 17 6.82 0.20 57.00 0.000 
ROE95 52    5.26 36 5.26 16 4.67 0.21 52.00 0.000 
PCR97 57  25.56 40 22.93 17 28.31 0.20 57.00 0.000 
PCR96 57  24.09 40 25.57 17 22.97 0.20 57.00 0.000 
ROE96 57    4.09 40 5.06 17 1.32 0.21 57.00 0.000 
PCR95 52  31.35 36 45.69 16 18.54 0.22 52.00 0.000 
OHER97 57  50.88 40 55.92 17 43.40 0.21 57.00 0.000 
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Table 3.  continued 
Median statistics Tests of Normality∗ (Pooled)  
N Total N F=0 N F=1 Statistics df Sig. 
CAR96 57  31.17 40 35.37 17 20.18 0.21 57.00 0.000 
SDI95 52  55.41 36 55.07 16 59.02 0.23 52.00 0.000 
NIM96 55 12.08 38 13.03 17 10.58 0.23 55.00 0.000 
LR95 51 24.90 35 24.50 16 26.40 0.24 51.00 0.000 
NCSSR95 52   9.41 36 8.91 16 10.96 0.24 52.00 0.000 
ROA96 57   1.01 40 1.30 17 0.20 0.23 57.00 0.000 
BSAG97 57 28.36 40 28.56 17 28.36 0.24 57.00 0.000 
MM97 57   107.43 40 111.76 17 100.83 0.24 57.00 0.000 
CRAG96 52 33.24 36 29.24 16 53.11 0.25 52.00 0.000 
BSAG96 52 21.76 36 17.22 16 34.71 0.26 52.00 0.000 
LIQ97 57   8.39 40 13.23 17 -2.35 0.25 57.00 0.000 
LIQ95 51   0.03 35 0.08 16 -0.10 0.26 51.00 0.000 
PIAR95 52   0.69 36 0.59 16 1.35 0.26 52.00 0.000 
NPAR97 57   3.56 40 2.76 17 4.12 0.25 57.00 0.000 
OBSAG96 51 25.84 35 26.30 16 24.61 0.27 51.00 0.000 
RLAR96 57   5.52 40 3.81 17 10.22 0.27 57.00 0.000 
LIQ96 54   8.18 37 12.73 17 -13.27 0.28 54.00 0.000 
PIAR97 57   0.53 40 0.43 17 1.60 0.27 57.00 0.000 
NIM97 57   9.53 40 9.74 17 8.36 0.27 57.00 0.000 
LTIAR95 52   1.08 36 9.48 16 0.06 0.28 52.00 0.000 
CM96 54 95.08 37 95.37 17 86.44 0.28 54.00 0.000 
AARER95 52 27.17 36 27.17 16 27.12 0.29 52.00 0.000 
LTIAR96 57   0.07 40 1.33 17 0.01 0.28 57.00 0.000 
PIAR96 57   1.27 40 0.65 17 2.09 0.28 57.00 0.000 
NCSSR96 57   8.58 40 7.66 17 9.72 0.29 57.00 0.000 
LDR97 57 89.72 40 92.65 17 89.15 0.29 57.00 0.000 
LTIAR97 57   0.20 40 0.59 17 0.00 0.30 57.00 0.000 
MM95 51  122.81 35 124.63 16 115.37 0.32 51.00 0.000 
ROE97 57   6.99 40 7.20 17 6.30 0.31 57.00 0.000 
ROA97 57   1.46 40 1.47 17 1.40 0.31 57.00 0.000 
RLAR97 57    3.61 40 2.91 17 11.52 0.31 57.00 0.000 
DLR97 52     86.36 35 73.60 17 88.37 0.33 52.00 0.000 
MM96 55   115.55 38 116.58 17 112.45 0.32 55.00 0.000 
LDR96 55     78.42 38 75.25 17 85.52 0.32 55.00 0.000 
AARER96 57     25.26 40 23.67 17 25.64 0.32 57.00 0.000 
BS97 57 483,398 40 471,783 17 528,424 0.33 57.00 0.000 
CM97 56     72.57 39 74.15 17 57.03 0.35 56.00 0.000 
BS96 57 397,932 40 366,306 17 463,360 0.35 57.00 0.000 
BS95 52 320,517 36 322,598 16 320,171 0.37 52.00 0.000 
OBS97 56 182,435 39 136,373 17 228,946 0.39 56.00 0.000 
OBS96 57 98,492 40 93,492 17 129,509 0.40 57.00 0.000 
OBS95 52 76,421 36 69,706 16 93,469 0.42 52.00 0.000 
CRAG97 57   70.67 40 72.57 17 55.47 0.41 57.00 0.000 
LDR95 51   74.28 35 72.06 16 75.09 0.43 51.00 0.000 
OBSAG97 55   47.25 38 45.28 17 57.24 0.51 55.00 0.000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
∗ Kolmogorov-Smirnov w/ Lilliefors Significance Correction, i. e. Shapiro – Wilk for N<51 
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Table 4.  Mann Whitney U-test results for initial predictors 
Year (2 x 1–sided p-value) 
Variable 94 95 96 97 Total 
DR  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0 
LIQ  0.003 0.001 0.000 0.0 
CAR   0.013 0.002 0.0 
RLAR   0.053 0.045 0.1 
LR  0.133 0.014 0.007 0.2 
OHER  0.276 0.075 0.040 0.4 
CM  0.429 0.049 0.035 0.5 
PIAR  0.253 0.179 0.116 0.5 
CRAG  0.143 0.383 0.060 0.6 
ROBAR   0.364 0.320 0.7 
MBAR   0.443 0.250 0.7 
BSAG  0.131 0.204 0.530 0.9 
MM  0.320 0.259 0.287 0.9 
SDI  0.416 0.320 0.191 0.9 
LTIAR  0.440 0.332 0.215 1.0 
OHAR  0.500 0.496 0.072 1.1 
ROA  0.606 0.020 0.453 1.1 
AARER  0.322 0.475 0.329 1.1 
NPAR   0.541 0.760 1.3 
MGPPR  0.792 0.202 0.364 1.4 
PAR  0.108 0.303 0.958 1.4 
IMPAR   0.577 0.855 1.4 
NCSSR  0.905 0.530 0.078 1.5 
NIM  0.855 0.051 0.625 1.5 
OBSAG  0.069 0.745 0.729 1.5 
PCR  0.226 0.794 0.542 1.6 
SPR  0.815 0.495 0.407 1.7 
RIAR   0.917 0.821 1.7 
DLR  0.259 0.653 0.930 1.8 
ROE  0.984 0.057 0.875 1.9 
LDR  0.776 0.799 0.519 2.1 
OBBR  0.428 0.866 0.931 2.2 
FAAR  0.706 0.807 0.986 2.5 
OBS 0.168 0.751 0.794 0.979 2.7 
BS 0.304 0.937 0.650 0.903 2.8 
Total 0.472 12.586 13.461 15.213 41.7 
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Table 5.  Correlations among final predictors 
 
Y = 1997 
    
CRAG LIQ DR LR OHER OHAR NCSSR CM RLAR CAR  
1.00 0.34 -0.09 -0.29 0.06 -0.05 -0.09 -0.20 -0.28 0.25 CRAG 
 0.01 0.52 0.03 0.63 0.69 0.49 0.14 0.03 0.06  
 1.00 -0.42 -0.38 0.39 -0.02 -0.20 0.23 -0.34 0.55 LIQ 
  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.89 0.13 0.09 0.01 0.00  
  1.00 0.55 -0.49 0.15 0.30 -0.47 -0.04 -0.18 DR 
   0.00 0.00 0.28 0.03 0.00 0.77 0.19  
   1.00 -0.18 0.10 0.25 0.10 0.07 -0.11 LR 
    0.19 0.46 0.07 0.45 0.58 0.43  
    1.00 0.30 -0.19 0.52 -0.11 0.48 OHER 
     0.02 0.15 0.00 0.43 0.00  
     1.00 0.09 -0.07 0.06 0.13 OHAR 
      0.49 0.61 0.68 0.32  
      1.00 -0.04 0.13 -0.06 NCSSR 
       0.78 0.33 0.67  
       1.00 0.07 0.32 CM 
        0.60 0.02  
        1.00 -0.44 RLAR 
         0.00  
         1.00 CAR 
Y = 1996 
           
LIQ96 DR96 LR96 OHER96 NIM96 ROE96 ROA96 CM96 RLAR96 CAR96  
1.00 -0.31 -0.24 0.37 0.12 0.12 0.26 0.38 -0.28 0.63 LIQ96 
 0.03 0.08 0.01 0.39 0.40 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.00  
 1.00 0.51 -0.43 -0.10 0.08 -0.04 -0.28 0.05 -0.08 DR96 
  0.00 0.00 0.49 0.56 0.81 0.05 0.74 0.56  
  1.00 -0.19 0.28 0.17 0.17 0.07 0.12 -0.16 LR96 
   0.16 0.04 0.22 0.21 0.61 0.38 0.26  
   1.00 0.04 -0.29 -0.14 0.30 0.00 0.51 OHER96 
    0.79 0.03 0.30 0.03 0.98 0.00  
    1.00 0.29 0.41 0.44 -0.15 0.09 NIM96 
     0.03 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.52  
     1.00 0.91 0.12 -0.53 0.00 ROE96 
      0.00 0.37 0.00 0.99  
      1.00 0.21 -0.52 0.18 ROA96 
       0.13 0.00 0.17  
       1.00 -0.10 0.44 CM96 
        0.48 0.00  
        1.00 -0.39 RLAR96 
         0.00  
         1.00 CAR96 
Y = 1995 
    
LIQ95 DR95 OBSAG95  
1.00 -0.30 0.14 LIQ95 
 0.04 0.35  
 1.00 0.00 DR95 
  0.98  
  1.00 OBSAG95
 
   
 
Note: * Shaded areas mark correlations significant at the 10-percent (2-tailed) significance level. 
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Abstract 
 
The process of real convergence generates important challenges and opportunities for 
old, new and perspective EU members. While much has been said concerning 
convergence in terms of per capita GDP in PPS, a new way to look at the process of 
equalisation in standards of living of the population in an enlarged Europe, is to focus 
on individuals’ wealth accumulation and indebtedness choices. In order to investigate 
these issues, this paper analyses aggregate household wealth accumulation as well as 
savings’ allocation choices in the New Europe presenting more updated and detailed 
figures for financial assets compared to national published accounts. With the objective 
of explaining the main trends in recent years and the differences across countries, we 
also investigate the determinants of household wealth and liabilities accumulation as 
well portfolio allocation choices, focusing on macroeconomic variables, financial markets 
developments and households’ specific characteristics. We find out that the build-up of 
financial wealth in the New Europe is and will continue to be mainly a product of 
economic growth and income levels. However, with increasing convergence in income, 
we expect on the one side increasing share of the population becoming able to save, on 
the other, increasing households demand for consumption and investment, leading to a 
non increasing saving propensity of individuals throughout the region. We also 
investigate households’ financial investment choices, by distinguishing among risk-less 
and risky assets. In view of macroeconomic stabilisation and more or less gradual EMU 
convergence, as well as full integration in the EU financial market, we expect individuals 
in the region to gradually shift towards a relatively more diversified portfolio, adding to 
their basket more sophisticated products.  
 
 
Keywords: household wealth, savings, convergence, Central and Eastern Europe 
JEL Classification: D31, E21, O16 
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1  Introduction 
 
One of the main challenges of the EU integration process is to guarantee real 
convergence, which means, among other things, equalisation in standards of living of 
the population. A number of studies have focused on time for convergence in terms of 
per capita GDP in PPS, with estimates ranging from 5 to 30 years, according to single 
country development. 
 
If the gap in terms of per capita GDP is huge, another area where differences between 
EU15 and “New Europe countries”1 are particularly relevant is related to wealth 
accumulation and saving choices of individuals. The most significant figure is probably 
the following: while in the region wealth is only 47% of GDP, in the EU15 the ratio is 
170%, thus revealing a poor capitalization record. Differences in terms of portfolio 
allocation choices are also significant. 
 
In order to further investigate these issues, this paper analyses aggregate household 
wealth accumulation as well as savings’ allocation choices in the New Europe. 
Difficulties in making such kind of analysis refer to the fact that the information 
necessary for such a measure and its “sectoral” allocation in a fast developing region like 
the New Europe, is usually available with considerable delay. 
 
We present new figures for financial assets, with a more detailed classification with 
respect to standard Eurostat figures and with an update to 2003. We also provide 
comparisons with other industrialized nations (par. 2 and 3).  
 
Leveraging on these new collected figures, we investigate the determinants of household 
wealth and liabilities accumulation, focusing on macroeconomic variables, financial 
markets developments and households’ specific characteristics (par. 4). The latter class of 
variables is particularly significant, as it shows a strong divergence in saving and 
indebtedness attitudes of individuals, according to their income group.  
 
We also analyse the determinants of portfolio allocation choices of individuals and we 
aggregate individuals’ risk/return choices (par 5). In par. 6, we investigate the experience 
of Italy and other EU15 countries in the last decade provides some interesting insight for 
                                                 
1 The present research focuses on New Europe Countries, including EU new members, plus other 
candidate or EU approaching countries (i.e. Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia and Turkey). Due to lack of 
data, Slovenia has been excluded from the analysis. 
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future developments. In particular, in view of macroeconomic stabilisation and more or 
less gradual EMU convergence, as well as full integration in the EU financial market, we 
expect individuals in the region to gradually shift towards a relatively more diversified 
portfolio, adding to their basket more sophisticated products.  
 
 
2  Data Description 
 
Wealth of individuals is usually measured using financial account data, collected by 
National Statistical Offices or by the Central Bank. In the New Europe countries, however 
such data are not always available or they are available or they are collected with a 
considerable delay, that, given the fast pace of development of the financial sector, 
generates considerable problems. 
 
To overcome those limitations, efforts have been directed towards collection of the data 
from Supervisory Authorities and Central Banks in an attempt of analysing personal 
financial wealth using a nomenclature and methodology as near as possible to the 
official European ones (ESA95). Using such kind of approach allows us to focus 
specifically on resident household (sector S.14 in the European definition) financial 
holdings2 with further breakdowns in order to account for different financial instruments 
and/or risk categories and all figures updated to 2003. The detailed classification we 
used for financial assets has the primary goal to better specify the level of risk actually 
borne by the individual household. Thus, in case of mutual funds, we wanted to identify 
the relevance of equity-heavy funds and those invested primarily in bonds. When it 
comes to pension funds, we introduced the distinction between defined-contribution 
schemes, where the contributors bears the management risk, and defined-benefit funds, 
where is the company that accepts this risk.  
 
Apart from some adjustments due to difficulties in gathering information and the 
aforementioned further breakdowns, our classification of financial instruments strictly 
resembles the current one prevailing in the European System Accounts. Financial wealth 
is thus defined as the sum of currency (mainly local currency with an estimate for FX 
included only for Hungary and Croatia), bank deposits including housing savings, 
securities other than shares, quoted shares, mutual funds shares (including those funds 
                                                 
2 Except for the Czech Republic where all figures refer to household in the broad sense (S.14 and 
S.15). 
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domiciled abroad and promoted by national providers), insurance technical reserves and 
pension funds (second and third pillar). One should note that unquoted shares, other 
equity and other accounts receivable have been excluded for all countries, meaning an 
underestimation of household financial holdings.3 These aggregate usually suffer of 
serious problems also in national published accounts, with the breakdown sometimes 
not provided and when it is, barely plausible. 
 
As far as concerns financial liabilities, our definition refer to loans granted by monetary 
and financial institutions including mortgage, consumer and other forms of lending 
excluding leasing contracts (expect for the case of Bulgaria). Consumer credit is however 
underestimated, given that lending from non-bank financial institutions is only 
marginally covered. It should be noticed also that in all countries all transaction in other 
accounts payable where there are timing difference between transactions and the 
corresponding payments have been excluded for homogeneity.  
 
 
3  Household Financial Wealth 
    in the New Europe Countries 
 
Aggregate household financial wealth in the New Europe is equal to € 335 bln, which is 
approximately only 2% of the EU15 level. Even more importantly, the average per capita 
wealth of individuals is equal to €1,897, which means only 47% of the annual per capita 
GDP (around €4,000). If one considers that at the EU15 level per capita wealth is equal to 
roughly €42,000 (170% of per capita GDP) the low savings capitalisation records in the 
New Europe emerge.  
 
This is likely to be a consequence of historical reasons, rather than of current trends. 
Despite high involuntary savings4 during the planned era (Denizer, Wolf 1998 and 
2000a), indeed, real assets values erosion and the reforming shock substantially depleted 
households financial wealth. Accumulation has gradually evolved since then, in line with 
economic recovery and the development of the financial sector.  
 
                                                 
3 It should also be noted, that the estimate of shares held by individuals is the most difficult 
calculation to be performed in investigating total wealth. In our analysis, we generally have only a 
rough estimate of quoted shares, while the unquoted component is excluded (with the only 
exception of the Czech Republic and Latvia). 
4 Involuntary saving as a consequence of consumption constraint, determined by rationing. 
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By contrast, in the EU 15 countries trends are typical of more mature economies. Asset 
growth has been impressive, especially from 1995 to 2000, due to the combination of 
savings flows and market return effects.  
 
Table 1.  Main economic indicators (2003) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: data for EU-15 are as of 2002 and refer to a proxy including Italy, France, Germany, Spain, The Netherlands 
and UK. 
Source: PFA Database (UniCredit New Europe Research Network, OEE, Pioneer), based on data from National 
Central Banks and Financial Supervisory Authorities and Statistical Offices. 
 
 
Considering relative figures, Central European countries emerge with a ratio of financial 
assets over GDP above or close to 50% (table 1). Other countries lag behind: Bulgaria and 
Romania with a ratio still close to 20-30% and the Baltic countries, with a low level of 
recorded financial wealth penetration, to a large extent explained by the decision to 
exclude, for homogeneity reasons, unquoted shares and other equities from the analysis.  
 
Cross-country disparities are a result of several factors, ranging from traditional and 
historical patterns (different kinds of socialism implemented in different countries), 
divergences in the kind, speed and success of the transition process and current 
macroeconomic and financial sector developments. Generally speaking, those countries 
which started the process earlier and from a better position have been able to benefit 
from a longer period of wealth accumulation fuelled by strong economic growth, price 
stabilisation and increasing overall stability. 
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A slightly different pattern concerns Turkey, where individuals continue to hold a large 
share of their wealth in the form of non-financial assets (particularly gold). If such 
holdings were included, the ratio of wealth over GDP for Turkey would equal 81%. 
Instability of the macroeconomic environment and repeated financial crises, indeed, 
suggested in the country a prudent approach towards financial holdings, while recent 
successes can be the stimulus for further financial deepening. 
 
A ranking among countries in both per capita wealth and per capita income confirms the 
existence of a strong direct relationship between the level of country development and 
accumulated wealth of individuals. This is a first indication that in the New Europe 
wealth accumulation is to a large extent a matter of earning capacity, while heritage does 
not have a significant role. 
 
Graph 1.  Per capita financial wealth and GDP (2003) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The financial penetration gap envisaged on the asset side between New Europe countries 
and the EU15 is even reinforced on the liability side, given the very recent start from 
scratch of a retail lending market throughout the whole region. The average liabilities 
over GDP in the New Europe is equal to 9%, compared to 59% of the EU15 level. Croatia, 
Hungary, Poland and Estonia emerge, as a consequence of a one or two years advantage 
in the lending boom process, compared to other regional players.  
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By focusing on individuals’ indebtedness, measured as the ratio of financial liabilities to 
financial wealth, it is interesting to note that Croatia and Estonia are even exceeding the 
average level of financial liabilities over wealth of the EU15 countries, which is now 
equal to 35%. This should not be perceived however as a worrying signal. Increasing 
indebtedness, indeed, is part of structural development of the financial sector.  
 
Different levels of indebtedness of individuals in different countries suggest the need of 
focusing on net financial assets as a further indicator of households wealth. This is an 
important correction, as it might be the case that, with a growing lending market, 
individuals continue to accumulate assets, only by increasing their debt stock.  
 
A first immediate result is that in terms of net wealth over GDP the gap between the New 
Europe and EU15 is reduced. By comparing New Europe countries, the overall framework 
does not change much, with the central European ones, plus Turkey, leading the ranking 
and inter-country disparities being partially reabsorbed.  
 
Table 2 presents main figures in terms of flows, focusing on the saving ratio of 
households, originating from official national accounts and the change in wealth and 
liabilities (the difference of which represents change in net financial position of 
individuals). The first indicator is thus saving – i.e. the difference between disposable 
income and consumption, while the second is net change in individuals’ exposure 
towards the financial sector. 
 
Notwithstanding the substantial heterogeneity and variability of household saving 
ratios, the data suggest some important similarities within groups of NE countries, with 
a positive relation between income levels, saving attitudes and wealth. Such relationship 
is however likely to lose strength over time, with consumption appetite increasing in 
high income countries. 
 
Central European economies (Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Croatia and the Czech Republic) 
present substantially higher gross saving ratios, being almost in line with saving ratios 
currently prevailing in the EU15. In the Czech Republic, Croatia and Poland we also 
measure relevant changes in net financial wealth. This means that individuals’ savings 
are actually transferred into financial wealth accumulation. In Slovakia and Hungary, 
instead, a low or even negative delta in net financial stocks signals that a substantial 
part of the saving effort is directed outside the financial sector, towards real assets.  
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Table 2.  Wealth accumulation and indebtedness (2003) 
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Gross saving ratio %(1) n.s. 12.1 5.6 12.2 10.3 5.5 6.7 n.a. 2.4 3.1 2.2 
Change in Hous. Wealth as % 
of GDP(2) 5.7 8.1 7.1 5.9 4.7 3.1 2.5 9.6 4.4 2.4 3.1 
Change in Hous. Liabilities as % 
of GDP(2) 3.3 6.3 2.2 6.3 1.5 2.9 2.0 1.2 3.2 1.4 1.6 
Net change Hous. Wealth as % 
of GDP(2) 2.4 1.8 4.9 -0.4 3.2 0.2 0.5 8.4 1.2 1.0 1.5 
 
Note: (1)Data are as of 2001 for Hungary, Estonia and Latvia; as of 2000 for Romania and Lithuania; (2)Data as of 
2001 for Estonia and Latvia; as of 2002 for Lithuania. 
Source: PFA database and (1)National Accounts except for Croatia where data are estimated by Zagrebacka Banka 
Research. 
 
 
Turkey is showing a relatively high net financial wealth accumulation, with a strong 
increase in financial assets, matched by only marginal developments on the liability side. 
The other countries traditionally show a lower gross saving attitude.  
 
In Bulgaria and Romania, given the low average income, a large share of the population 
cannot afford strong saving patterns, while the accumulation effort is mainly a privilege 
of the higher income classes.  
 
The households saving rate in the Baltic countries is low in an international perspective. 
It seems that individuals are already focusing on consumption expansion, leveraging on 
expectations of future income growth, rather than addressing precautionary savings. 
 
 
4  Wealth, Indebtedness and Saving Choices: 
    Main Determinants 
 
To better understand the rationale of the differing regional patterns in terms of financial 
assets and liabilities, we focused on the analysis of determinants of households’ wealth 
accumulation and indebtedness at the regional level. Identifying such determinants 
represents a key step in order to evaluate future developments in this area and on 
financial systems overall.  
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There are only a few empirical studies on the determinant of individuals’ savings in the 
transition economies, partly due to the unavailability (until recently) of adequate data5.  
 
Among those, there are two World Bank studies by Denizer and Wolf (2000a and 2000b). 
The first, analyses the determinants of savings during the initial period of transition 
(until 1995, using IMF estimates of savings) stating that substantial similarities exist 
between saving patterns in transition and market economies. However, it reports one 
remarkable exception finding a negative link between domestic savings and GDP growth 
for its sample of 21 transition economies in Central Europe, the Baltics and the former 
Soviet Union. In contrast, the second work, devoted to more narrow aspect of household 
saving behaviour and based on survey data for Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland, finds out 
that income has a positive influence on household saving.  
 
Other studies, that are based on large international data sets including both 
industrialised and emerging economies, explain trends in domestic and private savings 
mainly through growth and age structure (Edwards, 1995; Loayza et al., 1999; Loayza et 
al., 2000). On this perspective, a recent contribution by Schrooten and Stephan (2003) 
finds support for the hypothesis that private savings in EU candidate countries are 
driven by the same determinants as at the EU level. In particular, in both groups of 
countries, saving behaviour shows a certain degree of persistence, being positively 
related to changes in per capita income growth and to the performance of domestic 
financial markets, while being negatively influenced by the dependency ratio and the 
relaxation of international borrowing constraints.  
 
By using country-level data for a sample of 11 New Europe countries in the 2000-2003 
period, we ran several panel regressions in order to identify the main determinants of 
household wealth and indebtedness (measured as financial wealth over GDP and total 
liabilities over GDP) and of individual wealth accumulation choices (measured as change 
in gross financial wealth over GDP). We investigate the relevance of a number of 
potential determinants, which can be grouped in terms of macroeconomic indicators, 
investors’ specific characteristics and attitude, as well as financial development. We 
further extend our analysis also on the determinants of individual wealth accumulation 
mainly focusing on factors driving demand for deposits and mutual funds shares.  
 
                                                 
5 Among the others see Borensztein and Montiel (1991), Conway (1995) and Denizer and Wolf 
(1998). 
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The model estimated is: 
 
(1)   Wit = α0 + α Iit + βFit + γXit + εit 
 
where: 
• Wit is the independent variable (either households’ financial wealth over GDP, 
change in financial wealth over GDP or households’ liabilities over GDP) for country 
i at time t;  
• Iit are investors’ type variable for country i at time t;  
• Fit is a financial market variable for country i at time t;  
• and Xit are macroeconomic variable for country i at time t. Further, α0 is a constant, 
and α, β and γ are coefficients, while εit is an error term.  
 
The estimation is by feasible Generalized Least Squares applied to panel data with 
correction for heteroskedasticity and panel specific AR(1) autocorrelation.  
 
In general, the model appears to be quite successful in explaining the variation in the 
dependent variable and most of the estimated coefficients have the expected signs. The 
only variable whose direction of impact is indeterminate, the real interest rate has a 
statistically and negative coefficient in the equation for the determinants of households’ 
wealth (Table 3). This result however might reflect distortions in saving behaviour 
caused by the endemic incidence of negative real interest rates in the transition 
economies. 
 
 
4.1  Empirical Estimation 
 
The first regression investigates the determinants of individuals’ wealth, as measured by 
the ratio between households’ wealth and GDP. Among the variables which summarise 
the individuals’ characteristics (Iit) we included: 
• per capita GDP (pcgdp) to account for differences in the level of income between 
countries; 
• a measure of the share of population in poor income classes (below $10.000 in PPP) 
to account for differences on the distributional side; 
• and the stock of financial wealth lagged one period (fingdp) to correct for the impact 
of past accumulated wealth. 
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The level of inflation (infla) and real interest rate on deposits (realrate) have been used to 
control for the specificity of the macroeconomic environment. Finally, the ratio between 
M2 and GDP have been included to account for the impact of financial markets 
development on wealth.  
 
Table 3.  Determinants of households’ wealth 
FINGDP Coefficient Std. err. z P>z 
Pcgdp 0.0008053 0.0004115 1.96 0.050 
Infla -0.0523997 0.0282751 -1.85 0.064 
Realrate -0.3757938 0.1303815 -2.88 0.004 
dependency -3.356694 1.029337 -3.26 0.001 
distribution -12.08725 4.857263 -2.49 0.013 
m2gdp 0.0745523 0.0318517 2.34 0.019 
fingdp_1 0.7694837 0.05062 15.20 0.000 
 
 
One immediate result (table 3) is that the current level of wealth over GDP is a positive 
function of past wealth (figdp_1) and current income (pcgdp), meaning that the rich/high 
income people, can save more. Moreover, a negative relationship with the variable 
measuring distribution of income (distribution) suggests that individuals in the poorest 
income classes cannot afford saving. Also a positive relation with share of working 
population over the total (dependency) is detected. In transition countries, the working 
age population is now holding the largest amount of wealth, while the old age 
population has not been able to accumulate wealth in the past. All those results suggest 
that wealth of individuals throughout the region is not widespread, but is still strongly 
concentrated in the hands of those classes which have, more than others, profited from 
the transition process. 
 
Similar results are confirmed when considering changes in financial assets (table 4). 
Again, past wealth, as well as income distribution, age and education of individuals 
affect their saving choices. Moreover, a positive relationship with interest rates (nomrate) 
and economic growth (gdpgrowth) is detected, while the share of obligatory social 
insurance contribution (contribution) has a negative impact on saving, in that it reduces 
the amount of disposable income of individuals. 
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Table 4.  Determinants of wealth accumulation 
DFINGDP Coefficient Std. err. z P>z 
fingdp_1 0.1548243 0.0037842 40.91 0.000 
gdpgrowth 0.6694922 0.0603146 11.10 0.000 
Nomrate 0.1137354 0.0184941 6.15 0.000 
dependency -1.6669980 0.3230576 -5.16 0.000 
contribution -0.1979993 0.0221073 -8.96 0.000 
distribution -2.3203910 0.9511225 -2.44 0.015 
education 0.0278331 0.0074577 3.73 0.000 
Spread 0.4050061 0.0455180 8.90 0.000 
 
 
By focusing on liabilities of individuals, a similar scenario emerges (table 5), with a 
strong selection on the side of banks for the best clients (income distribution and age 
patterns are important determinants of credit allocation). Cost of debt (nomrate) appears 
to strongly influence credit demand, with both the level of interest rates and the recent 
trend being significant determinants. A further variable to take into consideration is the 
relevance of household expenditures as a percentage of GDP (consgdp), meaning that the 
recent credit boom is financing an increase in consumption demand by households. This 
appears as a rational behaviour, once the real convergence process to EU standards is 
assumed and individuals internalise their future higher spending patterns. 
 
Table 5.  Determinants of household indebtedness 
DFINGDP Coefficient Std. err. z P>z 
Spread -.1595262 0.1035925 -1.54 0.124 
Consgdp 0.2967492 0.0786329 3.77 0.000 
M2gdp 0.0675383 0.0343367 1.97 0.049 
dependency -4.937807 1.62485 -3.04 0.002 
Nomrate -0.1436353 0.0563376 -2.55 0.011 
Drate -0.0946097 0.0551709 -1.71 0.086 
distribution -23.77084 7.435876 -3.20 0.001 
 
The above analyses suggest an interesting environment in the New Europe.  
 
Contrary to the experience of most EU15, being rich is a matter of income flows rather 
than of past accumulation. Heritage still does not represent a significant inter-
generational transfer.  
 
Differences among income classes also reflect on saving and accumulation options. In 
particular, some segments of the population are still unable to save, with income largely 
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passed towards final consumption or investment (i.e. house purchase, etc). Also, to a 
large extent, the low income share of the population is excluded from the lending 
market.  
 
Given expected convergence towards the EU and resulting increase in individual income, 
we expect in the forthcoming years a significant number of new households to become 
customers of the financial sector, both as lenders and as savers.  
 
With an increasing percentage of the population able to save, we would expect a hike in 
the saving propensity of households at the country level and stronger net financial assets 
accumulation. However, increasing income also means higher consumption and 
expenditure appetite, as testified by the current behaviour of high income share of the 
population in the region.  
 
On balance, we can not say whether the first or the second effect will prevail and thus if 
saving propensity and financial asset accumulation will remain increase or decline. Most 
probably, a stable/negative trend could be forecasted. 
 
Table 6.  Financial wealth by instrument (2003)                                                 % 
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EU
(1
)  
Currency 32.8 17.2 12.0 13.3 12.0 14.9 15.8 5.1 2.1 
Deposits 58.7 71.2 53.3 47.8 51.8 63.2 64.7 55.4 35.4 
 LC Deposits 24.5 12.7 36.5 41.8 43.0 34.8 48.4 25.1 n.a. 
 FX Deposits 34.1 56.0 4.0 6.0 8.8 28.4 9.2 30.4 n.a. 
 Housing savings 0.0 2.5 12.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.1 0.0 - 
Securities other than shares 0.6 0.1 0.8 11.4 4.7 8.3 0.0(2) 17.6 9.4 
Quoted shares 1.2 3.9 13.2 1.6 2.8 9.5 0.0(2) 5.2 4.9 
Mutual funds 0.1 1.1 8.4 6.9 7.3 0.2 6.9 11.1 10.6 
 Open-end 0.1 1.0 5.8 0.0 7.3 0.1 6.6 11.0 n.a. 
 Close-end 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.0 n.a. 
 Investment funds 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 n.a. 
 Foreign funds 0.0 0.0 2.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 n.a. 
Insurance technical reserves 2.4 2.9 8.2 8.4 10.3 3.9 10.5 2.4 24.5 
Claims on life insurance reserves 0.6 2.9 6.5 7.3 7.5 2.8 8.1 1.5 22.4 
Claims on non-life insurance reserves 1.7 0.0 1.7 1.1 2.8 1.0 2.4 0.9 2.1 
Pension funds 4.3 3.6 4.2 10.5 10.9 0.0 2.1 3.2 13.1 
Defined-benefit funds 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.0 
Defined-contribution funds 4.3 3.6 4.2 10.5 10.9 0.0 2.1 3.2 2.1 
 
Source: PFA Database. Note: (1) Proxy for the EU aggregate including Germany, The Netherlands, France, UK, Italy 
and Spain. (2) A proxy – assets allocated in securities are of negligible volume and prevailingly low liquidity. 
 
  236
Even a decline, however, would not necessarily have a negative impact on the 
macroeconomic environment and on real convergence perspectives. As long as FDI is 
financing the widening CA deficits and fiscal consolidation leads to increases in 
Government savings, indeed, we can expect high and sustainable growth.  
 
This will revert also in higher income of individuals and higher volumes of savings, as 
well as continuing strong demand for indebtedness. Obviously, this means an increasing 
penetration of financial products and a demand side push for financial sector 
development. 
 
 
5  Portfolio Composition of Financial Wealth 
 
The portfolio composition of financial wealth of individuals among different forms of 
savings is a function of: 
 
• the macroeconomic environment,  
• the level of development of financial markets and availability of products,  
• the level of wealth of individuals and their risk propensity, as well as the need for 
precautionary saving,  
• the institutional framework in terms of pension reforms, health insurance, etc.  
• the relative value of assets and prospective returns. 
 
Given the above, we are not surprised in detecting a substantially different pattern in 
terms of portfolio allocation between the EU15 and NE countries, the latter being still 
strongly focused on more traditional products. Expected changes in the above mentioned 
fundamentals are likely however to push towards a higher diversification. 
 
By comparing the New Europe countries, some stylised factors immediately emerge.  
 
As far as currency is concerned, our data, in most cases do not allow to split for 
households and non financial corporations, thus causing a general overstatement of the 
relevant value. Moreover, we have included only in Croatia and in Hungary an estimate 
for holdings in foreign currency.  
 
Traditionally, all over the region, currency relevance has been a function of relatively low 
banking penetration, when measured in terms of number of individuals holding a 
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current account. However, in order to explain an increasing, rather than a declining 
trend in the last few years, we have to consider the strong demand for transactions, as a 
consequence of consumption expenses growth, not fully matched by increases in the use 
of electronic means.  
 
Bulgaria stands out for a relatively high weight of currency holdings. Such preference for 
liquidity in the country can be explained by considering the relevance of cash as a form 
of payment and the large share of grey economy6. On the other hand, Turkey has a 
relatively low share of wealth in currency, given the high inflationary environment and 
the lack, in our figures, of the FX component.  
 
Bank deposits still represent the most relevant form of savings for individuals, 
accounting for 50% or more of total financial wealth in all markets. Financial markets in 
the region tend to be banking based, with capital markets playing only a limited role 
both in terms of collection of savings and in terms of financing. The relatively more 
developed financial markets are those for the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary and it 
comes as no surprise that those countries are the ones showing a lower share of saving 
in traditional banking deposits. Croatia and Slovakia stand out as strongly bank-based 
systems, with 65/70% of financial wealth kept in this form. In both countries, the 
government bond market is not significant, while the corporate sector is still not strong 
enough to support autonomous development of the equity and the private bond market. 
Irrespectively of demand, indeed, there is a supply problem still hindering diversification 
of individuals investments. 
 
The share of foreign exchange deposits continues to be relevant in Croatia , Bulgaria and 
Turkey, and to a lower extent, in Romania. While the first two countries have a stable 
currency (Bulgaria running a successful currency board and Croatia an informal 
exchange rate stabilisation), Turkey and Romania are pursuing a policy of real 
appreciation of the currency, against a USD/Euro basket. Being all countries still far 
away from EMU convergence, we do not expect a substantial change in the currency mix. 
  
Finally, it is interesting to note the relevance of building societies as a form of savings in 
both the Czech Republic and Slovakia, where they account for 7 to 13% of financial 
wealth of individuals. This form of savings, strongly linked to future mortgage contracts, 
                                                 
6 Some studies have shown that Bulgaria, in addition to Estonia, emerge in the region for a relative 
high weight of grey economy with an estimate close to 36% of GDP in 2000/2001. For details, see 
Schneider (2002). 
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however, is gradually losing relevance, with the development of a direct banking 
mortgage market and the end of specific treatments for those institutions, as part of the 
EU accession process. 
 
To further understand the determinants of traditional deposits demand (compared to 
other intermediated assets), we have decided to expand the analysis presented in the 
previous paragraph. A simple panel regression (table 7) shows that individuals stick to 
deposits (depoia) when interest rates (drate) are higher and thus a good remuneration 
from the investment is guaranteed. Still, they strongly feel the pressure of alternative 
forms of savings (thus a negative relation with returns in stock markets – yield – is 
detected). Traditional deposits are preferred by the low income part of the population (a 
positive relation with percentage of the population in low income classes is detected), 
being perceived as safer products, but also as a liquid instrument, which can be 
associated to transaction services (a positive relation with consumption expenditure over 
GDP – consgdp -is found). 
 
Table 7.  Determinants of deposits’ demand 
DEPOIA Coefficient Std. err. z P>z 
pcgdp -0.0012083 0.0009966 -1.21 0.225 
gdpgrowth 1.066214 0.458186 2.33 0.020 
consgdp 0.4830092 0.222601 2.17 0.030 
realrate -0.3899753 0.4252184 -0.92 0.359 
infla -0.0908936 0.0946645 -0.96 0.337 
yield -0.0278079 0.0105106 -2.65 0.008 
drate 0.4858929 0.2792154 1.74 0.082 
distribution 60.66912 22.67691 2.68 0.007 
 
 
Given the above, we can thus expect demand for bank deposits in the region to gradually 
decrease, leading to an increase in portfolio diversification. 
 
First signals of such trend are already present. The growth of the mutual funds market in 
the region is indeed mirroring, with a few years lag, the development in other EU 
countries in the last decade. In these countries a switch away from traditional bank 
deposits has been recorded as a consequence of the reduction of interest rates and the 
increase in individuals’ appetite for more developed financial products, with a sudden 
increase in AuM.  
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Mutual funds represent 9 to 11% of intermediated financial assets7 held by individuals in 
the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and almost 8% in Slovakia, with a substantial 
growth path in the last year. In Turkey, the share of mutual funds in total intermediated 
assets is even higher, close to 15% in 2003. 
 
The relevance of investment funds as savings instruments is growing fast also in those 
countries where the market is still small, supported by macro-trends and demand/supply 
ones. The ongoing process is such that not every product will benefit, neither will every 
supplier be able to keep and/or capture market share as clients are going through the 
learning process: gradually ’asset management products’ will be understood and, more 
importantly appreciated at least among younger generations. Clients will be able to 
distinguish between suppliers and between funds. Elements such as track record and 
performance will become more and more relevant, especially in countries like Bulgaria 
and Romania where frustration with, and distrust in, ’investment funds companies’ as a 
results of past collapses has induced individuals to be more cautious towards these 
products. 
 
By focusing on the determinants of preferences for mutual funds some interesting results 
emerge (table 8). While in some developed financial markets mutual funds tend to be a 
mass product, in the New Europe region, a strong correlation is observed between 
average wealth, percentage of population in higher income classes and relative weight of 
mutual funds on total financial assets.  
 
Demand for mutual funds is also associated to higher propensity of individuals to risk, 
which is measured as the share of risky assets (mainly equity) in individuals’ portfolios. 
This is not however yet reflected in a shift of mutual funds towards a more risky 
composition. 
 
Finally, preference for mutual funds increases when interest rates on traditional deposits 
decrease, while a high bank mark down (difference between interbank rate and deposit 
rate, which means high margins for the banks and higher costs for the client), leads to 
shift of preferences away from deposit instruments. 
 
 
                                                 
7 Our definition of intermediated financial assets includes bank deposits, mutual funds shares, 
insurance technical reserves and pension funds assets. 
  240
Table 8.  Determinants of mutual funds’ demand 
MUTUALIA Coefficient Std. err. z P>z 
Pcgdp 0.0010018 0.0005258 1.91 0.057 
Risk 0.0819855 0.0459009 1.79 0.074 
distribution -19.72801 10.48603 -1.88 0.060 
nomrate -0.2639881 0.0944061 -2.80 0.005 
differential 0.4375116 0.1667978 2.62 0.009 
 
 
All in all, we can expect that macroeconomic stabilisation, a decrease in interest rates 
and development in financial markets integration will accelerate the ongoing switch from 
traditional deposits towards AUM, already perceived as more innovative and advanced 
financial products. 
 
The relevance of equity markets and securities as a form of investment is quite limited all 
over the region, with some exceptions, mainly related to the structural features of the 
economy.  
 
Securities other than shares are a relatively more interesting form of saving for 
individuals in Turkey (where they account for 18% of individuals’ wealth), Hungary 
(11%), Romania (roughly 8%) and Poland (5% of wealth). These four countries feature a 
relatively strong Government bond market, as a consequence of past and present 
financing needs of the authorities and continue to have interest rates above the regional 
average. The corporate bond market, instead, is still quite underdeveloped .  
 
The level of development of equity markets in different countries and the relative 
relevance of shares as a saving instrument for individuals is mostly a consequence of the 
privatisation process adopted throughout the region. Countries which adopted a voucher 
scheme privatisation - mainly the Czech Republic and Romania - tend to show a sizable 
role for equity investments; it is less common in those countries which focused on a 
mixed approach – like Poland – based on both coupon privatisation and foreign direct 
investments or fully dependent on foreign direct investment – as in the case of Hungary . 
  
In the forthcoming period, individuals’ preferences for share-holdings are likely to be 
strictly determined by expected return and risk, with the EU accession/convergence 
process, integration of financial markets at the cross-border level (thus leading to an 
increase in supply of financial products) and decreasing return of alternative products 
likely to play a significant role.  
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One point to mention is that from our analysis we had to exclude figures concerning 
unquoted shares, as we could not find reliable estimates for most of the countries 
considered. Such shares account for roughly 30% of financial wealth in Hungary and 45% 
in the Baltic countries and represent an important form of indirect investment, 
particularly due to the relevance of small and medium enterprises in the local economies. 
A similar correction has been done also for EU15 data.  
 
The choice to invest in insurance products or in pension funds is a function of 
precautionary attitude of individuals and institutional features, such as the level and 
quality of state protection, as well as the pension legislation and the fiscal treatment. 
 
As far as insurance is concerned, on the one side, the level and the quality of state 
protection is negatively related to need of insurance, on the other, insurance policies are 
usually a benefit for workers, thus meaning a direct relationship between economic 
growth and insurance market development. We can distinguish two groups of countries 
in the region: Central East European ones, where reserves for insurance account for 8-
10% of total individuals’ financial wealth, and other countries, with an incidence going 
from 2 to 4%.  
 
Investment in pension funds is strongly influenced by the specificities of pension reform. 
Even more than in the EU15, most New Europe countries have already passed radical 
reforms in the pension area, by switching from a first pillar to a multi-pillar funded 
system. Such reform is already implemented in Poland, Hungary, Croatia, Bulgaria and 
in the Baltic countries, while new laws have been recently passed or are in the process of 
being passed in the remaining ones. In Turkey, a second pillar pension system is in place 
as a substitute for first pillar for those categories which were not covered in the basic 
system and plans to transform the first pillar are still not in place. 
 
Accumulation of assets in mandatory second pillar is thus a function of time (system 
inception) and specific features of the reform (i.e. mandatory contribution by employer 
and employee, possibility of switching from old to new pension scheme, etc). The 
participation in fully funded pillars is indeed already high in those countries where 2nd 
mandatory pillar has been introduced as first – like in Poland and Hungary with 67% and 
54% participation ratio respectively and in Croatia. Expectation for further rises in the 
near future concern those countries where second pillar started recently – as in the case 
of Slovakia and Lithuania – or is supposed to start in the near future –Romania and 
Czech Republic.  
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Being mandatory, accumulation of wealth for the second pillar should not be considered 
as an autonomous investment choice by the individuals. Despite that, it can impact the 
propensity for long term investment in other products, in that individuals feel that they 
are already covering the long-term precautionary need.  
 
On the contrary, as far as the voluntary third pillar is concerned, the accumulation of 
resources is fully dependent on the individual attitude towards precautionary savings 
and the level of average contribution. In particular, the evaluation of current and 
prospective life-styles, and more specifically tax treatment, are playing a major role in 
determining the decision to participate or not in the system. In the Czech Republic, as an 
example, participation is unusually high, mainly as a consequence of very attractive 
state subsidies. In Poland, the TEE tax system – coupled with other macro-based factors 
– constrained growth in the sector.  
 
 
6  Investment Risk Profile – Behaviour of Individuals 
    in New Europe and Lessons from EU15 
 
Table 9.  Financial products: portfolio structure, returns, volatility 
             and sharpe indices (2003) 
 C
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Portfolio structure 
Risk Free Inst 68.2 63.0 66.1 83.3 87.2 91.6 78.3 65.2 
Bonds 16.8 34.9 30.9 14.6 8.5 7.2 12.1 29.2 
Equities 15.0 2.1 3.0 2.1 4.3 1.2 9.6 5.6 
Returns 
Risk Free Inst. 1.4 6.5 3.3 1.3 - 1.3 - 37 
Bonds (1) 2.0 7.4 5.1 5.9 - - - 38 
Equities 30 13 28 24 - 68 - 18 
Volatility 
Risk Free Inst 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1 - 0.0 - 1.5 
Bonds 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.6 - - - 6.6 
Equities 6.4 6.8 8.2 5.8 - 11.5 - 14.9 
Sharpe Index (2) 
Bonds 1.05 1.56 2.72 7.96 - - - 0.2 
Equities 4.41 0.97 2.97 3.82 - 5.82 - -1.3 
 
Note: (1)Bond index returns as from ELMI, the JPM index on local currency bonds, providing for a conversion 
returns in local currency. (2)Sharpe index is measured as (return on asset i – return on risk free assets)/Standard 
deviation asset. 
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As a final step, by focusing on individuals’ asset allocation choices, we compare the 
risk/return choice in the New Europe and at the EU15 level. By considering the 
experience of Italy and other EU15 countries in the last decade, and in view of the 
expected macroeconomic stabilisation and EMU convergence process, we believe we can 
gain some insight for future developments. 
 
A caveat: one should remember that the exercise is somehow arbitrary given the small 
time period examined (2000-2003). 
 
Moreover, on the demand side, the exercise assumes strong flexibility of individuals in 
their investment choices. The experience of more advanced financial countries shows 
that this is obviously not always the case. In the New Europe countries, however, 
reactivity of individuals to market conditions tends to be relatively high.  
The equilibrium level is also influenced by the supply side, with supply of financial 
products continuing to be an important constraint, which could be at least partially 
relaxed in the future, in view of integration of EU financial markets.  
  
 
6.1  Current Trends in New Europe 
 
A simplified version of households’ investment portfolio has been considered. In 
particular, available saving instruments have been aggregated in three different groups, 
with some adjustments in order to take into account peculiarities in New Europe 
countries. The three types of investment considered are:  
 
• risk free activities (holdings in local currency, deposits, short term bonds and money 
market funds) 
• bonds/securities (including government bonds and other bonds, bond funds, real 
estate funds and pension funds, life insurance ) 
• equities (including equity, equity funds, balanced funds). 
 
Table 9 presents the portfolio structure, returns (in 2003) and volatility of returns (in the 
2000-2003 period) of these various instruments, for a sub-sample of countries in the 
region.  
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Generally speaking, the strong relevance of risk free and bond products is striking. This 
is a natural pattern in the early stage of development of financial markets, given the high 
level of interest rates on the short term instruments and high risk of equities.  
 
A synthetic index of the return/risk matching for investors is provided by the Sharpe 
index, i.e. the incremental return that can be obtained by investing in riskier instruments 
in terms of its units of risk. The higher the value the better the return/risk trade-off.  
 
We decided to show only 2003 data, as they represent the current stage of development 
of financial sectors, although again we do realize that looking at only one year can prove 
highly misleading. Considering previous years, the scenario would point to the relevance 
of macroeconomic stabilisation and financial sector development in shaping individuals’ 
choices, with risk free assets representing the best choice in terms of risk return in the 
early years of transition and other products gradually picking up. 
 
Only in the Czech Republic, and to a lesser extent in Poland, the Sharpe index in 2003 
suggests the rationality of a relative preference for equity products. In the Czech Republic 
the combination of a significant share of equity investments as a result of the past 
coupon privatization process and the positive stock market performance in the last two 
years, in an environment of low interest rates, have jointly been successful in attracting 
individuals’ investors towards more risky assets. In Poland, the gap in terms of Sharpe 
index is very close. On the one side still relatively high interest rates suggest the 
rationale for traditional products, on the other, positive results in the stock market 
suggest a gradual shift towards equities. The fact that equity markets are relatively well 
developed in the two countries obviously plays a role. 
 
In Slovakia and Hungary, the bond market still has to be preferred, given high 
guaranteed returns. In Slovakia, moreover, low size of the equity market generates a 
substantially higher volatility and risk of returns. In Turkey, the current macroeconomic 
environment is still allowing a significant return even in the risk free categories. This 
leads to a very low Sharpe index for bond products and even a negative one for equity 
markets. 
 
On the overall, we highlight a fast developing scenario, strongly based on fundamentals. 
We can thus expect changes in macroeconomic or financial sector determinants to 
rapidly affect individuals’ choices, leading to increasing portfolio diversification. 
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6.2  The Experience of Past Convergence Processes: 
       the Italian Case 
 
As already mentioned, we now focus on the Italian experience for the last decade. In 
view of the expected macroeconomic stabilisation and EMU convergence process for most 
New Europe countries, we believe we can gain some insight for future developments.  
 
Italy has gone through a convergence process with a strong decrease in the risk premium 
on its bonds. From 1995 to 2000, the share of bonds in individuals’ portfolios decreased 
from 31% of the total to 20%. As interests rate decreased the relative long term value of 
equities has increased, with their weight, in individuals portfolios going from 14 to 27%. 
 
The mutual fund industry and, more broadly on the asset management industry played a 
significant role in the process. Mutual funds started in Italy in 1985 and have had an 
impressive growth, encompassing, since the very start, equity as well as balanced and 
bond funds. To date they account for approximately 15% of household assets. In the 
initial phase, similarly as now in New Europe, there were strong restrictions as far as 
mutual fund international diversification was concerned. As these regulations were lifted 
at the end of the eighties and as the market matured, the industry started to focus on 
fund specialization. Soon the Italian mutual fund market was able to cover a very wide 
spectrum of alternatives. 
 
As already mentioned, convergence coincided with the need for Italian households to 
rebalance their portfolios towards a more diversified composition and, correspondingly, 
for the Italian banking and insurance industry to improve its servicing capabilities. In 
this context, mutual funds proved to be a very powerful instrument, as shown by the 
strong growth in assets in the later part of the 1990ies. 
 
From a regulatory point of view the trend towards greater liberalization was not limited 
to international diversification. Gradually management companies were allowed to 
broaden their scope and to manage assets other than mutual funds such as segregated 
accounts and pension funds. The possibility of establishing non-ucit funds, such as 
hedge funds and funds of funds, was also introduced in the late nineties thus putting the 
Italian market virtually at a par with leading international financial markets and, in 
some instances, as for example for domestic hedge funds and absolute return products, 
at the forefront of financial innovation. 
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The Italian asset management industry has in less than 15 years, changed the structure 
of the Italian financial system. The key differentiating factors are part of a “best practice” 
virtuous circle that is based on competitiveness, transparency of governance processes 
and communication, ability to deliver efficient portfolio solutions, strong administrative 
and operational capabilities, economies of scale and of scope. 
 
What can we learn for the New Europe?  
 
First a comparison with Italy has elements of interest both in terms of similarities and of 
differences.  
 
While macroeconomic trends are likely to be relatively similar, the end of the Italian 
convergence has coincided with the equity market bubble and this has made the 
transition bumpier. From this point of view the New Europe countries may be in a better 
position, because they enter the world of portfolio diversification in a context that is less 
characterised by “irrational exuberance”. 
 
Another advantage for New Europe could arise from the fact that these countries have 
directly “jumped” into a phase where institutional investors have a role. As we have 
shown in our study on Household Wealth in the National Accounts of Europe, the United 
States and Japan (PGAM Research February 2003) it appears that institutional investors 
act as stabilizers with respect to the natural tendency of retail investors to have a pro-
cyclical behaviour in equity markets, with the risk of “buying high and selling low”. 
 
Another very relevant difference is that , for the historical reasons mentioned, the level of 
financial wealth is quite substantially lower in those countries than in Italy. So while 
switch effects have been a main driver in the EU 15 we may expect accumulation effects 
to be more important in the New Europe countries. 
 
As a final point, it should be noted that the EU financial sector per se has been subject to 
a strong transformation process, aimed at increasing efficiency and integration. The New 
Europe countries are thus joining in an already different and progressively more 
integrated market, and will be able to jump-start into the latest “state of the art” 
products. 
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6.3  Lessons for the New Europe Countries 
 
The experience of past macroeconomic convergence processes provides useful 
suggestions in terms of possible future developments in individuals’ portfolio allocation 
choices in the New Europe.  
 
The analysis of returns and volatility associated to each instrument, based on the Sharpe 
ratio, has shown how in those NE countries where the convergence process is relatively 
ahead, a rationality for the preference for alternative and more risky products exists.  
 
Using tools derived from the modern portfolio theory we try to push further the analysis, 
focusing on a mean-variance approach. Essentially, the lowering of short-term interest 
rates and the appearance of a truly risk free rate tends to favour portfolio rebalancing 
towards a more equilibrated mix. 
 
The usual caveat about the limited time-period examined should be borne in mind as far 
as the empirical verification is concerned. Given the aforementioned selection of asset 
classes – risk-free, bond and equity – and the average returns and historical volatility 
associated to each instruments, we sketched comparative “efficient frontiers”. 
 
The evolution in the portfolio allocation choices of individuals between 2001 and 2003 is 
presented in graph 2. For the sake of clarity, we decided just to present the evolutionary 
path of the portfolio allocation chosen.  
 
The results confirm the intuition provided by the Sharpe index analysis. The trend is 
towards lower returns, which is consistent with interest rate convergence. The generally 
higher volatility could be explained partly by the fact that the volatility of bonds in the 
earlier period may not have been fully reflected in the risk premium, partly because of 
switches to equity instruments, partly to “noise”. The Czech Republic, where 
macroeconomic convergence is largely achieved and risk free rates are low, is a special 
case. In this country a very positive equity market performance in the last two years 
allowed individuals to increase their returns.  
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Graph 2.  Portfolio allocation evolutionary path – 2001 vs. 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Graph 3 we have highlighted what we can call “biased” efficient frontiers: before 
convergence high short-term rates and high rates on bank deposits may not appear to 
domestic investors as risky as they appear to foreign ones. The “efficient frontier” has 
therefore an upward bias with apparently (and often ex-post effectively) superior 
risk/returns characteristics. With convergence lower risk and lower return instruments 
prevail together with an “unbiased” and lower risk/return frontier. 
 
Graph 3.  “Biased” efficient frontiers and convergence 
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Thus, with full macroeconomic convergence, the efficient frontier for New Europe 
countries will finally coincide with the markets at the EU level. Only a fully integrated 
market can guarantee potential for broad diversification, allowing investments in the 
liquid global equity markets, along with international bonds and money market 
instruments. 
 
 
7  Concluding Remarks 
 
The in-depth analysis of household wealth in New Europe confirms the existence of a 
strong gap in terms of wealth accumulation with EU-15 countries and significant 
disparities across the region. This is a consequence of both historical reasons and 
different patterns in the transition process among countries. 
 
In the New Europe “being rich” seems to be more a matter of flows rather than of stocks, 
meaning that the rich are those earning high incomes, thus being able to save and 
accumulate, while the relevance of “heritage” still seems to be low. Moreover, low 
income groups are still unable to save, being substantially excluded from the financial 
market.  
 
Overall, we expect in the next decade the stock of individuals’ wealth to increase, thus 
increasing even more growth opportunities for the financial sector.  
 
In terms of individual portfolio allocation choices, we foresee a gradual shift of 
preferences towards more risky and sophisticated products. Macroeconomic stabilisation 
and integration in the EU financial markets are gradually reducing return opportunities 
biased by high risk premia and individuals have to increase diversification to at least 
partially compensate for lower returns. We expect in the forthcoming years the efficient 
frontiers for the New Europe to finally coincide with the that of the EU15. 
 
Overall, forthcoming developments of the financial sector infrastructure in the New 
Europe will be characterised by a more or less straightforward shift towards market 
oriented systems. Banks will however continue to play a leading role, while strong 
discontinuities are possible in the process, in view of differences in the regulatory and 
legal framework, and in particular in the key area of pension reform. 
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Monetary Policy in Real-Time     
Situations: The Relevance of Simple 
Instrument Rules 
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There is a long tradition of Austrian, or neo-Austrian, 
economics within which the scope for policy action 
is limited on the grounds that the knowledge base of 
policymakers is insufficient,… 
 
(Sheila Dow, 2002) 
 
Abstract 
Policy formulation, evaluation and interpretation by means of simple policy rules, as for 
instance the popular Taylor rule, have attracted much attention in recent years. Such 
rules have not only been viewed as guidelines to (the transparency of) policy decisions, 
but also as benchmarks for predicting future policy and as a tool to judge whether current 
or past policy has been appropriately set. Furthermore, they have an important role in 
inflation targeting. 
It has been pointed out, however, that results will be misleading, if policy reaction 
functions, whose parameters are estimated on the basis of “final”data, are used for 
understanding how policymakers react in real-time situations (Orphanides, 2001). The 
problem is aggravated by the fact that in monetary policy the necessity to take into 
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account long lags leaves the policymaker with rather long-term forecasts for the 
variables entering his reaction function. 
In order to obtain a better understanding of these real-time data issues we evaluate 
accuracy and efficiency of OECD’s forecasts for the G7 countries, paying attention to 
ex-post data revisions. Apart from a rather disappointing forecast performance over 
horizons of more than one year, we identify significant biases in the forecasts and a 
rather different behavior among countries as to data revisions. We find significant 
differences between Taylor rules estimated over revised data as compared to those 
estimated over real-time data that are still subject to later revisions. 
Further, we suggest methods to correct forecast data for some of these defects, thus 
enabling a policymaker to use more efficiently the information set available at a certain 
moment of time. We propose procedures to control for distorting influences on the rule’s 
data input and show that policy errors can be reduced. Generally, however, our results 
support scepticism against the use of simple instrumental rules in practical monetary 
policy, mainly because they imply large policy errors if they are based on unadjusted 
real-time input data. 
 
Keywords: monetary policy rules, economic forecasting, OECD, real-time data 
JEL Classification: C53, E52 
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1  Introduction 
In approaching the European Union (EU) and, in further course, the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU), considerations concerning the conduct of monetary policy and 
exchange rate policy are important issues. There are numerous papers dealing with 
exchange rate strategies which could be useful for preparing the ground for convergence 
and final entrance into the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II).  
Monetary policy will have to support these endeavours by designing and implementing a 
framework which should be conducive for the fulfillment of the well-known Maastricht 
criteria, most of all the inflation criterion. In this context, the currently very much 
advocated strategy of inflation targeting is a policy option. Some of the new member 
states of the EU, namely Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, follow policies of 
this kind. 
Inflation targeting – sometimes also inflation-forecast targeting – is to be regarded as an 
approach to the conduct of monetary policy that focuses on a clearly defined target for 
the inflation rate which has to be hit or not exceeded. In following such a strategy, an 
important role is assigned to quantitative projections of the economy’s future evolution, 
and there is a strong commitment to a high degree of transparency and communication as 
to the goals, the decisions and the principles guiding this policy (Woodford, 2004). 
Inflation targeting is closely related to the concept of “monetary policy rules”, and 
research on such rules has strongly intensified over the last years. In its simplest form, as 
for instance the well-known Taylor rule, the monetary policy instrument (mostly a short-
term interest rate under the control of the central bank) is a function of a small subset of 
information relating to the economy’s current (and future) situation (mainly the evolution 
of inflation and output). Rules of this kind have been termed “simple instrument rules”. 
For different reasons, these simple instrument rules have come under critique recently. 
Svensson (2003) has judged them as “inadequate as a description of real-world inflation 
targeting” and even their use as mere guidelines as “incomplete and too vague to be 
operational”. It has become clear that there seems to exist a gap between the academic 
discussion and the current practice of central banking where the opinion prevails that a 
mechanical application of instrument rules is not appropriate and that some amount of 
discretion has to be retained.  
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Moreover, as monetary policy operates on long and variable lags, current policy 
decisions are made on the basis of assumptions and forecasts about the state of the 
economy in the future rather than on the basis of the actual state. When current policies 
are chosen, policymakers are uncertain about the state of the economy which is to prevail 
at the time the planned policy is expected to impact. 
Thus, the literature on policy rules and, especially, on forecast-based rules, brought the 
problem of forecast quality and reliability to the forefront. Some authors found that such 
forecast-based rules seemed to be able to control better for current and future inflation 
(Batini and Haldane, 1999). Ex post, however, forecasts might turn out to be quite 
wrong, most likely if also forecasts for national account data enter the rule (as in the case 
of flexible inflation targeting), implying policy error and welfare losses. 
In this context, Orphanides (2001) has pointed out that: “The discussion (on monetary 
policy rules),…., often does not place proper emphasis on the informational problem 
associated with some of the advocated policy rules.” Taking into account that the 
policymaker when making a decision has at his disposal only forecast values for the 
arguments entering his reaction function, Orphanides argues that the weights attached to 
these arguments when estimated by means of “realised” or revised data could be rather 
misleading. A voluminous literature on “real-time issues” was elicited by this 
observation, and there is an ongoing debate about its implications. Thus far, the evidence 
on whether it really matters if a central bank uses real-time data or final data is not yet 
clear. Orphanides (2001) finds that revisions of recommendations tend to be “very large” 
comparing results from these two data sets, whereas Adema (2003) for “quasi-real time” 
data as well as Bernanke and Boivin (2000) and others cannot find much difference. 
In this paper we want to concentrate on a problem which we feel has been somewhat 
neglected in this context, namely: Is the quality of forecasts for the aggregates in 
question sufficiently reliable to base rules and monetary decisions with possibly far-
reaching consequences on it? We will show that this is not the case and together with the 
additional fact of frequent and significant data revisions this implies high uncertainty 
concerning the parameters to be used in such rules, thus increasing potential policy error. 
One has to be aware that there exists a complex set of errors and mistakes which threaten 
to be incurred if monetary policy rules whose parameter values are obtained from 
estimation over “final” data from the past are applied to real-time decisions. Generally, at 
least three sources of potential mistakes can be observed: 
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• Forecast uncertainty: The policymaker wishing to influence some future outcome in an 
optimal sense has, as mentioned, at his disposal only forecasts for the period in question. 
These forecasts may be wrong and the mistake usually is the larger the longer the 
forecast horizon is. Thus, for the sensible application of a monetary policy rule, first of 
all it has to be asked what the forecast horizon will be starting from which the forecast 
performance shows some reliability. 
• Forecast bias: Errors do not sum up to zero over time, but in many cases forecasts can be 
shown to be severely biased. If such biases can be identified, is it possible and does it 
make sense to correct for them in order to bring the policymaker’s real-time decision 
closer to “reality”? 
• Data revisions: In some cases – apart from the fact that significant revisions can be 
observed - there seem to exist systematic components in the revision process. Again, if 
identifiable, can these be incorporated into some correction mechanism? 
Neglecting these problems may render simple instrument rules estimated over revised 
data practically irrelevant for real-time decisions and may lead to an interest rate setting 
consistently too high or too low with high costs incurred by such policy errors. By close 
examination of OECD forecasts1 we try to obtain some estimates of the size and 
evolution of these mistakes by evaluating forecasts over longer periods, by calculating 
the forecast errors over changing forecast horizons, by investigating for biases, and by 
observing the ex-post data revisions. Thus, the policy error incurred by a “final-data 
Taylor rule” as compared to a “real-time Taylor rule” can be enumerated and procedures 
be developed to correct for these distortions. 
The outline of the paper is as follows: In section 2 we explain the content of our data 
base and quantify forecast errors and biases. In section 3 we examine the difference 
between „real-time data” and „last reported data” Taylor rules and we experiment with 
different procedures to improve the information content of data available in the real-time 
situation. In section 4 we draw our conclusions. 
 
                                                 
1 See Glück, Schleicher and Catena (2000). We want to point out that it is not our intention to 
blame anybody for deficiencies of forecast quality. It is our intention here to learn from the 
observed problems and try to develop procedures to improve upon them. 
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2  Dynamics and Bias in Forecasting 
There is a vast literature on the evaluation of forecast accuracy trying to discriminate 
between models based on their relative forecasting record. Although this seems to be 
potentially an objective criterion, considerable difficulties remain nonetheless.  
The first difficulty inherent in such an exercise relates to the measurement of forecast 
quality. What should be the appropriate metric? As regards quantitative measures, there 
are many to choose from – absolute errors, root mean square errors, Theil’s U, etc. 
Similarly, a number of qualitative measures are available. For instance, we might be 
interested in correctly predicting turning points. Alternatively, we might be more 
interested in the forecast ’story’. It is widely acknowledged that accurate short-run 
forecasts are better made by small time series or reduced form models than by structural 
relations. Such time series models, however, have limited economic content. Policy 
institutions, by contrast, typically value the economic content of a forecast since it 
facilitates internal and external communication and allows them to conceptualise risks 
and scenarios around the forecast. 
Second, even if we assume that some suitable forecasting metric can be found, there still 
remains the question of how one interprets and makes use of that metric. For example, 
over which horizon do we judge performance? Results will inevitably differ at different 
forecast horizons. Moreover, ex-post data revisions will change those errors. Indeed, 
even if we can identify the best (ex-post) performer, there is no guarantee that this will 
extrapolate into the future. It should also be borne in mind that small forecast failure 
does not necessarily imply that the model is well-specified; the forecast error is a 
compound of different errors – specification (i.e. model) errors, errors in residual 
adjustment and errors in exogenous assumptions, and it is not clear how to disentangle 
these different aspects. For many projection exercises, the outcome is a combination of 
model and off-model judgment.  
Recent papers2, however, conclude that more serious problems are involved in 
forecasting than the simple aspect of accuracy, namely bias, rationality and efficiency as 
well as the problem of data revisions. It is found that efficiency does not seem to be 
guaranteed, as shown for instance by Joutz and Stekler (2000) as well as by Loungani 
(2000), and obviously there are extended periods of bias towards systematic over- or 
                                                 
2 A more elaborate review of this literature was given in Glück, Schleicher and Catena (2000). 
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underestimation. Whereas Joutz and Stekler in their study of the Fed forecasts find that 
on average these were unbiased, Loungani (2000) in his investigation on private sector 
forecasts finds evidence of an upward bias. These results relate predominantly to GDP 
forecasts, but generally it can be supposed that they also apply to previsions of inflation.  
In the following, we put special emphasis on the dynamic aspects of the forecasting and 
data revision processes and on biases as this will provide us with a data base appropriate 
to deal with some of the problems discussed above. For this purpose, as mentioned, we 
take under scrutiny the forecasts of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD).  
 
 
2.1  Data Base 
Since the sixties, the OECD in its Economic Outlook has been publishing forecasts for 
some of its member countries. Projections for the major macroeconomic aggregates are 
published twice a year, one in June (mid-year forecast) and one in December (end-year 
forecast). Originally, the first forecast for a particular year was the mid-year forecast one 
year ahead. This has been extended in the late seventies to the end-year forecast two 
years ahead. Thus, for instance, the first forecast for 2006 is published in December 
2004.  
We analyze the gross domestic product (GDP) and consumer price forecasts, both in 
rates of change, for the G7 countries (USA, Japan, Germany, United Kingdom, France, 
Italy and Canada). The basic data for this study were taken from every published 
Economic Outlook since 1967. The evolution of forecasts for the particular years as well 
as the data revisions constitute the data base which is analyzed. That sums up to nine 
estimates (one two-year-ahead estimate, two one-year-ahead, two current year and two 
estimates each one year and two years after) for every country. These estimates are 
compared to the final data, where “final” still means preliminary and should better be 
termed “last reported” since many countries continue to revise data. The final data in this 
study are the last reported values for every year that were published in late 2003. 
For several reasons, these forecasts are tempting for a thorough analysis. First, the 
forecasting process in these institutions obviously takes into account a lot of national and 
international information and political influence cannot be fully excluded. Second, the 
sequence of these forecasts provides a good documentation of the gradual revisions of 
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the forecasts, since five semi-annual revisions for the predictions of a particular year are 
available. Third, a very special feature of this data base is the documentation of the data 
revision process that follows afterwards which can be traced over four additional 
estimates (revisions) of the data for a particular year. 
Some examples of this sequence of forecasts and data revisions are shown in Graphs 1 to 
3 on the following page for the evolution of GDP rates and inflation rates from the 
OECD data set and, for comparison, from IMF. As a first impression we observe large 
adjustments in the GDP forecasts, but much more stability in the inflation predictions.  
This data base offers the possibility to investigate 
• if there is an improvement of forecasting accuracy over the sample period and in the data 
revision process3, 
• if regularities in forecasts and data revisions can be used to adjust the preliminary data in 
order to obtain estimates that are closer to the final data and 
• if there are major differences with respect to the quality of forecasts among the G7 
countries. 
 
 
2.2  Forecast and Revision Dynamics 
Formally, we observe the evolution of the value for a variable y at time t for which 
information is available at time t-τ. We talk about  
forecasts if τ = 0, 1, 2, … 
and about 
data revisions if τ = -1, -2, … 
In the following we will treat both cases symmetrically and denote by estimate a 
particular variable y at time t based on information at t-τ by           . 
 
 
                                                 
−|
e
tty τ
3 This was extensively analysed in Glück, Schleicher and Catena (2000). No improvement in 
forecast quality could be diagnosed. 
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Graph 1.  OECD forecasts and data revisions: GDP USA 
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Graph 2.  IMF forecasts and data revisions: GDP USA 
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Graph 3.  OECD forecasts and data revisions: Consumer prices USA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OECD Forecast: Consumer Prices USA 
-2.00
-1.00
0.00
1.00
2.00
P
er
ce
nt
po
in
ts
di
ff
e
re
nc
e
to
la
st
re
po
rt
ed
1991
2001
1994
1999
 
 
 
The relationship between the last reported value of variable      and the estimate made at 
different periods τ before (forecast) or after period t (data revision)         and the 
corresponding estimation error            is  
ty e
tty τ−|
τ−tte |
(1)        =           +             ,   τ = -2, -1, 0, 1, 2. ty etty τ−| τ−tte |
 
Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Annex report the error analysis for relation (1). For rates of 
change of GDP and of consumer price deflators various vintages of estimates and last 
reported values are compared for the G7 countries, using the following country 
abbreviations: United States (USA), Japan (JPN), Germany (DEU), United Kingdom 
(GBR), France (FRA), Italy (ITA) and Canada (CAN). The rows in the tables refer to 
the dates when the corresponding estimates (predictions or data revisions) were 
published. 
The general impression we get from Tables A.1 and A.2 corresponds to what we would 
expect as to forecast errors which improve with the age of an estimate. But it may not be 
that plausible that the data revision process continues with remarkably pronounced errors 
over more than two years after the date a forecast belongs to. From the beginning of the 
forecast sequence, the precision of inflation forecasts is higher than for GDP growth.  
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As to GDP, all countries seem to have a tendency towards starting with an 
overestimation, except the USA. More details will be revealed in the error model which 
we will present below. For the United States we discover a substantial and systematic 
underestimation both during the forecast as well as the data revision period. Quite the 
reverse holds true for Japan. This country’s GDP is systematically overestimated (as 
indicated by negative average errors) in both periods. Compared to this, Germany and 
France show a very different error behavior: They start with an overestimation of the 
GDP growth rates but the errors quickly converge to zero and stay there. This means that 
both countries hardly revise their data afterwards4. Italy and the United Kingdom start 
out with overestimates in their first forecasts but keep underestimating during forecast 
and data revisions. A similar behavior is exhibited by Canada with a pronounced 
overestimation of its first forecast. 
 
 
2.3  Error Model of Dated Estimates 
Next, we investigate the relationship between dated estimates for forecasts and data 
revisions and the last reported values by specifying the following error model: 
(2)                                                   τ = -2, -1, 0, 1, 2 
 
                                                
Thus we estimate the linear relationship between the final (last reported) series      and its 
dated estimates             , covering both forecasts (if τ = 2, 1, 0) and data revisions (if τ = -
1, -2).  
We use model (2) to test the joint hypothesis that the coefficients b0 and b1 do not differ 
significantly from 0 and 1, respectively, and that there is no serial correlation in the 
errors, as is required for efficiency and unbiasedness. In addition, we would expect that 
the sequence of these regressions shows convergence both with respect to the parameters 
b0 and b1, the improvement of the overall fit (as reported by R2 ) and a lowering of serial 
correlation (indicated by the DW statistic). The results of these regressions for GDP 
forecasts are reported in Tables A.3 and A.4 in the Annex. A summary of these results 
expressed by the multiple coefficient of correlation is contained in Tables 1a and b. 
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4 It remains open if this is to be interpreted as proof of an excellent quality of the data generating 
process or rather as neglect of information coming up later. 
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Thus, the impression gained from visual inspection of Graphs 1 to 3 is confirmed by the 
error model: The forecast record for GDP growth rates is quite disappointing; the first 
two published forecasts contain hardly any relationship to the last reported values. There 
is convergence towards b0 = 0 and b1 = 1, but only very late in the revision period and 
not in the forecasting phase. 
Estimates for inflation rates, however, are much more accurate than estimates for GDP 
growth. The end-year inflation forecast two years ahead captures on average more than 
50% of the variance of the last reported data. This means that inflation forecasts contain 
more useful information that can be incorporated into monetary policy rules. Thus, in the 
following we will concentrate mainly on the GDP forecasts, as they seem to be the 
source of larger potential errors than the inflation forecasts. 
 
Table 1a.  Error analysis for dated estimates of GDP 
R2Date of estimate 
USA JPN DEU GBR FRA ITA CAN 
2 ys. ahead (end) 0.000 0.012 0.050 0.108 0.287 0.100 0.185 
1 y. ahead (mid) 0.191 0.071 0.000 0.068 0.035 0.000 0.110 
1y. ahead (end) 0.587 0.584 0.428 0.408 0.516 0.416 0.423 
Current year (mid) 0.804 0.779 0.769 0.853 0.747 0.627 0.734 
Current year (end) 0.883 0.920 0.898 0.871 0.929 0.821 0.837 
1 y. after (mid) 0.900 0.954 0.915 0.909 0.908 0.889 0.905 
1 y. after (end) 0.947 0.950 0.919 0.919 0.936 0.898 0.914 
2 ys. after (mid) 0.947 0.956 0.914 0.918 0.945 0.883 0.923 
 
Source: Calculated from OECD Economic Outlook. 
 
 
 
Table 1b.  Error analysis for dated estimates of consumer prices 
R2Date of estimate 
USA JPN DEU GBR FRA ITA CAN 
2 ys. ahead (end) 0.525 0.731 0.707 0.711 0.579 0.575 0.683 
1 y. ahead (mid) 0.780 0.750 0.537 0.649 0.930 0.941 0.894 
1y. ahead (end) 0.850 0.865 0.760 0.884 0.956 0.939 0.936 
Current year (mid) 0.987 0.931 0.915 0.906 0.984 0.983 0.962 
Current year (end) 0.980 0.929 0.943 0.960 0.992 0.992 0.985 
1 y. after (mid) 0.979 0.947 0.940 0.976 0.995 0.992 0.983 
1 y. after (end) 0.977 0.945 0.936 0.981 0.994 0.994 0.982 
2 ys. after (mid) 0.977 0.940 0.938 0.983 0.994 0.995 0.981 
 
Source: Calculated from OECD Economic Outlook. 
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We conclude that since all estimates of one-year ahead forecast produced at the end of 
the preceding year show a significant relationship between estimated data and last 
reported data, this fact can be exploited for improving both the dated forecasts and the 
data revisions in order to obtain combined estimates that come closer to the final series. 
This will be done in the next section. 
 
 
 
3  Overcoming Real-Time Data Problems                        
in the Case of Taylor Rules 
 
Given these data problems, a policymaker faces two options: 
• to apply parameter values of instrument rules which are estimated from real-time data, or 
• to correct real-time data for the known deficiencies like forecasting and revision errors 
and - if they can be identified - structural breaks and to re-estimate parameter values of 
instrument rules accordingly. 
 
In this section we first evaluate the extent of parameter uncertainty caused by real-time 
issues in the case of Taylor rules and then develop operational procedures for 
overcoming the problem of dated information. 
 
 
3.1  The Impact of Dated Information                                              
on the Parameters of Taylor Rules 
If characterised by simple instrument rules, to what extent does central bank behaviour 
seem different if observed in real-time situations or, alternatively, if extracted from an 
ex-post information set? Or, put differently, how would policy reactions change if 
parameter values gained from last reported data were applied instead of those from real-
time data? 
In order to investigate this, we estimate Taylor rules using forecast values as arguments. 
Thus, we regress the short-term interest rate of the current period on the forecasts made a 
certain time span ahead. As indicated, however, GDP forecasts over horizons of more 
than one year are of no predictive value; therefore, we estimate Taylor rules based on 
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one-year-ahead forecasts for GDP and inflation. In addition, we apply interest-rate 
smoothing by including the lagged interest rate, i.e. we regress 
 
 
(3)   
with          being the inflation rate for year t forecast at time t-1,          being the forecast 
output gap for the next year (defined as the difference between smoothed GDP growth as 
a measure for potential GDP growth and forecast GDP growth). We use equation (3) to 
generate a forecast for the short-term interest rate          in period t by using the forecasts 
for GDP and inflation available in period (t-1) for period t 5.  
The results6 of this analysis are summarized in Table 2a. It indicates that for all G7 
countries current year’s short-run interest rates are significantly related to inflation 
forecasts made at the end of the preceding year. The size of the estimated coefficients 
varies between 0.4 and 1.4. The impact of the same dated predictions for GDP gap on 
short-run interest rates is much weaker and only significant for Japan and United 
Kingdom. 
 
Table 2a.  Historical evidence of Taylor rules estimated 
                with end-year forecasts one year ahead 
Inflation GDP gap Lagged dep. var. Constant Country 
a1 t1 a2 t2 a3 t3 a4 t4
R2 DW 
USA 0.973 4.07 -0.377 1.33 0.406 2.66 0.697 0.82 0.847 0.97 
Japan 0.796 4.79 -0.580 2.40 0.541 4.83 1.522 2.56 0.895 2.07 
Germany 1.394 3.07 -0.302 0.88 0.321 1.45 0.676 0.67 0.709 1.45 
United Kingdom 0.789 4.19 -1.078 2.90 0.604 3.75 -0.060 0.04 0.817 1.03 
France 0.358 3.04 -0.102 0.24 0.656 4.07 1.229 1.17 0.870 1.72 
Italy 0.520 3.83 -0.399 0.98 0.625 5.58 0.956 0.94 0.915 1.87 
Canada 1.250 3.37 -0.111 0.19 -0.057 0.17 3.665 1.97 0.742 1.44 
 
Source: Own calculations based on data from OECD Economic Outlook, 1980-2001. 
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5 Given the high error in GDP forecasts, we do not invest more sophistication into the calculation 
of the output gap. 
6 Results for the countries participating in the EMU may be slightly distorted by the fact that they 
followed a common monetary policy as of 1999. 
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Table 2b.  Historical evidence of Taylor rules estimated with last reported values 
Inflation GDP gap Lagged dep. var. Constant 
Country 
a1 t1 a2 t2 a3 t3 a4 t4
R2 DW 
USA 0.874 7.42 -0.417 3.34 0.514 5.95 0.278 0.52 0.930 1.76 
Japan 0.875 4.67 -0.380 2.26 0.481 3.83 1.548 2.88 0.883 2.28 
Germany 0.949 5.02 -0.551 2.86 0.500 3.75 0.993 1.46 0.826 1.64 
United Kingdom 0.610 4.81 -0.310 1.30 0.457 3.35 1.834 1.51 0.841 1.38 
France 0.368 4.07 -0.146 0.53 0.649 5.32 1.210 1.46 0.895 1.63 
Italy 0.362 5.07 -0.700 0.24 0.667 6.84 0.709 0.80 0.928 1.97 
Canada 0.912 3.77 -0.132 0.44 0.229 0.85 2.650 1.64 0.782 1.74 
 
Source: Own calculations based on data from OECD Economic Outlook, 1980-2001. 
 
 
 
For comparison, the estimation results for the same Taylor rule specification, but with 
last reported values, are contained in Table 2b. We recognize that the significance of the 
inflation rate increases. As to the GDP gap, in contrast to the estimates based on 
predictions, the United States and Germany now show significant impacts, but the 
United Kingdom does not any more.  
Compared to the final data rules, as reported in Table 2b, we recognize that in the real-
time data rules of Table 2a the reaction to the inflation rate in most cases is somewhat 
stronger (though the difference is not always statistically significant), whereas for the 
real-time output gap the significance is reduced. The coefficients on the lagged interest 
rates suggest that the desire to keep the interest rate stable seems somewhat stronger than 
in the final data case. 
These results seem to point in the direction that central banks in real-time react more 
actively to deviations in inflation from their targets than rules estimated over final data 
would suggest, whereas the reaction to deviations in output in most cases seems less 
significant than for final data. 
Thus, it is confirmed that parameters of estimated Taylor rules are rather sensitive with 
respect to dated sample information. In addition, our investigations showed that there is 
evidence from CUSUM tests of structural changes. 
 265 
3.2  Some Proposals to Handle Dated Information 
What can be done? We are proposing a procedure which attempts to deal with a real-time 
policy decision environment that takes into account both the aspect of dated sample 
information and possible structural changes in the policy reaction behaviour. 
As to the problem of dated sample information, we propose two types of sample 
strategies: 
• The unadjusted sample only deals with last reported values but neglects the most recent 
four values because of the evidence of major data revisions. 
• The adjusted sample also deals with last reported values but replaces the most recent 
four values by estimates from the measurement error model. This means that the 
preliminary values for these values are replaced by bias-corrected values. 
As far as structural changes are concerned, we also employ two types of sample 
strategies: 
• Expanding samples start with a first sample 1980-1990 and expand in annual increments 
to the final sample 1980-2000.  
• Moving samples start with a first sample 1980-1990 and move in annual increments with 
11 years sample sizes to the final sample 1990-2000. 
For both types of samples, based on the estimated parameters, the one-period outside 
sample forecast for the short-term interest rate from 1991 to 2001 is estimated.  
Thus we design four types of real-time simulations in which we apply the information 
sets that could have been used by policymakers when calculating adequate policy 
reactions for short-term interest rates from 1991 to 2001. The policy errors resulting 
from not using these corrected data, measured in means, variance and mean square errors 
(MSE) of the short-term interest rate are reported in Tables 3a and b. 
The results seem to be quite revealing: In the case of expanding samples as reported in 
Table 3a, e.g. for the United States, interest rates were set too low over the period under 
consideration by about 30 basis points on average in the unadjusted sample. Adjusting 
the sample leads to a reduction of the policy error to about 8 basis points, though the 
variance increases. 
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In the case of moving samples as reported in Table 3b, we observe again a reduction of 
the short-term interest rate policy error from an underestimation of 84 basis points to an 
overestimation of 46 basis points, but a substantial reduction in variance that also 
reduces the mean square error.  
With only two exceptions (USA and Italy) out of 14 simulations, instead of using 
unadjusted samples the switch to adjusted samples substantially improves the 
performance as reflected in the decline of the mean square error.  
Switching to moving samples improves in eight out of 14 simulations the forecast 
performance. The reason for this improvement seems to be the handling of structural 
changes by moving fixed size samples instead of increasing samples. 
 
Table 3a.  Real-time simulation of Taylor rules using expanding samples 
                estimated with dated data values 
Unadjusted Sample Adjusted Sample  
Mean Variance MSE Mean Variance MSE 
USA 0.330 1.065 1.174 0.080 3.300 3.306 
Japan -1.780 4.283 7.451 -1.097 1.527 2.730 
Germany -0.067 2.865 2.869 -0.615 1.060 1.438 
United Kingdom -2.392 6.674 12.396 -1.138 2.811 4.106 
France -0.841 4.816 5.523 -0.819 2.066 2.737 
Italy -1.491 3.455 5.678 -0.888 3.113 3.902 
Canada -0.987 3.672 4.646 -1.472 1.503 3.670 
 
Source: Own calculations based on data from OECD Economic Outlook, sample starts 1980 and expands from 1991 to
2001. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3b.  Real-time simulation of Taylor rules using moving samples 
                estimated with dated data values 
Unadjusted Sample Adjusted Sample  
Mean Variance MSE Mean Variance MSE 
USA 0.843 5.703 6.414 -0.458 2.965 3.175 
Japan 0.730 1.482 2.015 -0.526 1.111 1.388 
Germany 0.574 2.087 2.416 -0.603 0.536 0.900 
United Kingdom -0.559 8.516 8.828 0.022 7.422 7.422 
France 0.239 7.898 7.955 -0.840 2.619 3.325 
Italy -1.398 3.059 5.013 -1.243 3.817 5.362 
Canada -0.406 9.827 9.992 -0.622 4.424 4.811 
 
Source: Own calculations based on data from OECD Economic Ou look, moving 11 year sample start with1980-1990 
and move to 1991–2001. 
 t
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Evidently, what might be regarded as the optimal strategy for handling these data 
problems, differs among countries. Therefore, we performed on the OECD data set a 
ranking of the four different sampling strategies for dealing with dated information in the 
context of Taylor-rule-based interest rate decisions. This ranking, using the mean square 
error as criterion, is shown in Table 4. 
Table 4.  Ranking of sampling strategies 
Ranking  
1 2 3 4 
USA unadjusted expanding 
adjusted 
moving 
adjusted 
expanding 
unadjusted 
moving 
Japan adjusted moving 
unadjusted 
moving 
adjusted 
expanding 
unadjusted 
expanding 
Germany adjusted moving 
adjusted 
expanding 
unadjusted 
moving 
unadjusted 
expanding 
United Kingdom adjusted expanding 
adjusted 
moving 
unadjusted 
moving 
unadjusted 
expanding 
France adjusted expanding 
adjusted 
moving 
unadjusted 
expanding 
unadjusted 
moving 
Italy adjusted expanding 
unadjusted 
moving 
adjusted 
moving 
unadjusted 
expanding 
Canada adjusted expanding 
adjusted 
moving 
unadjusted 
expanding 
unadjusted 
moving 
 
Source: Own calculations based on data from OECD Economic Outlook. 
Data are “adjusted” if they are modified according to the estimated error model, otherwise they are “unadjusted”. 
Samples are “expanding” if the sample size increases or “moving” if the sample size is kept constant. 
 
 
 
4  Conclusions 
We started from the general assertion that a useful monetary policy design should be 
founded on more realistic assumptions about what policymakers can know at the time 
when policy decisions have to be made.  
Applied to simple instrument rules – if they are to be used as an operational and forward-
looking device -, we analyze the reliability of the input information for such rules. We 
use OECD forecasts for inflation and GDP growth rates and investigate the forecasting 
performance for these variables. We diagnose a much better forecasting record for 
inflation rates compared to GDP growth rates, which for most countries are almost 
uninformative at the time a Taylor rule should sensibly be applied. Using this data set, 
we find clear differences between Taylor rules if estimated over revised ex-post data or 
over real-time data, and there is evidence that monetary policy seems to react more 
actively in real time than rules estimated over revised data suggest. 
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Since the OECD forecasts for GDP growth rates exhibit systematic errors, in a next step 
we attempted to correct for these forecast biases and checked to which extent this can 
lower the errors in interest rate policy setting. An ex-ante simulation for the years 1991 
to 2001 supports the proposal that correcting for forecast errors and biases based on an 
error model can lower the resulting policy error in interest rate setting for most countries 
under consideration. In addition, we investigate to what extent structural changes in the 
policy reaction behaviour can be handled with moving instead of expanding samples. 
Generally, our analysis supports critics and sceptics of the Taylor rule who argue that a 
mechanical application of this rule will not be appropriate and should at least be 
accompanied by a careful examination of a broad set of additional information (as is 
done, of course, in practice by most central banks). 
Svensson (2003) presented a long list of what may be wrong with the Taylor rule. Our 
results additionally point out the fact that the informational basis – when applying such a 
rule, for instance, in the case of inflation targeting - needs careful examination. Limited 
forecast quality and significant data revisions recommend a more sophisticated handling 
of the dated information for which we present an operational procedure that has the 
potential of reducing the risk of severe policy errors. 
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Annex 
 
 
 
 
Table A.1  Error analysis of GDP 
Means of errors of estimates 
2 y. ahead 1 year ahead current year 1 year after 2 years after 
 
end mid end mid end mid end mid end 
USA 0.32 0.35 0.41 0.27 0.38 0.34 0.34 0.36 0.32 
JPN -0.71 -0.25 -0.36 -0.07 -0.15 -0.30 -0.30 -0.35 0.04 
DEU -0.76 -0.60 -0.10 0.06 0.07 0.04 -0.03 -0.04 0.05 
FRA -0.72 -0.36 -0.14 -0.09 0.09 0.04 -0.01 -0.03 0.13 
ITA -0.73 -0.49 0.13 0.28 0.53 0.44 0.49 0.49 0.08 
GBR -0.15 0.36 0.28 0.60 0.61 0.55 0.41 0.36 0.21 
CAN -0.65 -0.44 0.11 0.23 0.47 0.40 0.39 0.36  
 
 
 
Table A.1  continued 
Root mean square of errors of estimates 
2 y. ahead 1 year ahead current year 1 year after 2 years after 
 
end mid end mid end mid end mid end 
USA 1.58 1.69 1.37 1.01 0.86 0.79 0.64 0.64 0.55 
JPN 2.12 1.98 2.24 1.69 1.21 1.08 1.12 0.96 0.66 
DEU 1.92 1.73 1.52 0.99 0.79 0.67 0.68 0.69 0.37 
FRA 1.77 1.54 1.22 1.00 0.75 0.63 0.53 0.51 0.40 
ITA 1.50 1.38 1.77 1.36 1.08 0.84 0.85 0.91 0.24 
GBR 1.30 1.43 1.49 0.94 0.93 0.80 0.68 0.66 0.47 
CAN 1.86 2.12 1.58 1.10 1.01 0.77 0.74 0.70  
 
 
 
Table A.1  continued 
Standard deviation of errors of estimates 
2 y. ahead 1 year ahead current year 1 year after 2 years after 
 
end mid end mid end mid end mid end 
USA 1.60 1.62 1.47 0.85 0.77 0.70 0.49 0.48 0.47 
JPN 2.06 1.93 1.34 0.74 0.99 0.76 0.76 0.59 0.59 
DEU 1.82 1.73 1.41 0.91 0.72 0.57 0.55 0.54 0.48 
FRA 1.67 1.60 1.15 0.72 0.57 0.48 0.50 0.46 0.44 
ITA 1.27 1.22 0.84 0.67 0.47 0.26 0.27 0.23 0.23 
GBR 1.33 1.26 1.14 0.79 0.54 0.39 0.38 0.39 0.40 
CAN 1.79 1.87 1.76 1.19 0.74 0.58 0.48 0.48  
 
 
 
 
 272 
Table A.2  Error analysis of consumer prices 
Means of errors of estimates 
2 y. ahead 1 year ahead current year 1 year after 2 years after 
 
end mid end mid end mid end mid end 
USA -0.55 -0.63 -0.28 -0.07 0.03 0.09 0.01 -0.03 -0.10 
JPN -0.53 -0.63 -0.36 -0.21 -0.06 0.03 0.01 0.02 -0.02 
DEU -0.12 -0.24 -0.09 -0.11 -0.13 -0.12 -0.09 -0.09 -0.15 
FRA 0.00 -0.01 0.14 0.04 0.06 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.20 
ITA 0.88 0.64 0.92 0.40 0.31 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.21 
GBR 0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.15 0.45 0.44 0.40 0.44 0.34 
CAN -0.40 -0.34 -0.10 -0.07 0.09 0.12 0.09 0.09  
 
 
 
Table A.2  continued 
Root mean square of errors of estimates 
2 y. ahead 1 year ahead current year 1 year after 2 years after 
 
end mid end mid end mid end mid end 
USA 1.01 1.01 1.01 0.31 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.38 
JPN 0.92 1.12 0.96 0.77 0.71 0.63 0.63 0.57 0.59 
DEU 0.80 1.01 0.91 0.60 0.54 0.48 0.48 0.40 0.41 
FRA 0.62 0.80 0.87 0.51 0.36 0.38 0.39 0.53 0.30 
ITA 1.45 1.16 1.67 0.84 0.58 0.47 0.48 0.42 0.35 
GBR 1.33 1.27 1.28 1.19 0.88 0.79 0.69 0.69 0.63 
CAN 1.23 1.12 1.02 0.84 0.67 0.57 0.58 0.44  
 
 
 
Table A.2  continued 
Standard deviation of errors of estimates 
2 y. ahead 1 year ahead current year 1 year after 2 years after 
 
end mid end mid end mid end mid end 
USA 0.88 0.60 0.83 0.31 0.30 0.26 0.23 0.26 0.31 
JPN 0.70 0.79 0.80 0.63 0.51 0.51 0.50 0.52 0.52 
DEU 0.58 0.64 0.58 0.38 0.37 0.42 0.44 0.43 0.43 
FRA 0.65 0.55 0.54 0.32 0.32 0.25 0.27 0.21 0.19 
ITA 1.19 1.01 0.92 0.36 0.42 0.30 0.31 0.24 0.26 
GBR 1.38 1.37 0.97 1.13 0.88 0.79 0.66 0.64 0.64 
CAN 0.81 0.51 0.53 0.44 0.36 0.33 0.30 0.30  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 273 
Table A.3  Error model for GDP 
USA GDP 
Estimated variable Constant Date of estimate 
b1 t1 b0 t0
R2 DW 
2 ys. ahead (end) -0.03 0.1 3.00 2.1 0.000 1.48 
1 y. ahead (mid) 1.05 2.2 0.21 0.2 0.191 1.36 
1y. ahead (end) 0.89 7.2 0.71 1.8 0.587 1.94 
Current year (mid) 0.83 12.0 0.75 3.1 0.804 1.78 
Current year (end) 0.85 16.3 0.78 4.3 0.883 1.74 
1 y. after (mid) 0.87 17.5 0.69 4.0 0.900 1.48 
1 y. after (end) 0.87 24.5 0.67 5.3 0.947 1.69 
2 ys. after (mid) 0.89 24.3 0.65 5.0 0.947 1.74 
 
 
 
Table A.3  continued 
JAPAN GDP 
Estimated variable Constant Date of estimate 
b1 t1 b0 t0
R2 DW 
2 ys. ahead (end) 0.17 0.4 1.44 1.3 0.012 1.03 
1 y. ahead (mid) 0.41 1.3 1.37 1.4 0.071 1.09 
1y. ahead (end) 0.83 7.1 0.39 0.6 0.584 1.78 
Current year (mid) 0.83 11.1 0.63 1.6 0.779 1.87 
Current year (end) 0.81 20.1 0.64 2.8 0.920 1.70 
1 y. after (mid) 0.82 26.5 0.51 2.8 0.954 1.95 
1 y. after (end) 0.81 25.5 0.53 2.8 0.950 1.91 
2 ys. after (mid) 0.86 26.8 0.30 1.6 0.956 1.93 
 
 
 
 
Table A.3  continued 
GERMANY GDP 
Estimated variable Constant Date of estimate 
b1 t1 b0 t0
R2 DW 
2 ys. ahead (end) -0.78 0.9 3.89 1.6 0.050 1.26 
1 y. ahead (mid) -0.06 0.1 2.02 1.2 0.000 1.05 
1y. ahead (end) 1.00 5.2 -0.09 0.5 0.428 1.64 
Current year (mid) 0.88 10.7 0.33 1.4 0.769 1.94 
Current year (end) 0.81 17.2 0.48 3.1 0.898 1.98 
1 y. after (mid) 0.85 19.1 0.38 2.6 0.915 1.80 
1 y. after (end) 0.84 19.5 0.35 2.5 0.919 1.71 
2 ys. after (mid) 0.83 18.8 0.38 2.5 0.914 1.64 
 
 
 
 
Table A.3  continued 
UNITED KINGDOM GDP 
Estimated variable Constant Date of estimate 
b1 t1 b0 t0
R2 DW 
2 ys. ahead (end) 0.93 1.3 0.01 0.0 0.108 1.22 
1 y. ahead (mid) 0.59 1.2 1.28 1.1 0.068 0.86 
1y. ahead (end) 0.82 5.0 0.67 1.6 0.408 1.45 
Current year (mid) 1.04 14.3 0.53 3.0 0.853 1.84 
Current year (end) 0.93 15.3 0.74 4.7 0.871 1.83 
1 y. after (mid) 1.03 18.4 0.50 3.5 0.909 2.57 
1 y. after (end) 1.02 19.7 0.36 2.6 0.919 2.96 
2 ys. after (mid) 1.01 19.2 0.34 2.4 0.918 3.17 
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Table A.3  continued 
FRANCE GDP 
Estimated variable Constant Date of estimate 
b1 t1 b0 t0
R2 DW 
2 ys. ahead (end) -1.78 2.5 6.67 3.4 0.287 1.14 
1 y. ahead (mid) -0.38 0.8 2.95 2.6 0.035 0.93 
1y. ahead (end) 0.85 6.2 0.29 0.7 0.516 1.50 
Current year (mid) 0.75 10.2 0.60 2.4 0.747 1.25 
Current year (end) 0.86 21.1 0.38 2.8 0.929 1.21 
1 y. after (mid) 0.81 18.3 0.55 3.6 0.908 1.45 
1 y. after (end) 0.80 15.0 0.60 3.4 0.936 1.22 
2 ys. after (mid) 0.85 22.8 0.37 2.8 0.945 0.91 
2 ys. after (end) 0.93 10.1 0.26 1.3 0.879 1.12 
 
 
 
Table A.3  continued 
ITALY GDP 
Estimated variable Constant Date of estimate 
b1 t1 b0 t0
R2 DW 
2 ys. ahead (end) -1.06 1.3 4.46 2.2 0.100 1.21 
1 y. ahead (mid) -0.02 0.1 1.88 2.0 0.000 1.16 
1y. ahead (end) 0.69 5.1 0.95 2.1 0.416 1.42 
Current year (mid) 0.88 7.7 0.57 1.6 0.627 1.74 
Current year (end) 0.88 12.7 0.76 3.5 0.821 1.61 
1 y. after (mid) 0.97 16.5 0.49 2.6 0.889 1.12 
1 y. after (end) 0.95 17.3 0.58 3.3 0.898 1.20 
2 ys. after (mid) 0.89 15.8 0.75 4.0 0.883 1.39 
 
 
 
Table A.3  continued 
CANADA GDP 
Estimated variable Constant Date of estimate 
b1 t1 b0 t0
R2 DW 
2 ys. ahead (end) 1.23 1.8 -1.39 0.6 0.185 1.22 
1 y. ahead (mid) 0.92 1.6 -0.18 0.1 0.110 1.24 
1y. ahead (end) 1.10 5.1 -0.21 0.3 0.423 2.09 
Current year (mid) 1.03 9.8 0.12 0.3 0.734 1.75 
Current year (end) 0.87 13.4 0.84 3.6 0.837 1.38 
1 y. after (mid) 0.93 18.0 0.60 3.2 0.905 1.31 
1 y. after (end) 0.94 19.0 0.58 3.2 0.914 1.34 
2 ys. after (mid) 0.94 19.9 0.55 3.1 0.923 1.32 
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Table A.4  Error model for consumer prices 
USA Consumer Prices 
Estimated variable Constant Date of estimate 
b1 t1 b0 t0
R2 DW 
2 ys. ahead (end) 0.65 3.9 0.47 0.9 0.525 1.25 
1 y. ahead (mid) 0.67 8.6 0.51 1.7 0.780 1.65 
1y. ahead (end) 0.93 11.7 -0.03 0.1 0.850 1.21 
Current year (mid) 1.02 41.9 -0.16 1.5 0.987 1.63 
Current year (end) 1.02 34.1 -0.07 0.5 0.980 1.48 
1 y. after (mid) 1.06 33.2 -0.10 0.7 0.979 1.27 
1 y. after (end) 1.06 32.2 -0.20 1.3 0.977 1.32 
2 ys. after (mid) 1.06 31.3 -0.25 1.6 0.977 1.57 
 
 
 
Table A.4  continued 
JAPAN Consumer Prices 
Estimated variable Constant Date of estimate 
b1 t1 b0 t0
R2 DW 
2 ys. ahead (end) 0.89 6.2 -0.46 2.3 0.731 1.20 
1 y. ahead (mid) 0.74 8.0 -0.30 1.6 0.750 2.19 
1y. ahead (end) 0.91 12.4 -0.23 1.2 0.865 2.82 
Current year (mid) 0.94 18.0 -0.13 0.9 0.931 1.96 
Current year (end) 1.07 17.7 -0.14 1.0 0.929 1.52 
1 y. after (mid) 0.99 20.7 0.32 0.2 0.947 1.56 
1 y. after (end) 1.04 20.4 -0.01 0.8 0.945 1.64 
2 ys. after (mid) 1.02 19.0 0.01 0.1 0.940 1.68 
 
 
 
Table A.4  continued 
GERMANY Consumer Prices 
Estimated variable Constant Date of estimate 
b1 t1 b0 t0
R2 DW 
2 ys. ahead (end) 1.03 5.8 -0.20 0.5 0.707 1.72 
1 y. ahead (mid) 0.91 4.9 -0.06 0.1 0.537 1.52 
1y. ahead (end) 1.19 8.9 -0.57 1.5 0.760 1.53 
Current year (mid) 1.10 16.1 -0.37 1.9 0.915 1.72 
Current year (end) 1.00 19.9 -0.14 0.9 0.943 1.94 
1 y. after (mid) 0.98 19.3 -0.11 0.7 0.940 1.89 
1 y. after (end) 0.97 18.7 -0.03 0.2 0.936 1.72 
2 ys. after (mid) 0.97 18.7 -0.05 0.3 0.938 1.67 
 
 
 
Table A.4  continued 
UNITED KINGDOM Consumer Prices 
Estimated variable Constant Date of estimate 
b1 t1 b0 t0
R2 DW 
2 ys. ahead (end) 1.65 5.9 -2.12 2.2 0.711 1.68 
1 y. ahead (mid) 0.92 6.2 0.31 0.5 0.649 0.78 
1y. ahead (end) 1.06 13.5 -0.33 0.7 0.884 1.06 
Current year (mid) 0.92 15.2 0.52 1.3 0.906 1.66 
Current year (end) 1.03 24.1 0.29 1.1 0.960 1.28 
1 y. after (mid) 1.02 31.1 0.30 1.4 0.976 1.77 
1 y. after (end) 0.99 35.0 0.41 2.2 0.981 1.93 
2 ys. after (mid) 0.99 36.3 0.47 2.5 0.983 1.47 
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Table A.4  continued 
FRANCE Consumer Prices 
Estimated variable Constant Date of estimate 
b1 t1 b0 t0
R2 DW 
2 ys. ahead (end) 1.23 4.4 -0.44 0.8 0.579 1.17 
1 y. ahead (mid) 0.91 16.7 0.28 1.2 0.930 2.31 
1y. ahead (end) 1.04 22.8 -0.58 0.2 0.956 1.98 
Current year (mid) 0.98 39.0 0.12 0.8 0.984 2.41 
Current year (end) 0.99 55.7 0.79 0.7 0.992 1.69 
1 y. after (mid) 0.99 0.2 0.24 2.6 0.995 1.82 
1 y. after (end) 1.01 62.5 0.12 1.2 0.994 1.23 
2 ys. after (mid) 1.01 64.1 0.12 1.2 0.994 1.31 
 
 
 
Table A.4  continued 
ITALY Consumer Prices 
Estimated variable Constant Date of estimate 
b1 t1 b0 t0
R2 DW 
2 ys. ahead (end) 0.94 4.4 1.09 1.4 0.575 1.48 
1 y. ahead (mid) 0.94 18.3 0.96 2.8 0.941 2.33 
1y. ahead (end) 1.09 19.2 0.37 0.8 0.939 0.86 
Current year (mid) 0.96 37.0 0.69 2.9 0.983 2.52 
Current year (end) 0.98 54.6 0.45 2.7 0.992 1.72 
1 y. after (mid) 0.98 53.0 0.30 1.6 0.992 1.58 
1 y. after (end) 0.99 63.5 0.21 1.3 0.994 1.74 
2 ys. after (mid) 0.99 71.3 0.22 1.6 0.995 2.08 
 
 
 
Table A.4  continued 
CANADA Consumer Prices 
Estimated variable Constant Date of estimate 
b1 t1 b0 t0
R2 DW 
2 ys. ahead (end) 0.69 5.5 0.40 1.1 0.683 1.26 
1 y. ahead (mid) 0.83 13.3 0.24 0.9 0.894 1.45 
1y. ahead (end) 1.04 18.7 -0.24 0.9 0.936 1.20 
Current year (mid) 0.98 24.7 0.52 0.3 0.962 1.68 
Current year (end) 0.97 39.7 0.20 1.6 0.985 2.18 
1 y. after (mid) 0.96 37.0 0.34 2.4 0.983 1.78 
1 y. after (end) 0.95 35.7 0.38 2.7 0.982 1.60 
2 ys. after (mid) 0.95 34.7 0.38 2.5 0.981 1.51 
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1  Introduction 
The theme of this session is broad enough to cover almost any topic in international 
macroeconomics of central and eastern European economies. This makes it impossible 
even to attempt to summarise the recent literature and policy developments in the area. 
So rather than embarking on a tour d’horizon, this contribution will take a closer look at 
only two sectors on the horizon: recent trends in global financial markets, and policy 
challenges arising from increased capital flows to central and eastern Europe.  
As it turns out, increased capital flows are currently challenging policy makers in 
emerging market economies worldwide. A combination of strong global growth, low 
inflation and historically low interest rates has led to a significant increase in financial 
flows towards emerging markets. Although important, low returns on financial assets in 
industrial countries and ample liquidity in global financial markets are not the only 
forces underlying this shift. Many developing countries have pursued sound 
macroeconomic policies and implemented major structural reforms over the past decade, 
attracting large direct and portfolio investments in the process. Moreover, institutional 
                                                 
* Dubravko Mihaljek, Bank for International Settlements, Basel, Switzerland.  
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investors from industrial countries seem to be changing their investment behaviour, with 
pension funds increasingly diversifying their assets towards emerging markets on a more 
permanent basis. These developments suggest that large capital flows might become a 
permanent feature of the policy environment in countries such as Croatia. The accession 
to the European Union and the requirement to liberalise capital flows – not least with 
respect to non-residents’ investment in the real estate sector – further highlight the need 
for a thorough analysis of issues in this area. 
Against this background, Section 2 traces in more detail the return of private capital 
flows to the emerging markets since 2000, and discusses some findings on the 
determinants and sustainability of recent capital inflows. Section 3 turns to challenges 
that capital flows pose for macroeconomic policies in EU accession countries. It 
discusses possible macroeconomic effects of capital flows in the run-up to the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) and examines different options for monetary and exchange rate 
policies. It also looks at empirical evidence on capital flows to the region and the 
countries in southern Europe that already joined EMU. It is shown that countries in 
central and eastern Europe have already been exposed to sizeable capital flows over the 
past decade without experiencing major instability. It is further argued that conditions 
prevailing currently in most accession countries are perhaps less conducive to 
speculative inflows than was the case prior to the accession of Greece, Italy, Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain. Inflation rates and interest rates have, with few exceptions, 
converged significantly during the past few years. Similarly, country risk premia have 
also come down markedly, so the remaining scope for volatile capital flows might be 
smaller than in the past. 
 
 
2  Recent Trends in Global Capital Markets 
Net private capital flows to the emerging market economies were estimated at about 
$174 billion in 2003 (Table 1), the highest level recorded since the peak of nearly $200 
billion in 1996.1 Both portfolio flows (equities and bonds) and other flows (commercial 
bank and other loans) were significantly higher than in 2002. Foreign direct investment 
(FDI), however, continued to decline, its share in total flows falling below 50% from 
over 70% on average during the 1990s. Asian economies attracted the bulk of the inflows 
last year, with China alone absorbing 60% of FDI in all emerging markets (close to 90% 
                                                 
1 This section updates and extends parts of Chapter 3 of BIS (2004).  
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of FDI flows to Asia). Brazil, China, India and Korea were important destinations for 
portfolio inflows, while countries in Latin America and central and eastern Europe 
(CEE) benefited from resumption in loan flows. 
Recent data confirm that private capital flows to the emerging markets have remained 
strong in 2004. Gross issuance of emerging market bonds in international markets 
reached $330 billion by mid-October, $11 billion higher than for the whole of 2003. 
There has also been a revival in FDI inflows, which are projected to increase by about 
10% this year after several years of decline, according to the latest World Economic 
Outlook (IMF, 2004). Central and eastern European countries have continued to attract 
large commercial bank inflows. 
A notable recent development in international bond markets has been increased issuance 
by debtors with sub-investment grade ratings, including corporations, financial 
institutions and local governments from Russia, Turkey and Ukraine, and governments 
of many central and south American countries. This development reflects favourable 
financing conditions in global capital markets on the one hand, and large current account 
surpluses in many oil- and commodity-exporting countries on the other. The EMBI 
Global index has narrowed by 170 basis points over the past six months, approaching in 
early November the record low spreads of 370 points observed in January 2004. The 
compression of spreads was particularly marked for Brazilian, Czech, Hungarian, 
Russian and Turkish bonds. Many sovereign issuers have as a result pre-financed part of 
their external financing needs for 2005. 
In net terms, aggregate flows to the emerging market economies are nevertheless 
projected to be smaller in 2004 than the previous year. However, this is the case not 
because of lower gross inflows, but because many emerging economies are using the 
“window of opportunity” in international financial markets to repay outstanding debt, 
and thus reduce the overall debt burden before the external financing conditions become 
more difficult. 
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 Table 1.  Net private capital flows to emerging market economies 
              in billions of US dollars 
 Annual average
1990–2000 
2001 2002 20031
Emerging market economies2
 Total flows 109 72 74 174 
  Direct investment 79 125 106 81 
  Portfolio investment3 45 –11 –28 34 
  Other private flows4 –15 –42 –4 61 
 Memo: Current account balance –30 37 97 133 
            Change in reserves5 –48 –88 –175 –280 
Asia6
 Total flows 35 31 41 111 
  Direct investment 35 42 47 45 
  Portfolio investment3 12 –12 –18 36 
  Other private flows4 –12 1 12 30 
 Memo: Current account balance 14 66 99 123 
            Change in reserves5 –37 –82 –151 –215 
Latin America7
 Total flows 62 36 –3 16 
  Direct investment 34 59 34 24 
  Portfolio investment3 30 1 –13 –5 
  Other private flows4 –2 –24 –24 –1 
 Memo: Current account balance –39 –47 –8 9 
            Change in reserves5 –11 3 0 –27 
CEE8
 Total flows 12 5 36 47 
  Direct investment 10 24 25 12 
  Portfolio investment3 3 1 3 3 
  Other private flows4 –1 –19 8 32 
 Memo: Current account balance –5 18 6 1 
  Excluding Russia  –14 –16 –23 –35 
            Change in reserves5 0 –9 –24 –38 
Notes: 1Estimates of capital flows based on national balance of payments data and Institute of International Finance. 
 
 
. 
2Comprises the economies in Asia, Latin America and CEE listed below and South Africa. 3Debt and equity assets and
liabilities. 4Includes net flows intermediated by commercial banks and other private sector agents (not including 
financial derivatives). 5A negative value indicates an increase in reserves. 6China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, Taiwan and Thailand. 7Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. 8Bulgaria, the
Czech Republic, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Turkey. 
Sources: Central banks; IMF; Institute of International Finance
 
 
 
 
The return of capital inflows over the past few years has been accompanied by a 
widening of current account surpluses in Asia, a reversal of the large deficits in Latin 
America, and smaller surpluses in central and eastern Europe (Table 1). In 2003, for 
instance, the three key emerging market regions all recorded aggregate current account 
surpluses. One should note, however, that the current account surplus of the CEE region 
is entirely due to Russia: without Russia, the region is running large and rapidly rising 
 284 
current account deficits, reaching $35 billion in 2003 and projected to increase to $43 
billion in the latest Consensus Forecasts (Table 1).  
Against this background, it is interesting to note how quickly the external positions of 
countries in the region have changed. The paper prepared for this session by Buturac, 
Lovrinčević and Teodorović (2004) studies the change in the structure of merchandise 
trade in Croatia and six other central and eastern European countries. With the exception 
of Croatia and Romania, these countries showed until 2001 positive changes in both the 
structure of merchandise trade and the level of foreign trade balances. While 
improvements in trade structures have in all likelihood continued, rapid credit expansion 
has led to a sharp acceleration in imports in the Czech Republic and Hungary since 2001. 
Hungary, for instance, is expected to record a current account deficit of over 9% of GDP 
in 2004, compared with a deficit of 3.2% of GDP in 2001.  
The concurrent increase in private capital inflows and current account surpluses raises 
the question of the uses of capital inflows. Investment rates have been on average 
constant over the past three years. However, there has been a massive increase of $540 
billion in foreign exchange reserves since 2001 (Table 1), suggesting that a significant 
part of the inflows boosted official reserves. 
 
 
Determinants and Sustainability of Recent Capital Inflows 
The return of capital inflows and the compression of bond spreads raise questions about 
sustainability of these developments. To the extent that they reflect macroeconomic and 
structural improvements – that is, better fundamentals attracting the flows to the 
emerging markets (the “pull” factors) – higher inflows and favourable external financing 
conditions could last. But to the extent that they reflect low industrial country interest 
rates, buoyant global liquidity and investors’ willingness to undertake riskier investments 
(the “push” factors), any change in these conditions in the industrial countries could 
renew concerns about emerging market vulnerabilities. 
Other than relative growth performance, which has an effect on all capital inflows, 
empirical evidence is mixed on the relative importance of “pull” and “push” factors in 
influencing the recent capital flows to the emerging market economies.  
The factors driving foreign direct investment seem to be independent of those 
influencing portfolio and loan flows. For instance, flows of FDI to Latin America 
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declined between 2001 and 2003 largely as a result of the crisis in Argentina and slower 
growth in Brazil and Mexico.2 In contrast, FDI continued to flow to the Asian emerging 
economies, especially China, reflecting better growth performance and structural 
improvements. The regression line in Graph 1 shows, for instance, that a 1 percentage 
point faster growth of an Asian emerging economy relative to the average for G7 
countries increased net FDI inflows to that economy by $400 million per year during 
1990–2003.3  
 
Graph 1.  FDI and relative growth performance in Asia, 1990-2003 
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Faster growth and structural improvements also benefited the economies in CEE, but 
after averaging 3–6% of GDP per year since 1995, cumulative FDI in CEE had reached 
such high levels that it became difficult to absorb further increases. Moreover, 
privatisations of state-owned assets, in particular sales of commercial banks to foreign-
owned institutions, had been largely completed by 2002. Reflecting these factors, FDI 
inflows to CEE fell sharply last year. The slower progress of privatisations in recent 
years has also held back FDI in many Latin American countries. 
                                                 
2 Crisis related events in Latin America may also have magnified previously latent risks of investing 
in emerging market countries, in particular risks to FDI stemming from a possible abrogation of 
private contracts. 
3 Graph 1 includes annual observations for China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Taiwan and Thailand.  
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Detailed studies, including recent reports by the Committee on the Global Financial 
System (2003) and the Capital Markets Consultative Group (2003), have established a 
positive relationship between FDI inflows and other country and sector specific factors. 
Over the past decade, FDI flows have shifted towards countries with large domestic 
markets (including in the financial and services sectors) and those that participate in free 
trade agreements or regional trade integration schemes. To date, this shift has benefited 
Brazil, China, Mexico and EU accession countries in CEE, and it might well benefit 
India in the future. 
Portfolio flows, comprising bond and equity flows, have been much less stable and 
subject to greater influence from global factors than FDI flows. The decline in bond and 
equity flows during 2001 and 2002 thus reflected not only conditions in the real 
economy (lower growth in industrial countries, crises in Argentina and Turkey, and 
weaker global growth prospects), but also financial market factors such as the fallout 
from the bursting of the technology and telecoms bubbles and increased risk aversion on 
the part of industrial country investors. Similarly, the surge in portfolio flows to the 
emerging markets in 2003 has resulted from a combination of factors. Among the 
country specific factors were improved credit ratings in many emerging market 
economies, as well as rising commodity prices and the prospect that emerging markets 
would benefit from strengthening global growth. These effects were particularly in 
evidence in Latin American countries. The regression line in Graph 2 suggests, for 
instance, that a one-notch upgrade in sovereign credit ratings in a Latin America 
economy is associated with an increase in net bond flows to that economy of about 0.9% 
of GDP a year.4  
Yet favourable liquidity conditions in international capital markets have also played an 
important role. Very low policy interest rates in the main industrial countries encouraged 
investors to search for yield in the emerging markets, where bond returns and short term 
real interest rates were higher than in industrial countries. In addition, factors such as a 
low dispersion of spreads among differently rated emerging market bonds point to a 
greater “risk appetite” among industrial country investors. 
 
 
                                                 
4 Graph 2 includes annual observations for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and 
Venezuela. 
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Graph 2.  Bond flows and credit ratings in Latin Amenrica, 1990-2003 
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Note: Positive change denotes a lowering of the rating, negative change an increase in the rating. 
 
 
 
Other private capital flows (trade credit and loans by commercial banks and non-bank 
financial institutions) turned positive in net terms last year for the first time since the 
mid-1990s. As in the case of portfolio flows, economies with relatively faster growth and 
improved credit ratings attracted larger loan inflows. These effects were particularly in 
evidence in central and eastern Europe. The regression line in Graph 3, upper panel, 
indicates that a 1 percentage point faster growth in a CEE economy relative to the 
average for G7 countries is associated with an annual increase in net loan inflows of 
$360 million. Similarly, the regression line in the lower panel of Graph 3 indicates that a 
one-notch improvement in the sovereign credit rating is on average associated with $1.5 
billion in loans by commercial banks and non-bank financial institutions to that CEE 
economy.5  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Countries included in Graph 3 are Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Turkey. 
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Graph 3.  Net loan flows, relative growth performance and credit ratings 
               in central and eastern Europe, 1994-2003 
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The shift in the composition of capital flows towards more volatile portfolio and loan 
flows raises the question of vulnerabilities to possible reversals. In January and May 
2004, perceptions that US rates might rise sharply triggered a sudden widening of 
emerging market bond spreads. A second vulnerability relates to the improvement in 
debt dynamics in countries with debt denominated in or linked to foreign currencies (eg, 
Brazil and Turkey). To a significant extent, this improvement was due to exchange rate 
appreciation, which might be only temporary. The third vulnerability, particularly 
relevant to central and eastern European countries, is large fiscal deficits. As discussed in 
the next section, financial market volatility in Hungary in 2003 showed that positive 
market sentiment can be quickly reversed if the fiscal outlook does not improve.  
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At the same time, several factors moderate such risks. The growth has strengthened and 
broadened globally over the past two years, with commodity prices rising strongly. 
These trends are not expected to be sharply reversed in 2005. As noted above, the 
favourable external financing environment has enabled many countries to meet a part of 
their financing needs for 2005. Some highly indebted countries, including Brazil, Mexico 
and Turkey, have taken advantage of the favourable market conditions to improve their 
debt profiles by lowering borrowing costs, extending maturities and reducing the share of 
short term external debt and debt indexed to short term interest rates and exchange rates. 
Low inflation, increased reserve holdings and the earlier shift to floating exchange rates 
have also reduced vulnerabilities. Brazil, Turkey and some other countries have in 
addition maintained tight fiscal policies and continued to implement structural reforms. 
Nevertheless, some countries, in particular in central and eastern Europe, have loosened 
their fiscal stance and slackened the pace of adjustment, or have seen a significant 
expansion of private sector credit. As argued below, underlying vulnerabilities masked 
by the ready access to financing are likely to become more apparent in these countries as 
the external financing environment turns less favourable.  
 
 
3  Capital Flows to EU Accession Countries  
Discussions on capital flows to EU accession countries have in the past mainly dealt with 
foreign direct investment inflows, addressing issues such as the determinants of inflows 
and their effects on the real sector. Other types of flows – equity, bond and bank- and 
non-bank loan flows – have been analysed considerably less.6 Likewise, the question of 
challenges that capital flows pose for macroeconomic policies in the region have until 
recently not been extensively analysed. 
A good example of the former group of studies is the paper prepared for this conference 
by Lovrinčević, Mikulić and Marić (2004), who analyse the effects of different types of 
inflows on domestic investment in central and eastern Europe. They find that “other” 
inflows have the largest effect on domestic investment, followed by FDI inflows, while 
portfolio inflows do not seem to have any significant impact. More precisely, an increase 
in the share of other flows by 1% of GDP is found to raise the share of domestic 
                                                 
6 On the determinants of bank lending to emerging market economies see Jeanneau and Micu 
(2002).  
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investment by 0.33 percentage points; the impact of FDI inflows is 0.24 percentage 
points.  
The relative sizes of these estimates should not come as a surprise. As noted above, 
“other” flows consist mainly of trade credit and loans extended by non-resident 
commercial banks and non-bank financial institutions. Trade credit is to a large extent 
used for imports of investment goods, which in the case of Croatia account for about 
30% of total imports. And the bulk of domestic fixed investment in central and eastern 
Europe is traditionally financed by domestic and foreign bank loans. On the other hand, 
most FDI inflows have been associated with privatisations of existing companies rather 
than greenfield investments. Thus, it is not surprising that the estimated impact of FDI 
inflows on domestic investment is smaller than that of loan flows. And regarding 
portfolio inflows, non-residents’ purchases of equities in regional equity markets have 
been very low (with the exception of Poland) and therefore could not contribute too 
much to domestic capital formation. Likewise, funds raised through bond issuance have 
been mostly used by governments to finance large budget deficits – which are in most 
cases not the result of public investments – rather than by corporations for the purpose of 
investment.  
Turning to the literature on challenges that capital flows pose for macroeconomic 
policies, one important issue is the so-called Tošovský dilemma. Another major research 
area has been conditions under which accession countries are expected to join the 
European Monetary Union (EMU). A third area, which has yet to be researched, is 
empirical evidence on capital flows in the run-up to membership in EMU. These three 
issues are examined in the remainder of this paper. 
 
The Tošovský Dilemma 
The Tošovský dilemma, named after former Czech prime minister and long-time 
governor of the Czech National Bank Josef Tošovský, stems from two stylised facts that 
are intrinsic to the economies that are rapidly catching up with the more developed 
economies in an environment of free capital flows.7
                                                 
7 This section is based on Mihaljek (2004a). 
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First, the pre-inflow rate of return on investment in the catching-up economies is much 
higher than in the mature economies of EMU, reflecting imbalances in initial stocks of 
capital and a relatively rich endowment of skilled labour in CEE.8 This differential could 
induce large inflows of long-term capital, for instance in the form of foreign direct 
investment.  
Second, in the catching-up economies there is a tendency for inflation to be higher than 
in mature economies. This may reflect macroeconomic policies that are too lax 
(especially fiscal policy). But it may also reflect important real factors related to the 
transition process, in particular the tendency for prices of non-tradable goods to rise 
faster than the prices of tradables as real wages rise in the wake of rising productivity 
(the so-called Balassa-Samuelson effect; see Mihaljek and Klau, 2004). In countries with 
fixed exchange rates, these same forces have also manifested themselves in (CPI-based) 
real exchange rate appreciation, while in countries with floating exchange rates they have 
manifested themselves partly in nominal exchange rate appreciation and partly in higher 
inflation. Given this inflation differential and the associated tendency of real exchange 
rates to appreciate, nominal interest rates in accession countries have tended to be higher 
than in the euro area. Such nominal interest rate differentials, although narrowing, 
remain sufficiently large to attract short term capital inflows.  
Consequently, the monetary authorities face a dilemma. If they set real interest rates low 
enough in an attempt to limit the short-term inflows (which seek to exploit nominal 
interest rate differential), large inflows seeking to exploit a high return on capital might 
nevertheless occur.9 Ex post, there might be a massive imbalance between investment 
and saving and a large current account deficit. If, by contrast, the authorities attempt to 
correct this imbalance by keeping domestic interest rates high, large arbitraging inflows 
would be stimulated. While various fundamental and institutional factors may slow this 
process, it is not likely that these frictions would be sufficiently large to afford the 
accession countries any significant interest rate autonomy. In both cases, capital inflows 
would undermine efforts to control inflation and contain large current account deficits, 
even if countries followed prudent macroeconomic policies. 
                                                 
8 Lipschitz et al. (2002) estimate the marginal product of capital to be 8½ times higher in the 
accession countries than in Germany, and on this basis calculate potential capital inflows at close 
to 5 times their initial (pre-inflow) GDP.  
9 For example, if the real interest rate in Germany is 2½% and the Czech koruna is expected to 
appreciate on average by 5% a year in real terms, then from the point of view of international 
arbitrage flows (and ignoring the risk premia), the equilibrium real interest rate in the Czech 
Republic should be –2½%.  
 292 
It is important to realise that this dilemma is independent of the exchange rate regime. 
Because the mechanisms motivating capital inflows are real rather than monetary, the 
only question is whether a real appreciation takes place through nominal appreciation or 
through inflation. Under a fixed regime (or a fixed but adjustable peg), capital inflows 
will reduce interest rates and increase investment relative to domestic saving. If inflation 
rises, external competitiveness would decline. While the monetary impact of inflows 
might be sterilised, sterilisation would likely be incomplete and would involve some 
costs, as the central bank would be buying low-yielding foreign assets while issuing 
higher-yielding domestic liabilities. Under a floating regime, capital inflows would lead 
the exchange rate to appreciate, again causing a loss of competitiveness and generating a 
current account deficit.  
One should also bear in mind that capital inflows can suddenly reverse when conditions 
change – if, for instance, ambitious strategies to reduce budget deficits in the run-up to 
ERM II were to go off-track, or if inflation control were to weaken. International 
investors might become uncertain even if underlying policies remain sound. In such 
conditions, an external shock, contagion from other markets, or political uncertainties 
might trigger a rush for the exit, potentially leading to the negative effects of the “sudden 
stops” in capital flows, ie, sharp devaluation, output contraction and fiscal sustainability 
problems.  
Capital inflows might also give rise to or worsen pre-existing currency mismatches in the 
financial system. As a result of the inflows, banks could acquire liabilities denominated 
in euros and grant loans in local currency, thus exposing their balance sheets to exchange 
rate risk. Hedging that risk is costly in accession countries’ shallow financial markets. 
Banks may be - and frequently are - requested to balance their foreign positions by 
prudential regulations. Nonetheless, if the banks grant loans in euros, they may simply 
replace foreign exchange risk by credit risk, as their customers – in particular households 
and companies producing non-tradable goods and services – may not be earning foreign 
currency. Croatia and some other CEE countries are already exposed to large currency 
mismatches as a result of historical circumstances, such as large foreign currency 
deposits remitted by expatriate workers in western Europe, or currency substitution 
induced by long periods of macroeconomic instability in the past. Because of such 
currency mismatches, banking and financial systems are highly vulnerable to volatile 
exchange rate movements. Furthermore, debt in central and eastern Europe is already 
skewed towards foreign rather than domestic liabilities, which may give rise to debt 
sustainability problems.  
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Options for Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies 
What is the relevance of the Tošovský dilemma for the choice of exchange rate regimes 
in the new member states and EU accession countries such as Croatia?10  
All accession countries are expected to become members of EMU and hence to 
participate in ERM II, for which they can apply at any time after joining the EU. ERM II 
is an exchange rate arrangement with fixed but adjustable central parities against the euro 
and a “normal” fluctuation band of ±15% around these parities. The timing of entry into 
ERM II is important because it influences the timing of EMU assessment and thereby the 
timing of the adoption of the euro. The accession countries will be able to keep their 
existing exchange rate regimes upon entry to the EU. But they will have to treat their 
exchange rate policy as a matter of common concern, a requirement aimed at preventing 
competitive devaluations. Moreover, the accession countries will have to fully liberalise 
capital flows and comply with certain provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact, in 
particular, avoiding excessive fiscal deficits. Upon entry to ERM II, countries with 
floating or managed exchange rate regimes will have to modify their regimes because 
exchange rates in ERM II are allowed to fluctuate only within a ±15% band around a 
fixed central parity vis-à-vis the euro.  
In view of the challenges for monetary and exchange rate policies that the Tošovský 
dilemma and large capital flows in general may pose in ERM II, academics and policy 
makers have proposed several alternatives to this “official roadmap” to the euro area. 
Generally, it has been argued that mechanisms that allow joining EMU earlier than 
foreseen in the official roadmap would reduce the currency mismatch problem, the need 
for exchange market interventions, and the risk of capital flow reversals. The Balassa-
Samuelson effect could be accommodated through higher inflation without affecting 
significantly the euro area inflation. It has to be recognised, however, that early EMU 
membership might not eliminate the volatility and inflationary effects of excessive 
capital inflows. Unsustainable booms might be followed by rising inflation. Risk taking 
by banks and financial institutions could become excessive even in the absence of 
currency mismatches. 
Leaving aside the fact that the new member states had to liberalise most capital 
restrictions (with the exception of those on real estate transactions), one proposed 
                                                 
10 This section draws on Mihaljek (2004b). 
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modification that could make ERM II more robust would be allowing countries to retain 
certain capital controls until they join EMU. The accession countries could, for instance, 
retain or introduce price-based controls on short-term capital inflows similar to those 
used in Chile and Spain in the past. While even well designed capital controls do not 
offer unlimited protection against speculative attacks, they may provide some valuable 
breathing space that could make the difference between a managed depreciation and a 
currency collapse (Wyplosz, 2002). Capital controls could also lead to more realistic risk 
premia on accession countries’ debt, signalling to investors that, even though these 
countries are candidates for EMU, their structural characteristics – in particular, the large 
saving-investment imbalance – justify higher domestic interest rates than in the euro 
area. 
One could argue, however, that countries facing large capital inflows that wish to avoid 
undue currency appreciation or problems associated with sterilisation of these inflows 
(including excessive credit expansion and foreign reserves accumulation) should ease 
controls on capital outflows rather than strengthen controls on capital inflows. The 
easing of outward foreign exchange controls would also promote a less distorted 
environment for financial investments, in particular of institutional investors such as 
pension funds, which are often restricted to holding mainly domestic assets.11 Because of 
underdeveloped debt markets, in most new member states this restriction implies that 
pension funds are more or less forced to hold government bonds. 
Under a more radical set of proposals, accession countries would be allowed to retain 
their current exchange rate regimes (thus bypassing ERM II) and enter EMU at a 
mutually agreed parity as soon as they fulfilled the Maastricht criteria (Buiter and Grafe, 
2002; Wyplosz, 2002). Proponents of this route argue that a free float or a currency 
board would be less susceptible to speculative attacks than ERM II. Moreover, countries 
with a currency board arrangement could satisfy the Maastricht criteria relatively quickly 
and be admitted to EMU in less than two years. At the same time, a floating exchange 
rate regime offers an easier way to deal with the capital inflow problem than ERM II, 
and it sends a signal to economic agents that currency mismatches are dangerous. 
Potential weaknesses are that floating requires deep exchange and financial markets and 
                                                 
11 For instance, South Africa eliminated in October 2004 all restrictions on the size of new foreign 
investments that South African companies can make abroad. Local companies will also be allowed 
to retain foreign dividends offshore. Restrictions will remain on individuals, however, and 
institutional investors will still be subject to prudential limits on foreign assets or the foreign 
currency share of their portfolios. 
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that currency boards may not be flexible enough to accommodate strong Balassa-
Samuelson effects. Moreover, as argued above, neither a free float nor a currency board 
resolves the Tošovský dilemma. 
The most far-reaching proposal is to let the countries in central and eastern Europe adopt 
the euro unilaterally. While this regime was originally formulated for EU accession 
countries, recently it has attracted attention as a possible long-term solution for non-
accession countries in southeast Europe (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, 
Serbia and Montenegro).12 Proponents of this view also claim that unilateral euroisation 
might reduce political influence over credit allocation in the domestic banking system, 
which has traditionally been one of the main sources of financial vulnerability. Unilateral 
euroisation would entail nearly the same benefits as membership in the euro area, the 
main exception being representation on ECB governing bodies. But it is not without 
costs. First, the central bank would have to use foreign reserves to retire the domestic 
currency from circulation. Second, it would lose the seigniorage revenue obtained by 
issuing domestic currency. Third, the central bank’s role as a lender of last resort to 
domestic financial institutions would be limited by the size of foreign reserves remaining 
after the retirement of domestic currency. But the biggest danger might be that the 
“wrong” conversion parity is chosen. In other words, unilateral euroisation cannot 
entirely eliminate the risk of a future regime change, nor can the monetary authority 
automatically adopt the credibility of the euro (Nuti, 2002). 
A small but influential group of economists continues to argue strongly against the 
official “roadmap”.13 However, by the time the new member states had joined the EU the 
majority of policy makers and academic economists seem to have accepted the notion 
that the accession countries will have to fulfil the Maastricht criteria as they stand. As a 
result, the attention in the literature over the past year has gradually shifted towards the 
design of macroeconomic policies for yet another transition period – that preceding 
membership in EMU (see De Grauwe and Schnabl, 2003) – as well as towards empirical 
issues such as equilibrium exchange rates for entry to ERM II and the related question of 
the Balassa-Samuelson effect (see Austrian National Bank, 2003). 
 
                                                 
12 For the original proposal, see Bratkowski and Rostowski (2000, 2002) and Rostowski (2002). On 
euroisation for southeast European countries, see Gros (2002). See also Buiter and Grafe (2002) 
on the adoption of the euro as a parallel currency. 
13 See eg Begg et al (2003), Buiter (2004), Buiter and Grafe (2004) and Eichengreen (2003). 
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Official Views 
EU institutions have rejected proposals for retention of capital controls in ERM II and 
for early adoption of the euro. Slovenia, for instance, tried to negotiate an exemption to 
by-pass ERM II, arguing that factual stability of the exchange rate before EU entry 
should satisfy the Maastricht exchange rate criterion (Lavrač, 2002). But the EU 
considered this incompatible with the acquis. 
With respect to unilateral euroisation, the European Commission has argued that: 
“any unilateral adoption of the single currency by means of ’euroisation’ would run 
counter to the underlying economic reasoning of EMU in the Treaty, which foresees 
the eventual adoption of the euro as the endpoint of a structured convergence 
process within a multilateral framework. Therefore, unilateral ’euroisation’ would 
not be a way to circumvent the stages foreseen by the Treaty for the adoption of the 
euro” (European Commission, 2001; p. 21). 
This position has been challenged by Nuti (2002), who points out that the Treaty does 
not prevent a country or a political entity from adopting the euro as its domestic 
currency. It seems, therefore, that underlying the concern about unilateral euroisation 
seems to be the fear that, by fixing the conversion rate of the domestic currency against 
the euro unilaterally, countries could gain an unfair advantage vis-à-vis incumbent 
members and EMU candidates. 
The ECB has clarified its position on exchange rate issues relating to the accession 
countries in a policy statement issued in December 2003 (ECB, 2003). The main points 
of this position are summarised in the left-hand column of Table 2. 
During 2004, the European Central Bank has further clarified its position on certain 
operational aspects of ERM II. ECB officials acknowledged that a conflict between an 
inflation target and exchange rate stability objective might arise in ERM II (Papademos, 
2004). Should this happen, central banks would be advised to give priority to the 
inflation target. Moreover, the new member states were advised not to seek to join ERM 
II until they have made substantial progress towards fulfilling the Maastricht criteria. 
Issing (2004) noted that: “If participation in ERM II occurs too early, maintaining 
simultaneously price stability and exchange rate stability could become extremely 
difficult, and at times impossible”. This view reflects the finding that the ECB strategy 
was chosen taking into account the specific features of the euro area, which are likely not 
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to be present currently in the new member states. The choice of a monetary strategy in 
the transition towards the adoption of the euro should thus depend on the individual 
countries’ specific features during the transition period. Since monetary aggregates are 
unstable in the face of rapid changes in these countries’ financial structure, a prominent 
role for monetary aggregates specified in the euro area may not be ideal for the new 
member states. In addition, since most of the new member states are small open 
economies relative to the large and more closed euro area, their domestic aggregates are 
likely to be less stable. In these circumstances, inflation targeting probably represents the 
optimal monetary policy framework for the countries that adopted it (Issing, 2004).  
While these statements signal a slight shift in the official policy thinking, which until 
recently highlighted the advantages of ERM II, perspectives on some other issues 
continue to differ between EU institutions and the new member states (Table 2, right-
hand column). One concern expressed by several central banks in the context of 
discussions on ERM II is the interpretation of the exchange rate stability criterion. The 
bands of ERM II are fairly wide: ±15% around the central parity against the euro, which 
itself can be adjusted. However, the ECB’s framework statement (ECB, 2003) envisages 
that the assessment of exchange rate stability will focus on the exchange rate being 
“close to the central rate while also taking into account factors that may have led to an 
appreciation” (the issue of “severe tensions” is dealt with separately). How close is 
“close to the central rate” has not been explicitly revealed, although statements by some 
EU officials and past experience suggest that this is probably meant to be a band of 
±2½% around the central parity. Papademos (2004) confirmed that the ECB’s 
assessment of exchange rate stability in ERM II will focus on the exchange rate being 
“close to the central parity”, and that deviations from the parity will not be treated 
symmetrically: factors that may have led to an appreciation will be taken into account, 
but apparently not those that may have led to depreciation. 
Likewise, there has been no official questioning of the rationale for the definition of the 
Maastricht inflation criterion – the average inflation rate in three member countries of the 
EU with lowest inflation, rather than the average inflation in EMU. In 2003, for instance, 
had they been members of EU the Czech Republic, Lithuania and Poland would have 
been the three EU member states with the lowest inflation, setting the benchmark for the 
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Maastricht inflation criterion that eight of the 12 current EMU members would not have 
met.14
 
Table 2.  Perspectives on ERM II1
European institutions’ perspective New member states’ perspective 
The roles of ERM II are to help participating 
states orient their policies to stability and to foster 
convergence. By requiring consistent economic 
policies, ERM II could help provide a more stable 
macroeconomic environment and act as a catalyst 
for structural reforms. 
Any disciplinary impact of ERM II in addition to the 
Maastricht criteria for the euro adoption and the 
multilateral surveillance under the Stability and Growth 
Pact might be negligible. 
ERM II, with its announced central parity, would 
provide guidance to participants in foreign 
exchange markets and act as a testing phase for 
both the central rate and the sustainability of 
convergence in general. 
ERM II is an intermediate exchange rate regime that 
puts policy makers in a dilemma between their inflation 
target and exchange rate objective and creates risks of 
speculative attacks (case of Hungary in 2003). 
The standard fluctuation band of ±15% would 
leave sufficient room for exchange rates to adjust 
to structural changes in the economy and various 
shocks. If the accumulation of shocks or 
fundamental changes substantially modify the 
equilibrium level of the exchange rate, ERM II 
allows for adjustments of the central parity. 
The standard fluctuation band plus the possibility of 
upward realignments might signal that the exchange 
rate could appreciate by 15% or more. Efforts to 
stabilise the exchange rate within the band in the face 
of speculative attacks could further increase exchange 
rate volatility. 
ERM II provides a mechanism for anchoring 
inflation expectations and speeding up 
disinflation. This is important for central Europe’s 
small open economies where the exchange rate 
plays a more important role in the monetary 
transmission mechanism than interest rates. 
Current monetary arrangements ranging from currency 
boards to free floats with inflation targeting are 
credible: inflation rates are already mostly low; policy 
rates and long-term bond rates have converged toward 
euro area levels; expectations of low inflation are well-
ingrained. 
Unlike other intermediate regimes, ERM II entails 
ultimate exit into the euro area, thus making the 
system more resilient than other intermediate 
regimes. 
Acceding countries are either ready to adopt the euro, 
in which case ERM II is not needed; or they are not, in 
which case ERM II is not a sufficiently safe policy 
framework. 
Limiting the duration of ERM II membership to 
two years may not be an optimal choice for all 
accession countries in view of the varying degrees 
of their convergence. 
Most new member states view ERM II as a “waiting 
room” for EMU and intend to enter it once the 
conditions enabling them to adopt the euro within two 
years are established. 
 
Notes: 1The official positions of European institutions and new member states are considerably more nuanced than 
the perspectives summarised in this table. For official positions, see the sources below. 
Sources: ECB (2003); European Parliament (1999); Backé and Thimann (2004); Noyer (1999); Padoa-Schioppa 
(2002); and country policy statements on central bank and government websites. 
 
 
 
Most new member states have for their part already announced their intentions regarding 
participation in ERM II and joining the EMU (Table 3). 
• The Baltic countries intend to keep their currency board arrangements in ERM II. 
Estonia and Lithuania joined the mechanism on 27 June 2004 and Latvia is expected to 
                                                 
14 Average inflation in the Czech Republic, Lithuania and Poland in 2003 was 0.5%. Adding a 1½ 
percentage point margin would have given an inflation criterion of 2%. In 2003, only Austria, 
Belgium, Finland and Germany had inflation below 2%.  
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enter ERM II in early 2005. Estonia and Lithuania set their central parities against the 
euro at the same exchange rates at which their currencies traded against the euro under 
currency boards. Both countries also adopted zero fluctuation margins as a unilateral 
commitment and placed no additional obligation on the ECB to intervene in the foreign 
exchange markets to defend the central parities. Since the Maastricht criteria for these 
countries are more or less fulfilled, they have considered themselves virtually in EMU 
even in the past; as a result, they want to minimise the length of their stay in ERM II. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.  Goals for participation in ERM II and adoption of the euro 
 Present exchange rate regime Euro target date ERM II participation 
Bulgaria  Currency board with euro 2009 Immediately upon EU accession in 
2007; keep currency board  
Croatia Managed float, euro as 
reference 
Not stated Immediately upon EU accession 
Cyprus Peg to the euro, with ±15% 
fluctuation bands 
2007 Join ERM II early by keeping the 
current exchange rate framework 
Czech Republic Managed float with inflation 
targeting (2–4% by end-2005) 
2009/2010 Participate no longer than two 
years; insist on ±15% margins 
Estonia  Currency board with euro  2007 Joined ERM II in June 2004, central 
parity same as currency board rate, 
zero fluctuation margins 
Hungary  Peg to euro with wide band 
(±15% around a central 
parity) 
2010 Postpone ERM II participation until 
markets consider the fiscal path 
credible and sustainable 
Latvia  Peg to SDR  2008 Early 2005; currency pegged to the 
euro in December 2004 at the 
prevailing market rate; will keep 
narrow ±1% band 
Lithuania  Currency board with euro  Mid-2006 Joined ERM II in June 2004, central 
parity same as currency board rate, 
zero fluctuation margins 
Poland  Float  2008/2009 Participate no longer than two 
years; insist on ±15% margins 
Malta Peg to a basket of euro 
(70%), US dollar and pound 
sterling 
2008 Prepare for ERM II in 2005; 
participate no longer than two years 
Romania  Managed float, euro as 
reference 
Not stated Not stated  
Slovakia  Managed float, with inflation 
targeting 
2007 Switch to inflation targeting within 
ERM II in 2005/06. Participate in 
ERM II no longer than two years 
Slovenia  Managed float, euro as 
reference 
2007 Joined ERM II in June 2004, central 
parity equal to market rate, normal 
fluctuation margins 
Sources: Policy statements on central bank and government websites; European Commission; European Central Bank. 
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• Slovenia also joined ERM II in June 2004 and intends to adopt the euro in 2007. The 
tolar will trade at the normal fluctuation margins of ±15% around a central parity, which 
was set at the tolar/euro exchange rate prevailing on the last business day before entering 
ERM II. The Slovenian authorities noted in the past that waiting longer than necessary in 
ERM II could prove to be more of a burden than an incentive for the economy. The 
central bank projects inflation to be cut below 3% by mid-2005, thus clearing the main 
Maastricht hurdle for Slovenia. 
 
• Other new EU member states and candidates (Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Slovakia and 
Turkey) have over the past year either announced or slightly modified their strategies for 
the adoption of the euro (Table 3). 
 
• One potentially more significant policy shift took place in Hungary, which originally had 
considered the earliest possible entry into ERM II with the intention to stay inside the 
mechanism for as long as necessary to meet the Maastricht criteria (National Bank of 
Hungary, 2003). This approach reflected the view that without the incentive of 
membership in the euro area, fiscal reforms in Hungary would not advance. However, 
the authorities recently expressed doubts about the rationale for joining ERM II early, 
noting that a prerequisite for joining ERM II was that markets considered the fiscal path 
credible and sustainable (Jarai, 2004). This seems to reflect both experience with 
turbulence in Hungary’s foreign exchange and bond markets in 2003 (discussed below), 
and the emergence of a consensus that ERM II should not be regarded as a tool to impose 
fiscal discipline – the risk of speculative attacks in countries that enter the mechanism 
with weak fiscal positions seems to be very high. The target date for joining EMU is 
currently set for 2010 (Government of Hungary, 2004). If conditions turn out to be more 
favourable and inflation falls more rapidly than currently envisaged (ie, to 3% per annum 
in 2008), the adoption of the euro could take place in 2009. 
 
• The Polish authorities take the view that membership in ERM II should be confined to 
two years preceding adoption of the euro. As Poland has gone through all exchange rate 
regimes and is currently focusing on direct inflation targeting, the central bank does not 
see the need to anchor inflation expectations through the exchange rate. If fiscal 
adjustment proceeds as planned, Poland could join EMU in 2008 or 2009. 
 
• The Czech Republic has indicated that it will not seek an early entry into ERM II. The 
authorities view ERM II merely as the gateway to the euro area, and intend to enter the 
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mechanism only after they have established the conditions that will enable the Czech 
Republic to adopt the euro in the minimum time required (ie, two years after joining the 
ERM II) (Czech Government and the Czech National Bank, 2003; Czech National Bank, 
2003). Based on existing fiscal plans, this would imply membership in the euro area in 
2009 or 2010. 
 
In summary, the official position remains firmly anchored in the Treaty principles, but 
allows for a certain degree of flexibility (eg, on exchange rate strategies, adjustment of 
central parity, assessment of exchange rate stability) to be used in appropriate 
circumstances, taking into account the specific situation of each individual country and 
the principle of equal treatment. Regarding country positions, all accession countries 
with the exception of Hungary aim to participate in ERM II no longer than the minimum 
required period of two years. The key issue determining the timing of entry to EMU in 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia is the timetable for the reduction of 
budget deficits. In Slovenia, the key issue is lowering inflation. In the Baltic countries, 
where fiscal deficits and inflation are already low, no major obstacles for an early 
adoption of the euro are foreseen.  
 
 
Empirical Evidence on Capital Flows in the Run-Up to ERM II 
 
How likely are scenarios under which capital flows could affect the operation of ERM 
II? To address this question, this section first analyses Hungary’s experience with 
speculative attacks in 2003 (Box 1), and then compares empirical evidence on capital 
flows to central and eastern Europe with the flows to the southern European countries as 
they prepared to join EMU in the 1990s.  
On the basis of Hungary’s experience, some observers concluded that all countries in 
CEE would be susceptible to such attacks once they entered ERM II. With potentially 
very large amounts of foreign capital flowing into and out of these economies, it might 
be difficult to keep currencies within the ±15% band and control inflation at the same 
time. Moreover, frequent and large adjustments of interest rates to respond to these 
external pressures could destabilise the economies domestically (Begg et al., 2003). 
Upon closer examination, however, Hungary’s experience does not support these 
arguments. The speculative attack in January was partly due to the misinterpretation of 
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institutional arrangements by the speculators: the National Bank of Hungary needs legal 
consent from the government before amending any aspect of the exchange rate 
arrangement. The attacks in June and November can be more clearly linked to policy 
mistakes rather than any defect of the exchange rate arrangement per se. In particular, the 
lack of decisive action on the fiscal front, difficulties in communicating the reasons for 
the adjustment of the central parity, and the use of a narrower target range have confused 
investors, denting their confidence in medium-term prospects for the economy. The real 
lesson of this experience is that regardless of the exchange rate regime, markets are 
likely to punish inconsistent policies eventually. 
 
Box 1.  Turbulence in Hungary’s currency and domestic bond markets in 2003 
Since October 2001, Hungary has operated a fixed parity regime against the euro, in which 
the forint can move within a band of ±15% each side of the central parity. On the domestic 
side, this regime has been complemented with inflation targeting. The forint had traded on 
the strong side of the parity throughout 2002, reaching the upper limit of the band in late 
2002 and early 2003 (Graph 4). As the fiscal deficit widened to almost 10% of GDP and 
public sector wages were raised by 50% over two years, speculators bet that the central 
bank would revalue the central parity or even perhaps allow the forint to float in order to 
meet its inflation target. Short-term inflows estimated at some €4–5 billion (equivalent to 7–
8% of annual GDP) entered Hungary within only a few hours on 15–16 January 2003. To 
deter inflows, the National Bank cut policy rates by 200 basis points within two days, 
introduced a quantitative restriction on short-term deposits, and intervened heavily in the 
foreign exchange market. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 4.
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Box 1.  continued 
On 4 June 2003, the central bank, at the initiative of the government, reluctantly devalued 
the central parity by 2¼%. This adjustment was intended to increase the external 
competitiveness and guarantee that the exchange rate would not appreciate beyond the 15% 
upper bound. The government also announced a small fiscal package. Subsequently the 
authorities disclosed that they would prefer the exchange rate to stay within a “preferred” 
target range of 250–260 forints per euro. This was some 10% above the central parity but 
within the wider existing band of 240–325 forints. However, the financial markets interpreted 
this move as a sign of underlying weakness and the forint was soon under strong downward 
pressure, forcing the central bank to raise interest rates by 300 basis points to stop the slide.  
 
In late November the forint came under renewed pressure as the high budget deficit and the 
rapid expansion of household borrowing raised the current account deficit, weakening the 
confidence of long-term investors. In addition, many short-term investors who suffered losses 
as a result of the January attack apparently sold forint denominated bonds to cover their 
losses before the end of the year. To help stabilise the forint, the central bank again raised 
interest rates by 300 basis points (to 12½%). At the same time, the government announced 
a more restrictive budget for 2004 (including a trimming of the subsidies on housing loans, 
which had helped fuel credit growth) and abandoned the policy of announcing a preferred 
range for the forint, which has apparently served as a target for speculators. These measures 
have subsequently calmed the foreign exchange and bond markets. 
 
 
 
 
What is the empirical evidence on capital flows to other central and eastern European 
countries, as well as the southern European countries in the period before they joined 
EMU? 
Increased capital flows were also observed in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain in the 
run-up to the adoption of the euro. In the case of Greece, these flows were for the most 
part “hot money” seeking to take advantage of the higher yields offered by Greek 
government bonds, which reflected higher inflation and interest rate differentials at the 
time. As convergence toward EMU started to reduce the country risk premium, the yields 
began to narrow, offering further capital gains (Hochreiter and Tavlas, 2003). 
In the case of Portugal, capital inflows were not channelled to the government bond 
markets as fiscal deficits were more or less under control. Instead, growing financial 
integration had led to a demand boom on the eve of EMU membership, so the authorities 
had to use strong prudential regulation to control credit expansion. 
A key consideration in this context is that countries in central and eastern Europe have 
already experienced capital flows on a larger scale than Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal 
and Spain before they joined EMU. Table 4 and Graph 5 show that, with the exception of 
Slovenia, net private capital flows have been significantly higher in the accession 
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countries during 1995–2003 than in Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain during 1994–99 (in 
Greece, during 1996–2000). For instance, net private capital flows in Croatia were 
equivalent to 12% of GDP on average during 1995–2003, compared with less than 4½% 
of GDP in Greece and Portugal. Net private capital flows in the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Latvia and Slovakia averaged between 8½–10½% of GDP over this period, double the 
average for the five current EMU members. 
 
Table 4.  Net private capital flows to central European 
             and selected euro area countries1
 Level (% of GDP) Standard deviation 
 Total FDI Debt Equity Loan Total FDI Debt Equity Loan 
Bulgaria 5.3 4.9 –0.7 0.0 1.1 7.1 2.5 1.0 0.2 5.1 
Croatia  12.0 4.3 2.1 0.0 5.5 3.5 2.6 2.0 0.1 3.9 
Czech R. 8.4 6.9 –0.5 0.5 1.6 4.6 4.1 1.4 1.5 4.4 
Estonia 10.5 5.5 0.3 1.4 3.4 4.4 2.9 2.7 1.7 3.9 
Hungary 6.2 4.0 1.4 0.6 0.3 4.9 2.9 2.8 1.2 3.3 
Latvia 9.6 5.3 –2.0 0.0 6.3 2.4 2.1 3.3 0.9 2.5 
Lithuania 7.5 3.8 1.2 0.2 2.2 2.4 2.1 1.6 0.3 1.9 
Poland 5.6 3.3 0.8 0.2 1.4 1.4 1.1 0.7 0.4 1.4 
Romania  4.8 2.6 0.2 0.1 1.9 2.0 1.2 1.0 0.2 1.7 
Slovakia 8.6 4.9 1.0 0.3 2.3 3.7 5.4 2.2 0.4 4.6 
Slovenia 3.6 1.6 0.8 0.0 1.3 2.2 2.5 1.1 0.2 2.0 
Average 7.5 4.3 0.4 0.3 2.5 3.5 2.7 1.8 0.6 3.2 
Greece 4.4 0.2 2.7 –0.3 1.9 4.2 0.7 3.6 1.1 2.8 
Ireland –4.0 4.4 –12.6 6.6 –2.4 3.3 4.8 17.4 10.5 3.2 
Italy –0.9 –0.4 2.1 –1.1 –1.5 0.6 0.3 1.5 2.4 2.0 
Spain 1.1 –0.8 –0.8 –0.3 3.1 2.7 1.9 3.1 0.7 4.8 
Portugal 4.2 0.0 –0.8 0.7 4.4 2.6 0.9 2.8 1.4 2.7 
Average 1.0 0.7 –1.9 1.1 1.1 2.7 1.7 5.7 3.2 3.1 
 
Note: 1Average net flows over 1995–2003 (accession countries) and 1994–99 (EMU members; except Greece, 1996–
2000). 
Sources: IMF; author’s estimates. 
 
 
 
Also relevant for the debate on the Maastricht criteria is the finding that the variability of 
FDI flows has been higher in central and eastern Europe than in five current members of 
EMU, while that of loan flows has been equally high on average (Table 4 and Graph 6). 
The fact that FDI inflows have been mostly related to the sales of state-owned 
enterprises and that most firms have by now been privatised, suggests that volatility of 
FDI is not likely to be higher in the future. 
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Regarding cross-border loan flows, the situation varies from country to country. As 
shown in Graph 7 (lower right-hand panel), the Baltic states, Croatia and Slovakia have 
already experienced very large loan flows. There is also some evidence of increased 
borrowing by foreign-owned banks in CEE from their head offices in EU countries to 
finance domestic credit expansion. However, this type of flows is less likely to persist 
over a longer period because the resulting increase in indebtedness relatively quickly 
triggers a self-correcting adjustment. Other determinants of loan flows – interest rate 
differentials and demand for credit – will, of course, also change and influence the size 
and direction of flows. But in countries whose financial systems are still not well 
integrated with EU (eg, Bulgaria and Slovenia), loan flows are likely to increase over the 
medium term. 
Graph 5.  Net private capital flows (in percent of GDP, period average1) 
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Note: 1For accession countries, 1995–2003; for EMU members, 1994–99 (except Greece, 1996–2000). 
Sources: IMF; author's estimates. 
 
 
The level and variability of equity and debt flows have been significantly lower in most 
new member states. This reflects a lower level of financial market development in the 
region relative to the four southern European countries, and lower stocks of public sector 
debt. Again, there are large differences across countries. Net equity flows to Estonia, the 
Czech Republic and Hungary were on average higher and no less volatile than those to 
Greece, Portugal and Spain (Graph 7, lower left-hand panel). Likewise, net debt flows to 
Croatia were comparable to those in Greece and Italy (Graph 7, upper right-hand panel). 
Developments in 2003 and 2004 indicate that the composition of capital inflows is 
changing in many countries in the region towards equity and debt flows, so it is 
reasonable to expect that portfolio flows in the region will become more volatile in the 
future. 
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Graph 6.  Volatility of net private capital flows 
              (standard deviation of flows as a percentage of GDP1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.1
4.9
4.6 4.4 4.2
3.7 3.5 3.3
2.7 2.6 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.0
1.4
0.6
0
2
4
6
8
BG HU CZ EE GR SK HR IE ES PT LV LT SI RO PL IT
 
Note: 1For accession countries, 1995–2003; for EMU members, 1994–99 (except Greece, 1996–2000). 
Sources: IMF; author's estimates. 
 
 
 
Graph 7.  Composition of private capital flows in central and eastern Europe 
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Sources: IMF; author's estimates. 
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Graph 8.  National currency per euro including +/-15% bands 
               from average value1 (inverted scales) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: 1Average calculated over the period January 1999 to January 2004. 
Sources: National data; ECB. 
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Despite large capital flows and a number of external and domestic shocks that have 
affected accession countries over the past few years, nominal exchange rates against the 
euro have not been excessively volatile. As Graph 8 shows, if central parities had been 
defined as the average daily exchange rate of domestic currency against the euro during 
1999–2003, only the Lithuanian litas and the Polish zloty would have exceeded the 
normal fluctuation margins of ±15% around these parities: the litas during 1999 (the 
lower bound), and the zloty briefly in 2001 (the upper bound) and since late 2003 (the 
lower bound). One should recognise that on these occasions the central banks of 
Lithuania and Poland did not intervene, whereas in ERM II they would be involved, 
together with ECB (and possibly other central banks), in interventions at the margin. 
This provides at least some assurance that exchange rate volatility in ERM II might not 
be as high as is often feared. 
It remains to be seen whether in the run-up to the adoption of the euro, in an environment 
of completely free capital flows, there could be significant profit opportunities, giving 
rise to short-term, potentially reversible, capital flows looking for more attractive returns. 
Although one cannot rule out this scenario, the fact that nominal convergence has 
progressed significantly in the acceding countries suggests that the remaining scope for 
such flows could be smaller than during the previous wave of monetary integration. In 
particular, Graph 9 shows that, by August 2004, both long-term bond rates and short-
term policy rates have already converged to a considerable extent. 
 
Graph 9.  Interest rates1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 1In percent; data for August 2004 or latest available. 2Central bank policy rates; the horizontal line refers to
the euro area rate. 
 
35 to 10-year domestic currency government bonds; the horizontal line refers to the 10-year 
German benchmark bond. 
Sources: ECB; national data. 
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1  Introduction 
The last 10 years of transition in the developing countries of Southeastern and Central Europe 
have witnessed an abundance of very interesting and significant economic events. A number 
of countries have already become an integral part of the EU through the first stage of 
expansion, while in the next few years it is expected that countries of South-eastern Europe 
will join as well. Transition countries face the challenge of more active inclusion in the 
European integration process, and one of the key factors in this path is the improvement in the 
structure of trade and in the competitiveness of the economy. This paper analyses the change 
in the structure of international trade of goods, occurring during the process of transition. The 
analysis comprises in part of the countries which have already become full members of the 
European Union as of the first of May of 2004 (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia), as well as Romania and Croatia which are expected to become 
members in the upcoming period.  
The basic hypothesis of this paper is that the greater openness of an economy and the increase 
of trade with the European Union are expected to result in a positive change in the structure of 
trade and the growth in specialisation for transition economies. This means that there should 
be growth in the share of research-oriented goods in the structure of foreign trade relative to 
that of raw material and labour intensive goods, as well as growth in the specialisation of each 
country in intra-industry trade. 
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the change in the structure of trade in Croatia and 
selected transition economies, as well as to explain the noted similarities and differences in 
the dynamics and direction of movements in comparative advantages and in specialisation of 
international trade. The analysis uses indicators that offer information about the comparative 
advantages of each group of products, the openness of the economy, as well as horizontal 
integration and specialisation in production and trade. 
The degree of integration in the international goods market and the level of specialisation 
were analysed by applying the Trade Overlapping Index (TO). The absolute and relative 
Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) indicators were used for analysing the change in the 
structure of trade of observed countries and weather these countries are complementary or 
competitive.  
This paper, through the application of the correlation analysis, tests the influence of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) on the change in comparative advantages and on the level 
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of specialisation in the international markets of Croatia and the selected transition 
countries. 
The paper is divided into three parts. The first part is a description of the research 
methodology. The results of empirical research of interdependent levels of FDI, levels of 
specialisation and changes in comparative advantages are shown in the second part. The third 
section outlines a synthesis of the results from the first and second part of the paper. 
 
 
2  Methodology 
For the purpose of analysing the structure of trade for Croatia and selected transition 
countries, products that are subject to international trade are classified into appropriate 
product groups. The level of intensity of the use of productive factors necessary for the 
production of the products is used as the criteria for classifying goods. Products are classified 
into the following five groups: 
• Raw material-intensive goods (SITC1 groups: 0, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29, 32, 33, 34, 
4, 56), 
• Labour-intensive goods (SITC groups: 26, 61, 63, 64, 65, 66, 69, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 
89), 
• Capital-intensive goods (SITC groups: 1, 35, 53, 55, 62, 67, 68, 78), 
• Easy to imitate research-oriented goods (SITC groups: 51, 52, 54, 58, 59, 75, 76), 
• Difficult to imitate research-oriented goods (SITC groups: 57, 71, 72, 73, 74, 77, 79, 87, 
88). 
The classifications of products mentioned above, as well as the division into five groups of 
products are often used in the analysis of the international trade of goods. Detailed 
classifications in above mentioned product groups are in the appendix.  
The economic analysis of the movements in the structure of international trade of the selected 
transition economies is calculated using the following indicators: 
 
                                                 
1 SITC (Standard International Trade Classification) is the standard international trade 
classification of products used in international trade. 
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• The share of exports and imports in gross domestic product and the relative deficit, 
• “Revealed Comparative Advantage” (RCA indicator), absolute and relative, 
• “Trade Overlap” (TO indicator), according to product group and in aggregate. 
The methodology for calculating the RCA indicator was originally developed by Bela Balassa 
(1965). Later, numerous derivations originated from this indicator. The RCA indicator is 
useful for the purposes of comparing comparative advantage for individual product groups.  
The TO indicator shows the level of integration of the economy of each country in inter and 
intra-industry trade. The methodologies and calculations of TO indicators were developed and 
applied by Finger and de Rosa (1979) 2.  
In the analysis of the structure of trade of Croatia and selected transition economies data is 
sourced from: The International Trade Statistics Yearbook, United Nations, New York, 2003, 
Countries in Transition, The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, Vienna, 
CD-ROM, 2003, and the COMEXT database. 
 
 
3  Empirical Analysis 
3.1  The Openness of an Economy and the Balance of Trade           
of Croatia and Selected Transition Countries 
The periods of transition were characterised by a process of accelerated opening and 
integration of transition countries. Therefore, in this introductory part of the empirical 
analysis, basic indicators and trends in international trade and rising trade openness are 
presented. Although there are numerous indicators for the degree of openness in an economy, 
one of the most often used is the share of trade in gross domestic product (GDP) because of 
its simplicity, accessibility and comparability. 
Table 1 shows changes in shares of exports and imports in GDP of the selected countries. It is 
evident that, besides Poland and Romania, Croatia has a lower level of openness measured by 
the total share of trade in GDP, than in other analysed transition country. Out of all the small 
countries observed (Slovenia, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Croatia) Croatia's economy is 
the least open. This is a consequence of the stagnation of Croatian exports over the course of 
                                                 
2 Details about index specializations in intra-industry trade of transition countries see, for example, 
in Kaminski and Ng. (2001).  
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the observed period in which the share of exports in GDP was considerably lower compared 
with the other analysed countries. 
In all analysed countries, trade rose rapidly relative to the rate of growth in GDP, which has 
resulted in the considerable growth in the share of trade in GDP. Also, all the countries 
experienced stronger growth of imports in relation to exports so that the share of imports in 
GDP in 2001 in all observed countries grew in comparison to the share of exports. 
 
Table 1.  The share of exports and imports in GDP of Croatia 
              and observed transition countries in the period from 1992 to 2001 
The share of exports in GDP (in %) 
 Croatia Czech Republic Hungary Poland Romania Slovenia Slovakia 
1992 - 36.8* 28.7 15.6 18.6 - - 
1995 24.0 41.7 29.1 18.0 22.3 44.4 44.8 
1998 21.0 49.7 48.9 22.2 19.8 46.2 48.7 
1999 21.5 48.8 52.1 21.5 23.9 42.6 49.8 
2000 24.0 56.5 60.3 24.9 28.1 46.1 60.4 
2001 23.9 58.4 58.8 28.4 28.3 47.4 61.7 
The share of imports in GDP (%) 
 Croatia Czech Republic Hungary Poland Romania Slovenia Slovakia 
1992 - 36.3* 29.7 18.8 24.7 - - 
1995 39.9 48.6 35.0 22.8 29.0 50.6 45.8 
1998 38.8 53.6 54.6 37.0 28.3 51.6 59.4 
1999 39.1 52.5 58.3 36.1 29.2 50.2 55.2 
2000 42.8 62.7 68.9 38.4 35.4 53.3 64.9 
2001 46.3 63.8 65.0 39.5 38.7 51.9 72.2 
 
*Note: 1993 figures are used. 
Source: International Trade Statistics Yearbook, United Nations, New York, 2003, The 
Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, Vienna, CD-ROM, 2003. 
 
 
 
The most intensive growth in the share of exports in GDP occurred in Hungary: it rose by 
30.1% from 1992 to 2001. Out of the analysed transition countries the country with the lowest 
share of exports in GDP in 2001 was Croatia (23.9%), practically stagnating in the share of 
exports in GDP. 
It is clear that the movements in exports and imports of goods determined corresponding 
movements in the balance of trade. Table 2 describes movements of relative deficits in the 
trade of Croatia and selected transition countries. Relative trade deficits are defined as            , 
where x is the value of exports, and m is the value of imports.  
mx
mx −
+
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Compared with the other selected transition countries, Croatia realised by far the largest 
relative trade deficit during the period from 1995 until 2001 (Table 2). 
 
Table 2.  Relative foreign trade deficits of Croatia and selected 
              transition countries during the period from 1992 until 2001 
 Croatia Czech Republic Hungary Poland Romania Slovenia Slovakia 
1992 1.5 - -1.7 -9.4 - 4.2 - 
1995 -24.9 -7.7 -9.2 -11.9 -13.0 -6.6 -1.1 
1998 -29.7 -3.8 -5.5 -25.0 -17.6 -5.5 -9.9 
1999 -29.0 -3.6 -5.7 -25.3 -10.0 -8.2 -5.1 
2000 -28.0 -5.2 -6.6 -21.4 -11.5 -7.3 -3.6 
2001 -32.0 -4.4 -5.0 -16.4 -15.5 -4.6 -7.8 
 
Source: The International Trade Statistics Yearbook, United Nations, New York, 2003, own 
calculations.  
 
 
 
This has to be considered with regards to the growth in the share of services exports in total 
exports of Croatia.3 However, Croatia is characterised by consistent tendency of increases in 
its relative deficit that is not common to other transition countries. Out of the analysed 
transition countries, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia have in 2001 the lowest 
relative trade deficits. Common reasons for these movements will be discussed later in the 
paper. Following these countries are Slovakia, Poland and Romania which had in 2001 
relative deficits at approximately the same level (about 16% of GDP). Furthermore, they 
reside at the level in which they were at the beginning of the transition period, although the 
reasons for the emergence of the deficits essentially differed. 
 
 
3.2  “Revealed Comparative Advantage” - RCA Indicator                  
for Comparative Advantage  
Although the indicators we analysed above are important, the key question is what happens 
with the structure of trade. Namely, we can ask does an increase in the international trade 
correspond to an improvement in the structure of international trade. A positive change in the 
structure of trade implies a change in comparative advantages towards groups of products 
providing more value added and specialisation in intra-industry trade. This section analyses 
                                                 
3 See more details in: Croatian Competitiveness Council in collaboration with the Institute for 
International Relations (2002). 
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the question of a change in comparative advantages while the problem of trade specialisation 
is considered afterwards.4
The change in the structure of trade for Croatia and the selected transition countries are 
analysed by the RCA indicator. The RCA indicator is calculated by the formula: 
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X is defined as the value of exports, while M is the value of imports. Index i is the product 
group classified according to (SITC).  
A positive value of the absolute RCA indicator for an individual product group indicates that 
the country has a comparative advantage in the production in that group of products. 
Conversely, a negative sign for the absolute RCA indicator indicates that the country does not 
have a comparative advantage in the corresponding group of products.5 An alternative for 
RCA indicators is the Lafay's RCA index Compared to Balassa's RCA indicator, Lafay's 
index takes in regard the flows of goods trade inside each sector of the economy, gross 
domestic product as well as exports and imports for each group of products.6
Besides Balassa's RCA indicator and Lafay's index, the structure of exports can be analysed 
by using the CEP (Comparative Export Performance) indicator.7  
                                                 
4 The concept of comparative advantage is distinct from competitiveness because of two reasons. 
First, competitiveness is related to the relative strength of a country for producing a given product 
while comparative advantage is to the relative strength of products for a given country. Second, 
competitiveness is also subject to macroeconomic fluctuations (exchange rate or wage policy), 
while comparative advantage is more structural. 
5 In analysing the structure of trade in transition countries using RCA indicators, see for example 
in Djankov and Hoekman (1997), Kaminski and Ng (2001), Yilmaz (2003), Gligorov and Vidović 
(2004). 
6 See more details about the use of Lafay’s index in Lafay (1992). 
7 See more details about the use of CEP indicator in Donges (1982). 
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3.2.1  Analysis of the Structure of Trade for Croatia and Selected                
Transition Countries by Applying the Absolute RCA Indicator 
In Croatia and selected transition countries, the absolute RCA indicator was calculated for the 
five product groups using Balassa's formula. The results are displayed in Table 3. Comparing 
the absolute RCA indicator for Croatia and selected transition countries shows that none of 
the countries had comparative advantages in the production and trade of raw material-
intensive goods (RCA indicators were negative for all countries). Also, in all countries, this 
group of products was characterised by decreasing trends of RCA indicators, which means 
that the countries lost competitiveness in production and trade of this product group. Slovenia 
had the lowest RCA indicator for raw material intensive-goods in 2001 (-139.5), whilst 
Hungary had the highest (-2.95). 
The Czech Republic, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia have comparative advantages in the 
production and trade of labour-intensive goods (positive RCA), however with differing 
intensities. The largest values of absolute RCA indicator in 2001 for labour-intensive goods 
was for Slovenia (25.76) and for the Czech Republic (16.41). In all the analysed transition 
countries comparative advantages for labour-intensive goods decreased during the observed 
period.  
Concerning capital-intensive goods, the Czech Republic and Slovakia had the largest RCA 
indicators. Slovenia also had a comparative advantage in the trade of capital-intensive goods. 
Croatia, Hungary and Poland did not have comparative advantages in the production and trade 
of capital-intensive goods. During the observed period, Croatia had the lowest RCA indicator 
for capital-intensive goods. In 2001, the absolute RCA indicator for Croatia was -90.45. 
In Romania, there was a trend of a significant decrease in the RCA indicator for capital-
intensive goods during the observed period. At the beginning of the transition period all the 
countries were characterised by a significant decline in the RCA indicator for capital-
intensive goods. This can be understood considering the countries’ need for technological 
restructuring at the beginning of transition. 
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Table 3.  Absolute RCA indicator in the Republic of Croatia and in selected 
              transition countries in the period from 1992 to 2001 
 Croatia Czech Republic Hungary Poland Romania Slovenia Slovakia 
Raw material-intensive goods  
1992 8.90 -16.37* 16.85 -12.06 -66.58 -93.79 - 
1995 -25.37 -32.70 3.88 -18.72 -50.59 -125.56 -57.61 
1998 -22.15 -47.17 1.90 -21.74 -51.08 -120.16 -66.21 
1999 -27.14 -46.70 -6.08 -28.94 -21.74 -119.84 -64.76 
2000 -27.97 -64.61 -4.27 -43.82 -23.33 -138.79 -72.10 
2001 -30.08 -66.57 -2.95 -39.06 -42.62 -139.54 -66.60 
Labour-intensive goods 
1992 26.96 47.21* 12.94 1.37 25.90 80.01 - 
1995 0.86 23.01 -13.49 5.90 17.75 43.07 51.22 
1998 -14.43 17.06 -19.36 -6.55 4.67 48.84 1.68 
1999 -8.47 17.48 -20.69 -5.74 6.79 20.36 11.12 
2000 -13.61 16.97 -21.93 -1.76 6.55 24.62 14.37 
2001 -18.91 16.41 -13.23 3.39 4.78 25.76 7.46 
Capital-intensive goods 
1992 -16.43 50.59* -9.74 22.77 45.15 33.75 - 
1995 -84.37 9.31 -16.72 6.18 27.55 -4.00 45.59 
1998 -84.40 23.51 -32.47 -29.40 4.45 1.25 24.86 
1999 -90.55 25.92 -22.37 -27.94 9.70 -7.66 35.91 
2000 -90.62 24.85 -18.16 -14.63 -2.40 1.41 48.47 
2001 -90.45 25.29 -14.26 -14.18 -21.16 4.22 29.64 
Easy to imitate research-oriented goods 
1992 -32.84 -81.53* -37.13 -77.92 -105.81 -60.42 - 
1995 -18.53 -80.48 -26.81 -96.49 -77.34 -50.26 -18.35 
1998 -24.14 -75.68 7.73 -82.49 -107.03 -51.13 -47.62 
1999 -31.64 -85.53 15.00 -89.96 -102.01 -56.23 -44.73 
2000 -34.99 -68.13 23.46 -88.02 -59.98 -54.03 -41.41 
2001 -42.66 -45.71 23.13 -89.24 -70.72 -43.17 -47.08 
Difficult to imitate research-oriented goods 
1992 37.97 -43.87* -33.05 -41.12 -43.15 19.40 - 
1995 -39.48 -48.44 -30.05 -42.63 -64.10 -2.83 -31.29 
1998 -22.68 -13.38 -11.45 -44.84 -50.67 0.52 -44.34 
1999 -20.31 -12.56 -17.69 -41.36 -47.28 0.34 -31.50 
2000 -15.16 -14.39 -25.30 -30.74 -58.01 3.77 -29.82 
2001 -14.49 -16.96 -23.73 -20.82 -44.51 11.01 -34.26 
 
Note: * 1993 figures are used.  
Source: The International Trade Statistics Yearbook, United Nations, New York, 2003, own 
calculations.  
 
 
Except for Hungary, not one of the observed countries had comparative advantages in the 
production and trade of easy to imitate research-oriented goods. Although, it is important to 
note that in all countries except Poland, Slovakia, and Croatia, the RCA indicator for this 
product group improved during the observed period, which is exceptionally encouraging. The 
highest RCA indicator for easy to imitate research-oriented goods in 2001 was in Hungary 
(23.13), and the lowest in Poland (-89.34). 
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From the analysed countries only Slovenia had a comparative advantage in the production and 
trade of difficult to imitate research-oriented goods. The other transition countries had 
negative RCA indicators, but with a distinct trend of improvement in trade of this group of 
products. Croatia has a relatively good RCA indicator primarily because of the inclusion of 
shipbuilding industry in this category. During the observed period the lowest RCA indicators 
for this group of products were Slovakia and Romania. 
In conclusion, compared with other analysed transition countries, Croatia is the only one 
without a comparative advantage in any group of products in 2001, partly explained by the 
prevalent structure of export services. The value of absolute RCA indicator for each product 
group during the observed period indicated that the structure of Croatian trade is moving in 
the expected direction, but significantly slower relative to countries which joined the 
European Union in 2004. The confirmation of an expected positive change in the structure of 
international trade for Croatia will be demonstrated in the following analysis of the relative 
RCA indicators.  
 
3.2.2  The Analysis of the Trade Structure of Croatia and Selected 
Transition Countries by Applying the Relative RCA Indicator 
The absolute RCA indicator forms a basis for only tentative conclusions about the dynamics 
and the desirability of changes in the trade structure therefore, for this sort of analysis, we use 
the relative RCA indicator. Empirical results are calculated for the relative RCA indicator by 
product groups for Croatia and for the selected transition countries in the period from 1992 to 
2001, and are shown in Table 4.  
Relative RCA indicator is calculated by using the formula: 
 
        
where: 
RCArel  is the relative RCA indicator, 
i  denotes the group of products, 
RCAi  is the value of the absolute RCA indicator for an individual group of products,  
RCAuk  is the total RCA indicator. 
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Compared by product groups, Croatia is characterised by a distinctly low value of relative 
RCA indicator for capital-intensive goods. This is a result of considerably larger imports of 
this group of products in relation to exports. The deterioration of the relative RCA indicator 
for capital-intensive goods in the observed period can be attributed first of all to strong 
growth in the imports of road vehicles (personal automobiles), while the exports from that 
group during the observed period remained unchanged. Relative to other groups of products, 
Croatia has the largest value of relative RCA indicator for difficult to imitate research-
oriented goods and for labour-intensive goods. The favourable relative RCA indicator for 
Croatia in difficult to imitate research oriented goods is primarily because of the considerably 
larger value of exports in other transport equipment (ships) relative to imports. This activity 
however, demands a very high level of subsidies. 
Positive values of the relative RCA indicator for labour-intensive products for Croatia are 
very evident. The Czech Republic has the largest relative comparative advantage in the trade 
of capital-intensive goods. High values of relative RCA indicators in the Czech Republic for 
these groups of products are the results of significant investments and developments in the 
automobile industry during the observed period in which the value of exports of road vehicles 
in 2001 recorded a fivefold increase relative to 1993. 
Hungary has considerably larger values of the relative RCA indicator for easy to imitate 
research-oriented goods compared with values of the same indicators in other product groups. 
The increase in the comparative advantage of Hungary in easy to imitate research-oriented 
goods results from the expansion of exports in telecommunication equipment, office machines 
and machines for automatic data processing during the observed period. The development of 
telecommunications and the production of office equipment evolved as a consequence of 
considerable investments of large multinational corporations in informational technology and 
telecommunications in Hungary. 
Compared with other product groups, Poland has the largest relative comparative advantage in 
the trade of labour-intensive goods. Significantly low values of the relative RCA indicator 
were displayed by Poland in easy to imitate research-oriented goods, because of significant 
imports of telecommunication devices, office machines and chemical products. Consequence 
being that in 2001 in Poland, the value of imports of easy to imitate research-oriented goods 
was 3.5 times greater than exports. 
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Table 4.  Relative RCA indicator in Croatia and selected transition countries  
            from the period 1992 to 2001 
 Croatia Czech Republic Hungary Poland Romania Slovenia Slovakia 
Raw material intensive products 
1992 0.06 -0.18* 0.20 0.04 -0.45 -1.03 - 
1995 0.05 -0.19 0.19 0.00 -0.30 -1.14 -0.55 
1998 0.11 -0.40 0.12 0.09 -0.26 -1.10 -0.50 
1999 0.06 -0.40 0.04 0.02 -0.05 -1.06 -0.56 
2000 0.04 -0.55 0.07 -0.16 -0.05 -1.26 -0.65 
2001 0.04 -0.58 0.06 -0.15 -0.20 -1.31 -0.53 
Labour intensive products 
1992 0.24 0.46* 0.16 0.17 0.47 0.71 - 
1995 0.31 0.36 0.02 0.25 0.38 0.55 0.53 
1998 0.19 0.24 -0.09 0.24 0.30 0.59 0.18 
1999 0.24 0.24 -0.11 0.25 0.23 0.34 0.20 
2000 0.19 0.26 -0.10 0.26 0.25 0.37 0.21 
2001 0.15 0.25 -0.04 0.27 0.28 0.34 0.21 
Capital intensive products 
1992 -0.20 0.49* -0.06 0.38 0.67 0.25 - 
1995 -0.54 0.23 -0.01 0.25 0.48 0.08 0.48 
1998 -0.51 0.31 -0.23 0.01 0.29 0.11 0.41 
1999 -0.58 0.33 -0.12 0.03 0.26 0.06 0.45 
2000 -0.58 0.34 -0.07 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.55 
2001 -0.56 0.33 -0.05 0.10 0.02 0.13 0.43 
Easy to imitate research-oriented goods 
1992 -0.36 -0.83* -0.34 -0.62 -0.84 - 0.70 - 
1995 0.12 -0.67 -0.11 -0.78 -0.57 -0.39 -0.16 
1998 0.09 -0.69 0.18 -0.52 -0.82 -0.41 -0.31 
1999 0.01 -0.79 0.25 -0.59 -0.86 -0.42 -0.36 
2000 -0.03 -0.59 0.35 -0.60 -0.42 -0.41 -0.35 
2001 -0.08 -0.38 0.32 -0.65 -0.48 -0.35 -0.34 
Difficult to imitate research-oriented goods 
1992 0.35 -0.45* -0.30 -0.26 -0.22 0.10 - 
1995 -0.09 -0.35 -0.15 -0.24 -0.44 0.09 -0.29 
1998 0.11 -0.06 -0.02 -0.14 -0.26 0.10 -0.28 
1999 0.13 -0.06 -0.08 -0.11 -0.31 0.14 -0.22 
2000 0.17 -0.05 -0.14 -0.03 -0.40 0.16 -0.23 
2001 0.20 -0.09 -0.15 0.03 -0.22 0.19 -0.21 
 
Note: * 1993 figures are used. 
Source: The International Trade Statistics Yearbook, United Nations, New York, 2003, own 
calculations. 
 
 
 
Romania has positive values of the relative RCA indicator only in labour-intensive goods. In 
terms of other product groups Romania has markedly low values of the relative RCA 
indicator, which indicates a structure of exports with low value-added.  
Slovenia had positive values of the relative RCA indicator for labour-intensive goods, capital-
intensive goods and difficult to imitate research-oriented goods. Significant comparative 
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advantages were calculated in Slovenia in the trade of labour-intensive goods and difficult to 
imitate research-oriented goods. The relative RCA indicator in labour-intensive products 
decreased during the observed period, while difficult to imitate research-oriented goods 
increased. The increase in the relative RCA indicator for difficult to imitate research-oriented 
goods arose as a consequence of the dynamic growth in exports of electronic machines, 
appliances and devices where the value of exports of this product group in 2001 ended 
twofold higher than 1992. Labour-intensive goods in the observed period came to a 
significant increase in exports of furniture. 
Compared to other product groups, Slovakia demonstrated significant comparative advantages 
in the trade of capital intensive goods. Similarly in the Czech Republic, comparative 
advantages in this product group were the result of significant investments in the automobile 
industry and the expansion in exports of road vehicles as well as production in parts for the 
automobile industry. 
Except for Croatia and Hungary, all of the analysed transition countries in 2001 had negative 
values of relative RCA indicators in raw material-intensive goods. Significant increases in 
imports of raw material relative to exports resulted in that Slovenia had a markedly lower 
relative RCA indicator in this product group relative to the other observed countries. 
Hungary is the only one of the analysed transition countries with a negative relative RCA 
indicator for labour-intensive goods.  
For easy to imitate research-oriented goods, Hungary had the only positive values of relative 
RCA indicators out of the analysed countries, and for difficult to imitate research-oriented 
goods only Croatia and Slovenia had positive values of relative RCA indicators. 
Compared to other observed countries the largest relative RCA indicator in 2001 for capital-
intensive goods was in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, and the lowest was in Croatia. The 
improvement in relative and absolute RCA indicators of capital-intensive goods in each of the 
analysed transition countries was the result of car industry development. Foreign direct 
investments by multinational corporations from the leading countries of the European Union, 
the US and individual Asian countries restructured the automobile industries of transition 
economies.  
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3.3  Similarities in the Structure of Croatian Trade                  
Relative to that of Selected Transition Countries 
The paper so far has analysed changes of absolute and relative RCA indicators according to 
individual product groups. However, we now move on to the question of similarities in the 
structure of trade, analysing whether Croatia has a complementary or competitive structure 
with the analysed transition countries. The analysis is made using the average deviation of the 
relative RCA indicator in Croatia compared to analysed transition country by product groups. 
The average deviation of the relative RCA indicator is calculated using the formula: 
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where: 
s  is the average deviation relative RCA indicator for Croatia compared to each analysed 
transition country, it can assume values of 1, 2; in which 1 denotes raw material goods and 
labour-intensive goods, while 2 is capital-intensive goods, easy to imitate and difficult to 
imitate research-oriented goods,  
xa  is the relative RCA indicator for Croatia 
xb  is the relative RCA indicator for an observed transition country 
N  is the number of product groups. In our case N=2. 
A large average deviation of relative RCA indicators indicates a greater difference in the 
structure of goods trade between two countries (the countries are complementary). 
Conversely, a low deviation of relative RCA indicators indicates a greater similarity in the 
structure of trade between two countries (the countries are competitive). An alternative 
measure for comparing the structures of international trade between countries is the Export 
Similarity indicator (ES)8. 
                                                 
8 Export Similarities - ES indicator shows the level of similarites in the structure of exports between 
two countries. It is calculated using the following formula:  
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ES indicator is used for measuring the different stuctures of exports of county a and of country b in 
country c. EXi(ac) describes a part of export products i of country a in country c in total exports of 
country a in country c. In this way the indicator is calculated assuming values in the interval from 
0 to 1. The closer the ES indicator is to 1 the more similar the structure of exports between two 
countries. For details about the concept of the ES indicator see in Finger and Kreinen (1979).  
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Empirical results calculated from the average deviation in relative RCA indicators of Croatia 
in relation to each analysed transition country are shown in Table 5. 
 
Table 5.  Average deviation of relative RCA indicators of Croatia 
             in relation to each analysed transition country 
 Hungary Poland Romania Slovenia Slovakia Czech Republic 
1995 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.71 0.46 0.25 
1998 0.26 0.24 0.38 0.58 0.45 0.34 
1999 0.43 0.16 0.34 0.74 0.51 0.33 
2000 0.45 0.09 0.16 0.83 0.56 0.38 
2001 0.42 0.07 0.18 0.86 0.44 0.44 
 
Source: International Trade Statistics Yearbook, United Nations, New York, 2003, own 
calculations. 
 
 
 
The average deviation of relative RCA indicator of Croatia in relation to each analysed 
transition country indicates that Croatia has the most similar structure of trade with Poland 
and Romania (Table 5) - the least developed, in terms of GDP per capita, transition countries 
of those selected. Out of the analysed countries, Croatia has the largest difference in the 
structure of trade relative to Slovenia, the most developed country. During the observed 
period, from 1995 to 2001, Croatia became increasingly different in the structure of trade 
relative to the structure of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia, because these 
countries quickly changed their trade structure. Moreover, Croatia experienced decreasing 
differences in the structure of trade relative to Poland and Romania. 
 
 
 
 
3.4  Comparative Advantage, Specialisation                                  
and Foreign Direct Investment 
At the very beginning of the transition process of Eastern European countries domestic 
national savings for investment were not sufficient for successfull restructuring and 
competing on the international market. The creation of competitive products resulted in strong 
demand for appropriate management, know-how, as well as the application of high 
technology. Despite this, the development and the application of technology that the most 
developed countries had accomplished up until then created new possibilities for rapid 
economic growth of the transition countries. First of all this pertains to the fragmentation of 
the European as well as of the world production processes. Namely, large industrial 
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conglomerates organise production processes in a way that each phase of production is 
delegated to separate autonomous firm. That kind of production enabled individual firms in 
transition countries to reconstruct, turning from local markets and integrating themselves into 
the production chain of large multinational corporations. 
Research in the field of international trade showed that the trade in product parts and intra-
industry trade was the fastest growing segment in international trade. According to rough 
estimations, the trade in parts makes 30% of total international trade, for example see 
Aturupane, Djankov and Hoekman (1997), Kaminski (2001). The phenomenon of 
fragmentation in production processes that includes firms from various countries is resulting 
in the appearance of added flows within total trade. Namely, a large part of international trade 
has been taken over by trade within individual sectors. A larger portion of intra-industry trade 
in total trade of goods shows a larger integration of an economy in international trade. The 
most commonly used indicators for the measuring of the level of specialisation in intra-
industry trade are the Trade Overlap Index (TO index) and the Grubel-Lloyd index9. On the 
subject of specialisation in transition countries that entered the EU in the first circle of 
integration see for example in Havlik, Landesmann and Stehrer (2001).  
TO index measures the level of specialisation in the international trade of goods within a 
sector relative to the international trade of goods between different sectors of the economy. 
TO indicator in the broadest sense shows the degree of liberalisation and integration of the 
economy in the international market. It is calculated using the formula: 
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X  is defined as the value of goods exports, and  M  is the value of imports. The index i shows 
the group of products classified according to SITC, it ranges from 0 to 910. The coefficient can 
vary from 0 to 1. The closer it is to 1, the higher degree of specialisation in intra-industry 
                                                 
9 Calculated using the formula:  
   
mx
mx
GL +
−−= 1   
in which: GL = Grubel-Lloyd's index, x= the value of the export goods sector, m= the value of 
imports in the goods sector. About the use of GL index see for example in Hoekman and Djankov 
(1996), Dixon and Menon (1997). Kaminski and Ng (2001), Boromisa and Mikić (2002). 
10 For more detail analysis of trade specialization in intra-industry trade 3 digit level of data 
aggregation is required  
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trade11. Lower value of the coefficient shows that the country has a larger level of 
specialisation in trade between sectors. A larger level of trade within a sector means a larger 
integration of the country in the trade of goods with other countries. Empirical results of the 
calculation of total TO indicator for Croatia and for the selected transition countries in the 
period from 1992 to 2001 are shown in Table 6. 
 
Table 6.  “Trade Overlap Index”, TO indicator for Croatia and selected 
               transition countries in the period from 1992 to 2001 
 Croatia Czech Republic Hungary Poland Romania Slovenia Slovakia 
1992 0.88 - 0.71 0.74 0.64 0.75 - 
1995 0.72 0.64 0.74 0.79 0.69 0.78 0.69 
1998 0.69 0.92 0.86 0.71 0.63 0.86 0.82 
1999 0.69 0.92 0.88 0.74 0.64 0.84 0.85 
2000 0.70 0.91 0.88 0.75 0.65 0.84 0.84 
2001 0.66 0.91 0.88 0.79 0.62 0.87 0.84 
 
Source: The International Trade Statistics Yearbook, United Nations, New York, 2003, own 
calculations. 
 
 
 
As seen from the table it is obvious that the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia show the 
largest level of specialisation in intra-industry trade. At the same time, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia show trends of growing integration in international 
flows of goods and specialisation. In Croatia we observe a trend of decreasing TO indicators 
from the period 1992 to 2001, while in Romania the TO indicator stagnated. From the 
analysed transition countries, Romania and Croatia had the lowest values of the TO indicator 
in 2001, which coincides with the conclusion from the previous part of the paper about the 
greatest similarity in the structure of trade for these two countries. 
The value of the TO indicator for Croatia in 2001 indicates a low level of trade integration 
and specialisation. Croatia, despite being a small country, has a significantly lower TO 
indicator in relation to the analysed countries that joined the European Union in 2004. This 
confirms the hypothesis that Croatia is lagging behind in the integration of its economic 
structures and specialisation in intra-industry trade in relation to the analysed transition 
countries that have joined the European Union in 2004. 
A comparison of TO indicator values (Table 6) with the average deviation of relative RCA 
indicators (Table 5) shows that Croatia has the largest similarity in the structure of trade with 
                                                 
11 More about problems of data aggregation and aggregate trade imbalances when using different 
types of intra-industry indicators see Greenway and Milner (1986). 
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countries that have slightly lower values of TO indicators. This leads to the conclusion that 
greater specialisation of a country in intra-industry trade and greater integration in the 
international flow of goods is correlated with a positive change in the structure of trade. 
 
Table 7:  TO indicators for Croatia and selected transition countries 
             by product group during the period from 1992 to 2001 
 Croatia Czech Republic Hungary Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia 
Raw material-intensive goods 
1992 0.79 0.53* 0.25 0.48 0.40 - 0.43 
1995 0.60 0.45 0.33 0.50 0.43 0.52 0.34 
1998 0.64 0.45 0.34 0.59 0.42 0.43 0.35 
1999 0.57 0.43 0.32 0.53 0.50 0.47 0.34 
2000 0.59 0.41 0.36 0.49 0.54 0.49 0.27 
2001 0.59 0.41 0.33 0.53 0.47 0.48 0.30 
Labour-intensive goods 
1992 0.69 0.60* 0.59 0.62 0.38 - 0.65 
1995 0.71 0.65 0.61 0.54 0.39 0.68 0.73 
1998 0.67 0.80 0.59 0.60 0.35 0.70 0.81 
1999 0.69 0.80 0.58 0.60 0.35 0.70 0.80 
2000 0.72 0.80 0.59 0.65 0.35 0.70 0.81 
2001 0.66 0.81 0.65 0.68 0.35 0.71 0.81 
Capital-intensive goods 
1992 0.59 0.67* 0.79 0.45 0.42 - 0.76 
1995 0.36 0.82 0.76 0.66 0.46 0.60 0.85 
1998 0.30 0.78 0.75 0.67 0.46 0.75 0.91 
1999 0.28 0.77 0.83 0.68 0.51 0.70 0.86 
2000 0.29 0.75 0.84 0.81 0.53 0.66 0.90 
2001 0.25 0.75 0.83 0.82 0.57 0.74 0.89 
Easy to imitate research-oriented goods  
1992 0.63 0.52* 0.70 0.45 0.36 - 0.53 
1995 0.51 0.48 0.76 0.37 0.47 0.51 0.57 
1998 0.71 0.55 0.83 0.35 0.33 0.65 0.56 
1999 0.68 0.50 0.75 0.33 0.42 0.69 0.52 
2000 0.69 0.58 0.78 0.37 0.62 0.70 0.54 
2001 0.61 0.72 0.79 0.41 0.52 0.70 0.58 
Difficult to imitate research-oriented goods 
1992 0.44 0.69* 0.66 0.49 0.68 - 0.77 
1995 0.51 0.65 0.63 0.51 0.51 0.74 0.79 
1998 0.64 0.90 0.62 0.47 0.52 0.72 0.80 
1999 0.64 0.92 0.60 0.52 0.53 0.77 0.82 
2000 0.62 0.92 0.61 0.67 0.51 0.82 0.82 
2001 0.53 0.90 0.60 0.66 0.58 0.78 0.82 
 
Note: * 1993 figures are used. 
Source: The International Trade Statistics Yearbook, United Nations, New York, 2003, own 
calculations. 
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The problem of a small TO indicator for Croatia is not only present at the level of aggregate 
values of exports and imports, but it is also explicitly present for all groups of products as 
shown in Table 712. 
Comparing the TO indicator for Croatia by product groups indicates that Croatia has the 
highest specialisation in intra-industry trade for labour-intensive goods, and the lowest for 
capital-intensive goods (Table 7).  
 
Significantly low values of TO indicators for capital-intensive goods are primarily the results 
of considerably higher imports of road vehicles relative to exports during the observed period. 
Croatia experienced a decline in the level of specialisation in the trade of capital-intensive 
goods with significant growth in the value of imports of road vehicles, and at the same time 
stagnating exports. 
 
 
3.5  Interdependence in the Level of Specialisation (TO Index), the       
Structure of Trade (RCA) and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
After we determined the movement of the TO index, the question arises as to whether the 
specialisation in intra-industry trade leads towards improvement of the RCA indicator or if 
these movements are independent. The purpose of the following analysis is to discover the 
relationship between the TO indicator and the total RCA indicator. The analysis of the 
strength in the correlation between the total RCA indicator and the TO indicator, is performed 
using Pearson's coefficient of linear correlation. Pearson's coefficient of linear correlation is 
covariant of standardised variables X and Y. It ranges between -1 and 1. As the coefficient 
approaches 0 the correlation is weaker and inversely, as it approaches 1 the correlation is 
stronger. It is calculated using the formula: 
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In our observation, empirical values of total RCA indicators are taken as variable x, while the 
values of TO indicators are defined with y. 
                                                 
12 For more detail analysis of trade specialization in intra-industry trade 3 digit level of data 
aggregation is required.  
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Pearson's coefficient of linear correlation between total TO and the RCA indicator of 
analysed transition countries is 0.65. The value of Pearson's coefficient indicates that there is 
a statistically significant relationship between the integration of analysed transition countries 
in international flows of goods and the change in the structure of trade. The correlation is of 
a medium level. Also, the relationship is positive, which means that the increase in 
specialisation and intra-industry trade and the greater integration in the international market 
of goods have had a positive influence on the change in the structure of trade. 
 
The reason why Croatia lags behind in the improvement of its structure of trade relative to 
the analysed countries that joined the European Union in 2004, measured by the total RCA 
indicator, can be explained by the lower degree of specialisation of Croatia in intra-industry 
trade. On the other hand, it is expected that foreign direct investments are the main promoters 
of the change in comparative advantages of transition countries, and the strengthening of 
intra-industry trade. This is also confirmed by Pearson's coefficient of linear correlation 
between the total TO index and FDI per capita of analysed transition countries. The 
coefficient is 0.69, which indicates a statistically significant correlation between foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and the level of specialisation in intra-industry trade (TO) for the analysed 
countries. The correlation is of a medium level. The increase of foreign direct investment per 
capita had a positive effect on the growth in the integration of the economy of transition 
countries in the international market for goods. However, the findings are especially 
interesting if Croatia is left out from the sample of observed countries. Then the value of 
Pearson's coefficient amounts to 0.75 and indicates that the relationship between FDI and TO 
in Croatia is weak. In contrast with other analysed countries, Croatia experienced an 
increase of foreign direct investment but a decrease in the specialisation in intra-industry 
trade. The TO indicator decreased in the product groups of raw material-intensive, labour-
intensive and capital-intensive goods. In the group of easy to imitate research-oriented goods, 
a change in the index of specialisation did not occur, while the TO increased for difficult to 
imitate research-oriented goods due to the growth in shipbuilding. 
 
The same conclusion is drawn from Graph 1, which shows the correlation of FDI and the 
RCA indicator. The value of Pearson's coefficient of linear correlation between the total RCA 
indicator and foreign direct investment in selected transition countries amounts to 0.62, which 
indicates a positive correlation of a medium level. This means that foreign direct investment 
in the countries had a positive effect on the change in the structure of trade since with the 
increase in foreign direct investment came an improvement in the total RCA indicator. 
Croatia is a clear exception because for a given level of FDI per capita, a more significant 
change in the RCA indicator was expected. 
A comparison of the total RCA indicator across analysed countries shows that Hungary, the 
Czech Republic and Slovenia have the highest values for total RCA indicators, and Croatia 
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has the lowest. Of the analysed countries the highest direct investments per capita were in the 
Czech Republic and Hungary, and the lowest was in Romania. 
Apart from Croatia and Slovenia, in all the analysed transition countries it is observed that 
countries with the higher values of foreign direct investments per capita have higher total 
RCA indicators (Graph 1). Although Slovenia has significantly lower foreign direct 
investment per capita in 2001 relative to the Czech Republic and Hungary, the total RCA 
indicator is almost at the same level as in those two countries. The highest deviation is for 
Croatia where there is no correlation between foreign direct investment and the change in the 
structure of trade. The growth of foreign direct investment in Croatia did not contribute to the 
improvement in the structure of trade, as was the case in other analysed transition countries. 
 
Graph 1.  The relationship between the total RCA indicator and foreign direct  
               investment per capita (expressed in current USD) in Croatia 
               and selected transition countries in 2001 
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Source: The International Trade Statistics Yearbook, United Nations, New York, 2003, own 
calculations. 
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It can be concluded from the analysis of the correlation in movements of FDI, RCA and the 
index of specialisation (TO) that Croatia is an exception in the group of observed countries. 
Namely, although relatively high growth in FDI per capita is noted during the observed 
period, those investments did not contribute to the growth in specialisation, or to a significant 
improvement in the RCA indicator. On the aggregate level it is evident in the character of FDI 
investments. Most investments were directed toward domestic markets i.e. monopoly or 
oligopoly positions. Also, a large portion of investments were directed into the non-tradable 
sector (banking, telecommunications) or investments for the domestic market in the 
manufacturing industry (for the process of reconstruction of the economy)13. FDI flows into 
the tradable sector were almost completely absent, which is why there is an atypical 
correlation between FDI, RCA and TO. It is important to mention that FDI did not flow into 
the tourist industry, which serves as a further explanation for the atypical correlation between 
foreign direct investment and the structure of trade. The lack of FDI for the tradable sector 
during the period of transition brought Croatia into the position of growing imbalances in 
international trade. Increasingly evident is the problem of growth in public debt and in total 
foreign debt. By the end of 2003 public debt reached 53% of GDP while total foreign debt 
was 83% of GDP. Therefore, in the coming period, a very intense effort needs to be made in 
creating the conditions that would influence the attraction of foreign direct investments to the 
tradable sector. Those conditions are: the strengthening of the integration processes, the 
judicial system reform, the acceleration of standardisation, the development of the 
infrastructure and the improvement in the quality of the labour force. 
 
 
4  Conclusion 
Despite the high level of data agregation, the obtained empirical results clearly indicate the 
key problems related to the structure of Croatian trade: 
• High relative deficits in the trade of goods with foreign countries is continuously present, 
with the tendency to stagnate in the share of goods exports in GDP; 
• The structure of trade is dominated by raw material-intensive goods and labour intensive 
goods relative to capital-intensive goods and research-oriented goods; 
                                                 
13 Details about the structure and FDI sector distribution in transition countries, as well as its 
effects on the growth in the economy and on international trade see in Lovrinčević, Marić and 
Mikulić (2004). The same atypical relationship between FDI and international trade for Croatia is 
confirmed by using different techniques of analysis.  
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• The share of raw material-intensive goods and labour-intensive goods relative to capital-
intensive goods and research-oriented goods is larger in the structure of exports than in 
the structure of imports; 
• The relative RCA indicator shows an advantage in the production of products of low 
value-added and more of a similarity in the structure of international trade with countries 
at much lower levels of GDP per capita (Romania and Poland); 
• There is a low level of integration in the international market of goods, of intra-industry 
trade and of specialisation. Croatia has a considerably lower TO indicator than observed 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe; 
• Differing from other analysed countries the direct relationship between FDI, RCA and 
the TO indicator is not evident for Croatia;  
• Although it has a relatively high level of FDI per capita, Croatia has enormous 
difficulties with an absence of FDI in the tradable sector, and so far the FDI has been 
aimed at taking a monopoly or an oligopoly position in the domestic market. 
 
Compared with the other selected transition countries, Croatia has the highest relative deficit, 
and the Czech Republic and Hungary the lowest. 
Next to Poland and Romania, Croatia has a somewhat lower level in the openness of its 
economy measured by the share of trade in GDP relative to the other analysed transition 
countries. This is primarily the result of the stagnation of exports during the observed period 
in which the share of exports in GDP was considerably lower compared to other analysed 
countries. 
Compared with other observed countries Czech Republic, Slovenia and Slovakia have 
comparative advantages in production and trade of capital-intensive goods. Hungary is the 
only one from the analysed countries that has a comparative advantage in the trade of easy to 
imitate research-oriented goods, while only Slovenia has a comparative advantage in difficult 
to imitate research-oriented goods. 
When compared with analysed transition countries, Croatia has the most similar structure of 
trade with Poland and Romania, while at the same time it has the greatest difference in the 
structure of trade with Slovenia. During the observed period, there is an increasing difference 
in the structure of Croatian trade relative to the structure of trade of the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Slovenia, while the difference in the structure of trade is decreasing in relation 
to Poland and Romania. 
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The Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia have the highest levels of integration in the 
international flow of goods and specialisation in intra-industry trade, as measured by the TO 
index. In comparison, the TO indicator for Croatia by product group shows that Croatia has 
the highest specialisation in intra-industry trade in labour-intensive goods, and the lowest in 
capital-intensive goods. The low level of the total TO indicator shows the low level of 
specialisation of Croatia in intra-industry trade, as well as the low levels of trade integration. 
The calculated relative RCA indicator shows the existence of relative advantages in the 
production of labour-intensive goods, difficult to imitate research-oriented goods (ships), as 
well as of raw material-intensive goods. Raw material-intensive goods, labour-intensive 
goods, and the low value-added that Croatia realises in the export of ships indicate the 
existence of relative advantage predominately in products with low value-added. 
The results show that the trade structures of analysed countries were positively correlated with 
the level of specialisation in intra-industry trade (TO indicator). In other words, the increase 
in the trade integration of analysed countries had a positive effect on the improvement in the 
structure of trade. 
Croatia shows the most similarity in the structure of trade with Poland and Romania, which, 
like Croatia, have lower levels of openness in their economies, as well as lower levels of 
specialisation in intra-industry trade (TO) relative to other analysed transition countries. 
Except for Croatia, a higher level of foreign direct investment in selected transition countries 
had an explicitly positive effect on the change in the structure of trade and growth in 
specialisation in intra-industry trade.  
Empirical results confirm the hypothesis that Croatia is significantly lagging behind in the 
improvement of its structure of international trade relative to analysed transition countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe. This shows the importance of accelerating structural reforms in 
Croatia. 
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Appendix 
Classification of Products by the Intensity of the Use of Factors of Production and the 
Standard International Trade Classification of Products (SITC) 
 
 
Raw material-intensive goods: 
 
 
SITC 0 Food and live animals chiefly for food 
SITC 21 Hides, skins and furskins, raw 
SITC 22 Oil seeds and oleaginous fruit 
SITC 23 Crude rubber (including synthetic and reclaimed) 
SITC 24 Cork and wood 
SITC 25 Pulp and waste paper 
SITC 27 Crude fertiliser and crude minerals 
SITC 28 Metalliferous ores and metal scrap 
SITC 29 Crude animal and vegetable materials, nes 
SITC 32 Coal, coke and briquettes 
SITC 33 Petroleum, petroleum products and related materials 
SITC 34 Gas, natural and manufactured 
SITC 4 Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 
SITC 56 Fertilisers, manufactured 
 
 
 
 
Labour-intensive goods: 
 
 
SITC 26 Textile fibres (not wool tops) and their wastes (not in yarn) 
SITC 61 Leather, leather manufactures, nes, and dressed furskins 
SITC 63 Cork and wood, cork manufactures 
SITC 64 Paper, paperboard, and articles of pulp, of paper or of paperboard 
SITC 65 Textile yarn, fabrics, made-up articles, nes, and related products 
SITC 66 Non-metallic mineral manufactures, nes 
SITC 69 Manufactures of metals, nes 
SITC 81 Prefabricated buildings; sanitary, plumbing, heating and lighting fixtures and 
fittings, nes 
SITC 82 Furniture and parts thereof 
SITC 83 Travel goods, handbags and similar containers 
SITC 84 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories 
SITC 85 Footwear 
SITC 89 Miscellaneous manufactured articles, nes 
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Capital- intensive goods: 
 
 
SITC 1 Beverages and tobacco 
SITC 35 Electric current 
SITC 53 Dyeing, tanning and colouring materials 
SITC 55 Oils and perfume materials; toilet and cleansing preparations  
SITC 62 Rubber manufactures, nes 
SITC 67 Iron and steel 
SITC 68 Non-ferrous metals 
SITC 78 Road vehicles 
 
 
 
 
Easy to imitate research oriented goods: 
 
 
SITC 51 Organic chemicals 
SITC 52 Inorganic chemicals 
SITC 54 Medicinal and pharmaceutical products 
SITC 58 Artificial resins and plastic materials, and cellulose esters etc 
SITC 59 Chemical materials and products, nes 
SITC 75 Office machines and automatic data processing equipment 
SITC 76 Telecommunications, sound recording and reproducing equipment 
 
 
 
 
Difficult to imitate research-oriented goods: 
 
 
SITC 57 Plastics in primary forms 
SITC 71 Power generating machinery and equipment 
SITC 72 Machinery specialised for particular industries  
SITC 73 Metalworking machinery 
SITC 74 General industrial machinery and equipment, nes, and parts of, nes 
SITC 77 Electric machinery, apparatus and appliances, nes, and parts, nes 
SITC 79 Other transport equipment 
SITC 87 Professional, scientific, controlling instruments, nes, parts 
SITC 88 Photographic equipment and supplies, optical goods, watches, etc 
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Capital Flows to Transition Economies: 
Implications for Investment 
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Abstract 
At the beginning of the 1990’s, transition countries started with trade liberalization, which, 
coupled with capital and financial integration paved the way for foreign capital inflows 
and outflows. The magnitude and sequence of this capital account liberalization was not 
the same throughout the transition countries. Two thirds of total capital inflows to 
transition countries (excluding the ex Soviet countries) concentrated in only three of them, 
the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary. Capital inflows can have positive impacts on the 
developing (transition) countries. Most importantly, capital inflows can directly enhance 
economic growth by increasing level and efficiency of investments and through the 
development of the domestic financial sector. Access to foreign capital can also smooth 
consumption, improve risk management between domestic and foreign investors and 
deepen integration with international financial markets. This paper focuses on some of 
these positive effects. We analyze the implications of capital inflows into transition 
countries on domestic investment. For that purpose, we conducted regression analysis on 
panel data on a sample of 11 transition countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia). 
We used the instrumental variables method, due to the endogenous nature of capital 
inflows. Our findings indicate a positive relation between capital inflows and the level of 
domestic investment. Other foreign investments (mainly foreign loans) have the highest 
impact on domestic investment. Foreign direct investments (FDI) have a positive and 
significant influence on domestic investment, while foreign portfolio investments have no 
significant impact on domestic investment activity. 
Keywords: transition economies, capital inflows, domestic investment, panel data analysis 
JEL Classification: C33, F21 
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Introduction 
At the beginning of the 1990s, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe began the 
transition process from a centrally managed system toward a market economy. A large 
number of structural and institutional reforms occurred simultaneously, while the price 
and market liberalization substantially increased the openness of national economies. 
These processes of liberalization, in conjunction with the beginning of privatization, 
contributed the most to the foreign capital inflow in transition economies. 
This paper analyzes the positive aspects of the inflows of foreign capital in transition 
economies with an emphasis on the relationship between foreign capital inflows and 
domestic investment activities in transition economies. The following hypothesis is put 
forth, stating that during the period of 1993-2002, in 11 of the selected Central and 
Eastern European countries foreign capital stimulated domestic investments (a 
"crowding in" effect). Moreover, the study then continues to analyze the impact of 
individual categories of foreign capital inflows including foreign direct investments, 
portfolio investments and other foreign investments, on domestic investments in 
transition economies. 
This paper contains five parts. After the introduction, the first part gives a short 
methodological framework, which lists the basic categories of foreign investment. The 
second part shows the findings of other authors who analyzed the influence of foreign 
capital inflows on recipient countries. In the third and fourth part the emphasis is placed 
on transition economies. The development of international investments in these countries 
is shown first, followed by the results of the regression analysis testing the basic 
hypothesis. Concluding remarks as well as the list of references and appendices are given 
at the end. 
 
 
1  Methodological Framework 
An international flow of capital is formed when the resident of a country invests capital 
in another country by using different types of investments. Investments could be in the 
form of a loan to the resident of another country, the purchase of securities of a company 
or country, or a share in a non-residential company. From this definition it can be seen 
that there are several categories of international investments. According to IMF 
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definition, foreign investments can be divided into foreign direct investments, foreign 
portfolio investments and other foreign investments.1
All of the transactions within individual categories of international investments are 
recorded in the balance of payments, specifically in the financial account of the balance 
of payments. The rules of bookkeeping and methodology for the composition of the 
balance of payments for all their members are stipulated by the IMF. The balance of 
payments data are sourced from the International Financial Statistics - IFS.  
 
 
2  Empirical Literature About the Foreign Capital Inflows     
in Developing Countries  
The issue of international flows of capital is often explored in economic theory. A large 
number of textbooks and papers are concerned with the theoretical aspects of 
international capital transactions. The empirical literature covering this theme is, 
however, relatively small compared to the theoretical, but still sufficient for a useful 
analysis and study. If individual categories of international capital flows are taken, one 
can easily notice more theoretical as well as empirical literature on the topic of foreign 
direct investments, while the impact of the inflow of foreign portfolio investments and 
other foreign investments are significantly less explored. This provided additional motive 
for exploring the influence of all categories of international capital flows in this paper. 
The inflow of capital in developing countries is also a broadly analyzed theme. 
Theoretical and empirical literature on the subject of capital flows in developing 
countries during the 90s can be grouped into 4 basic categories, according to subject. The 
first category deals with the reasons for international capital transactions in developing 
countries.2 In these studies authors were trying to find out whether the expansion of 
foreign capital inflows in developing countries was relatively more influenced by 
external factors ("push") or internal factors ("pull"). Examples of external factors are the 
interest rates differential or the business cycles of the US and EU, while internal factors 
include the intensification of the privatization processes, implemented structural reforms 
or successful stabilization programs in some of the developing countries. 
                                                 
1 IMF (1993). 
2 For example, Calvo, Leiderman, Reinhart (1996). Determinants of foreign direct investments in 
transition economies are dealt by Resmini (2000). That study places an emphasis on foreign direct 
investments in individual sectors of the manufacturing industry.  
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The second group of studies examines the challenges for the creators of economic policy 
brought on by the inflow of foreign capital. One of the most commonly analyzed theme 
is the well known "trilema" (impossible trinity)3, according to which the countries in the 
conditions of free flows of capital must decide between fixing the foreign exchange rate 
and retaining the independence of monetary policy. A large part of the literature from 
this category deals with restrictions and controls of capital transactions. 
The third group of studies is concerned with the characteristics of individual categories 
of foreign investments. By comparing individual categories of international capital flows, 
conclusions are drawn concerning the characteristics and differences between foreign 
direct investments, foreign portfolio investments, and other foreign investments.4 
Furthermore, these studies explore the historical development of individual categories of 
international capital. 
Finally, the fourth group of theoretical and empirical literature deals with the effects of 
capital flows on domestic economies. Generally, this topic explores the relationship 
between the flows of foreign savings and the domestic aggregates, such as economic 
growth, exports, national savings and domestic investments. 
This paper falls into the fourth category, as it examines the influence of foreign capital 
on domestic investments. It attempts to provide an answer to the question of whether 
foreign capital in selected transition economies stimulated domestic investment activity 
(a "crowding in" effect) or displaced it (a "crowding out" effect). 
These issues in particular were analyzed in the study of Bosworth and Collins (1999). 
The authors examined the effect of foreign capital inflows and each individual category 
on savings and investments in developing countries. The principal conclusion of the 
analysis was that foreign capital inflows in 58 countries of Latin America, East Asia and 
Africa during the period 1978-1995 stimulated the growth of domestic investments but 
also decreased national savings. The result of this influence of foreign capital inflows 
was a growth in the current account deficit of the observed countries. 
This general conclusion shelters the specifics of individual forms of foreign capital. 
Namely, different categories of inflows have different effects on the domestic economy. 
                                                 
3 Obstfeld (1998). 
4 For example Fernandez-Arias and Hausmann (2000) examine the stability of each individual 
category of international investments. 
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According to the results of the analysis, foreign direct investments stimulate domestic 
investments and national savings, while the influence on the current account was 
negligible. Portfolio foreign investments stimulate domestic investments, while the 
estimated affect on national savings was very small with an insignificant coefficient. 
Finally, other foreign investments stimulate domestic investments and at the same time 
decreased national savings, thus presenting the largest influence on the current account 
deficit. 
Mody and Murshid (2004) in their analysis followed up on the work of Bosworth and 
Collins. They also examined the relationship between total foreign capital inflows and 
domestic investments in developing countries. In contrast to the previous analysis, the 
authors expanded the observed period until 1999. The results of the analysis confirmed 
the thesis that domestic investments could be stimulated through foreign capital inflows. 
The authors divided the period of observation into two periods, the eighties and the 
nineties of the 20th century, followed by additional analysis. In that way they sought to 
examine the relationship between domestic investments and foreign capital inflows 
separately during the two periods. Their main conclusion was that over time, the 
relationship weakened. In other words, in the nineties the effect of stimulating domestic 
investments through foreign capital inflows in developing countries was relatively 
smaller than in the eighties, although there was still a positive relationship between the 
variables. 
One more study, which empirically analyzed the influence of foreign capital on the 
domestic economy, was the paper by Borensztein, De Gregorio and Lee (1998). This 
study examined the influence of foreign direct investments on economic growth and 
domestic investments in 69 developing countries during the seventies and the eighties of 
the 20th century. 
The results of these analyses show that the flow of foreign direct investments in 
developing countries is an important mechanism for technology transfer, which has a 
relatively larger influence on economic growth rather then on domestic investment 
activity. The conclusion is that encouraging technological development, and therefore 
overall efficiency, is the primary channel through which foreign direct investment 
influences economic growth. The increasing accumulation of capital (investment) has an 
influence on economic growth, but that effect is relatively smaller than the increase in 
efficiency. 
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The paper by Krkoska from 2001 was the empirical contribution to the topic of foreign 
capital inflows and their implications on domestic economic activity in transition 
countries. The author analyzed the influence of foreign capital inflows on domestic 
investment activity in 25 transition economies in the period 1989-2000. In contrast to 
previous studies, in his analysis Krkoska included domestic and foreign sources of 
financing investments. 
The basic conclusion of the analysis was that foreign direct investments in the observed 
transition economies on average stimulated domestic investment activity. A positive 
significant relationship was also noted between domestic investments and domestic 
loans. However, the coefficient for that variable was less significant than the coefficient 
for the variable foreign direct investment. A positive significant relationship was also 
found for bond issues and other securities from domestic firms. Neither the variable nor 
the result could be fully classified as foreign portfolio investments since the buyer of 
those securities could not be unambiguously identified. Investors in this case could be 
foreign or domestic. Foreign loans (the category of other investments) were shown to be 
insignificant in the model, although they showed a positive relationship with domestic 
investments.  
 
 
3  Flows of Foreign Capital in Transition Economies 
There are numerous advantages foreign capital flows usually bring with. In the case of 
developing countries, and therefore of transition economies, foreign capital flows can 
directly increase economic activity of the country. Two of the most common channels 
for stimulating economic activity are by increasing total domestic investments and by 
increasing the quality and efficiency of investments. Increasing the efficiency of 
domestic investments relates to the transfer of technological innovations, called “know-
how”, generally a characteristic of foreign direct investments. Foreign capital flows can 
increase economic activity of the country through the spillover effect5, whereby 
increasing investments and efficiencies of one industry causes other industries and units 
to improve and innovate as well.  
 
                                                 
5Concerning the spillover effect and other benefits of developing countries from the inclusion in 
international financial flows see in Prasad et al. (2003). 
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Foreign capital flows can stimulate the development of the country’s domestic financial 
sector and its integration in the international financial markets. This case in particular 
emphasizes the spillover effect, since the financial sector is connected with all other 
sectors of an economy. The integration in the international capital markets and the flow 
of foreign capital upgrades the risk management system between foreign and domestic 
investors. The other positive impacts that foreign capital flows on the recipient country 
are consumption smoothing, the increase in specialization of the country and its 
comparative advantages. 
The necessary precondition for achieving positive effects of foreign capital inflows in a 
developing country is optimal liberalization sequencing. This international financial 
integration is connected to four steps necessary if the maximum positive effects of 
foreign capital inflows are to be realized. First of all, it is necessary to reduce the fiscal 
deficit of the country to a sustainable level, followed by price and foreign market 
liberalization. Next step is to liberalize and deregulate (re-regulate) the financial 
institutions thereby strengthening them, and finally liberalizing the capital and the 
financial account of the balance of payments.6  
The stated order is very logical. In developing countries, a fiscal imbalance is a typical 
source of instability for the whole economy. For that reason it is necessary to remove the 
sources of imbalances in the public sector. After that, the price and market liberalization 
should enable increases in the efficiency of the real sector, in a way that removes the 
risks of further accumulation of losses and insolvency. The liberalization and 
deregulation of the domestic financial sector allows an increase of the efficiency and 
transparency in accumulating and placing savings.  
Transition economies attempted following the theoretical model of liberalization. 
However, the liberalization process demands adjustments over the long-term period. At 
the very beginning of transition, countries were faced with large falls in output (high 
negative rates of growth), unemployment growth, high inflation and lower rates of 
national savings. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the equipment and production 
processes were obsolete and there were generally low capital stocks in the economy. In 
that situation the flows of foreign capital were desirable as an impetus for the recovery to 
begin. These are primarily the most important reasons why transition countries did not 
                                                 
6 McKinnon (1991). 
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gradually, one after another, follow the above mentioned steps of liberalization, but the 
steps were conducted in parallel only partially, at varying speeds and intensities.  
In the initial stages, the inflow of foreign capital into transition economies has strictly 
been related to the initiated processes of privatization and liberalization of the balance of 
payments capital and financial account. Further inflows of capital depended on the 
success of the transition and on the implementation of structural and institutional 
reforms. Some of the previously analyzed motives had a large influence on attracting 
foreign capital. Higher earnings on capital, higher rates of economic growth7, new 
markets and possibilities of further expansion, lower labor costs and others are among 
the most important motives. 
Taken individually, not all transition countries simultaneously began with attracting 
foreign capital. Hungary was the first to begin with the liberalization of the capital and 
financial balance of payments and the first to engage foreign capital into its privatization 
process. Poland and the Czech Republic followed suit. The other transition economies 
were somewhat more cautious towards foreign capital. The first significant penetration 
of foreign capital in all observed transition economies occurred in 1993, thus justifying 
the decision to base the analyses in this study on the period of 1993 to date. 
In the period of 1993-2002 in the selected transition economies it was recorded that total 
inflows of foreign capital were 236 billion USD. In the same time period outflows of 
capital amounted to 45 billion USD. The most often used form of foreign investments in 
transition economies was foreign direct investment, then other investments and finally 
portfolio investments (Figure 1). 
The countries in focus were not only at the forefront according to the criteria of the first 
to attract foreign capital, but also according to the criteria of total inflows of foreign 
capital. Almost two thirds of total foreign capital was directed into those three countries 
(the Czech Republic 25%, Poland 23%, Hungary 14% - Figure 2). Poland was at the 
forefront in attracting foreign direct investments, Hungary in attracting foreign portfolio 
investments, while the Czech Republic lead in the category of other foreign investments. 
The order changes if the inflows of foreign capital are analyzed in per capita terms or as 
a percentage of country’s gross domestic product. In this case, the most successful 
                                                 
7 In the period 1993-2002 11 of the selected transition economies grew on average at a rate of 3.6 
percent, while in the period 1995-2002 the rate of growth of the EU 15 was 2.2 percent. 
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country is the Czech Republic, followed by the smaller economies of Estonia, Slovenia, 
Latvia and Croatia (see Appendix 1, Table 3 and 4). 
 
Figure 1.  The structure of foreign capital inflows in analyzed 
                transition countries in the period of 1993-2002 
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Figure 2.  Share of each analyzed transition country 
               in total foreign capital inflows in the period of 1993-2002 
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4  The Analysis of the Influence of                          
Foreign Capital Inflows on Domestic Investments           
of the Transition Economies 
Two separate estimations of the regression equation are made in this analysis. The first 
estimation is the relationship of total foreign capital inflows to domestic investments in 
transition economies, while the second examines the impacts of each individual category 
of total foreign capital inflows on domestic investments. Domestic investments (INV) are 
defined as the function of foreign capital inflows (FORCAP) and the rate of economic 
growth (GDP), and as a function of individual categories of foreign capital (FDI, PORT, 
OTH) and the rate of economic growth. 
 
INV = f (FORCAP, GDP), 
 
INV = f (FDI, PORT, OTH, GDP). 
 
The analysis uses panel data of 11 transition economies during a 10-year period (1993-
2002). The advantage of using panel analysis stems from the fact that such data is more 
oriented toward the observed units, rather than towards the observed time. It is stated that 
panel data is wide and short, meaning that a sufficient number of observed units are 
sampled while the observation time does not necessarily need to be long. Actually, the 
whole transition period is quite short, justifying the argument for using panel data 
analysis instead of time series analysis. Panel data allowed control of the country-
specific effects (fixed effects)8 when estimating the relationship between domestic 
investments and capital inflows. Fixed effects approach was used in this analysis since it 
captures specific characteristics of each individual transition country. 
It should be taken into consideration that the limiting factor when analyzing transition 
economies is the availability of data. This is another reason why the analysis in this work 
was conducted for the period from 1993 onward, as new methodology for the calculation 
of the balance of payment was used from that point on.  
 
 
                                                 
8 Concerning panel data models and fixed effects approach see in Greene (2000). 
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4.1  Influence of Total Foreign Capital Inflows                                   
on Domestic Investments  
The regression equation of the analysis of the influence of total foreign capital inflows 
on domestic investments in transition economies in the period of 1993-2002 is the 
following 
 
 10,...,1,11,...,1,,1,21,1, ==+++= −− tiGDPFORCAPINV tititiiti εββα
 
where are: 
INVi,t  domestic investments of country i in year t, calculated as the share of gross fixed 
capital formation in gross domestic product, all in current prices,  
FORCAPi,t  total inflows of foreign capital in transition economy i in year t calculated as 
the share in gross domestic product,  
GDPi,t  the rate of growth of real gross domestic product of country i in year t. 
When analyzing the influence of foreign capital inflows on domestic investments, it 
should be noted that a large part of foreign capital was probably attracted by successfully 
implemented or announced investment projects in transition economies. In that case the 
model would indicate the presence of endogeneity. This means that the model analyzes 
the dependence of the dependent variable on one or more independent variables. 
However, another model could be constructed wherein one of the independent variables 
from the initial model could be explained using the dependent variable from the initial 
model. In our case, another model could be constructed to analyze the influence of 
domestic investments on foreign capital inflows. Endogeneity in the model violates the 
basic assumptions of regression analysis, which is the absence of correlation between 
one or more independent variables and residuals.  
Endogeneity in the model may lead to biased coefficient estimation. However the 
direction of this bias is unclear. For example, some measure of domestic economic 
policy can influence the increase of earnings on capital. Foreign investors will very 
quickly recognize the opportunity for realizing higher earnings on their investment, so 
there will be an increase in the inflow of foreign capital into that country. On the other 
hand, the increased earnings on invested assets will also help stimulating domestic 
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investments. In this way, a domestic factor (an instrument of monetary policy for 
example) influences the increase of investments as well as foreign capital inflows. This 
would tend to bias the coefficient on capital inflows in the investment equation upward. 
There could also be another situation in which domestic policy change increases the 
interest rate in a country. According to the classical theory of investment higher interest 
rates would mean decreasing investments. But, foreign investors would increase their 
investments with the aim of realizing higher interest rates, and therefore capital inflows 
would increase. This situation would also bias the regression coefficient, but this time 
downwards. 
Therefore, at the very beginning of our analysis, it is important to examine the issue of 
endogeneity in the model. Endogeneity in the model is tested using Hausman’s test. This 
test simultaneously examines and justifies the use of the method of instrumental 
variables as possible solution for endogeneity issue. The choice of instrumental variables 
is extremely important. The basic idea is to find a group of variables (instrumental 
variables) which are simultaneously correlated with "suspect" independent variable in the 
regression equation and uncorrelated with the residuals.  
Instrumental variables are used enabling the removal of the correlation between 
independent variables and residuals. In the model, that would mean choosing and 
incorporating instrumental variables that would isolate external factors of foreign capital 
inflows in transition economies from the internal ones. In that way, it would be possible 
to carry out an analysis of the influence of foreign capital inflows, as exogenous 
variables, on domestic investment activity. 
In the case of the analysis of foreign capital inflows on domestic investments of 
transition economies, instrumental variables can be divided into two groups. One would 
consist of instrumental variables that are the same for all countries, while the other would 
consist of those which were country specific. 
The first group of variables is exclusively related to external factors of foreign capital 
inflows in transition economies. Since transition economies mostly rely on the European 
Union as the main source of foreign capital, instrumental variables from the first group 
are the rate of growth of real gross domestic product (EUGDP) and the real interest rate 
(EUIR) of the European Union. Both instrumental variables in the model have a time lag 
of one year (t-1). Instrumental variables from the second group are the share of foreign 
debt in gross domestic product of transition economies (FDEBT) with a time lag of one 
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year, and domestic investment (INV). This last variable (INV) is actually a dependent 
variable in the model, with a time lag of one year (t-1). 
Hausman’s test was conducted according to the adjustable version, which was created by 
Davidson and MacKinnon9, and it contains two steps or two phases. After the initial 
model is formulated, the analysis conducted10, and the existence of endogeneity is 
assumed, then testing can begin. The first phase of the test is conducted according to 
what is called the auxiliary regression analysis, in which the "suspect" variable from the 
first model, total foreign capital inflows (FORCAP), is taken as the dependent variable. 
This means that the independent variable that is a potential cause of endogeneity in the 
first model becomes a dependent variable. The independent variables chosen are the 
remaining independent variables, the dependent variables with the time lag, and all of the 
instrumental variables from the initial model. The estimated coefficients have no 
meaningful economic interpretation. The only important result from the auxiliary 
regression is the residuals, which is named as a new variable (RESID). This new variable 
is then used in the second step of the analysis. See Appendix 2, Table 6. 
The second phase of Hausman’s test returns to the first regression model and it is 
supplemented with the new independent variable RESID. In this step, the primary 
interest is the obtained regression coefficient on the variable RESID. If the regression 
coefficient is significantly different from zero, the null hypothesis that both methods of 
analysis (with and without instrumental variables) were consistent can be rejected. This 
would prove the presence of endogeneity in the model and justify the use of instrumental 
variables. On the other hand if the regression coefficient on the variable RESID is not 
significantly different from zero then the null hypothesis is accepted, whereby it would 
not be important whether instrumental variables were included or not. The results of the 
second phase of Hausman’s test are shown in Appendix 2, Table 7. 
The regression coefficient on the variable RESID was found to be significantly different 
from zero, meaning that the null hypothesis could be rejected and the alternative 
hypothesis was accepted (p = 0.032, t = 2.18). In short, this means that the endogeneity 
in the model was proved and the use of the selected instrumental variables in the model 
was justified.  
                                                 
9 Davidson, MacKinnon (1993). 
10 The results of the dependence of domestic investments on foreign capital inflows, without using 
instrumental variables, are shown in Appendix 2., Table 5. 
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After having conducted Hausman’s test for endogeneity and including instrumental 
variables in the model, regression was run again. Because of the instrumental variables, 
we run two-stage least squares method of estimation (TSLS). The regression analysis 
results are presented in Table 1. Results confirm the initial hypothesis, which stipulated 
that foreign capital inflows in selected transition economies during the period of 1993-
2002 on average stimulated domestic investments.  
 
Table 1.  Analysis of the influence of foreign capital inflows 
              on domestic investments of transition economies 
Dependent Variable: INV 
Estimation Method: Two-Stage Least Squares  
Instrumental Variables: EUIR (-1), EUGDP (-1), FDEBT (-1), INV (-1) 
Sample: 1994-2002 
Included Observations: 11 
Total System (Unbalanced) Observations: 92 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
FORCAP (-1) 0.308743 0.066080 4.672291 0.0000 
GDP (-1) 0.260668 0.075217 3.465548 0.0009 
Fixed Effects 
_HR—C 17.49704 0.954777 18.32579 0.0000 
_BL—C 13.91218 0.747645 18.60801 0.0000 
_CZ—C 24.48876 1.140708 21.46803 0.0000 
_ES—C 21.19468 1.279804 16.56088 0.0000 
_LT—C 18.11732 1.317310 13.75327 0.0000 
_LI—C 18.18900 1.013421 17.94813 0.0000 
_HU—C 18.85851 0.933033 20.21206 0.0000 
_PL—C 19.29800 0.828685 23.28750 0.0000 
_RO—C 18.59037 0.881963 21.07840 0.0000 
_SK—C 27.04722 0.964628 28.03901 0.0000 
_SI—C 21.29432 0.876734 24.28825 0.0000 
 
 
The formal interpretation of the regression coefficient is that during the observed period 
an increase of the share of foreign capital inflows in GDP by 1 percentage point, on 
average, caused an increase in the share of domestic investments in GDP by 0.31 
percentage points. Empirical t statistics for the coefficient on the variable total foreign 
capital inflows (FORCAP) variable is 4.67, what proves its significance in the model. 
The regression coefficient on the FORCAP is somewhat lower than that from the study 
by Bosworth, Collins (0.52). However, it should be reemphasized that the two analyses 
differ in terms of the sample countries used and the observation periods.  
Furthermore, it is also useful to compare the above results with the results of the analysis 
when the method of instrumental variables is not used (Appendix 2, Table 5). Analysis 
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without instrumental variables also confirms the initial hypothesis of a "crowding in" 
effect. However, the values of the regression coefficients were lower. The regression 
coefficient on the variable FORCAP was 0.21, with empirical t statistics 3.91. Thus, by 
using instrumental variables, the problem of endogeneity in the model is solved, and the 
results were shown to be improved.  
The real rate of growth (GDP) was also shown to be significant in the model (t = 3.47). 
The regression coefficient tells us that on average the real growth of 1 percentage point 
leads to an increase of the share of domestic investments in GDP by one quarter of a 
percentage point (0.26). 
 
4.2  Influence of Different Categories of Foreign Capital              
Inflows on Domestic Investments 
So far we have analyzed influence of total foreign capital inflow on domestic 
investments. In this part we conducted additional regression analysis in order to identify 
the influence of each individual category of foreign capital inflow on domestic 
investments. The regression equation of the analysis of inflows of each individual 
category of foreign capital on domestic investment is the following: 
 
10,...,1,11,...,1,,1,41,31,21,1, ==+++++= −−−− tiGDPOTHPORTFDIINV tititititiiti εββββα  
 
where are: 
INVi,t  domestic investments of country i in year t, calculated as the share of gross fixed 
capital formation in gross domestic product, all in current prices,  
FDIi,t  total inflows of foreign direct investments in transition economy i in year t, 
expressed in its share in gross domestic product, 
PORTi,t  total inflows of foreign portfolio investments in transition economy i in year t 
expressed in its share in gross domestic product,  
OTHi,t  total inflows of other foreign investments in transition country i in year t, 
expressed in its share in gross domestic product, 
GDPi,t  the rate of growth of real gross domestic product of country i in year t. 
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Before the analysis we again conducted the Hausman’s test. It is possible to test one 
potentially "suspect" variable at the time, so three tests of that kind were performed (for 
each category of foreign capital inflow). Endogeneity was confirmed for variable other 
foreign investments (OTH). This was enough justification for the inclusion of the 
instrumental variables in the initial model. 
After including the same set of instrumental variables as before (EUGDP, EUIR, 
FDEBT, INV) with time lag (t-1) we run regression analysis again. Regression results 
are presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2.  Analysis of the influence of inflows of individual categories 
              of foreign capital on domestic investments of transition countries 
Dependent Variable: INV 
Estimation Method: Two-Stage Least Squares  
Instrumental Variables: EUIR (-1), EUGDP (-1), FDEBT (-1), INV (-1) 
Sample: 1994-2002 
Included Observations: 11 
Total System (Unbalanced) Observations: 87 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
FDI (-1) 0.237046 0.115399 2.054154 0.0436 
PORT (-1) 0.036910 0.143349 0.257484 0.7975 
OTH (-1) 0.332138 0.076085 4.365352 0.0000 
GDP (-1) 0.223633 0.070308 3.180751 0.0022 
Fixed Effects 
_HR—C 18.28117 0.923573 19.79397 0.0000 
_BL—C 14.33630 0.846916 16.92766 0.0000 
_CZ—C 25.42874 1.139756 22.31069 0.0000 
_ES—C 22.31436 1.327936 16.80380 0.0000 
_LT—C 19.51431 1.386926 14.07018 0.0000 
_LI—C 18.88265 0.969923 19.46820 0.0000 
_HU—C 20.21099 1.000004 20.21091 0.0000 
_PL—C 20.39696 0.946891 21.54099 0.0000 
_RO—C 18.86571 0.855319 22.05694 0.0000 
_SK—C 27.92090 0.914634 30.52685 0.0000 
_SI—C 22.13418 0.863811 25.62385 0.0000 
 
 
 
According to the results variable with the most significant t statistics was other foreign 
investments (OTH), t = 4.37. Regression coefficient (0.33) tells us that on average one 
third of the inflows of other foreign investments were used in stimulating the domestic 
investment activities.  
 358 
Taking into consideration the results of other empirical studies, a somewhat 
disappointing and unexpected result was the regression coefficient on the variable 
foreign direct investments (FDI). Foreign direct investments during the observed period 
also stimulated domestic investments of selected transition countries (0.24), but in the 
model they were only significant at the 5% level (p = 0.044, t = 2.05).  
The results about the effect of portfolio investments were expected, especially 
considering the results of other empirical studies. Portfolio investments (PORT) had a 
small but positive relationship with domestic investments. This variable was shown to be 
insignificant in the model (p = 0.798, t = 0.26), but was kept, so that the differences 
between the individual categories of foreign capital could be observed. Variable real 
economic growth (GDP) is shown to be significant in this model as well as in the first 
analysis dealing with total capital inflows. Regression coefficient (0.22) and the 
empirical t statistics (t = 3.18) are negligibly lower in comparison with the analysis of 
total capital inflows on domestic investments. 
 
 
5  Conclusion 
Transition countries beginning their processes of liberalization and privatization opened 
their doors to foreign capital inflows. In the 11 observed countries during the 10-year 
period from 1993 to 2002, the recorded annual inflow of foreign capital was 
approximately 23 billion USD. Two thirds of total foreign capital inflows were directed 
into only three countries, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary. The dominant 
category of foreign investments was foreign direct investments. 
Out of numerous advantages that foreign capital can bring to recipient countries, this 
paper analyzes the impact of foreign capital on domestic investments.  
The analysis uses panel data of 11 transition economies during a 10-year period (1993-
2002). Fixed effects approach was used in this panel data analysis since it captures 
specific characteristics of each individual transition country. Two-stage least squares 
method was used since the Hausman’s test detected the presence of endogeneity. 
According to the result of the regression analysis the initial hypothesis is confirmed. It 
states that foreign capital inflows in transition economies have stimulated domestic 
investment activity. On average in all of the analyzed countries an increase of the share 
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of foreign capital inflows in GDP by 1 percentage point increased the share of domestic 
investments in GDP by 0.31 percentage points. 
The regression analysis confirmed expected differences between the influences of each 
individual category of foreign capital inflows. According to the model, variable other 
foreign investments (0.33) demonstrated the most powerful relationship with variable 
domestic investments (p = 0.000, t = 4.37). Although in total, the most represented 
category of foreign capital, variable foreign direct investments (0.24) in the model was 
found to be significant only at 5% level of significance (p = 0.044, t = 2.05). The 
variable portfolio investments turned out not to be significant in the model (p = 0.798, t = 
0.26) as numerous research confirmed before. That means that foreign portfolio 
investment transactions do not have a significant influence on domestic investment 
activity. 
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Appendix 1.  Capital inflows in transition economies  
 
 
Table 3.  Average foreign capital inflows per capita 
              in analyzed transition economies, 1993-2002, USD 
 FDI Portfolio investments Other investments Total capital inflows 
Croatia 167 82 188 438 
Bulgaria 55 -6 -1 49 
Czech Rep. 289 100 256 648 
Estonia 223 76 173 472 
Hungary 216 143 18 334 
Latvia 125 19 228 373 
Lithuania 102 45 101 246 
Poland 130 27 1 158 
Romania 39 6 35 79 
Slovak Rep. 98 75 121 293 
Slovenia 187 92 240 518 
 
Source: IFS, authors' calculations. 
 
 
 
Table 4.  Foreign capital inflows in analyzed transition economies 
              in percentage of GDP, 1993-2002, in % 
 FDI Portfolio investments Other investments Total capital inflows 
Croatia 3.8 1.8 4.0 9.6 
Bulgaria 3.6 -0.3 -0.3 2.9 
Czech Rep. 5.6 2.2 5.7 13.5 
Estonia 7.6 2.3 6.3 16.2 
Hungary 4.8 3.2 0.3 7.5 
Latvia 5.2 0.6 9.6 15.5 
Lithuania 3.4 1.5 4.7 9.5 
Poland 3.4 0.7 -0.3 3.7 
Romania 2.3 0.3 2.2 4.8 
Slovak Rep. 2.7 2.2 3.3 8.3 
Slovenia 2.0 1.1 2.7 5.8 
Total 3.5 1.3 1.7 6.5 
 
Source: IFS, authors' calculations. 
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Appendix 2.  Hausman’s test of endogeneity 
 
 
Table 5.  Analysis of the influence of foreign capital inflows on domestic  
               investments of transition economies (without instrumental variables) 
Dependent Variable: INV 
Estimation Method: Pooled Least Squares  
Sample: 1994-2002 
Included Observations: 11 
Total System (Unbalanced) Observations: 95 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
FORCAP (-1) 0.207822 0.053105 3.913454 0.0002 
GDP (-1) 0.245716 0.065969 3.724742 0.0004 
Fixed Effects 
_HR—C 18.48913    
_BL—C 14.18714    
_CZ—C 25.88388    
_ES—C 22.87349    
_LT—C 18.45770    
_LI—C 19.93525    
_HU—C 19.79283    
_PL—C 19.74979    
_RO—C 19.09083    
_SK—C 27.94586    
_SI—C 21.86833    
R Squared 0.801022 S. E. of regression 2.394037 
Adjusted 
R Squared  0.771903 F-Statistic 330.1054 
 
 
 
Table 6.  The first phase of Hausman’s test of endogeneity in the model 
              of the influence of total foreign capital inflows 
              on domestic investments of transition economies 
Dependent Variable: FORCAP 
Estimation Method: Pooled Least Squares  
Sample: 1994-2002 
Included Observations: 11 
Total System (Unbalanced) Observations: 91  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
FORCAP (-1) 0.084188 0.103979 0.809664 0.4207 
GDP (-1) 0.126043 0.100451 1.254762 0.2135 
INV (-1) 0.117813 0.212435 0.554583 0.5809 
EUIR (-1) -0.629149 0.310327 -2.027375 0.0462 
EUGDP(-1) 0.115032 0.530632 0.216782 0.8290 
FDEBT (-1) -0.116194 0.038437 -3.022992 0.0034 
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Table 7.  The second phase of Hausman’s test of endogeneity 
Dependent Variable: INV 
Estimation Method: Pooled Least Squares  
Sample: 1994-2002 
Included Observations: 11 
Total System (Unbalanced) Observations: 91  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
FORCAP (-1) 0.224811 0.048165 4.667543 0.0000 
GDP (-1) 0.274777 0.063637 4.317854 0.0000 
RESID 0.117053 0.053668 2.181080 0.0322 
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Central and Eastern Europe in the EU 
Innovation System: Asset or Liability?  
Slavo Radošević*
 
Abstract 
During the 1990s the new EU member and candidate countries have experienced deep 
structural changes. These ranged from transformation in sectoral and industrial structure 
to changes in economic system. The issue is whether these changes have been sufficient 
to ensure catch-up in a period in which growth increasingly depends on the generation, 
use and diffusion of knowledge? Also, for the enlarged EU the emerging concern is 
whether the new member states (NMS) from central and eastern Europe (CEE) will be 
asset or liability in its objective to increase rate of productivity growth and base it on 
intensification of knowledge based activities. In a knowledge-based economy, growth 
depends essentially on a strong S&T system or the ’narrow NSI’ and how that system is 
embedded within the wider economy.1 This chapter aims to give a broader introduction 
into the issues of S&T, innovation and growth in CEECs. In the next section, we briefly 
review the role of S&T and innovation in growth of the CEECs during the transition 
period and we assess the effects of transition on restructuring of R&D system. In second 
part, we assess current innovation policies of the CEECs. Finally, we highlight the key 
issues that are important in future role of S&T and innovation in the CEECs, especially 
in view of Europeanization of S&T in these countries. Our conclusion is that a) we will 
see differentiation in the role of S&T and innovation in growth of individual CEECs, b) 
this role will be strongly shaped by the way CEECc countries managed the process of 
Europeanization of their R&D and innovation systems. 
Keywords: innovation system, innovation policies, S&T system, Central and Eastern Europe 
JEL Classification: O31, O38 
                                                 
* Slavo Radošević, University College London, UK. 
1 The NSI in a narrow sense embraces those institutions which are directly involved in R&D and 
the dissemination of the results of R&D. The NSI in a broad sense points out that the way in which 
enterprises conduct innovation is not simply a matter of R&D but is also dependent on the way in 
which markets operate and production is organised as well as on the legal and cultural norms of 
society (Freeman, 2005). 
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1  S&T and Innovation in Growth of the CEECs           
During the Transition Period: Outcomes 
Technology was not the major force driving recovery and growth in the CEECs during 
the 1990s (Havrylyshyn, 2001). First, research shows that recovery and growth have 
been unrelated to domestic technology and R&D. The sources of growth in CEECs have 
not so far been directly linked to R&D but to the acquisition of knowledge in the 
production process and through different forms of firm-based learning (Dyker and 
Radošević, 1999). The main capability acquired during this period has been production 
capability or the capability to produce in accordance with the standards of efficiency and 
quality required in export markets. The technology capability or the ability to generate 
change seems to be much less significant in explaining growth of these economies. 
Secondly, there has been significant productivity growth but little technological 
development, except in sectors with high levels of FDI. Given the abundance of idle 
capacity and the considerable potential for efficiency gains, the expansion of output 
during the transformation has been based mainly on non-investment sources of growth. 
As the Polish case shows, early expansion coupled with structural shifts and a decline in 
employment is likely to have been caused by unprecedented efficiency gains (Zukowski, 
1998).  
As Freeman (2005) points out, the crucial weakness of the narrow NSI under socialism 
was the failure to develop R&D at enterprise level. The post-socialist transformation of 
industry has not rectified this inherited problem. Examination of the restructuring 
process in six industrial sectors in CEECs shows that this restructuring did not involve 
domestic R&D (Bitzer and Hirschhausen, 1998). Big increases in productivity have not 
led to increased demand for local R&D. As innovation surveys shows imported 
technology, primary equipment, was the key mechanism of technology accumulation. In-
house R&D departments were drastically cut back while the industrial institutes were not 
integrated into large enterprises. The 1990s were years of stagnation and the erosion of 
R&D capacities.  
The major effects of transition on restructuring of R&D systems have been: 
• Initially very strong downsizing of R&D funding and employment which was followed 
by stabilization since mid-1990s and then by recovery of R&D by the end of the 1990s 
and early 2000 (see evidence in this Report). During the 2000s there is emerging 
differentiation across countries in terms of relative R&D expenditures and employment.  
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• The overall reduction of gross expenditures for R&D has been accompanied by limited 
structural changes in R&D system in terms of shares of business, government and 
university R&D. Nevertheless, there have been gradual and varying increases in shares 
of university R&D and decreased role of Academy of Sciences.  
• Among institutional sectors the sharpest decline in funding has been in sector of 
industrial R&D. Higher Education Sector experienced the lowest cutback while sector of 
industrial R&D has experienced the biggest. Industrial R&D has suffered the greatest 
absolute and in most countries also relative losses. Enterprise R&D has declined with 
break up of large enterprises, except in Hungary and Slovenia. 
• There has been limited integration of industrial R&D organisations into manufacturing 
enterprises. There has been decline in revenues from contracts with industry and the shift 
towards academic research and relative share of applied research on average has 
declined. 
• At levels of independent research institutes there has been reorientation towards non-
R&D activities including standardization, testing, measurement, etc. This led to 
hybridisation of industrial R&D organisations. By this we mean that they operate as 
public funded R&D organisations as well as commercial organisations operating on 
market, especially in Romania and Poland. However, their R&D activities are too 
extensive for them to survive as private firm in a market economy without public 
subsidies and their commercial activities are now too significant for them to be 
considered solely as research centres (Kozlowski, 2004). In that respect, they are 
incoherent and transitory forms which do not further R&D capacity of economy;  
• Introduction of competition principle in R&D systems varies across countries while 
diversification of funding has been driven by increasing sources from abroad. This has 
been accompanied by increasing internationalisation of R&D systems through increasing 
share of international co-publications. 
• University education has expanded during the 1990s as returns to education have 
increased and unemployment of this category declined. However, all systems have 
difficulties to ensure quality and high education standards. 
• Domestic and foreign patenting has significantly declined reflecting technology gap as 
well as changing focus of enterprises towards acquisition of imported technology. The 
structure of resident patenting has been changed reflecting past specialisation in 
mechanical technologies. Also, scientific specialisation has remained basically 
unchanged and highly specialised in areas around math, physics and chemistry. There 
has been modest shift towards life sciences. 
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• Structural analysis of manufacturing exports shows that Central European countries have 
become specialised in low value added segments of nominally high tech sectors while 
Eastern Europe (Romania and Bulgaria as well as Baltic states) are specialised around 
low tech sectors. 
 
 
2  Assessing Current Innovation Polices of the CEECs 
Although some of trends outlines in section 1 have not been very favourable, our 
comparative analysis of innovation capacities of the CEECs within the enlarged EU 
show that there is not ’East – West’ division in terms of innovation capacities (see 
Radošević, 2004). Our analysis which is based on 25 indicators goes beyond R&D 
indicators and thus gives a broader picture of innovation capacities by focusing on 
indicators of absorptive capacity, knowledge generation, knowledge diffusion and 
demand for technology. Based on this broader conceptualisation of innovation we see the 
emergence of three-tier Europe. By this we mean that developed countries of central 
Europe (Slovenia, Estonia, Czech R., Hungary) are faring relatively well in terms of 
innovation capacities and are closer to the ’middle level’ group of the EU than to the less 
developed CEECs (Romania, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia). Also, EU15 is 
divergent in terms of innovation capacities so that we can distinguish between high tech 
Europe (Nordic countries, UK), medium level Europe (France, Germany, etc.) and less 
developed EU15 with Greece, Portugal and Spain. Less developed EU15 and less 
developed CEECs are closer to each to other than to other groups of countries.  
However, innovation capacities do not necessarily translate into growth and productivity. 
Nevertheless, the level of development of innovation policy is an important ingredient of 
potential growth and it is essential to evaluate whether innovation policies of the NMS 
form the CEE are up to the challenge that these countries faced with. 
Analysis of current innovation policies of the CEECs shows several common features2: 
• All CEECs policies aim to increase R&D/GDP under the influence of so called 
Barcelona target. However, they differ with respect to the levels of ’back-up’ i.e. 
instruments which could ensure this objective. 
                                                 
2 Based on author’s participation in the EC Trendchart project. 
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• All CEECs have made improvements though of very different degrees in their research 
policies. In particular, this applies to evaluation and selection mechanisms and 
administrative procedures. 
• Since 1999, CEECs have ’discovered’ of innovation policy be it in rhetorical terms 
(strategies) or in real policy instruments’ terms. We can observe in all countries gradual 
process of awareness raising in this respect. 
• None of the CEECs has in place systematic evaluation and monitoring practices in 
innovation policy. So, they all share strong ’evaluation gap’ which is largely the result of 
low level of innovation management skills at academia and low level of administrative 
skills to run/monitor RTDI schemes in governmental agencies’. 
• A current focus of these policies is on how to couple Structural Funds with objectives in 
innovation policy and how to improve coherence of innovation policies through 
implementation of Structural Funds. 
 
However, there are also important differences across these countries’ innovation policies. 
First, different countries face different challenges in terms of coherence and coordination 
with other policies. Hungary and Slovenia are the most aware of this challenge and are 
searching for their own solutions. In other countries, we observe improved R&D policy 
but there is further need to develop instruments of innovation policy (Czech R., Poland, 
Slovakia, Estonia). In other countries, there is a great need to develop both, R&D and 
innovation policy (Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania). Second, there are big 
differences across countries in terms of transnational learning i.e. actual schemes which 
are modelled or transferred from abroad. In this respect, we can distinguish between 
’active learners’ (Slovenia, Hungary, Estonia) and ’passive learners’ (Romania, Bulgaria, 
Poland, Czech R., Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania). Third, there is a gradual shift and big 
country differences in terms of the extent to which the innovation policy measures are 
focused on: promotion of R&D in the business sector or on research component (most of 
the CEECs). Only in Hungary and Slovenia we come across more direct innovation-
focused measures. Finally, there are big differences among the CEECs in terms of 
maturity of innovation policy. Some CEECs are very often transferring mechanically 
’the best practice’ from abroad while only some of them (Hungary and Slovenia) have 
been spotting local deficiencies and have been adjusting the instruments accordingly.  
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3  Europeanization and Future of S&T in CEE3
The next 10-30 years of this century will be marked by increasing divergences in the 
S&T systems among CEECs, whose main driving forces will come from differences in 
’broad NSI’ but also from impacts on S&T systems in CEECs which we describe as the 
Europeanization of their S&T systems. Differences in ’broad NSI’ will affect the main 
feature of their S&T system. In those CEECs that will see recovery and high growth 
rates, a revival of domestic demand for R&D and a strengthening of in-house R&D are 
to be expected. This may lead to substantial institutional transformation in S&T systems, 
which will be organized around enterprises’ innovation activities. In countries with 
sluggish growth rates or stop–go growth, further marginalization of domestic R&D for 
domestic innovative activities is to be expected. This may be the case where additional 
EU funding may actually deepen the gaps between international pockets of excellence in 
R&D and domestic innovation activities. 
In S&T, Europeanization means that the dynamics of EC research, technology and 
development (RTD) policy is likely to become part of the organizational logic of national 
S&T and innovation policies. CEECs have already become part of that dynamic as a 
result of pre-accession activities. In that respect, Europeanization can be seen as a major 
component of the forces driving the restructuring of their R&D systems. We assume that 
Europeanization will strengthen the restructuring component of their S&T systems and 
that, as a result, S&T systems in the CEECs may diverge further from each other. 
However, it is difficult to predict whether Europeanization by itself can solve the key 
weakness of their S&T system, which is the low level of demand for domestic R&D.  
The studies carried out on innovation policy in the thirteen candidate countries 
concluded that none of the CCs could be considered to have a fully-fledged innovation 
policy (EC, 2002, 2003). EU accession is likely to push CEECs into developing 
innovation policy, including regional innovation policies, as one of the preconditions for 
the effective use of structural funds. Research and technology policy is likely to be 
expanded and modeled on EU arrangements and to be extended towards downstream 
activities such as knowledge diffusion, in particular through support for regional 
innovation policy. In R&D, EU support through Framework Programs will establish 
criteria of international excellence which will operate as reference points for the 
restructuring of domestic R&D groups and organizations. For example, EU support for 
                                                 
 This section is based on Radošević (2004). 
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centers of excellence, which is already being followed by domestic networking and 
selection, has this effect.  
Europeanization can be expected to weaken the power of the central state in S&T policy 
and will enhance the power of regions in big CEECs like Poland and Romania. It will 
strengthen the innovation community, encourage new social associations and interest 
groups to participate in the process of developing RTD and structural policy to be 
supported by the EU. To judge from the Greek experience, it is likely that the 
policymaking process will become less bureaucratic and more transparent. 
Whether all CEECs will exploit the opportunities created by Europeanization to 
modernize their S&T systems and integrate them into EU-wide S&T activities will 
depend on a variety of local factors. In some cases, Europeanization will elicit only 
passive responses or nominal conformance, with considerable derogation in practice. 
However, given the considerable opportunities that EU accession opens up for the 
CEECs, Europeanization can be expected to be the main instrument of modernization for 
CEECs. For this to be realized, Europeanization will have to involve not only top-down 
change but also bottom-up responses and strategies developed by firms, R&D 
organizations and regions. In S&T, Europeanization is already being perceived as 
modernization. S&T administrators from the CEE can now travel, exchange experiences 
and familiarize themselves with current developments in S&T and innovation policy in 
the EU. The domestic S&T policy community, like their counterparts in the southern EU 
countries, is likely to internalize the logic, norms, behavior and culture associated with 
integration (Featherstone and Kazamais, 2001, p. 17). However, whether we will see real 
or surrogate modernization of S&T systems through Europeanization will depend to a 
great extent on the structure and the role of national political elites as well as on the 
involvement of civil society in Europeanization. 
We must be aware that Europeanization has limits and ambiguities. As the dynamic of 
EU RTD becomes part of the logic of national S&T policymaking, it is likely to impact 
strongly on the definition of policy priorities and may lead to the mechanical transfer of 
policy models that may not be the most relevant for the CEECs. 
Experience of Europeanization in the southern EU countries shows that the strongest 
effects were on the definition of the relevant policy actions and mechanisms and of 
national priorities. In the case of the CEECs, this will be compounded by the great 
importance of funding streams from Framework Programs and, in future, structural 
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funds. This is likely to lead to a sort of myopia, in which the importance of local 
problems and the search for local solutions is downgraded. The autonomy of CEECs in 
S&T policy may remain a theoretical possibility only, since in practice the EU may exert 
considerable influence over goals, cost allocation and the resource mobilization. 
The automatic transfer of EU policy mechanisms may often be irrelevant to local S&T or 
not constitute the most effective policy actions. For example, the transfer of the science 
park model without regard for local demand makes such programs highly dependent on 
foreign funding and barely sustainable. The transfer of policy models to support 
domestic clusters in conditions where there are no strong domestic organizations that can 
operate as ’network organizers’ or in whose interest it is to develop linkages usually has 
limited effects, if any at all. While Europeanization will enhance and legitimize the 
innovation community, this may at the same time become just one more layer of 
bureaucracy or civil society without domestic roots, which are than perceived as alien to 
the domestic S&T community. Although we are quite optimistic regarding the positive 
effects of Europeanization on S&T in CEECs, this by itself is no panacea but rather a 
great opportunity for CEE CCs to modernize their S&T systems and integrate them into 
the emerging EU-wide innovation system.  
 
 
4  Conclusions 
The ’narrow’ NSIs in CEECs are undergoing extensive functional, organizational and 
financial restructuring (see Meske, 2004 for evidence). However, despite these changes, 
the key weakness of the CEEC’s S&T systems remains the failure to develop enterprise 
R&D. The weaknesses in ’narrow’ NSI will become visible through inadequate in-house 
R&D, weak university - industry links and a lack of technological co-operation among 
enterprises. In order to grow, these economies will have to generate their own innovation 
dynamics in order to complement imported technologies. These innovation dynamics 
will have to be driven by local enterprises committed to R&D and innovation. 
’Narrow’ NSI cannot be ignored if CEECs are to continue to grow and restructure. It 
may be possible for a limited period, as was the case during the transformational crisis of 
the 1990s. However, it is unlikely that CEECs can continue their industrial upgrading 
without restructuring their ’narrow’ NSI, which plays a very important role in the 
development of technological capability in any economy. Its role cannot be reduced to 
the direct provision of technical information to industry. Research systems have several 
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functions that are important for industrial upgrading, of which the provision of new and 
useful information is only one. Other functions include the creation of new 
instrumentation and methodologies, the provision of skills developed by engaging in 
research, participation in research networks, the resolution of complex technological 
problems and the establishment of spin-offs (Martin and Salter, 1996). 
It is not yet clear what national systems of innovation are emerging in the CEECs. These 
systems are far from being fully formed and it would be more appropriate to search first 
for signs of the emergence of sectoral innovation systems. Sectoral innovation systems 
are groupings of enterprises and their related networks of public and private institutions 
that are involved in the development, diffusion and utilization of innovation. These 
systems will strongly shape the character of NSIs in CEE. Based on the current patterns 
of production networks in CEECs it seems that these systems will be very 
heterogeneous. In some countries, such as Hungary, NSI may be based more on foreign 
enterprises.. In countries like Estonia, they may be formed around small enterprises. In 
other countries, the NSI could be dualistic in character, with subsectors of small and 
large firms being unrelated to each other or with weak links between domestic and 
foreign firms. In some cases, they may be based on a few strong regions which are the 
drivers of growth. In these cases, the NSI could be strongly shaped by a few regional 
systems of innovation. Alternatively, NSIs could be formed around one or two sectors in 
which the innovation process is developed on a collective basis, while in the rest of the 
economy the innovation links are very weak. For the time being, the innovation dynamic 
is strongest among foreign enterprises. Our conclusion is that this is the greatest strength 
but also, potentially, the greatest long-term weakness of the CEECs that have attracted 
large volumes of FDI. The way CEECs integrate into international production and 
innovation networks will strongly shape their NSI. 
 
 
References 
Bitzer, J. and C. von Hirschhausen (1998): “Conceptual Framework”, Summary and Industry 
Studies, Final Report C on ’Industrial Restructuring’, TSER Project, German Institute for 
Economic Research, Berlin. 
Dyker, D. and S. Radošević (1999): “What quantitative analysis of trends in science and 
technology tell us about patterns of transformation and growth in the post-socialist 
countries?”, in D. Dyker and S. Radošević (eds.) Innovation and Structural Change in Post-
Socialism, NATO Science Series, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, pp. 1-28. 
 377 
EC (2002): “Innovation policy in six candidate countries: Hungary, Slovenia, Estonia, Poland, 
Czech Republic, Cyprus”, EC DG Enterprises, Innovation Studies, Luxembourg. 
EC (2003): “Innovation policy in seven applicant countries: challenges”, EU DG Innovation, 
EC Printing Office, Luxembourg. 
Featherstone, Kevin and George Kazamias, (eds.), (2001): Europeanization and the southern 
periphery, London, Cass. 
Freeman, Chris (2005): “Catching-up and innovation systems: implications for Eastern 
Europe”, in Piech, K. and Radošević, S. Knowledge Based Economy in central and eastern 
Europe: countries and sectors in a process of change, Palgrave, London, (forthcoming). 
Havrylyshyn, Oleh (2001): “Recovery and growth in Transition: A Decade of Evidence”,  
IMF Staff Papers, Special Issue, Washington, IMF, Vol. 48, pp. 53-87, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/staffp/2001/04/pdf/havrylys.pdf 
Kozlowski, Jan (2004): “Governmental research units in Poland: present, future and the 
burden of the past”, State Committee for Scientific Research, Warsaw, mimeo. 
Martin, B. and A. Salter (1996): “The relationship between publicly funded basic research and 
economic performance”, A SPRU Review, Report prepared for HM Treasury, University of 
Sussex, April.  
Meske, W., ed., (2004): From System Transformation to European Integration. Science and 
technology in Central and Eastern Europe at the beginning of the 21st century, LIT Verlag, 
Munster. 
Radošević, S. (2004): “A Two-Tier or Multi-Tier Europe?: Assessing the Innovation 
Capacities of Central and East European Countries in the Enlarged EU”, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, Vol. 42, No. 3, September, pp. 641-66. 
Radošević, S. (2004): “What future for S&T in the CEECs in the 21st century” in Meske, W. 
(ed.), From System Transformation to European Integration. Science and technology in 
Central and Eastern Europe at the beginning of the 21st century, LIT Verlag, Munster , pp. 
443-478. 
Zukowski, Richard (1998): “From transformational crisis to transformational recovery: the 
case of Poland’s industries”, Economic Systems, Vol. 22, No. 4, December, pp. 367-397. 
 
 378 
Innovation Policy in Croatia: the First 10 
Years 
 
Jadranka Švarc*
 
Abstract 
The paper examines the development of innovation policy (IP) in Croatia during the 
1994-2004 period and it does so from the R&D sector’s point of view. The paper argues 
that Croatia has failed to make the necessary shift from the standard research and 
industrial policies towards an innovation policy which is seen as the new policy 
paradigm necessary for the structural adjustment of the national economy to the 
knowledge-based economic growth. To support the thesis, the convergence of the 
science and technology policies into the innovation policy is explained. Also, the 
chronology of the development of the innovation policy in Croatia is provided. The 
major shortcomings of the research system are described to illustrate the failings of that 
policy. The inadequate and fragmented national system of innovation (NSI) – being the 
direct outcome of the social factors such as the climate of “semi-modernism” which 
caused the lack of the social and political will for the change towards innovation-driven 
development – is seen as the main reason for this failure. The solution offered is to build 
social capability for the introduction of the pro-active innovation policy and related NSI. 
 
Keywords: innovation policy, Croatia, knowledge-based economy, semi-modernism, social 
capability 
JEL Classification: O38 
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1  Introduction 
Even if during the last 15 years, in the process of transition towards market economy, 
Croatia has had some significant results, it has, almost universally, been recognized that 
the exclusive orientation towards market regulation of economy, neo-liberal concept of 
laissez faire, privatization and macroeconomic stabilization has not produced the 
expected effects on economic growth. 
Following the theory of the socio-economic roots of technology change and economic 
growth (OECD, 1992; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Dosi, 1982; Freeman, 1988a, Knack 
and Keefer, 1997; Knack, 1999; Perez, 1996), the main thesis of the paper is: Croatia’s 
slow economic growth is related to the obsolete management of technology change and 
the related slow development of the new policy paradigm of economic growth – the 
innovation policy (IP). The innovation policy “has only recently emerged as an amalgam 
of science and technology and industrial policies” (OECD-EUROSTAT, 1997, p. 6). It 
is, in practice, focused on the creation of the national system of innovation (NSI) 
(Lundvall, 1992; Freeman, 1988) as the mechanism for the structural adjustment of the 
socio-economic structures and of the management of the national resources towards the 
emergence of the knowledge based economy (KBE) based on the appropriation of 
knowledge. 
In contrast to the developed and fast growing countries which have, during the 1980s and 
the1990s, introduced IP as a new way of socio-economic adaptation to the KBE, Croatia, 
pursuing the market economy, has simply applied some neo-liberal recipes to the old 
economic and social structures. Such twisted construction has dragged many aspects of 
social and economic life into the pre-industrial era and has produced a distorted version 
of post-socialist wild capitalism (Županov, 2001). Due to the social climate and the state 
of mind characterised by the state of semi-modernism (Županov, 2001), Croatia in 
general and the ruling elites in particular have been very slow in adapting to the new 
technological regime and have demonstrated very low level of the social assimilation of 
the changes in global economy and the related changes in growth management.  
The innovation policy and the corresponding NSI which provide mechanisms and 
instruments for the strategic integration of science, industry and technology policies for 
the purpose of the capitalisation of knowledge, have, by the end of the 20th century, 
become the essence of the strategic development polices in many developed and fast 
growing countries, the EU included. Nevertheless, the idea of the integration of science 
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and innovation, as well as of the integration of science policy and industrial and 
technology policies, has, in Croatia, been poorly received and understood. From the 
socio-economic and cultural point of view, it has hardly been accepted at all. The last 
two decades of the 20th century spent in the majority of the developed countries in 
making the necessary shift from the standard research and industrial policies to the 
innovation policy, have, for Croatia, been lost. Although the Croatian Program for 
Innovative Technological Development (HITRA) launched in 2001 (MoST, 2002), 
marks the turning point towards innovation policy and NSI, the general environment is 
yet not stimulating enough to enable the appropriate development of NSI as a 
comprehensive system. Since the further development of HITRA strongly depends on 
the strength of the other parts of the system, the weakness of NSI threatens the future of 
HITRA, too. 
To prove the thesis, the paper will explain the shift from the standard research and 
industrial policies to the innovation policy and will, then, provide the chronological review 
of the development of the innovation policy in Croatia together with its main failings. 
 
 
2  The Shift from Science Policy to Innovation Policy 
The notion and the scope of science policy has radically changed since the mid 1970s. 
Focused on the administrative regulation of science traditionally divided into three 
categories of basic, applied and development research mostly conducted and financed by 
the public sector or the State, it has, gradually, been replaced by the innovation policy 
oriented primarily towards innovation as a mechanism of utilization and capitalization of 
science and seen as a factor of economic growth. 
The dramatic change from science to innovation policy is the result of the growing 
convergence of science with the broad field of innovation as well as of the convergence 
of science, industry and technology policies into the unique policy of development 
(Lemola, 2002, p. 1482). 
These convergence processes were initiated by the several interrelated changes in 
analytical approach to the innovation as complex socio-economic phenomenon that 
occurred during the last three decades of the 20th century. 
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The new conceptualisation of innovation emerged within evolutionary economics 
pioneered by Nelson and Winter (1982) and Dosi (1982)1. In contrast to the mainstream 
neo-classical economy (Solow, 1957; Abramovitz, 1956) that emphasised the exogenous 
character of technology and the linear model of innovation, the evolutionary economics 
argues that innovation is endogenous to economy and society and that, therefore, it can 
not appear spontaneously and in a linear succession from R&D in some ideal market 
conditions. 
Comparable to the “evolution of genes” in biology, technological innovation is the result 
of the long process of evolution of technology trajectories as well as of the evolutionary 
adaptation of companies to the market and socio-economic environment (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982, p. 9). The evolutionary economics and the numerous studies of innovation 
process led to the conclusion that technology does not appear as “manna from heaven” 
(Petit, 1995) which is beyond the reach of socio-economic agents (Lente, 1994). In 
result, the causality between technological innovation and socio-economic context was 
reversed while the linear model was abandoned as “primitive” (Abramovitz, 1989, p. 
29). Instead, the interactive model of innovation presuming the emergence of innovations 
at any phase of innovative chain, not necessarily involving scientific research, was 
introduced. 
Thanks to the evolutionary economics which has revealed the heterogeneous and 
pervasive nature of innovation, it has been widely accepted that managing innovation 
involves not only science and technology, but also the functionally interrelated sectors of 
finance, trade, management, industrial production, marketing as well as socio-cultural 
changes and public polices as their common integrator. Thus, the innovation policy is 
essentially oriented towards building an appropriate national system of innovation (NSI) 
(Lundvall 1988 and 1992; Freeman, 1988; Mowery and Oxley, 1995; OECD, 1997) – a 
concept which has had an astonishing take-up and still has the greatest impact on policy 
thinking (Mytelka, 2002, p. 1472). 
The fundamental idea of NSI is that economic growth is not a spontaneous process, but 
rather a process constructed within specific socio-economic environment. Therefore, the 
production of innovation requires deliberate policy action, economic resources and social 
recognition. In other words, it is the result of the tentative action of a human being (or 
                                                 
1 It was Dosi, among others, who elaborated on the interaction between the technology paradigms 
and trajectories and the socio-economic environment (1982), which lead some authors to note the 
Nelson-Winter-Dosi model of technology development (Belt and Rip, 1987, p. 135). 
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enterprise) that responds to the economic (e.g. market demands, profit gains, 
administrative benefits) and social incentives (e.g. respectability, recognition, power).  
Therefore, economic growth could be accelerated by creating proper socio-economic and 
institutional environment that stimulates the production of innovation above incentives 
provided by the mere market forces. Since this recognition has paved the way for the 
state interventions in terms of public support and deliberate policy actions in accelerating 
technology change, it makes the second and the most decisive change in analytical 
approach to innovation that has contributed to the innovation policy. 
NSI is of the greatest importance for the development of the transition countries such as 
Croatia because of its fundamental assumption that the competitiveness of a nation does 
not depend on the scale of R&D but rather “(…) upon the way in which the available 
resources are managed and organised, both at the enterprise and at the national level” 
(OECD, 1992, p. 80). NSI could enable a country of rather limited resources to make 
very rapid progress and vice versa, inadequate NSI might waste abundant resources. The 
examples of Japan, Korea, Ireland or Finland are the living proof of it. 
However, in the 1970s, the recognition of the interactive model coupled with the 
pressure of achieving national competitiveness, seriously shook the faith into the power 
of scientific achievement2 as the driving force of economy and technology. The reliance 
on the science policy as the core of development strategies deteriorated. By the end of 
the 20th century many countries have reconsidered their strategic polices and have shifted 
from science to technological innovation as applied and commercially exploited 
knowledge. The academic community was distressed by the difficult question which, 
after the “golden age” of science during the 1950s and the1960s (Lente, 1994, p. 302), 
government laboratories and universities had to face: If innovation does not originate 
from R&D, what, if any, is the use of academic research, science and university?3  
                                                 
2 Innovation and technology in the neo-classical model appear according to the linear model of 
innovation where innovation is just the last phase of a chain beginning with research and 
development. Many governments, therefore, assumed scientific research to be an implicit factor for 
generating new technologies and supported it with lavish financial resources. In such a way the 
neo-classical theory made room for growing public interest and investments in science end 
education. The “golden age” of science during the 1950s and the 1960s when science was socially 
and economically accepted as a value per se promoted science policy to the position of the central 
policy of many a national development strategies. 
3 The numerous books and studies analyze the changing role of universities and public research 
stressing their loss of supremacy in R&D systems. The culmination of transformation is probably 
best outlined in the T. Kealey’s (1996) astonishing book persuading us that public funding of 
science and technology is not only unnecessary but also counter-productive. 
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The answer was given by the new growth theory formulated by Paul Romer (1989; 1990) 
whose endogenous model of sustainable long-term growth fed by new ideas implies 
public investments in R&D seen as a rational and acknowledged principle of accelerating 
technical change above pure market inventiveness. Although there is a direct link 
between the investment in research and the number of innovations, economic growth 
depends on technology change defined as “improved instructions for mixing together 
raw materials” (Romer, 1990, p. S72), which absolutely involves the capitalization of 
knowledge. Technology change is, however, considered endogenous since it “(…) arises 
in a large part because of intentional action taken by people who respond to market 
incentives” (Romer, 1990, p. S72). Since economic growth is seen as greatly affected by 
an institutional structure and state policy that induces innovation, the new growth theory 
makes the third factor that pinpoints the importance of the long-term, deliberate and 
committed innovation policy. 
At the beginning of the 1990s the majority of the developed and fast growing countries 
began to support industrial innovation and new technologies by applying different 
measures and instruments. In addition to the direct support to companies and innovators, 
the emphasis was on stimulating cooperation between science and industry to integrate 
science and technology policies. Many governments started to fund and orchestrate large 
national cooperation programs for new technologies, primarily information technology, 
materials technology and biotechnology (Lemola, 2002). The innovation policy was born 
as a strategic integration of science, industrial and technology policies and as a powerful 
tool for the structural adjustment of national economies to the knowledge-based 
economy 
 
 
3  Innovation Policy in Croatia: the First 10 Years 
3.1  The Social Roots of the Slow Development of Innovation Policy 
In Croatia, the public policy was deeply influenced by the provincial spirit of semi-
modernism. The term was coined by the Croatian sociologist Josip Županov (2001) to 
mark the mixture of modern and traditional elements in the Croatian society in the last 
decade of the 20th century. 
This semi-modernism is driven by the domination of the so-called de-industrializing 
political elite and consists of the three mutually linked socio-economic processes that 
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frame the nature of the transition process. The first is re-traditionalisation – the process 
of de-secularization and the so called "moral and social renewal" back to the ethical 
values of the 19th century. The social type of "Gemeinschaft” which was believed to have 
disappeared during the migration and urbanisation was resurrected surprisingly 
successfully as a new normative integration. A kind of «Hobbesian incivility" and anomy 
was quite visibly at work, because the old business and political norms and values were 
destroyed while the new ones were based on de-industrialization as a second process that 
constitutes semi-modernism. De-industrialization is a process of the privatization of the 
previously state owned industrial companies according to the "empty shell model” 
meaning that the tycoons and corrupted managers suck out the company's substance. 
This privatization regularly ended in the devastation of company’s fixed assets, 
competences in technology, skills and market competitiveness. It usually turned 
companies into empty shells dependent once again on the state support. The “political 
capitalism" hidden behind the “privatisation” allowed the new class of businessman who 
had no management skills to take over the firms with minimal investment. The so-called 
“rent-seekers”, who earned themselves the rent by selling the property accumulated by 
the previous generations, swapped out the ’profit seekers’ who, led by the profit 
maximization, are interested in technological accumulation and industrial development. 
The third process, de-scientization, is the natural consequence of the two previous 
processes and designates the marginalization of science by both the political and 
business elites that have induced the climate of anti-intellectualism and anti-academism. 
The infamous brain drain, the financial starvation of the research sector and the 
stagnation of scientific productivity and the general shrinkage of science base was, 
therefore, the inevitable outcome. 
These three processes constitute Croatian socio-cultural and politically specific historical 
heritage that, helped by the general disorientation of population after the collapse of 
socialism, shape the state of mind and practical day-to-day governance. Although the 
failure of adaptation could definitely be ascribed to the painful process of “creative 
destruction” (Perez, 1996), the examples of other, less myopic countries, illustrate that 
different scenarios are possible in creating own future and welfare. 
In Croatia, the suggestions involving common and deliberate action or a national policy 
involving state interventions in the long-term resources for growth such as ICT, 
technology accumulation, innovativeness and R&D, were rejected with disdain, because 
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they were seen as the relics of the socialist past of planned economy4. The rule of de-
industrializing elite and the limited vision of Croatia as the “country of waiters and 
peasants” obstructed the other different visions of Croatian future that would take into 
account the need for structural adjustment of institutional and economic structures to 
new techno-economic paradigm. The innovation policy and NSI were, as accordingly, 
ignored.  
 
 
3.2  The Development of Innovation Policy:                       
the Chronology 
Due to the influence of the neighbouring western countries (Germany and Italy in 
particular) as well as to the exposure to the foreign literature and international seminars, 
some among the Croatian administration at the Ministry of Science and Technology 
(MoST) together with a number of scholars from the academic community have, by the 
mid 1990s, discovered the modern methods of innovation policy and tried to apply them 
in Croatia. They have initiated the socio-economic and cultural changes of the rigid 
political and academic environment leading towards the idea of the Croatian NSI and 
paved the way for the innovation policy as a new growth paradigm. In the development 
of innovation policy in Croatia the three phases could be identified.  
The first phase, from 1991 to 1993, begins with the collapse of the socialist regime. It 
was the period of standard R&D policy characterised by the deep political fractioning 
among intellectual elite and by the groups struggling for control and supremacy. The 
year 1994, the beginning of the second phase, is marked by the first attempts of transfer 
of advanced “western” methods and IP know-how to Croatia, while the beginning of the 
third phase is marked by the launch of the Program of Innovative Technological 
Development – HITRA at the beginning of 2001 (MoST, 2002). HITRA marks a turning 
point in science policy since it is the first program that created and implemented the IP 
measures, paving the way for the new paradigm of economic growth. 
 
                                                 
4 “Ironically, while “Western” states are more prepared to adopt state interventionist policies to 
foster innovation, post-socialist states regard intervention as a hangover from the past “ (Webster, 
1996, p. 1). 
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The First Phase: Centralized Science Policy (1991-1993) 
During the first phase the science policy was centralized. It was governed by MoST, the 
main goal of which was to sweep away the old socialist ways of organizing science and 
to introduce new models designed in the image of those of the neighbouring “western” 
countries. Although many new organizational elements like public competitions for 
grants, the pyramidal organization of projects, young researchers schemes, etc. were 
introduced, the role of science didn't change much. It was still seen as the dominant 
factor of the national cultural heritage, while the connection to the national economic 
development was not recognized. 
The state of mind was adapted to the maintenance of the traditional perception of science 
as an “ivory tower” of fundamental research reserved for the scientific elite. Such 
perception had both the positive and the negative influence on the science system. The 
positive impact was the preservation of the national knowledge base in terms of keeping 
alive academic community, their competences, equipment and skills – quite an important 
achievement in those turbulent times when the national economy was brought to ruins 
and when the science system was also at peril.  
On the other hand, the elitist approach which ignored engineering, applied sciences and 
technologies has seriously slowed down the recognition of innovation as a driving force 
of economic growth and the science-industry cooperation as a development mechanism. 
The elitist approach as the dominant way of thinking (among natural scientists kept alive 
to the present day) together with the exhausted industry left at the mercy of the anti-
intellectually disposed tycoons prevented the recognition of the research, innovation or 
education as the ways of the recovery from economic collapse. The “rent–seekers” 
supported by the political elite who perceived them as the pillars of the privatization and 
the prime agents of the planned restructuring to market economy hindered the 
convergence of the science and industry sectors as well as of science and technology 
policies towards the national system of innovation.  
The obsolete linear model of the innovation process upon which the traditional approach 
to technology was based and which was largely accepted and exercised during the 
socialist period, was still very influential in Croatia. At the beginning of the 1990s, when 
many countries were introducing innovation policy as a new form of science 
management, both the scientific community struggling for its “academic freedom” and 
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the industrial business elites seeking “fast and vast” gains rejected the public research 
orientation towards market, industry and innovation. 
Such a rigid scientific system seriously deteriorated by the end of the 20th century when 
the lack of academic autonomy and scientific dignity, budget cuts, the exclusion from the 
regional research networks, etc. finally brought the R&D sector to stagnation and 
lethargy causing the loss of the scientific excellence (Silobrčić, 2000) and the general 
shrinkage of the science base5.  
The second process of semi-modernism, the so called “de-industrialization” according to 
the "empty shell model" was the cause of the major failing of the innovation policy of 
that period: the devastation of the industrial research institutes, the so called “heart of the 
capitalist machine”. In Croatia, same as in other transition countries like Hungry, Poland, 
Romania, Bulgaria, etc., the political elite, pursuing the dominant “mantra” of liberal 
market economy, withdrew the state funding to the institutes and left them at the mercy 
of the market or to the care of their parent companies The transformation of the socialist 
industrial research sector according to the model known as “shock without therapy” 
(Radošević, 1996) caused the heavy losses in technology accumulation and skills, the 
negative effects of which can, to their full extent, be seen today, when the absorptive 
capacities of companies appear as the fundamental prerequisite for research-based 
technology development. 
 
The Second Phase: Building the Infrastructure (1994-2000) 
The idea of innovation policy which goes beyond the mere organization of scientific 
research and which stresses the interaction of science and industry for the purpose of 
economic growth wasn't readily accepted by the public administration. The initial steps 
were taken in 1994 when MoST, developing the models of science-industry cooperation 
and financial support for innovative small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), tried to 
                                                 
 For example, according to some estimates, in 1989, Ruđer Bošković Institute, the leading 
Croatian scientific institution earned 40% of its revenue from the business sector and published 
0.75% of a scientific paper per employee. In 1999, only 13% of revenue came from businesses 
while publishing activity is reduced to 0.68 % of a paper per employee (Pisk, 2001). Radošević 
(1996, p. 17) finds that, in socialism, the Croatian R&D system was a mixture of different activities. 
For example, in 1989, 52% of the total revenue of R&D system came from research, 37% from the 
production and 11% form the services rendered. 
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apply the principles proven successful in Germany6 (Lange and Švarc, 1994) and Italy.7 
To promote the idea, MoST organized in Istria in November 1994 the first international 
conference entitled "Technology parks: European experience for Croatian development" 
(Ružinski et al., 1994). The participation of more than 200 experts from every part of 
Croatia illustrates the scope of attention the topic aroused. This conference was a kick-
off meeting for the dissemination of the idea of technology business incubation in 
Croatia.  
As the IP measures resulting from the cooperation with Germany and Italy, same as 
everything else connected to IP, were, for Croatia, terra incognita, the first practical 
results came almost two years later when the first guidelines of the innovation policy 
were outlined within the National scientific and research program 1996-1998 (The 
Official Gazette 16/1996). In spite of the fact that these guidelines were firmly 
incorporated into the research policy, they formed the legal basis for MoST to implement 
two framework programs that have determined the future of the whole innovation 
system. The first program was oriented towards setting up of the national network of 
institutions for the development, transfer, implementation and financing of new 
technologies, while the second stressed the importance of government support measures 
for innovations and technology-based businesses. 
The program of institutional technology infrastructure comprised the government support 
for the establishment of the business-innovation8 and technology centres which were 
assigned the ambitious and important task of local economic development. They were 
understood as intermediaries between universities and industry as well as institutions that 
were to assist the companies in their start-up and expansion phases. Furthermore, the 
centres were expected to become the points of reference for the future international and 
regional aid-programs (like PHARE or INTERREG, etc.). These centres never received 
                                                 
6 Projects were made within bilateral cooperation of MoST and the German Federal Ministry of 
Research, Science, Education and Technology using the expertise of FhG-ISI, Karlsruhe and 
VDI/VDE-IT, Berlin. 
7 The Business Innovation Centre Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Trieste according to the model 
experienced by SPI - Promozione e Sviluppo Imprenditoriale in Italy.  
8 Since at that time there was no other government or non-government body for supporting business 
incubation, MoST has naturally incorporated these activities under its umbrella. The Department 
for small entrepreneurship of the Ministry of Economy started with its activities little bit later and 
the demarcation line between responsibilities and scope of the work between the two ministries was 
drawn in 2001, when the Ministry of Crafts, Small and Medium Sized Enterprises was established 
as the separate Ministry (merged again into the Ministry of Economy in 2004).  
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any funding from these aid-programs, even if, at the time, those fund were seriously 
reckoned with. 
The implementation of the Program went quite well. From 1996 to 1998, in the major 
university centres (except Osijek) three technology centres were established and 
supported by MOST: Centre for Technology Transfer, Zagreb, 1996, Technology and 
Innovation Centre Rijeka, 1997, Technology Centre Split, 1997 (MoST, 2002). 
The cooperation with Italy resulted in the establishment in 1998 of the Business 
Innovation Centre of Croatia – BICRO. It was a coordinating body of the technology 
network the primary aim of which was to create the financial models and instruments for 
the support of the innovative entrepreneurship. To fill the gap with the foreign special 
financial instruments such as venture capital (risk, seed capital, etc.) which did not (and 
still do not) exist in Croatia was an extremely important task. 
Following this task BICRO has outlined its Program for the establishment and the 
promotion of the production based on new technologies with the aim to support 200 
companies in 4 years (Program 200/4) by equity financing (Salamon, 1998). The 
criterion used for granting support to companies was scientific intensity. The companies 
were differentiated as knowledge-based companies, engineering and know-how 
companies. Even if the Program was quite avant-garde, it was approved by the 
Government in 1998 and it found its place in the budget plans. However, the planned 
financial resource were never actually allocated to it, and the Program never came into 
function.  
Even if these centres were established by almost mechanical application of the western 
know-how to the “East” (which, by the way, received some serious criticism from some 
scholars9) from the point of view of the future development of the innovations system 
this was the most decisive phase. This phase has not only provided some precious 
experience and assimilated new ideas, but during it the basic “institutional infrastructure” 
was established. Also, a group of managers emerged forming the nucleus for creating 
national IP after 2000. 
                                                 
9 Establishing of government-backed business and technology centers in Central and Eastern 
Europe was estimated as widespread but mostly unsuccessful attempts of building technology 
infrastructure (Dyker and Radoševiæ, 1999, Webster, 1996). 
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The Third Phase: The First Step in Innovation Policy Measures (2001 -      )  
The last and not yet concluded phase of the development of the innovation policy is 
marked by the establishment of the separate Ministry for Crafts and Small and Medium 
Businesses (MOMSP) (recently merged with the Ministry of Economy) and by the 
launch of HITRA - the first government innovation policy program in 2001 (MoST, 
2002). Both initiatives reflect the desire of the government elected in 2000 to give the 
impetus to innovation and entrepreneurship. 
MOMPS played an important role in innovation policy in the sense of fostering 
entrepreneurship culture and upgrading technology capabilities of companies. A range of 
different programs for the provision of credit lines, technological upgrading of 
companies in the sense of the procurement of the new equipment, training managers, 
donating grants for innovators, etc. were developed and introduced into the policy 
agenda (Jurlina-Alibegović, 2002). 
Trying not to interfere with the other ministries', especially not with MOMSP's 
responsibilities, MoST has confined its efforts to the companies and activities with 
higher value added and therefore involving cooperation with R&D sector. For that 
purpose, HITRA was transformed into a program especially tailored to encourage the 
science-industry cooperation and providing a framework for direct cooperation between 
entrepreneurs/industry and Croatian universities and research institutes. Within this 
framework HITRA maintains its central mission of restructuring R&D sector towards the 
requirements of KBE by reversing the share of the state and the business sector in R&D 
system. The predominance of business over public R&D is perceived as the most 
important aspect of structural adaptation and involves three main activities (Švarc, 
2003):  
• fostering science-industry cooperation, 
• reviving industrial R&D and 
• encouraging commercialization of the research results. 
 
HITRA is a big step forward in innovation policy because it is public administration's 
first attempt to formulate the functionally related elements of innovation policy for the 
purpose of establishing Croatian national innovation system. The three constitutive parts 
were planned, as follows: 
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1) The creation of stimulating policy measures, mechanisms and programs;  
2) The creation of technological institutional infrastructure; 
3) The establishment of the control mechanisms for the innovation and technology 
policy. 
The most substantial part of HITRA, the policy measures, consists of two 
complementary subprograms (Table 1). The first one, TEST, focuses on technology 
projects. Its aim is to finance the pre-commercial development of new products, 
processes and services in the public and private R&D sectors. The outcomes are to be 
commercialized through the second sub-program RAZUM (Development of Knowledge-
Based Companies), aimed at the provision of support to commercial entrepreneurial 
projects (start-up, development and expansion of companies) based on new technologies 
and/or cooperation with research institutes and universities. 
Table 1.  Policy measures of the HITRA program 
Sub-Program Type of projects  Targets of the policy measures 
“Simple” technology projects 
(TP) 
Development of the commercially promising products, 
processes and services prior to their commercial use up to 
the stage of original solutions (prototype/pilot stage) 
“Complex” technology 
projects (STIRP) 
Development of the multidisciplinary, cooperative research 
for launching new or developing the existing technological 
areas 
T 
E 
S 
T 
Nucleus (Jezgre) 
Research and technological NUCLEUS aimed at 
concentration of R&D resources (experts, equipment, 
instruments) both from public and private sector to gain 
critical mass for technology and research based services. 
RAZUM Knowledge-based companies  
Development of the Knowledge-Based Companies at start-
up or expansion phase, aimed at commercialization of 
research by entrepreneurial projects 
 
 
As the system developed and matured, it was planned for BICRO to be restructured to 
become an investment institution, close to the venture capital fund as was its original 
purpose. In 2001 some new centres were established: Technology innovation centre in 
Osijek, Research and Development centre for mariculture in Dubrovnik and Centre for 
production processes, Zagreb, 2001. 
HITRA has envisaged the establishment of the Research and Development Technology 
Institute (ITP) as the centre of research and professional excellence in innovation policy, 
technology studies, technology foresight exercises and the creation and management of 
the specialized innovation programs. Program TEST was planned to be outsourced to 
ITP, like RAZUM is to BICRO. 
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In order to control the overall operation of HITRA, and the distribution and spending of 
budget resources in particular, as well as to create a space for inter-ministerial discussion 
on innovation policy issues, the Inter-ministerial Control Group was founded on 
December 6, 2001 (The Official Gazette of the RH, No.108/2001). The program has also 
envisaged The Ethical Committee, a body affiliated to the Ministry, to take care of the 
harmonization of moral criteria and public welfare with the new technologies and their 
commercial use. 
HITRA has introduced a range of completely new instruments and organizational and 
institutional arrangements to science policy like the Technology Filed Council, the 
regulations on intellectual property rights (IPR), the new methods of evaluating and 
monitoring of projects, etc., which have paved the way for the innovation policy in 
Croatia (Table 2). In spite of these novelties, HITRA, due to it exclusive orientation to 
science-industry cooperation, is rather limited as a common ground for the establishment 
of the comprehensive NSI. Some important aspects of NSI were, from the political point 
of view, outside the competences of HITRA. For example, the commercialization of 
research results requires sound intellectual property protection policy, new financial 
support instruments, the involvement of business planning in research management, etc. 
To overcome these obstacles that threaten HITRA’s further development, MoST used the 
opportunity to launch, by the end of 2001, the World Bank technical assistance project 
(TAL2) entitled “Science and Technology Project” (STP) aimed at designing 
comprehensive innovation system. The underlying idea was to use the World Bank’s 
“brand name” to disseminate among political and intellectual elite the idea of NSI in 
order to secure its broader implementation. 
Table 2.  Some new IP instruments introduced by the HITRA Program 
TEST RAZUM 
Budget grants for developing prototypes, pilot 
plans, feasibility studies 
Subsidies to companies for research and 
development (30% of the total project value) 
Grants and subsidies of small and large scale 
equipment 
Favourable commercial loans with the interest 
equalling the discount rate of the Croatian National 
Bank 
Co-financing with private partner(s) of developing 
new technologies/innovations 
Conditional loans in case of risk projects and 
particularly in case of academic entrepreneurship, i.e. 
spin-offs from the university 
Arrangements of IPR among partners and 
introduction of business secret 
Monitoring of the project realization 
Re-payment of 21% of grants in case of 
commercialization  
Assistance in business management, marketing, 
cooperation with R&D organizations, etc. 
Public defence of the project, “on the spot control” 
of project realization 
 
Grants for feasibility studies for establishing 
market oriented research service centres (Nucleus) 
in private company or research institution 
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STP did actually initiate the comprehensive framework for NSI that provides a new 
impetus to innovation policy, especially by starting the “White paper of Croatia”. The 
project is still under discussion and preparation. In addition, the separate project on the 
establishment of the system of the protection of the intellectual property rights in 
academic sector was also initiated within CARDS program and recently approved by the 
European Commission. 
 
 
4  The Restructuring of R&D Sector: The Shortcomings 
HITRA, STP and numerous other activities of different groups and local authorities 
during the last 10 years began the irreversible processes of convergence of science and 
technology policies towards innovation system and new policy paradigm. 
Croatia still lags behind in implementation of IP and the related structural changes of 
research sector towards requirements of KBE. The innovation policy focused on the 
restructuring of R&D system towards the predominance of the business sector 
investments hasn't yet achieved its central goal. The four aspects of the current research 
and innovation system illustrate this: 
a) Weak industrial R&D sector and the low technology capabilities of companies 
b) Croatian research paradox 
c) Weak science-industry cooperation  
d) The lack of stimulating environment. 
 
 
A.  Weak Industrial R&D Sector and the Low Technology capabilities of companies 
The full effect of the negative impacts of the loss of the industrial research institutes and 
the centres of high-tech competence together with almost 15 years of not accumulating 
technological capabilities in companies, are seen today, when competition is ultimately 
based on technology and innovation. 
While in the developed countries industry dominates the science system since it funds 
nearly 63%, performs about 72% of the total R&D (OECD, 2004, p. 10) and employs the 
majority of researchers and scientists, e.g. 50% in EU and 65% in OECD countries on 
average, the Croatian R&D system is still dominated by the public sector. State funds 
more than the half of research activities and employs the significant portion of 
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researchers - about 83% out of which 53% are affiliated to universities and 30% to public 
institutes. In contrast, business finances about 44% of total R&D and employs only 17% 
of researchers. It is obvious that the vast majority of R&D potentials heavily depends on 
the scarce budget resources, which amounts to only 0.55% of GDP (The Official 
Gazette, 2003). 
The total investment of business sector in R&D is extremely low and amounts to 0.43% 
of GDP, while in the developed countries business sectors invest more then 1% of GDP 
and in the fast growing countries more then 2% of GDP. It is a valid argument for both 
the government and the industry to urgently join efforts in restructuring of R&D sector 
so that their current roles may be reversed. 
 
Table 3.  R&D and innovation indicators for selected countries in 1999  
             (or the most recent available year) 
Indicators Croatia EU OECD Finland Nordic countries Poland Hungary Slovenia 
The Global Competitiveness report   
- Rank of GDP per capita (2001) 44 14 38 30 25 
- Rank of national competitiveness 58 2 51 29 28 
- Rank of technology index 43 3 36 21 25 
- Rank of innovation capacity 42 3 35 28 25 
GERD  1.19 1.85 2.21 3.19 - 0.75 0.68 1.51 
% of GERD performed by business 44.4 65.6 72.4 70.0 69.2 41.4 45.4 55.0 
% of GERD performed HE and public 
labs 51.2 34.4 27.6 26.0 30.8 58.6 54.6 45.0 
% of GERD financed by business 44.5 54.7 63.2 65.0 62.8 38.1 38.5 56.9 
% of GERD financed by the State 52.7 36.0 29.8 30.0 30.0 58.5 53.2 56.9 
BERD 0.43 1.20 1.54 2.18 - 0.31 0.28 0.84 
Public expenditures on R&D as % of 
GDP (GOV+HE)  0.55 0.64 0.61 0.99 - 0.44 0.37 - 
R&D expenditures per capita (USD)  70 415 500 - 690 60 90 220 
Researchers in business sector (%) 17.3 49.8 64.9 - 50.5 18.3 25.9 34.8 
Researchers in public sector (%) 82.7 50.2 35.1 49.5 81.7 74.1 63.6 
Researchers per 1000 labour force 3.2 5.2 6.1 8.1 3.3 5.7 8.9 
PhD in science and technology 
(aged 25-34) 0.17 0.55
0.47
(USA) 0.97 - - - - 
 
Source: Radas (2003); Strategy of Development, “Croatia in 21st century - Science”, (Official Gazette, 108/2003), The
Global Competitiveness Report, 2002-2003, Annual Competitiveness Report of Croatia, 2002, NVK, 2003
 
. 
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B.  Croatian Research Paradox 
However, the total investment in R&D in Croatia (GERD) is quite satisfactory (Table 3) 
placing Croatia high on the list of the newly-integrated European countries10. At the 
same time, industrial R&D which is the heart of the modern industrial societies has 
almost disappeared, while the technology capacities of companies and innovation 
capacities have been seriously weakened.  
The diagnosis is that the problems are not so much in “inputs” but in “outputs” revealing 
that Croatia suffers from the same “pan-European” paradox (European Commission, 
1995), of the effective use of research and science for economic development. 
Such outstanding neglect and under-use of research and innovative technology capability 
in industry for making structural adjustments to global changes has a negative impact on 
both the macro and micro-level of economy. To illustrate, the overall structure of the 
industrial sectors of economy and export has not significantly changed for the last 25 
years and is still dominated by the low-profit “Croatian traditional industries” like wood 
and textile industry, fishery, tobacco and shipbuilding (Jurlina-Alibegović, 2003).  
Similarly, on the micro-level of the technology capability of companies, the comparison 
of some selected indicators like the number of patents, ISO standards 9000 and Internet 
hosts reveals that Croatia doesn't only lag behind the developed countries, but also 
behind the newly integrated European countries that Croatia used to compare to (The 
Official Gazette, 2003) . 
In addition, the National Competitiveness Council (2002) ranked Croatia 58th by its 
national competitiveness and 43th by technology index among 80 countries (Table 4).  
 
C.  Weak Science-Industry Cooperation 
The strengthening of industrial R&D sector greatly depends on the science industry 
cooperation, a mechanism which is widely used in developed countries for translation of 
R&D potentials into new marketable technologies. The low level of the technology 
capabilities and industrial research in Croatia resulted in very weak science-industry 
cooperation. The industry is not capable of absorbing and using research services, while 
                                                 
10 Still below Slovenia with 1.5% of GDP, but above Slovak Republic and Hungary with 0.68% of 
GDP, or Poland with 0.75% of GDP. 
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the research sector is traditionally closed system focused on the basic research and state 
support. It is estimated that today only about 10% of the revenues of the institutes and 
6% of the revenues of the universities come from the contract research with industry 
(Švarc et al., 1996) 
This cooperation was better even in the socialist period when it was dictated by the State 
through the socialist organization of the scientific work (“providers” and “receivers” of 
R&D activities). At that time almost the 30% of the revenues of public institutes and the 
23 % of the revenues of universities was coming from industry. (Peruško et al., 1989) 
 
D.  The Lack of Stimulating Environment 
Since the roles of innovation and knowledge based factors of growth in economic 
development were not recognised, the setting up of the proper environment was also 
seriously neglected. The elements commonly found in NSIs all around the world, in 
Croatia simply do not exist:  
• Domestic venture capital industry for start-up and technology based SMEs; 
• Encouraging the system of the protection of intellectual property rights in research sector 
(project is still in its initial phase within STP and CARDS); 
• Large infrastructure institutions for technology development like technology or science 
parks and other forms of the centres of technology excellence; 
• Technology foresight exercises; 
• The centre of competences in generic technologies like biotechnology, nano-technology, 
new materials, even computer technologies which today play the same role as electricity 
did in the past; 
• The mobility of researchers and experts between industry and academia. 
 
It is obvious that in Croatia, unlike in the developed and fast growing countries, there are 
businesses capable of performing and investing into R&D. There is a great need to 
develop supportive environment for upgrading the technological capabilities and 
innovativeness of companies, stimulating science-industry cooperation and developing 
in-house R&D activities.  
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5  Conclusions 
The transition from the mere market economy to the knowledge based economy requires 
the new policy paradigm of growth, an innovation policy focused on the productive and 
commercial use of knowledge instead of standard production factors. In practice, it is 
oriented towards the establishment of the NSI as a model of integration of domestic 
science and research potentials with the other sectors of national economy and society 
that all take part in the production of innovation as commercially exploitable knowledge. 
Such a change in development paradigm towards KBE is overwhelming, pervasive and 
rather painful process since it requires radical changes not only in science and 
technology but also in socio-economic environment that includes various sectors such as 
financial sector, legal arrangements, management and decision making as well as 
changes in cultural values and patterns of communication.  
Providing the review of the chronological development of innovation policy in Croatia 
with its main failings, the paper describes the difficulties in the emergence of the 
innovation policy in Croatia. It also argues that innovation policy and national innovation 
system are, in Croatia, still unrecognised as tools for economic development and as the 
essence of strategic policy. 
The rule of de-industrializing elite and the spirit of semi-modernism resulting in the 
fundamental miscomprehension of the roles of knowledge based factors and innovation 
for economic growth are seen as the underlying reasons. Since the need for the structural 
adjustment of national economy to the knowledge based economy was not recognized, 
innovation policy and NSI were, consequently, disregarded and ignored. 
De-industrialing elite has not recognised that innovation crosses the boundaries between 
science and industry and that the innovation policy as their strategic integration is needed 
for knowledge based growth. Instead, the obsolete dualism between science and 
industrial policy is maintained. Therefore, the role of science is restricted to the autistic 
policy of scientific research isolated from country’s economic development. On the other 
hand, industrial policy is focused on financial rehabilitation and the privatization of 
traditional industries which lost their technology dynamism and dragged the whole 
economy to structural crisis and unemployment. 
The paper, therefore, emphasises that failure in innovation policy and as well as moving 
towards KBE strongly depend on “hidden factors” of growth embodied in country-
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specific socio-cultural and political factors. The different aspects of the historical 
heritage of a nation, the particularities of a national culture, political context, moral 
values, the way of industrialization, etc., produced in Croatia the “social incapability” for 
growth. These usually underestimated “soft” factors hinder the most important condition 
for change – the social assimilation of the new technology style that generates economic 
growth in the particular moment of historical development – today KBE. 
Probably the most valuable experience earned from the 10 years of innovation policy is 
its practical demonstration that economic growth is primarily a social process (OECD; 
Sundqueist report), a complex socio-economic phenomenon that does not happen 
spontaneously, but is constructed within the certain economic and social system 
(Freeman, 1988). Therefore, economic growth calls for the deliberate policy action, 
economic resources and social recognition. It is the result of the intentional activity of 
the whole society and the political elite in particular to install the new way of 
management of economic growth, today inclined towards commercial application of 
knowledge. 
Today, the only policy program in Croatia that is intentionally aimed at the integration of 
knowledge based factors and economic development is HITRA. Although HITRA is 
almost marginal program in terms of financial resources, scope and related capacities, it 
is of capital importance for the Croatian overall future perspectives since it paves the 
way for the new policy paradigm that should become the dominant way of management 
of the national resources directed towards knowledge based growth. 
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This paper reports preliminary results of the first Community Innovation Survey 
conducted in Croatia. The survey collects internationally comparable enterprise-level 
data on inputs and outputs of innovation processes in Croatian companies, covering the 
period from 2001 to 2003. Key survey findings are summarized and compared to 
selected countries of Central and Eastern Europe. These include the data on product and 
process innovation, expenditure on innovation activities, intramural research, 
information sources for innovation and factors that constrain innovation. Moreover, the 
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outputs, unfavorable structure of innovation expenditures, widespread occurrence of 
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1  Introduction 
Innovation tends to be considered as a pivotal driver of both economic growth and 
competitiveness of companies and sectors. However, measurement and analysis of 
innovative activities and their impacts at micro-, meso-, and macro-levels have often 
been burdened with conceptual and applicative difficulties. Following the Oslo Manual 
(OECD, 1996), a methodology for collecting and interpreting enterprise-level data on 
technological and organisational innovation has been developed and applied to the 
countries of European Union, as well as accession countries. In addition to economic 
imperatives, transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe, have tended to embrace 
the innovation-related issues within their accession into the European Union, which 
states the development of a knowledge-based economy as a crucial policy goal. 
In addition to underlining the importance of innovation for economic growth in the 
context of restructuring of the Croatian economy, the paper reports key preliminary 
results of the first Community Innovation Survey conducted in 2004 on a stratified 
representative sample of manufacturing and service enterprises in relevant sectors. The 
survey collected internationally comparable data on inputs, outputs and obstacles to 
innovation processes in Croatian companies, covering the period from 2001 to 2003. 
After basic insights into the methodology, the paper focuses on inputs (e.g. expenses, 
financing, R&D, sources of information), outputs (e.g. types of innovation) and obstacles 
of innovative activities. We then analyse the characteristics of innovative firms such as 
size and ownership, and finally offer some concluding remarks. 
 
 
2  Innovation and Economic Growth 
Recent years have seen the emphasis of the relationship between innovation and 
economic growth (Aralica and Bačić, 2004). For instance, there is a general consensus 
among economists that technological innovation plays a central role in the process of 
long-run economic growth (Radosevic, 2003, p. 4). Neoclassical growth theory (Solow, 
1956) has not elucidated how the technological progress is achieved, although it 
perceived such progress as a source of growth. Within endogenous growth models (i.e. 
models based on externalities, Neoschumpeterian models and AK models) technological 
progress continues to be perceived as the main source of growth, but such models view it 
as a result of activity of firms and/or individuals (Romer, 1986, 1990). In the models 
based on externalities, learning from other firms within an industry leads to new ideas 
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that may result in technological progress. Knowledge, with which technological progress 
is identified, is considered free and thus can be easily spilled over. Neoschumpeterian 
models stipulate that research and development can spur economic growth (Grossman 
and Helpman, 1990, 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1992). Namely, in the context of 
imperfect competition, firms will have an incentive to innovate since they can protect the 
innovation via patenting, thereby achieving strategic advantage and gaining extra profits. 
Within the AK models (e.g. Jones and Manuelli, 1990) economic growth stems from 
capital accumulation whereby capital is viewed as an agglomeration of different forms, 
including human and physical capital. However, these models fail to differentiate 
technology from physical capital, which makes them comparatively less sophisticated 
even in relation to the neoclassical Solow’s (1956) model (Romer, 1999). 
At the micro-level, the role of innovative SMEs in modern economies has been 
emphasised; such enterprises, which develop specific capabilities and are often included 
into corporate production networks, are characterized by higher rates of employment and 
output growth than other SMEs and large enterprises (Iliev and Račić, 2003). At the 
macroeconomic level, innovation tends to contribute to the accumulation of capital, and 
growth of employment and multifactor productivity (OECD, 2001). However, the 
relationship between research and development (R&D) expenditures and growth is not 
straightforward. Although significant, aggregate R&D explains limited part of variation 
of growth. This suggests that the factors such as allocation of R&D resources, and the 
mechanisms of creation, dissemination and commercial exploitation of knowledge matter 
fundamentally. These factors are significantly influenced by the national innovative 
capacity (Stern, Porter and Furman, 2000), which covers the ability of a country to 
produce and commercialise a long-term flow of innovative technology. R&D or ability to 
generate new knowledge is only one component of broader concept of national 
innovative capacity. Among other issues, national innovative capacity depends on the 
strength of a strong common innovation infrastructure, i.e. cross-cutting factors that 
contribute to innovation throughout the economy. Hereby the crucial factors include the 
science and technology policy, mechanisms for the support of basic research, and the 
accumulated stock of technological knowledge including diffusion and utilisation of the 
existing knowledge. Consequently, government policies can play an influential role in 
the facilitation of innovation - notably through support for R&D, education and labour 
market policies, entrepreneurship support, and the promotion of interaction among 
different organisations within the national innovation system (including the research 
institutions, business firms and government). 
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The realisation of the importance of innovative activities and innovation policy has 
recently been facilitated by two key factors. Firstly, there has been an exhaustion of 
growth and productivity improvements based on defensive restructuring and non-
investment reallocation of resources (Mickiewicz and Radosevic, 2001). Since 
competition on the basis of low wages is an unfavourable and unsustainable strategic 
option for most of these economies, their long-term competitiveness requires 
technological advancement and the development of innovative capacities. Moreover, 
most of these countries are being integrated into the European Union. The EU is already 
the main foreign trade partner and the source of FDI for transition economies during the 
pre-accession period, which reinforces the need for maintaining and improving internal 
and external competitiveness. Furthermore, the EU not only states the development of a 
knowledge-based economy as a crucial policy goal for its current members, but also 
requires from the candidate countries to demonstrate the same orientation. Namely, 
innovation and increased technological change in new member states are viewed as 
fundamental to their economic convergence with current members and the cohesion of 
the enlarged EU. Consequently, maintenance of productivity and GDP growth require 
new mechanisms for supporting innovation and industrial upgrading (EC, 2001, p. 11). If 
transition economies are to catch up with the EU in terms if economic growth, that is 
likely to require increased competitiveness of firms and sectors in those economies i.e. 
their ability to withstand competitive pressures within the Union (Radosevic, 2003). 
 
 
3  The Environment for Innovation in Croatia 
In terms of relative wages, Croatia fares badly in comparison to the rest of CEE, which 
undermined the competitiveness of several traditional export-oriented sectors (e.g. 
textiles and apparel industries). On the other hand, retarded levels of technological 
capacity and product and process innovation have not provided an alternative route to 
competitiveness. The examples of internationally competitive innovations have been 
sporadic and they have rarely induced strong spillover effects. Moreover, inadequate 
factor markets (i.e. inflexible labour market and underdeveloped capital market) and 
insufficiently supportive policy mechanisms have even encouraged dislocation of certain 
activities to other CEE countries. Deteriorating competitiveness of Croatian exports has 
been observed both in the EU-15 and former CEFTA markets (National Competitiveness 
Council, 2003). 
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Therefore, the necessity for the development of innovative activities supported by 
adequate innovation policy is paramount for the catching up in terms of technological 
advancement, product and process developments and the resulting competitiveness of the 
Croatian economy. However, the realisation of this need by researchers and policy 
makers and the development of adequate policy mechanisms have been relatively slow 
and occasionally inconsistent. The economic policies mostly focused on macroeconomic 
stabilisation, reforms of the financial system, taxation and the pension system, and 
liberalisation of trade and exchange regimes. When it came to microeconomic issues, the 
policies have often been related to privatisation and restructuring of existing enterprises; 
even in these areas the success has been mixed due to political influences and weak 
institutional frameworks (Račić and Cvijanović, 2004). Consequently, not enough 
emphasis was given to the issues of new enterprise development, promotion of 
innovative activities, creation and effective functioning of interfaces between research 
community and industry, or the facilitation of integration of innovative enterprises into 
local, national and global industrial networks (Račić et. al., 2004). Moreover, due to 
inadequate investment promotion policy, the FDI inflows have predominantly occurred 
through privatisation of existing firms for market seeking reasons, mainly in the services 
sectors (transportation and telecommunication; financial intermediation; retail), and they 
have not resulted in significant technology transfers or spillovers (Bačić, Račić and 
Ahec-Šonje, 2004). More recently, there have been improvements within the area of 
enterprise development: new credit lines have been secured, and better technical 
assistance to entrepreneurs provided, which had noticeable effects on the performance of 
the SME sector and led to wider acknowledgement of its role in the economic growth 
and job creation. 
The existing research into innovation (Radas, 2003a; Radas, 2003b), innovation policy 
(Švarc, 2004; Andrijević-Matovac, 2003; Aralica and Bačić, 2004) and competitiveness 
(National Competitiveness Council, 2003) indicates inadequate innovation performance 
of the Croatian economy and deficiencies in the processes supporting the development 
and commercialisation of new knowledge. However, these findings have not been 
supported by comprehensive firm-level innovation surveys that could also give insights 
into specific firm- and sector- level issues and support the formulation of a more 
effective innovation policy. First such survey has been conducted in 2004, and the 
remainder of the paper presents some of its preliminary findings. 
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4  Empirical Foundations and Methodology 
Empirical basis for this paper is being obtained through the first Community Innovation 
Survey (CIS) in Croatia. In this survey enterprise-level data are collected in accordance 
with the Oslo Manual (OECD, 1996) guidelines and the available literature on the 
implementation of CIS III (e.g. Kurik et al., 2002; Boia et al., 2003a). The survey covers 
the period from 2001 to 2003. In addition to general information about the enterprise, the 
survey includes the data on the following aspects of innovation activities: product and 
process innovation, expenditures on innovation activities, intramural research and 
experimental development, innovation cooperation, information sources for innovation, 
factors hampering innovation activities, innovation protection, and important strategic 
and organisational changes in the enterprise. The survey is based on a stratified 
representative sample of all Croatian enterprises in relevant manufacturing and service 
sectors. Consequently, the survey is to provide comprehensive overview of innovative 
activities in Croatian enterprises, which should form a basis for the formulation of more 
effective innovation policy. Although the survey provides a fairly comprehensive data 
set, it also has a number of important shortcomings that can affect the validity and 
usefulness of the data, which have been tackled, among others, by Archibugi and Pianta 
(1996), Radosevic (1999) and Criscuolo and Haskel (2003)1. However, the shortcomings 
can be controlled to some extent by careful survey implementation and subsequent 
application of analytical techniques (for an example, see Boia et al., 2003b). The 
questionnaire was initially sent to companies by mail. Those who failed to respond to the 
initial mailing were contacted by phone. Those who still did not reply have received an 
additional mailing and a phone reminder. The survey was administered from May 2004 
onwards. Preliminary findings have been reported on the basis of the first 617 valid 
responses from companies in relevant manufacturing and service sectors. 
 
 
5  Innovative Activities: Inputs, Outputs and Obstacles 
In this section we tackle some of the basic results from our survey, which deal with main 
inputs into innovation activities (structure of innovation expenditures, R&D activities 
undertaken and the persons employed in innovation-related activities), outputs of such 
                                                 
1 The shortcomings stem from various factors ranging from the sampling procedure to definitional 
issues, composition of the questionnaire, and the implementation process. Moreover, since CIS is a 
voluntary postal survey, the results are necessarily subjective. 
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activities (i.e. the types of innovations observed2) and the main obstacles to innovation 
activities and processes. 
 
5.1  Structure of Innovation Expenditures 
The majority of innovation expenditures are related to acquisition of machinery or 
equipment (83.1%). This indicates that innovative processes in Croatian companies are 
mainly oriented at purchase and use of “embodied” technologies (innovative machinery 
and plants). Although this type of innovation costs is also high in EU (50%) (Radosevic, 
1999), its overwhelming position in the structure of innovation expenditures observed in 
Croatian companies is quite problematic. These investments do not seem to be 
accompanied by adequate technology transfer processes, i.e. they do not regularly lead to 
new innovations based on the acquired technology. Consequently, the investments in 
patents, licenses and know-how (4.0%) and education (1.3%) do not feature prominently. 
Furthermore, only 10.1% of innovation expenditures are related to intramural R&D. 
Extramural R&D is represented by only 1% of total innovation expenditures, which 
indicates very weak co-operation between companies and research institutions, as it has 
already been reported in similar studies (Radas et al., 2003). Total R&D expenditures 
(11.1%) considerably lag behind the EU average, which amounted to 41% in 1998 
(Radosevic, 1999). Finally, expenditures for marketing of innovations are represented 
only by 0.4% of the total, which indicates a major drawback to the possibilities of market 
success of innovated products and processes.  
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Within the questionnaire, innovation is defined as the creation of a new or significantly improved 
product (good or service) introduced to the market as well as a new or significantly improved 
process introduced within a company. By innovation we consider those activities that are based on 
the results of new technological developments, new combinations of existing technology or 
utilization of other knowledge by the company. Product innovations cover goods and services that 
are either new or significantly improved with respect to fundamental characteristics, technical 
specifications, incorporated software, or other immaterial components, intended uses, or user 
friendliness. Product innovations should be new to the company, even if they are not necessarily 
new to the market. It does not matter whether the innovation was developed by the company or by 
another entity. Changes of a solely aesthetical nature, and pure selling of innovations produced 
and developed by other companies, are not included. 
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Table 1.  Structure of innovation expenditures 
Type of expenditure Percentage 
Intramural R&D 10.1 
Extramural R&D 1.0 
Acquisition of machinery/equipment 83.1 
Patents, licenses, know-how 4.0 
Education and training 1.3 
Design 0.2 
Marketing 0.4 
 
 
5.2  R&D Activities 
Although intramural R&D makes only 10.1% of total innovation expenditures, 19.4% of 
the surveyed companies continuously engage in intramural R&D, whereas 16.9% of 
companies undertake intramural R&D occasionally. The combined figure of 36.3% 
companies engaged in intramural R&D at least at some level of intensity puts Croatia 
above Poland (10.7%) and Slovenia (22.7%) (Radosevic, 1999). Although such a high 
percentage signifies a large proportion of firms engaged in R&D, low share of R&D in 
total innovation expenditures (11.1%) implies that R&D is predominantly a non-core 
concern within corporate strategies. Since innovation activity is mainly related to 
equipment, R&D activities are currently insufficiently related to reaping of economic 
benefits through marketable products and/or more efficient processes.  
Correspondingly, the majority of companies engaged in intramural R&D have small 
R&D teams with 1-3 researchers, whereas R&D departments of more than 10 persons 
exist in 2.2 percent of companies - as it can be seen in Table 2. Although the overall 
proportion of companies with R&D personnel has been fairly stable in the observed 
period, a negligible increase of the proportion of larger R&D teams can be discerned. 
 
Table 2.  Number of employees engaged in intramural R&D 
Number of employees 2001 (%) 2003 (%) 
1-3 20.9 19.6 
4-10 5.8 8.3 
11-20 0.9 1.1 
21 and more 0.9 1.1 
No intramural R&D 63.7 63.7 
No answer 7.8 6.2 
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5.3  Sources of Information for Innovation 
The most important sources of information for innovations are fairs and exhibitions 
(11.6), suppliers of equipment, materials, components or software (11.2), and 
professional conferences, meetings, journals (11.1). Universities and companies for 
research and development are given low importance (6.9 and 3.9), which further 
indicates weakness of co-operation and technology transfer between research and 
business sectors. 
 
Table 3.  Sources of information for innovations 
Sources of information Importance of the source 
Within the enterprise 9.5 
Other enterprises within your concern 6.0 
Suppliers of equipment, materials, components or software 11.2 
Clients or customers 9.6 
Competitors and other firms from the same industry 10.6 
Consultants 7.1 
Universities and higher schools, their units and institutes 6.9 
Companies for research and development 3.9 
Professional conferences, meetings, journals 11.1 
Expert associations 10.1 
Fairs and exhibitions 11.6 
Technical standards 9.6 
Standards and regulations connected with health and protection 10.1 
Standards and regulations connected with environmental protection 9.5 
 
Importance of sources of information is calculated by giving weights to each level of importance (high 0.6, medium
0.3, low 0.1), and by summing up weighted frequencies. 
 
 
 
5.4  Type of Innovations 
The percentage of companies that have introduced new or significantly improved 
products during the period between 2001 and 2003 amounts to 36.6 per cent. On the 
other hand, the percentage of companies that have introduced new or significantly 
improved production process in the aforementioned period is 31.1 per cent. Both figures 
seem fairly high and may be partially due to bias towards innovative firms (which are 
more likely to respond to a voluntary survey), as well as to possible over-reporting. For 
example, comparable data for Estonia and the UK are 27 and 18 per cent for product 
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innovations, and 23 and 15 per cent for process innovations respectively (Stockdale, 
2002 and Kurik et al., 2002)3.  
 
 
5.5  Obstacles to Innovation 
Factors that hamper innovation activities should carry strong features of the economic 
environment in which companies operate, but they may also reflect particular 
characteristics of organizational strategy and culture, which may be more or less 
supportive of innovation activities. The following table shows the main obstacles for 
innovation activities and their perceived degree of importance. 
 
Table 4.  Obstacles to innovation activities 
Factors Importance of the factor 
Excessive perceived economic risk 10.9 
Innovation costs too high 10.0 
Lack of appropriate source of finance 10.9 
Market decrease 9.8 
Organizational rigidity 9.5 
Lack of qualified staff 10.6 
Lack of information concerning technology 11.8 
Lack of information concerning market 13.0 
Insufficient support from the state for innovation activities 9.3 
Insufficient flexibility of regulations or standards 9.9 
Lack of customer responsiveness to new goods or services 11.8 
 
Importance of hampering factors is calculated by giving weights to each level of importance (high 0.6, medium 0.3,
low 0.1), and by summing up weighted frequencies. 
 
                                                
 
 
 
The most important hampering factors are lack of information concerning market (13.0), 
lack of information concerning technology (11.8), lack of customer responsiveness to 
new goods or services (11.8). It can be observed that these are predominantly marketing-
related, which can be linked to the rather low share of overall innovation expenditures 
allocated to marketing activities. 
Furthermore, insufficient support from the state seems to be the least important 
hampering factor. This reinforces the claim that the main obstacles to innovation are 
within companies, rather than in insufficiencies in state support or the lack of funds for 
 
3 The Estonian data have been obtained through CIS 3, whereas the UK data stem from CIS 2.  
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innovative activities. However, this is also likely to be related to the unfavorable 
structure of innovation expenditures, since the role of the state becomes more 
pronounced as innovative activities in enterprises (and in innovative SMEs in particular) 
begin to revolve around R&D and networking, rather than around purchase of 
equipment, as it is currently the case in Croatia. 
 
 
6  Firm Characteristics  
In this section we examine the relationship between some firm characteristics and 
innovation. In particular, we consider firm size and firm ownership and examine whether 
they have any impact on innovation output. 
6.1  Firm Size 
There is a large body of literature devoted to examining the relationship between the firm 
size and innovative activities. Some authors posit that several things cause the positive 
effect of firm size on innovation. For example, large firms can take advantage of scale 
and scope economies in productions of innovations. They have the ability to better 
spread the risk of R&D by conducting many projects at the same time, and to recover the 
investment through sufficiently large sales. They also often have better access to external 
finance. For manufacturing industry some studies justify the existence of a positive effect 
of firm size on innovation activity (Cohen (1995), Freeman and Soete (2001)). For 
services, a study by Arias-Aranda et al. (2001) found that firm size is positively related 
to innovation. Opposite arguments have also been suggested in Scherer and Ross (1990), 
Acs and Audretsch (1990, 1991) and Pavitt et al. (1987). These studies show that the 
relationship between firm size and innovation depends on industry sectors, definition of 
innovation output and other variables. However, Symeonides (1996) points out that most 
authors would probably agree that innovative output tends to rise with firm size, but less 
than proportionally, although other patterns were also suggested for particular industries, 
periods or countries.  
In this study we measured firm size by number of employees. Firms were divided into 
four groups: firms with 9 employees or less (so called micro firms), firms from 10 to 49 
employees, firms from 50 to 250 employees, and finally firms with more than 250 
employees.  
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To examine if there is any relationship between firm size and innovation in Croatia, we 
first observe how many firms innovate in every size segment. For the EU and several 
CEE countries, CIS data shows that there is a positive relationship between firm size and 
the fact that the firm innovated; namely there is a higher share of innovating firms among 
large firms than among other groups (Radosevic, 1999). This same pattern is found in 
Croatian study, namely there is a much higher share of innovating firms among those 
firms with more than 250 employees. There is smaller percentage of micro and small 
firms that report innovation, both in products and processes, but there is a relatively high 
percentage of innovating firms among medium firms (between 50 and 250 employees). 
Please see table 5 for details.  
 
Table 5.  Percentage of innovating firms related to size 
Both product and process Only product Only process 
Firm size 
Innovative Innovative Innovative 
0-9 36.33% 30.04% 24.12% 
10-49 49.74% 40.84% 36.32% 
50-250 57.61% 49.45% 41.30% 
>251 76.32% 63.16% 63.89% 
 Pearson Chi Square 29.05, 
df=3, p=0.000002 
Pearson Chi Square 21.95, 
df=3, p=0.000067 
Pearson Chi Square 26.92, 
df=3, p=0.000006 
 
 
 
It is obvious from the table 5 that the share of innovative enterprises increases with firm 
size. This is not unexpected finding, because it is shown in extant CIS studies that 
propensity to innovate generally increases with firm size. This finding, which is true for 
all the EU countries and those candidate countries that performed CIS surveys, confirms 
Schumpeter’s argument that large firms stimulate innovations.  
When we compare share of innovative firms in Croatia with the share of innovative firms 
in the EU, we find that these numbers are very close (table 6). This is a very unexpected 
finding, and it certainly does not mean that Croatia is as innovative as the EU 
(unfortunately abundant anecdotal evidence points to the contrary). We have to take in 
account the fact that a very large number of companies did not respond to the survey. It 
is only natural to assume that most of them are non-innovative companies, since it is 
logical that such companies would not take the time to fill out an innovation survey.4 
This would mean that the percentage of innovating firms is in reality much lower.  
                                                 
4 It is known that CIS samples can be biased towards innovating firms (Radosevic, 1999). 
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Table 6.  Proportions of enterprises with innovation activity in EU and Croatia 
Firm size EU* Croatia 
10-49 39% 50% 
50-250 60% 58% 
>251 77% 76% 
 
* The data for the EU is from the most recent third CIS survey. 
 
 
Apart from exploring if firm size is related to the fact that companies innovated, we 
examine a related issue of whether the structure of innovation output depends on firm 
size. We would actually expect that this relationship does exist in Croatia. For example, 
in Croatia larger firms have more resources that can be devoted to innovations 
development, which can result in their ability to develop and commercialise larger 
number of new products than smaller firms. This should hold true in particular for 
incremental new products, where economies of scale, power in distribution channel and 
better management and marketing skills are more important. Regarding radically new 
products, one could again make the case for large companies. Croatian industry is for the 
most part capital intensive, and small firms do not posses adequate resources for 
investment that radical innovation requires. In addition, radical innovation usually 
requires research proficiency. Many small firms simply do not have enough research 
"man-power", because majority of active research scientists who are employed in 
industry work for large companies. To prove that point, we regressed the number of 
highly educated employees against the total number of employees. Resulting regression 
shows that the number of highly educated employees increases with firm size.5  
As measures of innovation output, we consider number of new products and their share 
in firm’s sales. We first divide new products in three categories according to how new 
they are to the firm and to the consumers (here we followed established CIS 
methodology). The first category consists of products that are not very new for the firm, 
but are new for the market. An example of such product is when company lengthens its 
product line with new offerings. For instance, a chocolate producer introduces a 
chocolate with a novel filling or some new properties (chocolates with 70% or more 
cocoa were an example of such product when they first appeared on the market). Here 
the firm has necessary technology and experience, so it does not consider the product to 
be very new from their perspective, although it is new for the consumers. This is a very 
good situation for the company, because it can enjoy first mover advantage with minimal 
                                                 
5 F=581.56, p=0.0000, adjusted R2=56.33%. 
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investment. Second category consists of products that are new for the firm and not new 
for the market. For example, if a company that regularly produces chocolate starts 
producing chocolate ice cream, this will be quite new for the company (it needs new 
equipment, technology and expertise), but consumers would consider it as just another 
chocolate ice cream. Since this involves certain investment in new product development 
for the firm, such new product must be able to return the investment unless its role is to 
be the loss leader and to fulfil certain strategic mission in the company portfolio. The last 
category of products that we consider is those products that are new both for the 
company and for the firm. Such radical innovations require substantial investments in 
terms of heavy R&D, special organizational arrangements and developmental activities, 
but they present huge profit opportunities. 
We conducted regression analysis to examine whether the number of new products in 
each category is related to the firm size. We expected to find that the larger the size, the 
more new products are introduced. We conducted three separate regressions (one for 
each new product type) with the number of new products of specific type as dependent 
variable and number of employees as independent variable. All three regressions turned 
out to be non-significant6, suggesting that in our sample there is no relationship between 
size and the number of new products of any type. 
Next we conducted three separate regressions (one for each new product category) to 
examine whether the share of sales from new products depends on the firm size. We 
found that regressions for the first new product category (i.e. products not new for the 
firm, but new for the market) is significant, but does not have a good fit7. The other two 
regressions are not significant8. These findings show that the share of new products in 
sales does not depend on firm size except for the products that are line extensions (not 
new for the firm but new for the market), where we detect a decreasing trend. This last 
result is contrary to findings in Radosevic (1999), who points out that for the EU the 
shares of new products in firm sales follow a U type relationship (share is larger for 
small and large firms than for medium ones). However, because of the low fit in our data 
                                                 
6 Regression statistics for “not new for the firm, new for the market” are p=0.57, F=0.56, 
regression statistics for “new for the firm, not new for the market” are p= 0.33, F=1.11, regression 
statistics for “new for the firm and for the market” are p= 0.79, F=0.29. 
7 Function is decreasing, p= 0.017, F=4.23, adjusted R2=6.5%. 
8 Regression statistics for “new for the firm, not new for the market” are p= 0.058, F=2.93, 
regression statistics for “new for the firm and for the market” are p= 0.099, F=2.37. 
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it would be dangerous to draw general conclusions about capability of large Croatian 
enterprises to commercialise innovations9. 
Another interesting issue is where innovations are developed. Here we adopt four 
categories from extant CIS surveys. Namely, innovations can be developed by the 
enterprise, or by the enterprise in collaboration with other companies and institutions. 
Innovations could be developed by other companies and institutions, or they could be 
developed by the enterprise group that a company belongs to. Not surprisingly, 
overwhelming majority of firms that answered that question reported that they developed 
their innovations within their enterprise and without any collaboration. Table 7 compares 
Croatian results with the EU results from the most recent CIS survey (European 
Communities, 2004). 
 
Table 7.  Percentage of innovators developing innovations 
              with selected partners* 
Croatia EU  
Product Process Product Process 
Developed by the enterprise or the enterprise group 26% 18% 66% 57% 
Developed in collaboration with other companies and 
institutions 
6% 9% 18% 25% 
Developed by other companies and institutions 3% 3% 9% 9% 
 
* Percentages in columns do not add up to 100 because of the non-response. 
 
 
 
To investigate that issue further, we explored whether firms of different sizes differ in 
where they develop innovations. For example, large firms often have larger networks and 
could develop more products in collaborations than small firms. To test whether firm 
size is related to where the innovation is developed, we used the Chi-square statistics. 
We found that this relationship is statistically significant10. For all firms size groups, 
majority of products are developed mostly in-house, but this is most pronounced for 
micro and small firms. On the contrary, among the companies that develop their products 
in-house but in collaboration with other firms and institutions, there are more medium 
and large firms than micro and small firms. This reflects weak network structure of small 
firms. This result is not surprising; as all CIS surveys show that large firms are more 
networked than the small ones. Interestingly, the interaction between firm size and the 
                                                 
9 It should be noted that such discrepancy could be also caused by industry structure. 
10 Pearson Chi Square 22.78, df=9, p=0.007. Less than half of product innovating firms supplied 
the information about the place where the products were developed. 
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place where new processes are developed is not statistically significant11. Again as for 
the new products, we observe that most new processes are developed in-house. Certain 
percentage of processes is developed in-house, but in collaboration with other companies 
or institutions. This percentage is larger for processes than for products, which reflects 
the nature of technological process where certain procedures can be adopted from 
outside and then improved on. Please see table 8 for details. 
 
Table 8.  Where new products/processes were developed 
 Developed by the 
enterprise 
Developed in the 
enterprise group 
that the company 
belongs to 
Developed in 
collaboration with 
other companies or 
institutions 
Developed by 
other companies or 
institutions 
Size Product Process Product Process Product Process Product Process 
0-9 7.80% 59.26% 0% 0% 18.06% 29.63% 11.11% 11.11% 
10-49 82.67% 63.77% 1.33% 1.45% 6.67% 21.74% 9.33% 13.04% 
50-249 58.14% 58.33% 11.63% 5.56% 20.93% 30.56% 9.30% 5.56% 
>250 59.09% 47.83% 0% 0% 31.82% 43.48% 9.09% 8.70% 
 
 
 
 
Extant literature shows that new products and processes are connected, namely the firms 
that develop new processes also develop new products (Koschatzky et al., 2001; Radas, 
2003a, Radosevic, 1999). This relationship is confirmed again in this study, where we 
find a strong and significant correlation between the number of new products and the 
number of new processes introduced from 2001 to 200312. This reflects the fact that to 
realize new products, especially those of higher novelty, firms have to improve outdated 
technologies and processes. 
It might be beneficial for the company to enter into collaboration with another company 
or institution when developing certain types of new products. For example, when 
developing a product new for the firm but not new for the market, it might be better to 
collaborate with a company that already has required expertise and technology. On the 
other hand, products that are not new for the firm would be better produced in-house. 
Development of radical innovations might benefit from collaboration with a research 
institute. If these hypotheses are true, we might be able, for example, to find that on 
average larger number of products that are new for the firm but not new for the market 
                                                 
11 Pearson Chi Square 10.59, df=9, p=0.3. Less than half of process innovating firms supplied the 
information about the place where the processes were developed. 
12 R=0.55, p=0.0000. 
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are developed in collaborations. To investigate that issue further, we used the location 
where product was developed13 as a categorical factor in ANOVA analysis, and then we 
examined whether there are any differences among the mean numbers of new products 
for each location. We performed such analysis for every category of new product 
separately, and did not find any significant effects. To check if this effect is dependent on 
the firm size, ANOVA was performed for all firm size groups separately. Again, no 
significant relationship was discovered. This indicates that for every new product 
category, the number of new products is not related to where the product is developed. 
This same result holds for all four groups of enterprises (micro, small, medium and 
large). This means that all our hypotheses stated in the beginning of this paragraph 
should be rejected. 
Regarding innovation expenses, in EU total innovation expenditures per employee 
increase with firm size (Radosevic 1999), indicating that there is a positive relationship 
between firm size and innovation intensity. Interestingly, we do not find that effect in 
Croatia. On the contrary, we find that the total innovation expenditures per employee are 
decreasing with firm size. Although we observe that innovation expenses per employee 
are lowest in large firms, the variability of the data is so large that this effect is not 
statistically significant (ANOVA analysis was performed, p=0.26). Please see table 9 for 
details. 
 
 
Table 9.  Innovation expenditures per employee14
Firm size Mean innovation expenditures for innovative firms 
0-9 1109.414 
10-49 9069.315 
50-249 132.551 
>250 15.552 
 
 
This finding might suggest that large firms do not make sufficient investments in 
innovation, which could seriously hamper their innovation capability in the future. 
 
                                                 
13 These items are: developed by the enterprise, developed in the enterprise group that the company 
belongs to, developed in collaboration with other companies or institutions, developed by other 
companies or institutions. 
14 Expenditures are expressed in HRK 1000.  
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6.2  Ownership and Innovativeness 
Extant studies indicate that innovation capability for firms in CEECs could depend on 
their ownership structure (Bonin and Abel 1998, Bojnec 2000, Shipley et al. 1998). The 
rationale is that owners, being vitally interested in their business performance, will be 
strongly motivated to foster innovation. For example, Shipley et al. (1998) find that there 
is a higher incidence of new product development among privatised firms in Poland.  
To examine whether the same is true in Croatia, the firms in the sample were divided in 
two groups: those that are in predominantly private ownership, and those in 
predominantly state ownership. 
We first examine whether the share of innovative firms is larger among privately owned 
companies. Although we would expect to find many more innovative firms among 
private companies due to entrepreneurship, the data shows that the share of innovative 
firms is almost the same for both privately and state owned companies. The same fact is 
found in Radas (2003a) in a study of hundred leading Croatian firms. Similarly, 
Koschatsky et al. (1998) find that there is no relation between ownership structure and 
innovative performance in Slovenia, which they explain as the consequence of private 
owners being not yet developed enough to “…exert their ownership rights and supervise 
management “. It is possible that the same explanation would work for our findings, 
although to be precise we would need to control for a variety of factors.  
However, when we look into the structure of innovation, we do find some indications 
that private companies might be more innovation active. In order to control for the type 
of the private company, we distinguished those that are newly formed (i.e. after 2001) 
from those firms that were established before 2001. When we explored if private and 
state owned companies differ in the number of new products, we found that the number 
of new introductions is on average indeed larger for private companies, as we would 
expect. However, ANOVA analysis showed that the effect is statistically insignificant for 
all three-product types, due to large data variability exhibited by state owned enterprises. 
Similar results are found when share of sales based on new products is examined in 
relation to ownership. Again we observe that privately owned firms indeed earn more of 
their sales from new products, but again because of large variability among state owned 
firms ANOVA showed that the relationship is not significant. Please see table 10 for 
details. 
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Table 10.  Innovation and ownership 
Mostly privately owned  Mostly owned by 
state, state agencies 
and institutions Founded in the period 2001-2003
Founded before 
2001 
Innovated 25 5 227 
Did not innovate 24 11 252 
Average number of new products 
Not new for the firm, new for the 
market 3 4.3 3.5 
New for the firm, not new for the 
market 0 5.6 5.3 
New for the firm and for the market 3 2.4 1.3 
Average share of new products in sales 
Not new for the firm, new for the 
market 1 23.1 23.0 
New for the firm, not new for the 
market 0 13.6 14.9 
New for the firm and for the market 1 14.3 14.3 
 
 
An interesting question is whether the distribution of private and public innovative firms 
changes with firm size. Table 11 shows the distribution of the share of innovative firms 
across firm sizes and ownership. We observe that in all size groups, except among 
medium enterprises, the shares of innovative firms are almost the same. If we compare it 
to the results of Polish study from Radosevic (1999), we can see that the results are very 
similar for large enterprises, while for small and medium firms we observe certain 
differences. For example, more innovative enterprises are reported among small firms in 
Croatia than in Poland. This is true both for public and private ownership. Also, among 
privately owned Croatian firms there is a higher share of innovative enterprises than is 
reported in the Polish study. We need to take these comparisons with a grain of salt, as 
there might be differences in sampling and response that one would need to account for.  
 
Table 11.  Share of innovative firms in Croatia and Poland 
Small Medium Large  
CROATIA, 2004 
Mostly owned by state, state agencies and institutions 0.16 0.40 0.44 
Mostly privately owned 0.38 0.17 0.70 
 POLAND, 1997 
Mostly owned by state, state agencies and institutions 0.16 0.44 0.74 
Mostly privately owned 0.16 0.29 0.70 
 
 
In conclusion, we can say that firm characteristics do have some bearing on innovation, 
although not all effects are statistically significant. Regarding firm size, we find that 
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share of innovative firms increases with firm size, i.e. the largest percentage of 
innovative firms can be found among large companies. Most new products are developed 
in house regardless of firm size, while medium and large firms engage in some 
collaboration with other companies and institutions. This collaboration is more 
pronounced for new processes than for new products. The average number of new 
products increases with firm size, but this effect is not statistically significant. However, 
the share of new products in firm’s sales decreases with firm size. Both of these facts 
together suggest that large firms might lack ability to commercialise their innovations. 
We also observe that innovation expenditure per employee decreases with firm size. 
Although this effect is not statistically significant, comparison with the EU where 
innovation expenditure increases with size indicates that large firms do not invest enough 
in innovation. 
Regarding firm ownership, contrary to expectations, we do not find larger share of 
innovative firms among privately owned companies. Similarly, we do not find 
statistically significant impact of ownership structure on innovation output, although 
private firms on average introduce more new products and have larger share of new 
products in income. 
 
 
7  Concluding Remarks 
Although recent years have seen the emphasis of the relationship between innovation and 
economic growth, this has not been sufficiently realized neither in the business practice 
of Croatian enterprises, nor in the development of an effective innovation policy. 
Consequently, the mechanisms of creation, dissemination and commercial exploitation of 
knowledge are still being developed, with varying degrees of success. In this context, the 
preliminary results of the Community Innovation Survey for the period between 2001 
and 2003, which have been analyzed in this paper, have presented a mixed picture. 
Although the overall performance - in terms of product and process innovations - seems 
relatively strong, this still requires corroboration that could not be undertaken for the 
purpose of this paper. 
The share of innovative firms increases with firm size. The largest percentage of 
innovative firms can be found among large enterprises. In our sample we have detected 
no relationship between size and the number of new products of any type. The share of 
new products in sales does not depend on firm size except for the products that are line 
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extensions (not new for the firm but new for the market), where we detect a decreasing 
trend. It is likely that enterprises innovate on the fringe of their businesses and thus fail 
to integrate innovation into their strategic concerns. Most new products are developed in-
house - regardless of firm size. Medium and large firms engage in some collaboration 
with other companies and institutions – although more often when developing new 
processes than new products. Innovation expenditure per employee decreases with firm 
size, although this effect is not statistically significant. The predominance of investments 
into machinery and/or equipment in the structure of innovation expenditures – at the 
expense of research and development, patents, licensing, know-how and education – 
demonstrates a rather restrictive view of innovation and value-creation, which hinders 
the development of sustainable innovation capabilities. 
Correspondingly, main obstacles to innovation seem to be within companies, rather than 
in insufficiencies in state support or in the lack of funds for innovative activities; the key 
obstacles are discerned in unsupportive organizational strategies and cultures, which 
result in inadequate managerial and marketing practices. Even if this is acknowledged, a 
need for improvements in innovation policy can be discerned – especially in order to 
stimulate business R&D, reduce the risks and costs of setting up and growth of new 
innovative SMEs and facilitate the collaboration between various actors in industrial 
networks. The policy areas that might be addressed in this context include science-
industry collaboration, technology transfer, innovation finance and integration of 
innovative enterprises into wider industrial networks, as well as linkages between 
innovation policy and other (economic) policy areas – such as science and technology 
policy, enterprise policy and industrial policy. 
Although enterprise-level data obtained through the Community Innovation Survey 
provide some encouragement in terms of innovation outputs, unfavorable structure of 
innovation expenditures, widespread occurrence of intra-organizational constraints to 
innovation and failures in commercialization of innovations corroborate the macro-level 
findings that economic growth is still largely driven by private consumption and 
investment in low-tech sectors with limited spillovers (i.e. construction), rather than 
through dynamic medium- and high-tech manufacturing and services. That leads us to 
the conclusion that the movements towards a knowledge-driven economy in Croatia are 
still quite weak – which necessitates urgent development of a more effective innovation 
policy. 
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Abstract 
A patent is the main result of R&D activities and the first step in the creation of 
intellectual property rights (IPR) system in a country. Patenting culture is predefined by 
the level of development of a particular National Innovation System (NIS), compatibility 
of country’s IPR law with internationally adopted standards and norms and embedded 
innovation capacities and entrepreneurial behavior of individuals, organizations and 
institutions. Patenting activity in selected Central and East European (CEE) countries is 
analyzed in order to identify patterns of resident as well as non-resident patenting in 
these countries. Transformation of original patent data grouped under IPC (International 
Patent Classification) as WIPO defined units, into sectoral (HC – Harmonized 
Classification of sectors of economy) patent data using OECD proposed concordance 
programme, modified by the author for the use of publicly available national patent data, 
is made for a preliminary analysis of the validity of proposed transformation, as well as 
for the analysis of innovation capacity built into manufacturing sectors of transition 
economies. 
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1  Introduction 
It is a generally adopted finding that all technological advances have their origins in 
fundamental scientific research, sometimes based on research efforts which have not 
been predicted to have applicable results, and in most cases based on research and 
development (R&D) conducted 5, 10, and even 15 and more years ago! In a number of 
papers it is proved that scientific and technological (S&T) knowledge and advance are 
drivers for industrial competitiveness, but it still remains difficult to understand, evaluate 
and measure the socio-economic impact of R&D activities. This is, at least for the R&D 
community, an important issue, because of the need to establish an acceptable enough 
rationale for public and private investment in R&D activities, the cost of which is 
significantly increasing every year. Therefore, the role and contribution of, especially 
public S&T innovation, has been a major concern of S&T policy since the 1960s 
(OECD, 1991). A common conclusion of a number of studies is that “absorption and 
utilization of new knowledge into new artifacts and industrial innovations is an 
extremely complex social process involving a range of corporate sources and external 
knowledge and skills where most relationships and two-way interactions between 
research and technological development are neither direct nor obvious” (Tijssen, 2002). 
Patents are one of the very rare measurable indicators of R&D activities, which can 
shine a light inside the “black box” of R&D activities, but still, patents are only 
intermediate outcomes of innovative-driven R&D. There is a need for further 
development, resulting in marketable new products or processes or services. In fact, 
some patents will never end with marketable outcomes; some (so called “generic” 
patents) could be used for several innovations; some complex systems could be arranged 
with a number of interrelated and/or incremental patents. An additional problem is the 
question about the way in which the transformation of scientific research into marketable 
technologies functions? Answers started in 1970s with the linear model of innovation 
process1, which begins with laboratory science and moves through successive stages till 
the new knowledge is built into a commercial application that diffuses in the economic 
system. The S&T policy for this model fosters critical direction of S&T advancements 
and enhances the flow of knowledge down along the innovation chain, with emphasis on 
the process of designing market needs into R&D activities. Further work recognizes the 
                                                 
1 Linear Model of Technical Change is the conceptualization of technological change as a 
unidirectional sequence, in which innovation appears as a step or stage, following invention (or 
applied R&D), which follows basic R&D and precedes diffusion. There are no feedbacks among 
the stages in this sequence (MERIT, 2000). 
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complexity of innovation process, illustrated with a “chain-link” model2, characterized 
by many feedback loops between the different stages of the innovation process (Klein 
and Rosenberg, 1986). This model is supported with innovation policy, which recognizes 
the concepts of national, regional, sectoral and other sorts of innovation systems 
(Freeman 1987). The innovation policy is intended to: (a) enhance two-way 
communication across different nodes in the innovation process chain and (b) improve 
all sorts of innovation systems in order to inform decision makers about R&D, 
commercialization, technology adoption and implementation, etc. Although this model is 
still predominant in the present organization of public governance of R&D and other 
innovation activities, further improvements cope with process of networking between all 
actors in national innovation system (NIS), which is illustrated in figure 1 (EC, 2003a).  
In this view, innovation could be considered as a result of learning process, which is by 
nature interactive and cumulative. Interactions within economy, which can result in a 
combination of existing knowledge or, in some cases, with new knowledge, are among 
companies, financial, educational, R&D, and other organizations, government agencies 
and other public and/or private institutions (Galli and Teubal, 1997). Therefore, 
technological development is a result of complex interactions between mentioned 
organizations, named by Richard Nelson first as “capitalism engine of growth” 
(according to: Albuquerque, 1997), and later as “national innovation system” (Nelson, 
1993). 
Intellectual property is an important part of infrastructure for NIS, as a basis for 
organization and functioning of the NIS. Knowledge codified in patent documentation 
represents a resource for further development into marketable products/processes 
/services. This wealth of knowledge has to be available to all other participants in 
national innovation system. Equal treatment of resident, as well as non-resident inventors 
in one country is the foundation and basic principle of world intellectual property 
organization (WIPO) and international relations in this area. The unification of patent 
laws, a process driven by WTO, brought national regulations and inventors into similar 
position worldwide. 
 
                                                 
2 System Model of Technical Change is the approach that focuses on the interactive links approach 
that focuses on the interactive links between different stages in the innovation process and the 
composition of these linkages. It assumes that technical change is an emergent property of the 
whole set of interactions (MERIT, 2000). 
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Figure 1.  National Innovation System – Concept modified 
               and extended by S.Kuhlmann (EC, 2003) 
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Process of adaptation of intellectual property rights (IPR) laws to EU standards in CEE 
countries became an integral part of transitional changes and one of the indicators of how 
successful this transition is in a particular country (WDR, 1996). Moreover, a 
precondition for a significant inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) in CEE countries, 
preceded with protection of foreign inventions, was the adoption of IPR law fully 
adjusted with IRP laws in leading EU countries. One should have in mind that before 
1989, “the overall number of foreign patents in CEE countries, with exception of ex-
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Yugoslavia and ex-SU, was marginal” (Radošević and Kutlača, 1998). Not to forget that 
NIS in the form illustrated in figure 1 had existed in none of CEE countries before 1989. 
Therefore, progress in the adaptation of IPR regulation and increase of foreign patents 
are significant indicators in the process of transition, as well as the process of building of 
NIS in CEE countries. 
In this paper we analyze patent activity in CEE countries in order to identify patterns of 
resident as well as non-resident patenting in these countries. Having in mind that 
patenting culture is predefined by the level of development of particular NIS, 
compatibility of country’s IPR law with internationally adopted standards and norms and 
embedded innovation capacities and entrepreneurial behavior of individuals, 
organizations and institutions, in the following chapters we will present the analysis of 
the process in which patenting activity contributes to the innovation capacity building 
process in selected CEE countries. 
 
 
2  Innovation Capacity 
“National innovative capacity is the ability of a country – as both a political and 
economic entity – to produce and commercialize a flow of new-to-the-world technologies 
over the long term” (Furman, Porter, Stern, 2002). The authors of this concept of 
national innovative capacity distinguish three building blocks for this concept: 
a) Presence of a strong innovation infrastructure; 
b) Specific innovation environments present in a country’s industrial clusters; 
c) Links between the common innovation infrastructure and specific clusters. 
 
Again, patents are the main visible innovative outputs, as a result of properly engaged 
national innovative capacity. The proposed model of national innovative capacity 
integrates R&D funding and performance, degree of technological specialization, 
knowledge spillovers, human capital, as well as public policies and institutions. Analysis 
is based on international patenting activity (defined by authors as the number of patents 
granted to inventors from a particular country other than United States by the US PTO 
(US Patent and Trademark Office) in a given year). The main findings suggest that 
“public policy plays an important role in shaping a country’s national innovative 
capacity – beyond simply increasing the level of R&D resources available to the 
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economy, other policy choices shape human capital investment, innovation incentives, 
cluster circumstances, and the quality of linkages” (Furman, Porter, Stern, 2002). 
In this paper we shall use the concept of innovative capacity of the economy under the 
framework of national innovation system, but rather as potential for interaction between 
the actors of the NIS, than ability to innovate. This is so because of the choice of 
countries, NIS of which is the subject of analysis: developed economies use the already 
built ability to innovate; developing economies are in search for their potentials for 
innovation. In this paper we analyze patenting activity in CEE countries, and most of 
them are developing, some could be treated even as undeveloped economies, and just 
one, Slovenia, could be classified as a developed economy, in a way this is defined by 
UN (by the level of GDP per capita)! 
 
 
3  Patents as a Technological Indicator 
A number of authors have discussed justification for the use of patent data as a 
technological indicator. Usually, patents are compared with R&D expenditure as 
technology proxies: R&D expenditures are a measure for inputs and patents are a 
measure for outputs (Fai and Tunzelmann, 2001). There is consensus that patent statistics 
are a important, but imperfect indicator of innovative activities (Pavitt, 1988; Griliches, 
1990). 
There has been additional discussion on whether to use national patenting data or the US 
foreign patenting data, for the purpose of international comparison of technological 
performances between selected countries. The US foreign patenting data are most 
commonly used in the case of comparison between countries which are at the world 
innovation frontier. The relevance of the US foreign patenting is much less clear in the 
case of less developed or latecomer economies, because of relatively small numbers of 
patent granted by US PTO. Generally, the efforts for catching-up in technology 
development in latecomer economies may be divided into two components: innovative 
and imitative learning: imitative learning, which is in majority, is learning behind the 
world frontier; innovative learning, just sporadic and accidental, is technology 
development at the world innovation frontier. 
Using the US market as the most competitive market, the US foreign patenting data 
measure primarily commercially relevant technological effort at the world frontier. The 
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US patents for latecomer economies measure only a minor part of the overall 
technological effort, that which is at the world innovation frontier. This implies that the 
interpretation of the US foreign patenting data for these economies should be different: 
the link between the US foreign patenting and the growth of the latecomer economy may 
either not be strong or completely absent in the early phases of catching up, because of 
different sources and national strategies for catching up process. For example, the cases 
of Korea and Taiwan whose economies had been growing vigorously for some time, 
whereas in terms of US foreign patents a visible increase is present only from the mid-
1980s onwards (Choung, 1995). 
Latecomer economies may grow over long periods based on imitative learning or 
improvements in production and organization which are not of patentable significance 
(Radošević and Kutlača, 1999). However, eventually long-term growth requires 
developed innovation capabilities, which then become visible in US patenting 
accompanied by a higher technological content of export. This is especially relevant in 
the case of CEE countries, where much of the technology effort was of imitative type 
either because of autarchic conception of development or foreign restrictions on 
importing high-tech. Even more, minor improvements such as adaptation of imported 
technologies for local use are needed, but usually not sufficient to be granted as patents. 
This implies another bias, bias of domestic patenting data, because “local learning may 
exist without local patenting”, therefore, domestic patenting data in developing countries 
do not capture a significant share of relevant domestic technological activities, which 
cannot be patentable (such as minor adaptations and improvements of imported 
technologies suited for local use, which are not straightforwardly translated into patents, 
etc.) (Albuquerque, 2000). A thorough analysis of the cumulative aspects of technology 
learning based on national patenting data is given in a survey of national patenting in 
Serbia in 1921-1995 period (Kutlača, 1998), where persistent, decades long highest share 
of resident patents in the field of mechanical engineering and agriculture, proved 
eventual country’ competitiveness in these two sectors, as well as country’ technological 
dependence in chemical industry, with the highest share of non-resident patents over the 
entire analyzed period. 
Finally, we shall end discussion about the use of national patenting data or US foreign 
patenting data, with the importance of both types of patenting activities: “US patents 
capture only part of the technology effort in latecomer economies. Irrespective of their 
size they indicate the existence of technology effort at the world innovation frontier. Like 
the tip of the iceberg they indicate the existence of underlying, much greater imitative 
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technology effort or R&D behind the world frontier. Both angles of technology effort, 
imitative and innovative, are important in a long-term for catching up.” (Radošević and 
Kutlača, 1999). 
Besides the US PTO, there are two other types of patent systems, whose importance on 
the global level should be considered from the CEE countries’ patenting activity point of 
view: common EU (or EPO – European Patent Office’ patents) and Japanese system (or 
JPO – Japanese Patent Office’ patents). A long tradition (more than a hundred years of 
existence) gives the US PTO a big advantage compared with EPO and JPO. The above 
discussions about latecomer economies, and rationales whether to apply for patent rights 
in world leading economies or not, are fully applicable here too. Additionally, a serious 
obstacle to inventors from CEE countries asking protection of patent rights in all three 
mentioned global systems is the level of costs one inventor must pay for the protection of 
one invention during the period of economic and political transition. According to OECD 
Patent manual, there is range of costs one inventor is faced with (OECD, 1994): 
• Fees for the patenting procedure (filing, examination, and search fees); 
• Fees for a patent agent of attorney; 
• Renewal fees; 
• If protection is sought abroad, inventor must pay translation charges; 
• If protection is sought abroad, inventor must pay foreign patent agent of attorney. 
 
Although it is difficult to calculate precise figures, estimates start from 2,000 EUR and 
could reach 14,000-20,000 EUR for more complicated patent applications (EPO, 2004). 
Economical situation in a majority of CEE countries, whether EU member countries or 
not, is too difficult, and costs for the protection of patent rights in US PTO, EPO and 
JPO are still too high for most of inventors, residents of CEE countries. 
Clarification of all the above mentioned reasons why none of three global patent systems 
are attractive enough for inventors from CEE countries comes from the available data 
about international patenting from CEE countries, i.e. filing of patent applications 
abroad. Small figures for patenting in US PTO are already presented in (Radošević and 
Kutlača, 1999). Situation with patenting in EPO is illustrated with data in table 1. The 
second part of this table consists of data for so-called “triadic” patent families, i.e. for 
patents which are filed at the EPO, the JPO and are granted by the US PTO 
simultaneously. Figures for selected CEE countries are compared with the numbers of 
resident patents in those countries for observed years. Total figures (named as “world 
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total” in table 1) for both EPO and “triadic” patent families differ by about 1% from 
OECD member countries totals, i.e. other CEE countries can not contribute significantly 
– three selected CEE countries are sufficient for this analysis. Therefore, one must 
conclude that patenting from CEE countries in EPO (and JPO too) is too small and 
cannot be used as proxy for R&D and innovation activity in these countries.  
Additionally, the expansion of protection abroad, from one CEE country to a number of 
countries, particularly to all three biggest patent systems, observed as number of 
“triadic” patent families is decreasing, as this is shown with data in table 1 in the 
observed period. 
 
Table 1.  EPO patent applications and Triadic(2) patent families 
              by priority year and by inventor’s country of residence 
              for selected CEE and OECD member countries 
EPO patent applications Year Triadic patent families Year 
Country 1990 1995 1997 Country 1989 1993 1995 
Hungary 69 53 70 Hungary 43 24 15 
Hungary - % of NRP(1) 3.00 4.74 9.04 Hungary - % of NRP 1.62 2.09 1.34 
Czech Republic 22 19 42 Czech Republic 11 8 3 
Czech R. - % of NRP n.a. 3.03 6.99 Czech R. - % of NRP n.a. 0.89 0.48 
Slovak Republic 0 7 13 Slovak Republic 0 2 2 
Slovak R. - % of NRP n.a. 2.56 5.56 Slovak R. - % of NRP n.a. 0.71 0.73 
Japan 12976 11801 13974 Japan 9968 8031 8601 
United States 17396 20579 24129 United States 10743 10971 11162 
European Union 27016 30620 39712 European Union 10537 9941 10316 
Total OECD 60393 66801 82846 Total OECD 32682 30461 31711 
Total OECD - % of world total 1.28 1.62 1.99 Total OECD - % of world total 0.76 1.13 1.10 
World total 61177 67902 84530 World total 32932 30810 32064 
 
Notes: (1)NRP – National Resident Patenting  (2)Patent is a member of the “triadic” patent families if and only if it is
filed at the EPO, the JPO and is granted by the US PTO
 
 
. 
 Source: (OECD, 2001).
 
 
4  Central and Eastern Europe:                              
Patents as Indicator of Transition 
Transition from central planning to market economy in Central and Eastern European 
(CEE) countries is, among others, a process of catching-up with the average level of 
income in the EU economies. This process requires high rates of growth sustained over a 
long time period, what could be achieved only through technical change and 
technological learning. The cumulative nature of technological nature indicates the 
necessity to analyze technological trajectories in CEE countries and check whether the 
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technological history of this region is different, compared with western economies, as 
much as it is the case with political history, or not? One assessment of the basis and 
potentials for catching-up of CEE countries, based on the analysis of patenting activity in 
CEE countries and protection of their patents in the US patent office in the period 1969-
1994, concluded that there is no such difference. The main findings of this analysis could 
be summarized in seven points (Radošević and Kutlača, 1998; Radošević and Kutlača 
1999): 
1) The US foreign patenting from CEE countries in the analyzed period was not below 
the levels of comparable market economies; 
2) The levels and dynamics of US patenting activity of CEE as a region seem to be 
determined more by income levels and growth rates than by specific features of the 
command economy; 
3) Despite the closed character of their economies in the socialist period, state policy 
allowed and supported the sale of technological knowledge abroad. This ranged 
from more or less independent patent activities by enterprises in Hungary, and, 
especially, ex-Yugoslavia, to controlled state sponsorship in the case of ex-Soviet 
Union or even direct State involvement in patenting process, as in Romania; 
4) The US foreign patent trends in CEE reflect more their past capabilities than present 
strengths. The technological advantages of these economies are firmly rooted in 
their past successes and are very much based in metallurgical and mechanical 
technologies, and in chemicals/drugs; 
5) There are significant intra-regional differences in the institutional basis of US 
foreign patenting which broadly follow inter-country differences in the institutional 
structure of R&D; 
6) The basis for CEE for catching-up with the technological leaders is rather tenuous. 
The remaining strengths are in specific areas but not across sectors or industries. For 
example, in ex-Czechoslovakia, patenting activity is still strong in textile 
manufacturing equipment, in Hungary it is strong in drugs and organic chemicals, 
and Russia still obtains patents in mining and metallurgy equipment and processes. 
It is not likely that these countries can recombine world frontier R&D, design and 
manufacturing capabilities on a large scale but it is possible in the specific sectors 
that these economies still have patentable inventions. On the other hand, the level of 
human capital, size of R&D system, design and engineering capacities indicate that 
CEE countries may develop imitative capabilities not only in manufacturing but also 
in R&D and design. 
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Finally, one of the main messages of this analysis is that “in order to catch-up 
technologically, CEE will have to generate innovations which are relevant for the world 
market” (Radošević and Kutlača, 1998; Radošević and Kutlača 1999). One argument 
which supports this conclusion came from the analysis presented with data in table 1, 
concerning patenting from CEE countries in EPO. Patenting in EPO is more and more 
important since the enlargement of EU became a reality for several CEE countries and 
membership in EU emerged as the first national priority for a number of other CEE 
countries. Therefore, increase of importance of EPO for CEE countries is a natural 
process and a change in patenting structure, could be used as the indicator of integration 
into EU innovation system. This is something what is identified with data in table 1 – 
although not sufficient for a thorough analysis of innovation activities, in all three 
selected CEE countries one can notice increase of EPO patent application as the share of 
national resident patents, i.e. EU market becoming a target market for CEE countries! 
For example, the share of EPO patent applications in national total resident patent 
applications in Hungary jumped from 3% in 1990 to 9.07% in 1997; in Czech Republic it 
increased from 3.03% in 1995 to 6.99% in 1997; in Slovak Republic from 2.56% in 1995 
to 5.56% in 1997 (see table 1). 
This is a starting point in our analysis of national patent activity in selected CEE 
countries, which has to give answers to the three questions: 
1) What are the patterns of resident as well as non-resident patenting in CEE 
countries? 
2) How national patenting activity in CEE countries could play a role as an indicator 
of transition and catching-up process? 
3) How patent data could support the analysis of innovation capacity building into 
manufacturing sectors of transition economies? 
 
 
5  National Patenting Activity in CEE Countries                    
in the Period 1989-2000 
Using national patenting activity in selected CEE countries, we shall try to explore what 
are the main patterns of resident as well as non-resident patenting in these countries. 
Figures 1, 1a, 2 and 2a illustrate resident and non-resident patenting activity in 12 
selected CEE countries (in brackets are abbreviations used in all figures in paper): 
Bulgaria (BU), Croatia (CRO), Czech Republic (CZ), Estonia (EST), Hungary (HU), 
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Poland (PL), Romania (RO), Russian Federation (RF), Serbia and Montenegro (SMN), 
Slovak Republic (SLR), Slovenia (SLO), Ukraine (UKR). Also data for former 
Czechoslovakia (CZ+SLR), former Soviet Union (SU), and former Yugoslavia (SFRY), 
are used for better understanding of differences between patenting activities in period 
1985-1989 and in period since 1989, when transition processes in all these countries 
started. 
Rationale for a logarithmic view in figures 1 and 2 lies in strong differences between 
absolute numbers of patents in former Soviet Union and other CEE countries; figures 1a 
and 2a illustrate patenting in 10 CEE countries, without Russian Federation and Ukraine, 
which makes these illustrations more visible; and all these figures lead us to the 
following conclusions: 
a) Resident patenting almost disappeared in the first 2-3 years of transition, falling to the 
app. 10% of the level in 1988 patenting! In a majority of analyzed CEE countries 
recovering phase in domestic patenting activity started in 1993-1994. None of these 
countries had achieved 1988 level in last observed year, 2000. This indicates: 
 
1) How strong was the process of disintegration of former R&D system; 
2) How slow is the process of establishing a new, market oriented national innovation 
system; and the 
3) How vulnerable and slow is the process of innovation capacity building in a 
country!  
 
Relatively big numbers of resident patents in Russian Federation and Ukraine, after the 
year 1993 could be partly explained with preserved innovation capabilities, despite rather 
bad situation especially in manufacturing sectors in these two countries. Therefore, the 
analysis of patenting activity should be combined with the analysis of further 
exploitation of inventions, i.e. with the analysis of effectiveness of other chains in 
“chain-link” model of innovation system, which brings invention into marketable 
processes / products / services. Due to a limited size of the paper, we shall quote one the 
crucial findings of research of transition in CEE countries: “To date, restructuring in 
Central and Eastern European countries has led to a more autonomous and competitive 
science base, but it has not yet produced a science system which is relevant to its 
changed economic and technological structure. Hence there remains a large gap 
between the region’s level of potential in labor skills and R&D, and the current low 
levels of growth and recovery. To achieve growth, the economies of Central and Eastern 
Europe must restructure their science and technology systems, reintegrate them into EU 
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innovation networks and initiate a structural shift towards a knowledge-based economy 
that supports innovation and learning at level of every institution and industrial sector.” 
(Radošević, 1999). 
 
b) A completely different situation is with non-resident patenting activity in CEE countries, 
illustrated by figures 2 and 2a (again, a logarithmic view is used because of possible 
misleading disproportion between absolute numbers in former Soviet Union and other 
analyzed countries). As it was already mentioned in the introduction, the number of 
foreign patents in this region before 1989 was marginal. Since 1991 foreign investors 
launched “technological invasion” of CEE countries. One can notice that not all 
countries were “attacked” by a strong inflow of foreign patents. There are three groups of 
countries: 
 
1) The first group are “leaders” in transitional changes: Hungary and Poland, 
surprisingly joined by Romania – foreign patents emerged very quickly, already in 
1992;  
2) The second group consists of: Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Estonia, Bulgaria 
and Slovenia – foreign patents significantly emerged in 1993-1994; and  
3) Countries in the third group are Croatia and Serbia and Montenegro – because of 
the very fragile political situation, foreign inventors started with significant filing of 
patent applications in these two countries in 1996-1997. 
 
Although transitional processes in Russian Federation and Ukraine were (and still are) 
very slow, the size, potential market and geo-political position could be the main reason 
for early entrance of foreign investors in these countries, aligning them into first group 
countries. 
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Figure 1.  Resident patent applications in CEE countries, 
              in 1989-2000 period, selected countries, Logarithmic view 
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Source: (WIPO, 1985-2002). 
 
 
 
Figure 1a.  Resident patent applications in CEE countries,  
                 in 1989-2000 period – selected countries, Linear view 
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Figure 2.  Non-resident patent applications in CEE countries, 
               in 1989-2000 period, selected countries, Logarithmic view 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
10
100
1000
10000
100000
1000000
19851986 19871988198919901991 19921993 19941995 19961997199819992000
Year
P
at
en
tA
pp
lic
at
io
n
s
-
N
o
n-
R
es
id
en
ts CRO
SLO
SMN
CZ
SLR
EST
SU
RF
UKR
SFRY
CZ+SLR
CZ
CZ+SL
SU
SFRY
RF
SLO
CR
SMNEST
SLR
UKR
 
Source: (WIPO, 1985-2002). 
 
 
 
Figure 2a.  Non-Resident patent applications in CEE countries, 
                 in 1989-2000 period – selected countries, Linear view 
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Tables 2, 2a, 3 and 3a illustrate patenting activity in the analyzed CEE countries in 1985-
2000 period from another angle. The Coefficient of Inventiveness (CI) is the indicator of 
a country’s inventive production, calculated as the number of resident patent applications 
per 10,000 inhabitants. Average value for OECD countries has increased from 5.77 in 
the period 1985-1990 to 6.16 in the period 1995-2000. Average figure for OECD 
member countries is misleading because of the extremely high value for Japan (25.01 
and 28.23 in two periods respectively). Figures in table 2 indicate that high inventive 
production is in the countries where CI varies between 3 and 8. Values for CI between 1 
and 3 represent moderate inventive production, and values under 1.00 represent countries 
with modest or very low inventive production. One should notice that in all OECD 
member countries, except Greece, CI has increased in the second analyzed period 
(countries are grouped in table 2 according to CI value in 1995-2000 period). 
In table 2a are CI data calculated for selected CEE countries. In the first analyzed period, 
1985-1990, CI values were rather good, comparable with highly inventive OECD 
countries (in Soviet Union, like in Japan, CI values are extremely high, 16.44). Situation 
has changed in the second analyzed period. CI values dropped under 1.00 in all analyzed 
countries except Russian Federation, but figure for this country has also shrunk to 1.27. 
Situation in former Yugoslavia and successor countries is quite specific. Small figure in 
the first period (0.62) revealed technological policy in former Yugoslavia, based on 
import of foreign technologies, without domestic “value added” development leading to 
domestic inventions and innovation, because of detached industrial and R&D sectors. In 
the second analyzed period figures remain small in all three selected countries: 0.62 in 
Croatia; 0.34 in Slovenia and 0.50 in Serbia and Montenegro. This is another proof that 
the process of innovation capacity building, as well as the process of establishing a new, 
market oriented national innovation system in all three countries is slow. 
The Coefficient of Attractivity (CA) is the indicator of a country’s eligibility for inclusion 
in global economy, calculated as the number of non-resident patent applications per 
10,000 inhabitants. CA average value for OECD countries has jumped from 6.76 in the 
period 1985-1990 to 21.25 in the period 1995-2000. Figures in table 2 indicate that 
highly attractive markets for technologies are in the countries where CA scored more 
than 10. Values for CA lower than 10 indicate either some degree of closeness of one 
country for import of technologies (for example Japan), or how strong is one country in 
technology development (for example USA, Germany, France). Increase of CA value for 
more than three times in just 10 years indicates how strong and fast the process of 
globalization and technology development in developed countries is. 
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Table 2.  Coefficient of inventiveness and coefficient of attractivity 
              for OECD member countries 
CI = Resident patent 
application / 10.000 
population 
CA = Non-Resident patent 
application / 10.000 
population 
Country 
(Countries are grouped according 
to decreasing CI value in 1995-
2000 period – see text) CI for 
1985-1990 
CI for 
1995-2000 
CA for 
1985-1990 
CA for 
1995-2000 
Japan 25.01 28.23 2.95 5.76 
Sweden 4.14 9.30 39.24 139.06 
Switzerland 5.56 8.34 47.96 173.39 
Germany 5.22 7.96 8.35 15.49 
Finland 3.82 6.56 14.92 220.52 
Denmark 2.09 5.38 25.05 232.34 
United States 3.04 5.19 2.83 4.62 
Australia 3.93 5.05 9.42 24.56 
United Kingdom 3.51 4.82 10.09 23.23 
New Zealand 2.66 4.38 10.38 102.10 
Luxembourg 2.13 4.37 586.23 2891.00 
Netherlands 1.67 3.64 24.71 60.61 
Norway 2.19 3.60 18.88 88.31 
Austria 2.96 3.47 37.50 154.62 
France 2.24 3.27 9.37 17.55 
Ireland 2.07 2.49 8.88 249.05 
Belgium 0.89 1.64 32.24 92.57 
Canada 0.94 1.44 10.81 18.95 
Iceland 0.87 1.16 3.80 1173.67 
Italy n.a. 1.09 n.a. 17.29 
Spain 0.51 0.77 6.06 32.37 
Greece 0.84 0.18 10.69 87.44 
Portugal 0.08 0.11 2.61 124.08 
Mexico n.a. 0.05 n.a. 4.39 
Turkey 0.03 0.04 0.14 5.36 
Total OECD 5.77 6.16 6.76 21.25 
North America 2.83 3.67 2.97 5.66 
European Union 2.31 3.00 6.02 27.35 
Nordic countries 3.22 6.70 24.65 179.54 
 
Source: (WIPO, 1985-2002). 
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Table 2a.  Coefficient of inventiveness and coefficient of attractivity 
                for selected CEE countries 
CI = Resident patent application / 
10.000 population 
CA = Non-Resident patent application 
/ 10.000 population 
Country 
CI for 
1985-1990 
CI for 
1995-2000 
CA for 
1985-1990 
CA for 
1995-2000 
Bulgaria 3.87 0.39 0.73 41.51 
Czechoslovakia 4.81 n.a. 1.25 n.a. 
Czech Republic n.a. 0.60 n.a. 35.52 
Slovakia n.a. 0.43 n.a. 64.46 
Estonia n.a. 0.12 n.a. 243.26 
Hungary 2.70 0.85 1.59 35.69 
Poland 1.41 0.63 0.23 9.69 
Romania 2.01 0.65 0.23 22.58 
Soviet Union 16.44 n.a. 0.50 n.a. 
Russian Federation n.a. 1.27 n.a. 2.73 
Ukraine n.a. 0.83 n.a. 6.87 
SFRY 0.62 n.a. 0.39 n.a. 
Croatia n.a. 0.62 n.a. 42.04 
Slovenia n.a. 0.34 n.a. 255.08 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
n.a. 0.50 n.a. 30.25 
 
Source: (WIPO, 1985-2002). 
 
 
 
The absence of foreign patents in CEE countries before 1989 resulted in CA values 
around 1 (Table 2a). During the process of transition from centrally planned to market 
economy, one country could become interesting for foreign investors only if legal 
requirements (intellectual property rights regulations in our case, combined with other 
laws, especially financial, company and similar laws), and openness of the domestic 
market to foreign technologies, goods and services suit international standards. 
Therefore, the Coefficient of Attractivity (CA) could be used as the indicator of 
transition too. This is the main explanation why situation has dramatically changed with 
CA in the second analyzed period. CA values jumped in all analyzed CEE countries. The 
largest value has been recorded in Slovenia (255.08), but in all other countries CA values 
are also very high. Differences reflect either the degree of compatibility of a particular 
country with EU market regulations (Hungary: CA=35.69; Croatia: CA=42.04; etc.) or 
how influential is the size of the country (Russian Federation: CA=2.73), somewhere 
combined with the slow process of changes in economy (Ukraine: CA=6.87). 
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Table 3.  Dependency ratio (DR) for OECD member countries 
DR = Non-Resident patent application / 
Resident patent application 
Country 
(Countries are grouped according to 
decreasing 
 DR value in 1995-2000 period – see text) 
DR for 
1985-1990 
DR for 
1995-2000 
Portugal 33.66 1102.64 
Iceland 4.38 1012.45 
Luxembourg 275.00 660.91 
Greece 12.73 484.11 
Turkey 5.01 121.98 
Ireland 4.29 100.07 
Mexico n.a. 94.25 
Belgium 36.25 56.46 
Austria 12.65 44.55 
Denmark 11.99 43.21 
Spain 11.99 41.99 
Finland 3.91 33.61 
Norway 8.60 24.50 
New Zealand 3.90 23.33 
Switzerland 8.63 20.79 
Netherlands 14.77 16.64 
Italy n.a. 15.83 
Sweden 9.49 14.95 
Canada 11.48 13.12 
France 4.17 5.36 
Australia 2.40 4.86 
United Kingdom 2.88 4.82 
Germany 1.60 1.95 
United States 0.93 0.89 
Japan 0.12 0.20 
Total OECD 1.17 3.45 
North America 1.05 1.54 
European Union 2.61 9.12 
Nordic countries 7.66 26.78 
 
Source: (WIPO, 1985-2002). 
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Table 3a.  Dependency ratio (DR) for selected CEE countries 
DR = Non-Resident patent application / Resident patent 
application 
Country 
DR for 1985-1990 DR for 1995-2000 
Bulgaria 0.19 106.94 
Czechoslovakia 0.26 n.a. 
Czech Republic n.a. 59.18 
Slovakia n.a. 148.64 
Estonia n.a. 1979.80 
Hungary 0.59 42.19 
Poland 0.16 15.47 
Romania 0.11 34.92 
Soviet Union 0.03 n.a. 
Russian Federation n.a. 2.16 
Ukraine n.a. 8.28 
SFRY 0.62 n.a. 
Croatia n.a. 67.63 
Slovenia n.a. 750.87 
Serbia and Montenegro n.a. 60.93 
 
Source: (WIPO, 1985-2002). 
 
 
 
Tables 3 and 3a illustrate another indicator of patenting activity: dependency ratio (DR), 
or the number of foreign patents per 1 domestic invention. In almost all OECD countries 
DR scored above 1, only in USA and Japan are less than 1. Like CA values, DR values 
jumped in the second analyzed period extremely high (almost 1000 times more in some 
countries!). 
Again, DR values are very close to zero in the first analyzed period in all selected CEE 
countries, and very high in the second analyzed period. Similarities between DR values 
in OECD and in selected CEE countries indicate not only the degree of compatibility 
between market conditions in analyzed CEE countries with OECD member countries 
(for example: Slovenia – DR=750.87; Estonia – DR=1979.80), but the respect of 
inventors from OECD countries to potential inventive capabilities in CEE countries too: 
foreign inventors apply for protection of IPR in order to anticipate expected domestic 
inventions (for example: Croatia – DR=67.63; Serbia and Montenegro – DR=60.93)! 
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6  National Patent Data Transformed into               
Sectoral Patent Data in Selected CEE Countries            
in the Period 1989-2000 
In previous chapters it has been pointed that the use of US patents has been dominant in 
quantitative analysis of S&T. Moreover, decreasing costs of access to US PTO data as well 
as capability to use them in analysis at all levels (country, region, sector, firms) has led to 
proliferation of papers based on this source. US patents are extremely useful for measuring 
technology frontier technology effort. However, their relevance is lesser for understanding 
the whole spectrum of technology activities in countries behind technology frontier like 
CEE acceding countries and less developed EU economies. The key obstacle why there are 
no analyses based on national patents is methodological. Patents recorded under 
International Patent Classification (IPC) system are not compatible with international 
industry classification. Classification of economic activities (ISIC – International Standard 
Industrial Classification ver.3.0; HC – Harmonized Classification) is based on company’s 
manufacturing, production or service activity. However, Daniel Johnson’s (OECD 2002) 
methodological work has removed this obstacle (or, is an important contribution in this 
direction). Based on his work it is possible to establish concordance between IPC A-H 
classes and HC 4-digit level classification of industries in OECD countries.  
The author of this paper has improved concordance between IPC Units (1-32) and HC 4-
digit level classification of industries, and has implemented it with CEE countries’ patent 
data. National patent data with industry level data, derived in that way, are then used for 
analysis in order to test different determinants of technological capacity at industry level. 
Figures 3, 4 and 5 illustrate the results of described transformation: non-resident (Figure 
3), resident (Figure 4) and total patent applications (Figure 5) in selected CEE countries 
are distributed in 14 manufacturing sectors3. 
Although it is too early to make strong criticism of the proposed procedure, one can 
notice a completely equal distribution of patents between manufacturing sectors in all 
analyzed CEE countries for all sorts of patent applications. Further analysis of patenting 
                                                 
3 Manufacturing sectors are: 
DA – Food products; beverages and tobacco; DB – Textiles and textile products; DC – Leather 
and leather products; DD – Wood and wood products; DE – Pulp, paper & paper products, 
publishing & printing; DF – Coke, refined petroleum products & nuclear fuel; DG – Chemicals, 
chemical products and man-made fibers; DH – Rubber and plastic products; DI – Other non-
metallic mineral products; DJ – Basic metals and fabricated metal products; DK – Machinery and 
equipment n.e.c.; DL – Electrical and optical equipment; DM – Transport Equipment; DN – 
Manufacturing n.e.c. 
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activity in countries with available sectoral patent data could support the evaluation of 
proposed concordance between IPC and HC classifications. Interesting results, after all, 
are highs in sectors DG ad DK, which are traditionally competitive sectors in selected 
CEE countries, and lows in DF and DI, again traditionally sectors of low competence in 
most of selected Central and East European countries! 
 
Figure 3.  Non-resident patent applications in CEE countries, 
               in 1989-2000 period, selected countries, logarithmic view 
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Source: (WIPO, 1985-2002; OECD, 2002). 
 
 
Figure 4.  Resident patent applications in CEE countrie, 
                in 1989-2000 period, selected countries, logarithmic view 
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Source: (WIPO, 1985-2002; OECD, 2002). 
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Figure 5.  Total patent applications in CEE countries, 
                in 1989-2000 period, selected countries, logarithmic view 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
100
1000
10000
100000
1000000
DA DB DC DD DE DF DG DH DI DJ DK DL DM DN
NACE - sectors
P
a
te
n
t
A
p
p
li
c
a
ti
o
n
s
BU2
CZ2
SLR2
EST2
HU2
PL2
RO2
RF2
UKR2
CRO2
SLO2
SMN2
 
Source: (WIPO, 1985-2002; OECD, 2002). 
 
 
 
7  Concluding Remarks  
The presented analysis of patent activity in selected CEE countries could be summarized 
in the following 5 points: 
1) Patenting behavior in selected CEE countries has undergone the process of change in the 
same degree and scope as other transitional changes started in 1989. Patenting inventions 
have become an important part of business activity in new, innovative climate, triggered 
and forced by market as well as by R&D impulse; 
2) Indicators of patenting activity could explain the directions, trends, speed and degree of 
transition! Some of them, such as the coefficient of attractivity (CA) could be used as 
indicators of transition too; 
3) The recovering of the intensity of domestic patent activity is an important process of 
innovation capacity building in CEE countries; 
4) The strong inflow of foreign patents in CEE countries, which is aimed to conquer 
domestic market, could reduce areas to domestic inventors for competition too. Another 
aspect for treatment of foreign patents is use for the purpose of technological learning, 
increase of technological capabilities and competences, as this was case with import of 
technologies in Japan, South Korea and other countries in second part of XX century. 
Therefore, the presence of such a big number of foreign inventions, with available patent 
documentation, could become a source of technological development in analyzed CEE 
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countries. This is, again, one aspect of the process of innovation capacity building in 
CEE countries; 
5) Although necessary for different purposes, patent data transformed from IPC to HC 
sectoral classification are still not fully available and applicable. Achieved results could 
only raise the issue of importance, but cannot be used for a thorough analysis. 
 
Patent data remain a very rare measurable indicator of innovation activity. Therefore, the 
analysis of patent activity in Central and East European countries could support better 
understanding of the process of innovation capacity building and creation of national 
innovation system, which has happened under a new framework, predefined by the rules 
of the 20th century market economy as well as by the rules of knowledge-based 
development in the 21st century. 
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Foreign Business-led Mobility for 
Upgrading the Flow of Knowledge       
(New Measure and the Hungarian 
Experience) 
 
Annamária Inzelt*
 
Abstract 
This paper focuses on one part of the inflow of highly-skilled workers, namely on 
immigrants employed in relevant jobs by foreign (affiliated) companies. The aim of this 
research was to explore the relationship between foreign direct investment and 
knowledge-flow through mobility in the age of  continuing internationalisation of 
companies. The internationalisation of economies is clearly changing the size, direction 
and character of employment-based mobility across countries. 
This paper describes a new survey  which was developed for this investigation in order to 
collect information relating to business-driven mobiles who are knowledge-conveyors in 
terms of brain and skill circulation. 
Among the different types of business-led immigrants, managers first arrived in Hungary 
in the initial phase of transition. Foreign owners came here - or delegated employees - in 
the initial years of foreign direct investment in order to establish smooth collaboration - 
or simply to train locals in the jobs and apply tight controls. The importance of seconded 
CEOs (chief executive officers) should not be underestimated in the process of 
knowledge-flow, transfer of technology, and in changing the rules and behavioural 
routines. Managers create an environment for others to employ - or not to employ - their 
accumulated knowledge and skills and to support “upskilling” and mutual learning. In 
the later stages of development - more specifically in the late 1990s - other professionals 
were also imported by business, professionals such as development engineers and 
                                                 
* Annamária Inzelt, IKU Innovation Research Centre, Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary. 
The author wishes to express her special thanks to Ágnes Hárs, Slavo Radošević, Jasminka 
Lažnjak, and Anders Ekeland for their valuable comments to the previous version of this paper. 
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designers, and so many different types of knowledge assets flow into the country 
channelled through these occupations. 
In the sample, most immigrants (one-third, in fact) were employed in sectors related to 
information and communications technology, and this clearly shows that Hungary, as a 
newcomer to the field of employers of immigrant labour, matched the contemporary 
“more highly educated immigrant” job pattern very well. This sector is, in fact, the 
leading employer for both groups – that of developed countries and the post-socialist and 
developing countries. 
 
 
Keywords: knowledge flow, FDI, brain circulation, CEE 
JEL Classification: J24, F21, O52 
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Introduction1
Global competition for highly-skilled workers (HSWs) has placed the international 
mobility of more highly educated personnel at the very centre of policy concerns. The 
number of highly-skilled "globe-trotters" has increased rapidly, although this class of 
migrants still represents only a small fraction of all migrants - of the whole Human 
Resources of Science and Technology (HRST) population. However, it is no accident 
that both sending and receiving countries pay careful attention to this very small group of 
migrants. Highly-skilled (HS) human resources must be taken into account by policy-
makers, since it is such skilled people who are essential for the production, diffusion and 
dissemination of knowledge. They are one of the most important factors linking 
technological progress, economic growth, and competitiveness, social and environmental 
well-being. The internationalisation of economic development has noticeably accelerated 
the spatial movement of people. 
The migration of highly-skilled workers varies in its nature according to profession, and the 
motivational background to outflow and inflow varies also. In the internationalised economy 
one of the most important initiators of migration / mobility is business, mostly foreign direct 
investors. Business-driven migration can play an important role in acquiring and 
disseminating knowledge and in combining skills for generating new knowledge. 
This study focuses on one part of the inflow of HS workers, namely on incomers employed by 
foreign (affiliated) companies in highly-skilled jobs which normally require higher 
educational degrees. These jobs may either be more or less sophisticated than their previous 
jobs, but differences in sophistication among such type of jobs goes far beyond the scope of 
the present survey.  
Business-led mobility across countries has two aspects: (1) In the home country it is 
business which initiates HS inflow as a means of overcoming a lack of specific 
knowledge or expertise within the country, a shortage of skilled workers in a particular 
field or the acquisition of highly specialised skills. (2) Business, as an investor or trader 
in a foreign country, posts employees in host countries for longer or shorter periods. 
The brain-gain in several fields is extremely crucial for the transition economies. When 
located within a socialist system, this type of peripheral industry, arriving late on the 
                                                 
1 The paper is based on a report prepared for the EU Brain Drain project (EU ERBHP V2 CT 
1999-07). 
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scene, was effectively cut off from the major international sources of technology. During 
the transition period foreign investors could perform both types of business-driven 
migration (initiating and posting) in their role as initiators. The inflow of more highly 
educated people may become a genuine "brain gain" if these people are thoroughly 
involved in scientific/economic activity. Under the circumstances of transition, foreign 
affiliates seem to offer good examples for the study of business-driven migration and for 
examining gains in human resources of science and technology (S&T). The 
supplementary knowledge on which we are focusing can substantially help to 
compensate for the relatively low innovative performance of these countries.  
Central and Eastern European countries, however, are appropriate "laboratories" in 
which to investigate this movement of foreign investors from the point of view of 
mobility. Foreign direct investment (FDI) started to penetrate into these countries in the 
1990s when a positive correlation between the inflow of HS workers and the inflow of 
FDI was observable in the advanced market economies. At the same time, both brain-
drain and brain-waste in the transition economies accompanied economic and political 
liberalisation. Political discourses as well as research studies concentrated on outflow 
(Carrington, 1998; Findlay, 1995; Glaser, 1978; Gokhberg, 1994; Sakkeus, 1997; Vizi, 
1992; Walter, 1968), whilst our research is focused on investigation of inflow mobility - 
which is a very important part of brain-circulation. 
This phase of research may assume that the mobility of a highly-skilled person means 
spatial outflow and inflow of knowledge. The assumption is that a mobile person 
transfers knowledge embodied in him/her from one country or region and/or on a job-to-
job, employer-to-employer and sector-to-sector basis, across borders. Such embodied 
knowledge invariably has a (formally) certified content as well as a tacit content. It is, on 
the one hand, not fully transferable, whilst, on the other hand, the new environment may 
support the new combination of embodied knowledge which can lead to positive 
externalities for both the organisation and the individual. 
In this paper we describe a pioneering survey which was developed to investigate the 
business-driven immigrants who are knowledge-conveyors in terms of brain and skill 
circulation. This novel form of measurement is currently in its infant stage, but it may be 
helpful in respect of the collection of information on international mobile HS people and 
the flow of knowledge. 
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The aim of this survey was to explore the relationship between foreign direct investment 
and knowledge flow through migration. We assume that the migration of highly educated 
people means a flow of knowledge from one country to another, and the question, 
therefore, was whether the penetration of FDI into Hungary has been accompanied by 
the appearance of international mobility, that is to say, how foreign investors are 
involving the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) in brain circulation. The 
survey, therefore, focuses on the role of foreign investors: entities are either small (that 
is, owned by one or a small number of foreign nationals) or they are giant multinational 
companies (MNCs). A side-effect of this survey is an investigation into non-FDI-related 
immigrants who are employed by foreign-owned companies. Consequently, the 
population examined in this study is that of HS immigrants working for foreign-owned 
companies - either posted, or simply employed by them.  
 
 
1  Conceptual Framework 
Knowledge may circulate across borders in many forms. Mobility is one of the 
instruments for the transfer of scientific, engineering, and business knowledge. A mobile 
human means a conveyor of knowledge. There are several ways for knowledge 
embodied in highly-skilled personnel to move across borders, and the basic mobility of 
HSWs is only one of these. The globalising, learning economy needs more mobile 
human resources. This brain circulation process has different impacts on national 
economies, on innovativeness, competitiveness and  re-investment into knowledge. 
The concept of this study derives from three quite distinct types of academic literature. 
The first lies in the field of innovation research. Here, important understanding has 
developed around key concepts, such as national innovation systems (Nelson, 1993; 
Edquist, 2000; Lundvall, 1992), and knowledge-based economies (David and Foray, 
1996).  An important part of innovation research is concerned with internationalisation, 
and  the case is that  internationalisation of the generation of innovation and technology 
has expanded considerably during the last three decades of the 20th century (Cantwell 
and Molero, 2003; Meyer-Krahmer et al., 1998; OECD, 1998; OECD, 1999; Patel and 
Pavitt, 2000; Pearce, 1999). The knowledge-based economies favour innovative 
networks and development of a dynamics of creation and circulation of knowledge, and 
so networking has become more and more common among different institutions - both at 
domestic and international level. The geography of the production of knowledge is on 
the way to becoming drastically modified. "Multinationals are establishing and 
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expanding R&D abroad, benefiting from the possibilities offered by ICT to 
internationalise the learning process along the whole of the value chain." (Cohendet and 
Joly, 2001, p. 80). Multinationals, in fact, are establishing operations in some significant 
locations where key competencies for high-quality research are already available – in 
this way benefiting from combining their own current capabilities with other, highly 
absorptive capabilities which are not only already active in their own right, but which 
offer an international dimension.2
The second strand of  literature lies in the field of migration and mobility. Many 
academics have recognised (for example Findlay et al., 1994; Salt, 1997) that there is a 
positive correlation between the inflow of skilled labour and investment spending, as 
predicted by a model of migration of expertise following the economic theory of 
globalisation, but this is certainly not always the case. Intra-firm migration / mobility is a 
known phenomenon - although very little empirical evidence is available. Studying this 
topic is not easy since business organisations are usually reluctant to afford insight into 
this process (Winkelmann, 2002), and so the scarcity of studies in this field is due to 
many factors, the most important among them being the lack of data and general 
difficulties in measuring the phenomenon. 
Another important strand of literature deals with measurement. Two OECD manuals 
provide detailed information on this issue, namely the Frascati Manual (2002) which 
defines the research and development population and their measurement, and the 
Canberra Manual (1995) which deals with human resources in S&T. The latter manual 
provides a conceptual work for measuring human resources devoted to science and 
technology (HRST). The total HRST population includes not only those working in 
research and development laboratories but also personnel such as shop-floor engineers, 
medical salesman and financial managers.3 In this way the HRST population is broader 
than a simple group of scientists who are usually gifted, talented individuals (see the 
discussion of term in Cheese, 1991; UOE, 2001; David and Foray OECD STI, 1995, p. 
27; Wolff, 1996). 
                                                 
2 An important lesson from the experience of many countries is that FDI relates to pools of talent 
on a de facto, existing basis; foreign investors are not prepared to invest in education or in 
improving education (Pavitt, 1997). 
3 To employ Canberra Manual-type working definitions in this instance: to the HRST category 
belong those people who (a) successfully completed education at tertiary level in a science and 
technology (S&T) field of study ’more highly educated people’. (b) Not formally qualified as in (a), 
but who are employed in an S&T occupation where such qualifications are normally required ’skill 
level’. 
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We have many unsolved problems to face in the measurement of  migration of HS 
workers, including the basic one of the lack of a generally accepted definition of highly-
qualified migration. 
Many different terms are used in the literature to measure and discuss the international 
mobility of human resources in science and technology.  
Definitions employed in scientific literature differ from the definitions found in official 
documents.4 The length (of time) dimension is important in these notions but it does not 
enjoy overall priority over other factors. As Avveduto (2001) summarised the matter, 
literature sometimes uses the term “skilled international migration”, “skilled 
international labour circulation”, “professional transients”, “migration of expertise” and 
“quality migration”.5
Many different social science studies shed light on the drastically changing character of 
migration in the late 20th century (Chesnais, 1992; Cervantes and Guellec, 2002; Wolff, 
1996; Salt, 1997; Salt and Singleton, 1995). A new wave and style of migration is 
emerging from the mobility of the scientific and business community.  
The recent reshaping of the strategy of multinationals has increased “in-house" mobility 
and has changed the typical length of foreign postings. The professional pattern of posted 
personnel also differs from earlier periods. In general, multinationals and other foreign 
investors are becoming important players in the field of HS mobility. The forms of 
mobility accompanying foreign investment differ widely in that we can note both  
bilateral and multilateral posting of HS personnel,  training of people in countries other 
than their normal workplace and long-term collaborative work involving short-term 
physical co-existence. 
Foreign knowledge and the inflow of HRST are important sources of new technology, 
increasing productivity for any national economy, and foreign investors are becoming 
increasingly involved in, and responsible for, the migration of qualified personnel.  
                                                 
4 The current UN definition, which is the basic definition for official statistics, defines migrants by 
calculating the length of stay (1 year + 1 day of residence in another country and foreign 
citizenship or permanent residence in a different country). This means that simple migration 
statistics cannot assist too much in classifying HS migrants as emigrant/immigrant or mobile. 
5 The original sources in order of notions: Findlay (1990), Cormode (1994), Appleyard (1991), Salt 
and Singleton (1995) and Todisco (2000). 
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The "knowledge" embodied in individuals changes continuously by such means as 
further education, training and experience, as well as forgotten, disused or devalued 
knowledge. The impact of foreign highly-skilled workers on the economy of a host 
country depends on many factors: the differences in the knowledge actually imported by 
migrants relate to many factors - such as their education, work- experience and 
accumulated culture regarding the systems of innovation with which they are familiar, 
and so on. The knowledge actually embodied in “mobiles” can be either tacit or codified 
knowledge. Tacit or personal knowledge means that the individual concerned knows 
how to do something without necessarily being able to describe how he/she does it. 
Learning by doing is, therefore, one way of reproducing tacit knowledge. New people 
are brought into the company and the by-product of their activities is the diffusion of 
tacit knowledge (Arrow, 1994). 
 
 
2  Penetration of FDI in CEECs and Mobility 
Foreign investors range from the small foreign company, located in one or two countries, 
to the giant multinational6, and distinguished players in the process of 
internationalisation of labour markets are the trans-nationals. According to the recent 
UNCTAD 2000 report, roughly 40,000 multinational companies run 300,000 firms in 
130 countries of the world, although MNCs actually originate in very few countries (of 
the 100 top MNCs 88 originated from "the Triad"). 
The regional structure of investment flow has changed much during the last three 
decades. Until the beginning of the 1990s the majority of investment flow took place 
among the most advanced countries - within "the Triad". 
Each type of foreign investor has a part to play in international migration, although the 
MNCs, being such important players in the world economy, are the rule-makers in the 
field of intra-firm international mobility. In the 20th century these companies accelerated 
the internationalisation of trade and capital markets and played an important role in 
national labour markets. During the last two or three decades of the 20th century they 
were economic initiators of the free movement of people and commenced the 
internationalisation of business research and development activities. 
                                                 
6 Foreign investment is classified as a direct investment if the foreign investor holds at least 10% of 
ordinary shares or voting rights in an enterprise and exerts some management influence. The term 
“foreign affiliate” is restricted to those foreign affiliates which are majority-owned. 
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Multinational companies are important players in terms of brain circulation. They both 
export and import knowledge through internal mobility on an international scale. MNCs 
offer international career possibilities to their own employees, whilst the trans-national 
companies were always involved in organising the labour market across national 
boundaries, largely by encouraging people to change their location to where they could 
be most useful to the company. They brought managers into affiliates and created 
international career possibilities for people from both corporate headquarters and the 
affiliates. The differences may be observed by occupation and the status of affiliates 
within the group, this status relating to the position of individual countries in terms of 
world competition. 
Types of such internal mobility include short-term migration (for example, in training 
seminars, on-the-job training and study tours within the "empire") and work under 
circumstances of short or long-term migration from one country to another (although 
such possibilities are not open to all employees). Both have important roles to play in 
dissemination, diffusion, accumulation and exchange of knowledge. The tacit and 
codified knowledge of  organisations may be shared.  
Foreign-owned companies as employers of immigrants may be classified into three 
different groups: 
1) Long-term immigrants from investor-related countries (either from less or more 
developed regions). In such cases the home country of the investor and the 
citizenship of the immigrants are the same. 
2) Long-term immigrants from non-investor-related countries (either from less or more 
developed regions). Here the home country of the investor differs from the 
citizenship of the immigrants. 
3) Short-term immigrants from investor-related organisation (We do not, in fact, 
concern ourselves with this third group). 
 
Any long-term immigrants may be business-led employees or job-seekers. The 
“business-driven flow” comprises both employment-driven and employment-initiated 
flows. In the first case, immigrants accompanying FDI are employees of the investor 
companies who simply post them from one location to another. The “employment 
initiator” may head-hunt specialists or recruit new employees through different channels 
in different foreign countries – but still in order to post them to the investment recipient 
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country. Business-led, highly-skilled workers are naturally employed as highly-skilled 
workers. 
FDI is a relatively new phenomenon in CEECs. As is well known from the literature, the 
CEECs were outside the main flow of internationalisation for roughly four decades 
(WIIW Forschungsberichte No. 215, and Transition Report 1994), but they have now 
accumulated considerable experience of the influence of non-investment by foreigners in 
respect of knowledge flow. The less developed regions, which are generally avoided by 
investors, are usually great sources of migrant labour, including skilled migrants for the 
longer term, and only political constraints have prevented these countries from being 
large-scale suppliers of highly-skilled workers. The opening of borders has acted as a 
safety-valve for what we might perhaps term “pent-up migration”. 
The collapse of the socialist regimes and the transition of CEECs towards market 
economies have totally changed the situation. CEECs have become important target 
countries for foreign investors in the new unipolar world system (Resmini, 2000; 
Kalotay, 2003; Sass, 2004; Antaloczy and Sass, 2001; Inzelt, 1999, 2000, 2003a). 
Specifically, FDI has played a fundamental role in the transformation of the Hungarian 
economy. One of the most common forms of FDI, that is to say, acquisition, was an 
important part of the privatisation process. Inward FDI flows (as a factor of GDP and 
averaged over the period 1990-98) put Hungary at the very top of the list among OECD 
countries. At the same time, outflow was very limited and very much at the lower end of 
the ranking table (OECD, 2001, p. 99). 
There are many factors (and actors also) involved in establishing the ways in which 
people and jobs are brought together across borders. If foreign investment is 
accompanied by employment-based HS migration, then the consequent inflow and 
outflow will result in effective brain circulation. 
The penetration of foreign direct investment in the transition economies offers a good 
possibility to study how foreign investors lock their local CEE firms into intra-company 
mobility. 
Foreign investors are important players on the Hungarian labour market. (Inzelt, 1994; 
2000). As an OECD study (OECD, 2001, p. 102) highlighted, the ratio of foreign 
affiliates in employment in the Hungarian manufacturing sector is around 50% - as high 
as in Ireland and Luxembourg. The ratio of foreign affiliates in industrial R&D is also 
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high in Hungary at 70%. This high figure reflects the economic activity of foreign 
affiliates, since they carry out relatively more R&D than domestic companies. It is, 
therefore, worth studying how the posting of people from parent companies and of 
mobile people from other regions relates to this level of activity. 
It was assumed that the internationalisation of employment in CEECs would occur first 
of all in those companies which had been bought or capitalised by foreigners. The 
foreigners would upgrade the knowledge of companies by transferring their own 
knowledge. Other scenarios, however, were not excluded. Foreign investors might 
preserve the company’s capabilities at the same level - or might even downgrade them. 
These scenarios, however, do not belong to our study.7 According to their area of 
employment, the personnel involved might be the managers of subsidiaries of 
multinationals, professionals, consultants, specialist workers or international experts. The 
foreign, highly-skilled workers might be transferred within foreign-owned companies, 
recruited abroad by the company or simply employed locally. 
We would like to know whether the penetration of foreign direct investment in Hungary 
is accompanied by emerging international mobility. Do foreign investors bring highly-
skilled people into Hungary to upgrade the knowledge in various fields? Is our economy 
involved in brain circulation? From the standpoint of the overall  migration process, this 
might be a narrow topic, but it is very important. 
We made an attempt to measure the employment-based HS worker inflow into the 
country. In this connection, an important part of business-led HSW mobility is the long-
term business-posted emigration from affiliates and partner organisations. Until now 
CEECs have not featured on any map of such a type of mobility, even if scattered 
emigration may be observed towards investor countries and to other locations of the 
multinationals. This survey does not deal with this (almost negligible) outflow of 
HRST.8  
 
                                                 
7 Concentrating on brain circulation, we are less interested in the general influence of MNCs on 
the labour market. We are interested in cross-national HS mobility accompanying foreign direct 
investment. 
8 Generally speaking, the HS emigration from CEECs is not negligible. Here I would emphasize 
that an outflow through foreign investment channels has, as yet, hardly occurred at all.This 
channel of knowledge acquisition and dissemination has scarcely existed. 
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3  Designing a New Survey 
The thorough investigation of data sources (see Country folder on Hungary 2002) 
illustrates very well that very limited data on R&D mobiles are available and that the 
data on non-researcher, highly qualified employees are minuscule. The assessment of 
available sources leads us to conclude that a new survey is needed to fill the gap of 
missing data and indicators to respond to many important policy questions which are 
emerging with the internationalisation of economies. One of the important issues is the 
brain-gain of the business sector in a receiving country. 
The IKU Innovation Research Centre of Budapest designed a survey to study the inflow 
of FDI business-led, highly-skilled workers. The aim was to attempt to measure this 
process and collect adequate data for further investigation. The survey focuses on the 
role of foreign investors in HS inflow where the investors are either small foreign firms 
or giant MNCs.9  
HRST-related manuals (the Frascati Manual, 2002; the Canberra Manual, 1995) and 
classifications (UN, 1998) simply touch upon migration-related definitions of this 
particular population sector. The measurement of brain circulation belongs to different 
(as yet un-harmonised) statistical domains. The effective realisation of "brain-gain" 
naturally takes different periods of time for different groups of immigrants, and, if we are 
to focus on HSW immigrants amongst the newcomers to a country, we need to divide 
them into two distinct groups. The greater part consists of incoming established HS 
personnel, although a further part will belong to the receiving country’s HRST following 
a period devoted to  accreditation of their HE degree under the rules and regulations of 
the receiving country. Personnel posted to a country by foreign-owned companies belong 
to the first group, although it should be remembered that foreign-owned companies, as 
normal recruiters in the local labour market, may also employ other new arrivals. 
 
                                                 
9The design of the questionnaire and its testing in other CEE countries are described in an EU 
report (Inzelt, 2003b). Participatin in the survey process were Katalin Miskolczi (register 
preparation and survey testing), Nóra Csunderlik (survey testing and running) and Mandy 
Fertetics (data processing and tabulating). Their valuable work was extremely important for the 
successful completion of the pilot survey. 
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3.1  Questionnaire 
The survey method employed was that of a telephone interview combined with a fax-
sheet, since such combined survey methods increase the reliability of responses. (The 
questionnaires can be seen in Annex 1.). This type of questionnaire allows the collection 
of data on foreign HE employed by a company on the actual day [month] of 
investigation. This information is extremely helpful in learning the features of HS 
migrants, although many characteristics of mobility remain unclear. Two directions for 
further research can bring crucial, additional information to the study of the mobility 
patterns of HS and of changing business behaviour in employing HS migrants. One is a 
retrospective survey which makes use of company archives and the other is a direct 
survey of individuals. We have attempted the second of these. The main characteristics 
of the survey are described in Annex 2. 
It is not easy to identify the target group of the investigation, but the target group of this 
survey are either partially or totally foreign-owned companies employing highly-skilled 
immigrants. 
The working definition of this sample was that a foreign highly-skilled worker is a 
person employed in an occupation where a first-degree qualification is normally required 
and who has worked at the company surveyed for more than 1 year. Those who met 
these criteria were included in the sample, whether or not their employer was a 
Hungarian company. (The actual employer might be another firm within the same group 
but located abroad – or even another company which “borrows” them). This method 
allowed us to test the relevance of the definitions taken from the Canberra Manual and 
from UN Migration documentation. 
Two categories of HS migrants are employed: (1) Business-led and (2) Job-seekers. In 
both groups a distinctive group of migrants, returnees, may occur. The returnee has no 
clear definition, but it is a term commonly used for natives who stay a couple of years or 
decades abroad and then return to their native country.  
In 1998 the total number of foreign-owned companies in Hungary was 26,272, that is 
one third of all companies (Statistical Yearbook 2000, p. 275-279). Such a large group 
was unmanageable in relation to our feasibility study and so we were compelled to 
narrow the circle. It may be assumed, however, that (1) if a firm’s ownership is at least 
51% foreign, the foreign affiliate is more likely to employ immigrants than others, and 
that (2) if a foreign-owned firm is innovative, it will employ highly-skilled workers more 
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frequently than non-R&D oriented, non-innovative firms. Without going into the details 
of sample selection, I would simply mention at this point that we used three different 
sources to identify firms which apply double or single filtering criteria.10  
Only a minority of companies employ foreign HSWs on a long-term basis – that is for 
more than 1 year. There is, however, a great deal of what we may term short-term 
migrant activity among the companies which have not employed foreigners for a long 
time. In this connection, one or two respondents emphasised that highly-skilled 
foreigners regularly worked in Hungary for short periods. 
Among companies who did not respond, it is worth mentioning one group of Hungarian 
medium and large-size firms owned by large foreign, national or multinational companies. 
Seven of these reported that records were at corporate headquarters (HQ), but the majority 
refused to respond to questions relating to the make-up of their workforce based on levels of 
education, occupation and nationality, mentioning "commercial confidentiality" as their 
reason. This behaviour does not relate to the person, occupation or nationality of the 
respondent but to the general corporate culture, the culture of the affiliate and the  treatment 
of the affiliate by the group. 
The results of  sample selection are summarized in Table 1. 
Systematic responses were received from 43 companies, 39 of whom employed long-term 
highly-skilled immigrants in 2000. The remaining four had employed long-term HS 
immigrants in the 1990s. The sample, however, includes only those companies who were 
employers of long-term HS immigrants in 2000.11
                                                 
10 The sources were: The databank of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, which contained 
information on R&D, innovation, and technology transfer activities (in the broad sense) and on 
foreign investment. The reference year was 1998. Another source was the “Hungarian Top 200” 
compiled by "Figyelõ" which included well-known multinationals in Hungary. A further databank 
of the Ministry of Economic Affairs became available in 2001 and contained data on companies 
partly foreign-owned - by relevant sector and based on 1999 data. Sources were used consecutively 
in the sense that when the shortcomings of one source became clear, we moved on to another. 
11 The "used to employ" group illustrates the presence of two phases of FDI-related HS 
immigration, although we do not have retrospective statistical evidence on the HS inflow and 
outflow of companies. People interviewed mentioned that the company used to have long-term 
immigrants - for one or two years in many cases. They had arrived in the initial stage when the 
company was set up (or acquired) by its first foreign owner. The owners arrived or posted a few HS 
employees to Hungary to inculcate the new corporate culture, to import capabilities which were 
lacking and to learn the newly set-up/acquired firm's local culture and capabilities. After a few 
years of co-working these positions were passed on to locals (whether trained abroad by the 
company or not). Similar tendencies are also to be observed in other post-socialist countries. 
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Table 1.  Sources of sample register and steps in selection 
Number of firms by sources 
Steps in sampling 
MEA, R&D1 ‘Figyelõ’ TOP 2002 MEA, FDI3
Total 725 200  
Performing double filtering criteria* 172 36 1,095 
Not employing HSW immigrants** 79 16 638 
Refused, disappeared, etc. 53 12 438 
Respondents 40 8 19 
Employing HSW immigrants for more than 1 year 16 6 17 
 
Notes: MEA = Ministry of Economic Affairs. 
 
 f
                                                
*Filtering criteria by sources. 
1 51 % foreign ownership and innovation. 
2 At least 51 % foreign ownership among the first 50 in the rank of Top Hungarian. 
3 51 % foreign ownership and large net sales (about HUF 300 million). 
** Including short-term immigrants. 
The number of irms by sources produces some overlapping. 
 
 
 
 
4  Employment-based HS Immigrants at Foreign      
Owned Firms (The Main Findings of the Pilot Survey) 
The 39 respondent companies employing highly-skilled immigrants provided detailed 
information on a total of 182 long-term employed, foreign citizens.12 In the case of 
business-led immigrants, we can assume that the organisation posting an employee had a 
clear wish to transfer the embodied knowledge of the employee in order to realise 
positive externalities from the new combination of knowledge. 
Of a total of 182 highly educated foreign employees, 96 arrived from the home countries 
of the investors. The vast majority of these (60) came from the same countries or had the 
same citizenship as the investors. The number of business-led immigrants is somewhere 
between 60 and 96. Originating from non-investor countries are 86 HS immigrants, 18 of 
these from developed economies (UK, Belgium, Norway and Portugal) (Table 2). 
There is much empirical evidence in the literature which shows that the country of 
origin, the sector of activity, the size of firm and the relative and absolute size of 
investment have an important influence on the flow of knowledge between the investor 
and the receiving countries. Our previous case studies have supported these observations. 
 
12 The sample covers 5% of HS immigrants registered by National Employment Office. (Migration 
Statistics identified 4,384 higher educated immigrants in 1999 - 24% of total immigrants. The other 
statistical source, The National Employment Office registered 3,771 in the same year.)  
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The same influencing factors are as important in the transition economies as they are 
crucial in other parts of the world. Let us first  characterise the investors. 
The total number of investor countries is 13, whilst the number of countries sending 
immigrants is 25. Common to both groups are 9 countries that are both investors and 
senders of immigrants. Twelve countries which are the source of foreign ownership 
comprise the advanced European market economies (excluding the USA); whilst another 
is the post-socialist giant, Russia. The 25 different countries from where immigrants 
arrived are made up of 13 advanced market economies, together with 8 CEE post-
socialist countries and 4 belonging to the developing world. 
We do not have exact data on business-driven and job-seeking immigrants, but we can 
use rough measures to classify respondents into these two groups. It may be assumed that 
the “business-driven flow” is roughly the same as that of immigrants from investor 
countries and that the “job seekers” are those who arrived from non-investor countries - 
including both the advanced market economies and the post-socialist and developing 
countries.13 At this stage of transition this rough classification is relevant, although there 
are exceptions to be found in both groups (See table 2). 
We term the first group “business-driven” immigrants and the second “non-FDI-related” 
immigrants’ even though the latter group was also influenced by FDI. Foreign investors 
have an important influence on labour market conditions in that, during the first period of 
transition, the companies privatised by foreigners or who were invested in by foreigners, 
sometimes offered jobs with higher salaries than the others. In several sectors they were 
job-keepers/creators in the transition period.14 Our sample covers only those groups of 
companies which maintained or created jobs. A large group of foreign investors employs 
no foreigners whatsoever - neither posted nor job-seeking. 
 
 
                                                 
13 The investor countries in our sample are the developed (advanced) countries - with one 
exception: Russia. This Russian-owned company employs 1 Russian, which supports our rough 
measure. 
14 Foreign acquisition has produced very different impacts on the job-market. In many cases 
departments and/or factories were simply closed, but, if the companies recruited or were ready to 
employ HE job-seekers, they usually offered better prospects than other companies. 
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4.1  Characteristics by Employers’                                         
Organisations and by Employees 
From the 39-strong sample 21 investors originated from major, 10 from medium, and 4 from 
small economies.15 (The remaining 4 were unknown). The most common foreign owners are 
Germans (13 of the 39) followed by Austrian (6), and French (4). Foreign investment has, to 
all intents and purposes, penetrated all sectors of the Hungarian economy. By economic 
activity, 7 firms were active in the manufacture of chemicals, in the commerce of chemical 
products and in the rubber & plastics sector. The second largest number, 5, had invested in 
the metal fabrication, whilst 4 are engaged in the manufacture of electrical and non-electrical 
machinery, in construction and high-tech services (software, engineering advisors, 
engineering firms, natural science and engineering R&D activities). Regarding the size of 
companies, the sample is very rich: since the smallest has 2 employees and the largest 8,427. 
At the end of 2000 the number of companies in our sample which were 100% foreign-owned 
was 21. Foreign capital ranging from 90.1% to 99.9% was involved in 8 companies, from 
50.1% to 90.0 % in 5 whilst in 3 it was below 50%. Redeployment caused many changes in 
ownership between the period of selection and the investigation – which is the reason for 
foreign ownership being below 50% in several companies. 
The total number of employees in the sample is 34,965, but data is not available as to 
how many highly-skilled people are employed by these companies. The total number of 
foreign employees and the number of foreign HE personnel are also unknown. Clearly, 
job-seeking, highly-skilled personnel may or may not obtain HS positions, and those 
who could not are usually missing from an employer’s archives. Consequently, there is 
no one in our sample with higher education who does not perform an HS job. They were 
not, in fact, excluded from the investigation per se, but virtually no information is 
available on them through their employer.16
                                                 
15 Here, and in several other tables, we classified countries as investors or as the sending country 
by the OECD classification of major, medium and small economies. 
16 There are many reasons why more highly educated migrants cannot work in HS jobs (e.g. the 
labour market situation, the receiving country devalues the degree acquired by the immigrant, a 
limited knowledge of receiving country's language). The acceptance of an immigrant's knowledge 
also changes in the receiving country according to such factors as the economic situation, the 
organisation of the recipients and by the degree of assimilation of the immigrant himself (language 
skills, accreditation of degrees, networking). Some are "under process" for HS in receiving 
countries; others not. The survey could not identify immigrants belonging to these “no longer" and 
“under process” groups of HRST. According to our fragmented information, these people do not 
report themselves as more highly educated if their chances of an HS job are very limited. They like 
to avoid the possibility of their degree becoming a burdening factor in their employment. 
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The total number of foreigners in our sample who were employed in highly-skilled jobs 
is 182, whilst the ratio of foreign HE employees to the total number of employees is 
around 0.5%. If we assume that the total number of highly-skilled workers is no more 
than 10% of all employees (3,497), then the foreign highly-skilled worker category 
represents 5% of all highly-skilled employees. 
Out of the 39 respondent companies, 3 employ more than 10 more highly educated 
foreigners, whilst the 100% foreign-owned companies (21 in number) employed 75% of 
these (Table 3). As the last column shows, only 3 companies employ more than 10 
foreign HE personnel. Two of these are active in information technology and carry out 
R&D activities in Hungary, whilst the third is a well-known multinational in the tobacco 
industry.  
As Table 3 shows, half of the firms investigated employ only 1 highly-skilled foreigner 
and fewer than 10 % employ more than 10 HE personnel. The largest number of foreign 
highly-skilled workers is 39 (employed by a multinational company). The next in 
ranking is also an MNC, which employs 22. As we know from other sources, these 
MNCs have involved their Hungarian affiliates in R&D activity and both joint and 
shared R&D activities are characteristic of the category. 
By size of group, medium and large companies employed 78% of foreign HE personnel 
and one quarter employed at least 6 such (one of these was to be found among the small 
companies). 
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Table 3.  Number of companies by origin of FDI 
              and number of foreign HE employees 
Number of companies 
by number of foreign HE employees Country origin of investment 
Total 
1 2 3-5 6-10 11- 
United States 2 1 1    
Germany 13 7 2  4  
France 4 3  1   
Italy 1 1     
Major 
economies 
Russia 1  1    
Total 21 12 4 1 4  
Netherlands 2  2    
Switzerland 1     1 
Austria 6 3  1 1 1 
Medium 
economies 
Sweden 1     1 
Total 10 3 2 1 1 3 
Denmark 1 1     
Finland 1    1  
Cyprus 1 1     
Small 
economies 
Luxembourg 1   1   
Total 4 2  1 1  
Unknown 4 2  1 1  
Total 39 19 6 4 7 3 
 
 
 
4.2  Key Characteristics of HS Foreign Employees 
Relating to the development level of the host country, two main groups of immigrants 
may be distinguished according to their national origin: 
• Immigrants from countries more developed than the host country itself 
• Immigrants from countries less developed than the host country itself 
 
In very rough terms, citizenship (in regional terms) might indicate differences in 
development level and variations in familiarity with types of national innovation system. 
Each group of HS immigrants has both common and different roles in the S&T system 
and in the economy of the host country. Table 4 summarizes the origin of foreign HSWs 
by main region. 
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Table 4.  Foreign HS employees by regions of citizenship and by gender 
Region Total Male Female 
EU countries 92 86 6 
EFTA 8 7 1 
New members (Poland, Slovakia, Czech) 6 4 2 
Candidate (Romania, Croatia) 51 41 10 
Other European countries (Ukraine, Russia, Yugoslavia) 8 7 1 
America 11 10 1 
Others 6 5 1 
Total 182 160 22 
 
Note: Among the Romanians, 2 are Romanian citizens but ethnic Hungarian, 1 of whom has now been naturalised 
Hungarian; likewise, 1 German and 1 American are Hungarian by origin. 
 
 
 
One quarter of the foreign, highly-skilled employees are Romanian citizens (48). These 
are usually economic and ethnic migrants settling in Hungary or moving from East to 
West.17 The second largest group of highly-skilled workers is German (31); which is due 
to foreign acquisitions and investment. In this category many nationalities precede the 
Austrians. A special group of migrants, the returnees, may arrive from both groups of 
countries, and among the immigrants two were identified as returnees posted by foreign 
owners. However, we know of several other returnees educated in Hungary, holding 
foreign citizenship and who were posted here. These people usually have an important 
role as knowledge conveyors and are actively participating in brain circulation.18
As regards gender distribution among long-term immigrants, professional women seem 
less involved in intra-firm mobility than men. The vast majority of HS immigrants (88%) 
are men - from 25 different countries – and women (12%) have arrived from only 11 
different countries. Women may be more reluctant to move for family reasons or they 
may have fewer opportunities to be seconded or posted by their employers. It is, 
however, worth noting that only 36% of the females arrived from the advanced countries, 
                                                 
17 Liberalisation in CEE countries plays an important role in ethnic-based economic migration. 
Other motivating factors were significant: economic differences and labour market possibilities in 
neighbouring countries are serious factors in short and long-term migration. 
18 Not only do official statistics find difficulty in collecting data on genuine, returning (HS) 
migrants; it is not easy even for a specific survey such as ours to collect them. Human resource 
managers reported as returnees those holding dual nationality and foreign citizens with Hungarian 
family origins (either born in Hungary or born abroad but speaking Hungarian). If a Hungarian 
citizen had worked abroad for 5-10 years without changing citizenship, he/she was not included in 
the immigrant category nor identified as a returnee (one from Germany and the other from the 
USA). 
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whilst the proportion of males is 57%. The gender distribution factor may not be very far 
from the Hungarian average. 
Different generations show various characteristics as knowledge conveyors. The younger 
generation usually conveys fresh, new knowledge but can offer very limited experience. 
In other words, there is more codified and less tacit knowledge embodied in younger 
people, and in this case it is extremely important that they acquire new knowledge 
wherever they can. On the other hand, the older generation possesses much in the way of 
familiarity with routine and practice, of skills and competencies which are conveyed 
from one work-place to another across borders. Their codified knowledge may be either 
up-to-date or out-of-date - depending on the individual’s efforts and success in the life-
long learning process.  
Two-thirds of immigrants are below 40, so belonging to the generally more mobile 
population sector (Table 5). By their age 14% (25) employees are above 50, but only 4 of 
these arrived from post-socialist or developing countries (refugee supplier countries). 
Different proportions in age groups by country of origin highlight the fact that 
immigrants from different environments are arriving with different aims, expectations 
and opportunities. Immigrants from the advanced economies display strong mobility 
characteristics, in that, for example, young West Europeans and Americans look for jobs 
in Hungary (in CEECs in general) as a stepping-stone for a future career. More mature 
Westerners are given a job by their employer as a pre-retirement or "winding-down" 
position. 
 
Table 5.  Foreign HS employees by main region of origin and age-group 
Age group Region 
20-29 30-39 40-49 50< Total 
EU countries, EFTA, America 16 49 15 22 102 
Post-socialist countries 24 21 3 2 50 
Others 2 3 - - 5 
Total 42 73 18 24 157 
 
Note: Age distribution was not known in each case.  
 
 
 
People from post-socialist and developing countries belong to typical age groups of 
economic immigrants and represent the most mobile generations. For them Hungary 
might be a final destination (for example, for Hungarian ethnic minorities from 
neighbouring countries and for those who were educated in the country and speak the 
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language). Alternatively, it may be nothing more than a transit stop on the way from their 
home country towards the more advanced countries.19
The picture of age-group by gender is very typical. On average, the female HS 
immigrants are younger than their male counterparts. Of the females, 73% were below 
40 but only 66% of the males .The proportion of females to the total population below 40 
is 14%, whilst above 40 it is 7%. The sample is, however, too small for further analysis. 
If we examine the occupation of immigrants by age group, we can find only senior 
officials and managers above 60. In the 50-59 age-brackets this proportion falls to 21%, 
whilst only 6% of all professionals belong to this particular age-group. 
 
 
4.3  Imported Codified Knowledge 
The University degree is a common measure of codified (certificated) knowledge. The 
information on certificated knowledge is based on the foreign worker’s educational 
qualifications as accepted in the country of origin, but differences in educational systems 
among the countries of origin of the degree go beyond the investigation of this paper. 
The response rate to this item proved lower than to others. We know the degree of 
education of 60% of employees, and so this part investigates together both the business-
led and job seeker migrants who were employed by the companies investigated. 
In respect of university degrees, the majority (119 immigrants) had a second degree, 
whilst two had a third - and no more than 21 had a first degree only. In the class of 
’unknown’ there are several non-graduates.  
The largest group of immigrants have university degrees in engineering. In fact, two 
thirds have degrees in engineering, of whom half belong to ICT-related fields: electrical 
engineering and informatics (32% of item respondents). The engineering field was 
significant among arrivals from both the advanced countries and the former socialist 
countries (Table 6). Even the total number of arrivals shows almost the same proportion 
                                                 
19 In addition to the turbulent migration within the region, Hungary and other CEECs, are 
becoming target destination countries for many Asians - at least temporarily. In accordance with 
general migration tendencies, people are arriving from the ex-socialist countries or satellites of the 
communist world (e.g. Mongolia, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Georgia and Uzbekistan). People from the 
large Asian developing countries are also among the immigrants, although we could not find many 
of these in highly-skilled jobs in the companies surveyed. 
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of ICT-related engineers as higher among immigrants from candidate countries. 10% of 
respondents are educated respectively in the natural sciences or in business 
(management, marketing, and commerce). The majority of business degree holders 
arrived from EU countries and 35% of these are above 50 years of age. If we look at their 
occupations, this is self-explanatory (see Table 7 in the next section). People with a 
degree in the natural sciences came both from the former socialist countries and from the 
developing countries -  53 % of these are below 40 years of age. 
 
Table 6.  Relationship between field of education 
             and different groups of HS immigrants 
Foreign HS employee from 
Developed country Developing country 
Field of education 
business 
posted 
business 
initiated 
and job 
seekers
total business posted 
job-
see
kers 
total 
Law 1  1    
Economics 12 15 27  3 3 
Business 2 1 3    
Social and 
behavioural sciences 
Total 14 16 30  3 3 
Natural sciences 
Biology, maths and 
computer-related   2 2  10 10 
Medicine  General physician     1 1 
Unspecialised 25 6 31 1 13 14 
Business-engineer 4 5 9    
Mechanical engineer 4 6 10  7 7 
Production engineer     1 1 
Electrical engineer 4 3 7  10 13 
Chemical engineer 1 1 2    
Construction engineer 1  2  4 4 
Engineering 
Total 39 21 61 1 35 39 
Total known 54 39 94 1 49 53 
Unknown 5 11 17  10 18 
Total 59 50 111 1 59 71 
 
 
 
One interesting feature of those highly-skilled immigrants who arrive with foreign 
investment is that a home-country origin does not necessarily mean intra-firm mobility in 
all cases. Several highly-skilled workers were recruited in the home country (or in 
neighbouring or same-language family countries) specifically to work in the host 
country. We can assume that this type of recruitment policy which focuses on countries 
similar to the home-country is a transitory phenomenon. The reason for recruiting from 
countries similar to the home country (i.e. among the market economies) is perfectly 
rational: that is, to cover any missing capabilities in the host country and to upgrade 
knowledge in such areas as financial management, development management and 
 478 
specialised engineering skills. Naturally, such recruitment policy also reflects the fact 
that we, as other transition economies, were a great puzzle to many foreign investors and 
that, in consequence, they preferred to employ leading professionals from their own, 
better-known environment. 
 
4.4  Knowledge Acquisition and  Occupations of Immigrants 
Accumulated working culture, skills, competences and certificated knowledge may all 
inflow through the jobs performed by highly-skilled immigrants. Among the factors 
involved in knowledge-flow by means of migrants, a common language as a tool of 
communication is very important. The few exceptions lie in those jobs where 
communication is less important and where the shortage of specialists is high.20
It is well known that Hungarian belongs to a very small language family and is not easy 
for foreigners to learn. One of the important lessons of our telephone interviews was that 
immigrants may split into two groups by language requirement - the requirement of 
posted immigrants to be fluent in the best-known foreign languages. In the initial period 
of foreign investment Hungarian language skill was supposed to be a crucial knowledge-
conveying capability, and one of the functions of returnees was to help in 
communication with their particular language skills. After a  few months, however, it 
became clear that this function is, in fact, not so important. Immigrants posted for this 
purpose were replaced very soon - either by locals or by other foreigners who could 
communicate in one of the better-known foreign languages such as English or German. 
The requirement was different for job-seeking immigrants from the post-socialist 
countries and the developing world as their jobs were also different. They usually have to 
know or learn Hungarian both as an everyday and as a professional language. 
In relation to  occupations of foreign workers, we used data provided by human resource 
(HR) managers. These occupations were classified by IKU into ISCO (International 
Standard Classification of Occupations) categories, although on several occasions we did 
feel it necessary to consult with the respective HR managers in order to obtain a clearer 
understanding of the actual occupation quoted.  
                                                 
20 A well-educated Afghan dentist cannot work in his field in Hungary since he cannot adequately 
communicate with clients, even if he is fluent in English and Russian, but Afghan computer 
scientists can be employed as computer scientists in Hungary even with no Hungarian. 
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Highly-skilled immigrants, as reported by companies, are employed in those types of job 
which require a university or college degree.21 According to their occupation they were 
employed in highly-skilled jobs (Table 7). 
The pattern of occupation by ISCO category is quite interesting. 43% of immigrants hold 
“leader” positions, although most of those involved in production and functional 
managerial positions arrived in the country without management experience. The other 
57% are professionals and associates. Out of a total of 101 professionals, it is engineers 
and architects who form the largest group (45); second come computer specialists. 
Whilst managerial positions are held by foreigners emanating from developed countries 
(mainly owners or owners’ representatives) there is no significant pattern of professional 
jobs arising from developed, post-socialist or developing countries. 
Table 7.  Number of foreign HS employees by occupation 
              (ISCO88) and citizenship 
Citizenship of foreign HS employees 
 Occupation 
EU
 
EF
TA
 
N
M
.*
 
C
an
di
da
te
s 
O
EC
*
*
 
A
m
er
ic
a 
O
th
er
s Total 
Total 
in % 
1 Legislators, Senior Officials and Managers 58 6 1 6 2 3 2 78 42.9 
Corporate managers  52 6 1 5 2 3 2 71 35.7 
1.2.1 Directors and chief executives 16 2   1 1  20 10.4 
1.2.2 Production and functional department 
managers 24  1 5  2 2 34 23.1 
1.2 
1.2.3 Other departmental managers 4       4 2.2 
1.3 General managers 12   1    13 7.1 
2 Professionals 33 2 5 45 6 8 2 101 55.5 
Physics, mathematics and engineering science 
professionals 19 2 1 42 2 8 2 76 41.8 
2.1.3 Computing professionals 6 2 1 18 1  1 29 16.5 
2.1 
2.1.4 Architects, engineers and related professionals 11   23 1 8 1 44 24.7 
2.2 Life science and health professionals (biological 
scientists, chemists, pharmaceutical sales personnel)   1  3   4 2.2 
2.4 Other professionals (Business professionals) 14  3 3 1   21 11.5 
3 Technicians and Associate Professionals       2 2 1.1 
Unknown 1       1 0.6 
Total 92 8 6 51 8 11 6 182 100.0 
 
Note: * NM=New member **OEC=Other European Countries. 
                                                 
21 According to the experience of many other studies and  our face-to-face interviews with 
immigrants, several graduates are employed in non-highly-skilled jobs for a variety of reasons 
(language,  non-recognition of their degree, and the situation in the labour market) - for example, a 
Mongolian military engineer working as a maintenance mechanic is not included in the HS 
population. Without going into detail, we would like to emphasise that companies reported people 
as highly-skilled (HS) immigrants if they were employed in jobs requiring a degree.  
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The number of arrivals from investor and non-investor countries shows that the recruited 
and posted managers (people with a background in the business sciences) are almost the 
same. (This business-related inward migration is directed towards certain crucial 
jobswhich did not even exist before  transition.) Amongst engineers from the developed 
countries those who were posted represent two-thirds of the total number of engineers 
from the developed countries. This relatively large proportion illustrates the perceived 
importance of upgrading engineering knowledge in several fields and of co-operating in 
R&D activities in other fields. 
The relationship between occupation and field of education is interesting, both variables 
being known in respect of 80% of the sample. One third of senior officials and 
administrators are graduates in the fields of social and behavioural sciences and  law. 
Only one member of these groups was reported as holding a business degree. A majority 
of  others in managerial positions have various engineering degrees, and, of a total of 40 
engineering graduate managers, we found 20 who had a clear, distinct specialisation. 
The strong correspondence between occupation and field of education illustrates very 
well that both those professionals who were posted here because of their profession and 
the job-seeking immigrants could obtain HE jobs if their degree or knowledge was 
considered relevant by the employers. 
As regards the sector of employment, the largest single group of immigrants (one third) 
were employed in sectors related to information and communications technology, and it 
clearly shows that Hungary, a newcomer to the field of employers of immigrant labour, 
matched well with the contemporary “HE immigrant” job pattern. 
This sector is the top employer for both groups – that of the developed countries and the 
post-socialist and developing countries. However, the proportion of HE immigrants from 
post-socialist and developing countries is higher (58%) than of those from the developed 
world. 
Immigrants with an educational background in the natural sciences are employed only in three 
sectors, in Chemicals, in Radio, Television and Communications Equipment - and in 
“Services 2” (i.e. High-Tech Services). A background in Engineering and  Business Sciences 
appears in almost all sectors. 
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5  Conclusions 
The premise of this study was that the migration of highly educated people means a flow 
of knowledge from one country to another. This approach takes into account the 
migrants as knowledge conveyors from one country and/or sector to another, and the 
investigation focused on the inflow of HSWs from the perspective of the receiving 
countries’ employers. The internationalisation of economies is clearly changing the size, 
direction and character of employment-based migration.  
The question, therefore, was whether the penetration of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
into a transition economy has been accompanied by emerging international mobility, that 
is to say, how foreign investors are involving Hungary in brain circulation. Hungary, 
together with  other CEECs, is a good laboratory for such studies, since the penetration 
of FDI coincided with the process of globalisation in the knowledge economies. 
CEECs have accumulated considerable experience of the influence of non-investment by 
foreigners in respect of knowledge-flow. The period of the command economy system 
had constrained these economies from being involved in migration in any direction, and 
the political burden prevented these countries from being large-scale suppliers of highly-
skilled workers. Subsequently, the opening of borders acted as a safety-valve for what 
we might term “pent-up migration”. The inflow of HSWs is still narrower than the 
outflow, but its very presence is a good sign that a country is participating in the 
circulation of knowledge, since technology upgrading and innovativeness are both 
supported by the inflow of HSWs. 
This newly-designed survey is an attempt to fill the information gap, and it focuses, 
therefore, on the role of foreign investors: entities are either small (that is, owned by one 
or a small number of foreign nationals) or they are giant multinational companies 
(MNCs). This survey investigated HS immigrants who are employed by foreign-owned 
companies and who arrived either with or without investment. 
Most immigrants (one third) were employed in sectors related to information and 
communications technology, and it clearly shows that Hungary, as a newcomer to the 
field of employers of immigrant labour, matched well with the contemporary “HE 
immigrant” job pattern. This sector is the top employer for both groups – that of the 
developed countries and the post-socialist and developing countries. 
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Among the different types of business-led immigrants, managers arrived first in Hungary 
in the initial phase of transition. Foreign owners came here or delegated employees for 
the initial years of FDI to establish a smooth collaboration or simply to train locals for 
the tasks and to apply tight controls. The importance of the CEO should not be 
underestimated in the process of knowledge-flow,  transfer of technology, and in 
changing the rules and behavioural routines. They create an environment for others to 
employ - or not to employ - their accumulated knowledge and skills and to support 
upskilling and mutual learning. In the later stages of development, in the late 1990s, 
other professionals were also led here by business, such as development engineers and 
designers. Different types of knowledge assets flow into the country through these 
occupations. 
Germination of the seed sown by posted R&D personnel and their activities has 
occurred in Hungary. Involvement in research by MNC affiliates and extramural R&D 
activities are relatively new phenomena of globalisation, and the participation of 
Hungarian affiliates matches the new world experience. A few multinationals have 
posted professionals to manage research laboratories here in order to participate in 
research tasks allocated to Hungary, and these are crucial representatives of brain 
circulation. 
Foreign owners prefer to recruit returnees and they can offer suitable jobs, providing 
salary and benefits packages fully comparable to those in the West. (This group of 
people may be identified only by means of oral interviews.) 
If we consider the European Research Area, it is not sufficient to measure the process 
and its impact from the perspectives of the sending and receiving countries of Europe; 
the cost of transfer from one to the other is also crucial, and the globalising learning 
economies mean that it is extremely important to focus on such transfer costs. We need 
to elaborate further the concept of “brain drain”, “brain gain”, “brain waste” and “brain 
circulation”, but the findings are encouraging for the launching of studies into measuring 
the content of knowledge-flow through brain circulation. 
Observation of the changes in the pattern of HS migrations over a period of time is 
crucial to learning the pattern of brain circulation and knowledge sharing as well as to 
obtaining a closer picture of the relationship between systems of innovation and 
migration / mobility. Relevant data and indicators concerning the size, character and 
tendencies of HS migration are important to policy-makers, to the business community 
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and to society in general. The aim of this survey was to explore the relationship between 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and knowledge flow through migration, and so we 
attempted to measure the employment-based inflow of HS workers into the region. This 
research proved that the opportunities of brain gain are open to less advanced countries, 
and for them a study of brain gain is as important as that of brain drain. 
Changing the focus of the investigation from outflow to inflow leads to an important 
conclusion – that, even if the balance of the outflow and inflow is negative, the simple 
presence of inflow - and its durability - shows clearly that a country is participating in 
brain- circulation. 
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Annex 1.  Mini Survey of HE Foreign Labour Force in Firms 
 
General Data 
Name of the employing organisation: In Hungarian In English 
Address:       Webpage: 
Name of contact person:     Title of contact person: 
Telephone number:   Fax number:  E-mail address: 
In what language can he/she give information? 
 
Education Since when employed by 
Nationalities Per-son 
Age-
group 
Gender 
F/M 
Degree Depart.
Field of 
sc. 
Occupatio
n This firm Mother/Aff
. 
Perm. 
issued 
… country 1)          
 2)          
… country 1)          
 2)          
… country 1)          
 2)          
 
*The question about country of birth was optional (only to mention if different from nationality or citizenship). 
 
 
 
Annex 2.  Lifelines of the Hungarian Academic Survey      
              on Inflow of HSWs 
(Business Sector) 
Methodology Characteristics 
Kind of survey Academic survey 
Survey unit Firms with foreign ownership and employing highly skilled 
immigrants. 
Classification ISIC Rev. 3 (two digit level); ISCO; ISCED 
Definition Canberra on HRST; UN on migrants 
Obligatory/voluntary survey Voluntary 
Size of survey  
Number of responding firms 
employing HE immigrants - gross 
                                        - net 
Number of highly skilled foreign 
workers employed by responding 
firms - gross 
                                        - net 
 
 
43 
39 
 
 
207 
182 
Cut-off-point Foreign ownership at least 50% 
Employing at least 1 HE immigrant 
Questionnaire Self development 
Combination with other surveys Not yet 
Reference period 2001 
Survey method & implementation Phone interviews, face-to-face interviews and fax survey 
 
Data collected and analysed by IKU, commissioned by EU through MERIT. 
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It is now nearly two decades since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the failure of 
other economic systems that relied on central planning, state ownership of the major 
factors of production, and protection from competitive and market forces. It is generally 
accepted that a competitive economic system, based on market determined prices, 
transparent information, and the unfettered movement of resources is currently our best 
hope to achieve rapid overall economic growth and high standards of living. However, 
we have also learned during this period that finding this preferred road to prosperity, 
keeping up with the “traffic”, and even staying on the path is not simple. It requires 
patience, a tolerance for uncertainty, and a willingness to take risk. Consumers, 
businesses, governments, and educational institutions need to move out of their 
traditional “comfort zones”, embrace change, and take advantage of opportunities. 
Otherwise, they risk being left by the roadside as other businesses, countries, and citizens 
improve their positions. 
In this paper I will review what are considered to be key aspects of economic success in 
the first part of the twenty-first century. I will then describe some of the central aspects – 
and challenges – facing the most successful economic union in the world today, namely 
the union of the 50 “states” in the United States. I will then turn to the importance of new 
and effective management and the role of advanced management education. “Lessons 
learned” from the new International Graduate Business School’s (IGBS) MBA in Zagreb 
will be shared. 
                                                 
* Bruce L. Jaffee, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy, Indiana University, 
Bloomington, IN, USA. 
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A simple prescription for economic success for a business, especially one competing in 
the dynamic environment of the information age of the twenty-first century involves five 
factors: 
1) Create a product or service of value to customers. 
2) Keep costs low. Strive for efficient operations. 
3) Develop a pricing scheme that captures much of that value for the firm. 
4) Grow the market through effective marketing and promotion coupled with a 
dynamic innovation strategy. 
5) Retain the customers so that they are “locked in” and view the firm as the default 
supplier. 
 
Many business people try to succeed in an increasingly competitive market environment 
by focusing on step #2: lowering costs, retrenching, and competing by being the low cost 
supplier. In the short-run this can be an effective strategy, but in the limit it can 
deteriorate into what might be described as the “anorexic theory of management”. A lean 
operation does have low costs, but it will not be an engine for economic growth, 
employment opportunities, or sustainable profits. 
A more successful strategy is one that combines a focus on efficiency with a growth 
strategy. The Wall Street Journal last month1 suggested that growth is critical if a firm 
wants to attract and retain talented employees. However, growth – either internally 
generated or through mergers and acquisitions – will be successful only if the firm’s core 
business dimensions are recognized for their high quality. Growth for its own sake has 
little value. It needs to go hand-in-hand with increases in profits. 
The papers in this session are important contributions to the understanding of what are 
the keys to business organizational success and investment and economic growth in 
transition economies. The paper by Svetlana Avdasheva provides a valuable insight into 
the way in which enterprises, more precisely, “business groups”, are organized, 
managed, and controlled in Russia. The study by Tatiana Dolgopyatova looks at the 
important relationship between organizational structure and performance. As with the 
situation in many other countries, this analysis finds little relationship between the 
structure of corporate ownership and control on performance. There is no one structure 
                                                 
1 “The Best Ways to Grow” the Journal Report: Leadership, Wall Street Journal, October 25, 
2004, Section R. 
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that clearly dominates others in terms of performance. The study by Malgorzata Runevic 
shows the importance and effectiveness of foreign direct investment in stimulating 
economic growth in the Baltic States. FDI, especially when it comprises a large 
proportion of total investment as it does in these countries, can be critical in enhancing 
the export competitiveness of various sectors. 
It is generally accepted that a market based competitive economic system must have a 
clearly defined and consistently applied system of rules and expectations, especially as 
they relate to contracts and property rights and the transparency of accounting and 
financial information. We have also learned that high rates of productivity require 
unconstrained investment opportunities in the basic factors of production: labor, capital, 
land, and technology. Free movement of these factors of production, so that they can 
achieve their highest and best use, is a prerequisite to an effective economic system and a 
country’s long run competitiveness in a system of open economies. That is not to say that 
there is no role for government in facilitating such an economic system and speeding up 
the transformation process. Yet it is important for government policy to be forward 
looking. Its emphasis should not be on protecting the status quo, subsidizing inefficient 
operations, or protecting businesses or workers from competitive forces. Instead it needs 
to let the system work, where “winners” truly succeed and reap the benefits whether they 
are generated by inventive technology, forward thinking and creative management, good 
timing, or even luck. In contrast, governments need to have a system where failures are 
truly the end, where bankruptcy means equity positions are lost and workers must find 
new positions, albeit with the possibility for government help with retraining and other 
adjustments but without a “safety net” that might become too comfortable. 
The economic system in the United States is far from flawless. The recent corporate 
scandals (e.g., Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, and Qwest), corruption and incompetence 
by accounting firms which led to the collapse of the accounting firm Arthur Andersen 
and the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and recent investigations of the mutual fund 
industry and the insurance brokerage business indicate that there certainly is room for 
improvement. Yet a fundamental strength of the U.S. economic system is the free trade 
zone among the fifty states. Each of the states might be viewed as countries with its own 
government, parochial interests, and economic units that promote their narrow economic 
interests, especially protection from competition. Yet the U.S. has prospered as a whole 
by being willing to sacrifice the interest of the few for principles as diverse as a common 
currency, the free movement of labor and capital, and standard and reasonably 
transparent accounting and financial systems. 
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The role of education, especially management education, is another area where 
government – and business – investment is needed and is likely to produce high rates of 
return. This is especially true in economies that are still in the transformation process and 
face increased competition – and potential business opportunities – from the European 
Union whose educational institutions are emphasizing management education and are 
moving up in the raking of top MBA programs.2 Later in this paper I will describe the 
case study of the development of a full-time MBA program at the International Graduate 
Business School - Zagreb and “lessons learned” from that experience. 
The importance of managerial and technical education is likely to increase in the future. 
A recent study by Fernald and Ramnath (2004) found that there was an acceleration in 
total factor productivity in the United States starting in the mid-1990s. They give a 
substantial amount of credit to the information and communications technology (ICT) 
sectors of the economy. Yet they find that the majority of the acceleration in the rate of 
growth of total factor productivity did not occur within the ICT industries. Instead, they 
found most of the acceleration to be occurring in the way in which ICT technology is 
used in a wide range of sectors in the economy. They find that sectors as diverse as 
wholesale and retail trade and banking have combined ICT innovations with numerous 
organizational changes to lower their costs, expand the range of their goods and services, 
and improve their service quality. All these changes require a different level of 
management training and leadership skills than are found in traditional educational 
programs or via on the job training. 
The importance of management education in a competitive economic system is 
emphasized in a recent book by Robert Anderson (2004), a former World Bank 
consultant. He concludes his review of challenges and constraints facing countries that 
are trying to improve their economic growth rates by stating: 
When business people are asked why their company’s performance is so bad, 
they are likely to blame the banks for not giving them loans to modernize, high 
interest rates, high taxes, government corruption, or bad infrastructure such as 
roads or power supply. They rarely blame their own inadequate management. 
McKinsey [A series of country studies conducted by the McKinsey Global 
Institute] concludes that poor management is often the most serious problem 
                                                 
2 See for example the special section, “FT Business Education”, in the Financial Times of Monday, 
November 1, 2004. 
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and is frequently caused by lack of competition. In other words, these 
companies can still be profitable without improving their performance because 
they face little competition. Owners and managers have little incentive to 
change.3
 
Clearly in Europe in the twenty-first century the “incentive to change” has occurred and 
will continue to increase. Advanced management education is certainly not a sufficient 
condition to ensure sustained economic growth and business success. However, it is 
increasingly clear that it is a necessary condition to achieve these objectives. 
Let me turn next to a description of the efforts that my university has made in 
establishing a high quality management training program in Croatia. I will explain the 
background, indicate the adjustments that had to be made, and describe the MBA 
program that started in January 2004. I will summarize with “lessons learned” from this 
experience. 
In August 2001, the Kelley School of Business at Indiana University was awarded a 
grant from the U.S. Department of State to work with a Croatian partner in developing a 
high quality, full-time, English language MBA program. The Request for Proposal (RFP) 
designated the Consortium of Faculties of Economics in Croatia (CFEC) as that partner. 
In the process of program development, IU was also charged with assisting in Croatian 
faculty development to upgrade teaching methodologies and curriculum content. Over 
time, these faculty would take on curriculum delivery in the MBA program, helping to 
ensure the program’s sustainability. 
CFEC representatives were appointed by the deans of each of the four faculties – the 
Universities of Osijek, Rijeka, Split, and Zagreb. Given the population of Croatia – 
approximately 4.5 million – the establishment of one high quality MBA program would 
be sufficient to satisfy the country’s need for highly skilled managers, certainly for the 
next decade. By pooling their human and capital resources, and with the assistance of 
State Department funding and an experienced U.S. partner, all constituencies would 
benefit. These constituencies included: 
• all four Faculties of Economics, 
• the Croatian business and policymaking communities, in great need of trained 
managers, 
                                                 
3 Anderson (2004, p. 231). 
 495 
• the pool of prospective students and, ideally, 
• the Southeastern European region through the development of a cadre of skilled 
managers with an established network. 
 
The U.S. partner, Indiana University, would also benefit by extending and deepening its 
experience in transition economies and developing a new international partner for future 
collaborative activities. 
 
Lessons Learned 
 
The Consortium Model 
The concept of a consortium, particularly in a small area (a country, region, province) or 
in a highly specialized field, is appealing for many reasons. A cohesive consortium can 
pool limited resources, avoid unnecessary redundancy, share risks, and build on the 
comparative advantage of its members to create a higher quality product or service. In 
Croatia, with a total population of approximately 4.5 million, limited resources, and a 
pressing need for a skilled management force in the short – as well as longer – term, the 
idea of a collaborative effort among the Economics Faculties of the country’s four 
universities to create one high quality management training program makes eminent 
sense. The introduction of an experienced outside partner to serve as advisor should 
provide valuable assistance and support to the consortial effort, lowering the learning 
curve, minimizing the risks, and supplementing resource constraints of the consortium. 
In doing so, the external partner should quicken the development process and enhance 
the likelihood of a project’s success. 
IU’s experience with the Consortium of Faculties of Economics in Croatia (CFEC) 
revealed a simple but fundamental requirement for a successful consortium-based 
project. There must be a clear project objective on which all members agree. In the 
Croatian project, the lack of agreement on a clear objective by all partners predestined 
failure – not necessarily failure of the project’s goal, but rather of the consortium model 
to achieve that primary goal. 
IU was aware that politics would play a significant role in the MBA program 
development project. The University of Zagreb is, after all, the oldest, largest and, from 
its perspective, the best academic institution in Croatia. It came as no surprise to learn 
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that Zagreb intended to be the ’first among equals’ and to make key decisions throughout 
the development process, even beyond. While surely chafing under this attitude, Osijek, 
Rijeka, and Split decided that the potential benefits of being ’in’ rather than ’out’ 
exceeded the costs of inevitable jockeying for position within the Consortium. IU, on the 
other hand, was committed to an open, collegial process.  
After reflection and extensive discussion, it was decided that a successful MBA program 
needed to be in the population, business, and governmental center, namely Zagreb. 
Further, it was decided that to avoid internal discord among the faculties it was important 
to operate with a single entity who would be a true academic partner. We were able to 
develop this relationship with the Institute of Economics, Zagreb (EIZ) and used its 
facilities to start the full-time MBA program in January 2004. 
 
Challenges Faced 
 
Full-Time vs. Part-Time 
Graduate programs in Croatia are part-time programs – this is the accepted norm. The 
RFP called for a full-time MBA program, and IU agreed with the logic of an intensive 
course of study. A full-time program could generate highly trained managers in a short 
period of time. In discussions with business members in Zagreb, for example, it was 
common to hear that an individual had been enrolled in a part-time MBA program for up 
to 7 or more years.  
IU was cautioned against trying to introduce a full-time program by almost every 
Croatian, whether from academia, the business community, or the government. The 
Consortium assured IU that a full-time program would never attract students, and even 
the Institute of Economics was uneasy with the notion. While the IU planning team took 
seriously the concern and discussed among themselves the challenge this would be, IU 
decided this was a risk that had to be taken. Croatians, IU pointed out, were well aware 
that the most highly rated MBA programs in the U.S. and Europe are full-time. The new 
Croatian MBA would rival those high quality programs only if it adopted similar 
standards – excellent faculty, talented students, and an intensive course of study, the 
value of which would be evident in the product. While willing to discuss the issue at 
length, IU had decided that this was a key element of the program, and a barrier worth 
breaking. The full-time program would have to be marketed with skill to recruit the first 
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class of students; in years following, IU believed, the quality of the graduates themselves 
would be an outstanding marketing tool, even if the program structure needed to be 
modified to meet demand. 
IU – and the MBA program itself – was incredibly fortunate to have an energetic, 
intelligent, and committed Croatian team for what was an inconveniently short recruiting 
season, particularly in light of the challenges we faced. Today’s 2004-05 MBA class is 
composed of fourteen extremely bright and hardworking young men and women. In the 
end, IU concurred in the decision to allow two of these students to complete the MBA in 
a staggered manner. The two students are company-sponsored, and their employer 
requested this exception in light of the small window between admission into the 
program and the employer’s need to absorb or reallocate ongoing work projects for the 
periods the students would be away. 
 
Challenges Ahead 
Short-Term 
1) The key challenge facing the IGBS MBA program in the near term is the 
recruitment of a second class of MBA students. In light of the outstanding quality of 
the first class, IGBS and its partners will have to be very careful in reviewing 
applications and recommendations. Maintaining the high quality of the opening 
class, and its faculty, will make an important contribution to longer-term 
sustainability.  
Partners have agreed that the class of 2005-06 should be larger than the inaugural 
class. A student base of 20 to 25 will help the School’s financial prospects, as grant 
funds become depleted, and continue to draw attention to the program. A 
“stretched” two year version is being considered. 
2) A second challenge concerns MBA program personnel. The talents of 
entrepreneurial administration are not highly developed in many transitional states, 
as these professional positions are relatively new. This is the case in Croatia. 
However, IU and the Institute of Economics seem to have found the ideal 
Administrative Director in winter 2003. A former employee of the Ministry of 
Economy, Mr. Neven Trbovic is surprisingly insightful about the elements that are 
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needed to produce a high quality MBA program. He is also talented and energetic 
enough to make sure they are in place. Trbovic helped draft the IGBS promotional 
material – indeed, he designed what has become the IGBS logo – laid out an 
administrative plan that included all the key aspects that the Consortium had been 
exposed to during their week-long visit in February 2002 (marketing approaches and 
audiences, student recruitment, application criteria and procedures, tuition policies, 
alumni development – still comparatively uncommon in Europe – etc.). Trbovic’s 
relations with students and faculty are excellent, and he is an important 
representative of IGBS Zagreb and the MBA program. Retaining Trbovic’s 
commitment to the program and his services is very important to the success of the 
project in the next two years. His assistance in any inevitable transition will also be 
extremely valuable. 
IGBS was fortunate to have an outstanding academic with extensive experience in 
U.S. business schools, Prof. Sonja Radas, as its first dean. Prof. Radas, with a 
background in Marketing, was extremely helpful in the recruitment of the first IGBS 
MBA class, and she understood the importance of faculty and course materials to 
the academic quality of the MBA program. Nevertheless, Prof. Radas is a scholar at 
heart and, after devoting great energy to the start-up process, she chose to return to 
research. Her successor, Dr. Zlatan Fröhlich, engineered a seamless transition and, it 
appears, is an excellent match for the current needs of the program. As an academic 
active in the policymaking and business worlds of Croatia and Europe, Dr. Fröhlich 
has excellent ties to business executives and economic policymakers. Thanks to his 
efforts, Kelley School of Business faculty have been able to include key guest 
lecturers in the classroom, and to arrange field trips to companies that typically 
result in an interaction with the CEO. The project is very lucky to have Fröhlich as 
dean, and anticipates his continued commitment to the program. 
 
 
Long-Term 
The long-term challenge for the IGBS Zagreb MBA program is sustainability. In the 
first, and likely in the second, years of the program, reliance on the support of the U.S. 
State Department has been essential. Also key has been the participation of Kelley 
faculty, which will continue in 2005-06. Yet, the program must begin to include non-
Kelley and non-U.S. faculty to help guarantee its sustainability. Of course, if the program 
can generate sufficient revenue, ’outside’ faculty can continue to participate. A number 
of Kelley faculty who were involved in the development of an MBA program at the 
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University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, in the early to mid 1990’s continue to teach there, 
despite the fact that there is no U.S. government support and stipends for teaching are 
tiny. It is hoped that such relationships will grow out of the Croatian project as well, but 
the number will not be sufficient to deliver the entire curriculum. 
Experience to date has been that Croatian faculty do not yet feel comfortable teaching 
side-by-side with Kelley faculty. There is also the political issue of Croatia’s Economics 
Faculties boycotting the program, though we believe that is (a) a short-term 
phenomenon, and (b) there are not yet, unfortunately, sufficient Croatian faculty to 
deliver a top quality MBA curriculum. 
IU is currently scheduling faculty for the 2005-06 year, and it is our intention to seek 
non-Kelley faculty – from the U.S., Europe, and Croatia – to deliver as much of the 
curriculum as possible, while not jeopardizing the quality of the program. Helping IGBS 
over this hurdle is the next important task of the U.S. partner. 
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Abstract 
This study is based on a series of surveys and interviews of top-managers for approximately 
400 Russian industrial enterprises, which was conducted during the years 2001-2003. The 
main focus of the paper is the scope of business groups in Russia, which are based both on 
shareholding and alternative forms of coordination; entry into business-group incentives for  
insider owners (that is to change the right of control on certain gains), innovation strategies 
of  enterprises within business groups and the sources of competitiveness of both 
enterprises and the business groups as a form of industrial organization in Russia. The 
survey results show that industrial firms within business groups have different innovation 
and restructuring strategies in comparison with the firms that remain outside of both formal 
and informal business groups. Those firms that are controlled by business groups as outside 
owners are oriented primarily toward restructuring of internal organization and 
management, introduction of new products and expanding production. At the same time, 
this group of enterprises spends less effort on withdrawing unprofitable products and 
marketing restructuring. Results of an in-depth interview demonstrate the division of 
authority and responsibility within business groups. Goals for the enterprise management 
within business groups are formulated in terms of quantity of production along specific 
product lines, but not financial targets. The parent company retains all the detailed financial 
control over  enterprises. This kind of organization provides ambiguous impact on 
competitiveness of business group enterprises in the short and long run.  
 
Keywords: enterprise, business group, restructuring, innovation 
JEL Classification: P23, P31, M20 
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1  Introduction 
Business groups1 as a specific form of organization in Russian industry have attracted 
attention since the beginning of the 1999 economic recovery. Many people in business, 
academics and government hope that new holding companies could be the driving force 
of effective modernization of industry. At the same time, a number of questions about 
the business group’s influence on decision-making and performance remain unanswered.  
The objective of this article is to analyze the influence of business groups on the 
innovation strategies of Russian firms, which were established in the Soviet period. The 
main sources of information are the results of surveys and in-depth interviews of 
managers and owners of industrial enterprises, conducted within the project “Non-market 
Sector in Russian Economy” (2001-2004). The alternative theoretical explanation for the 
persistence of business groups as an organizational form in Russian industry is based on 
the analysis of data on innovation strategies, corporate governance, and incentives for the 
owners and managers of enterprises (according to their own estimation) to join a 
business group. 
 
 
2  Organization of Russian Industries: General         
Context of Development of Business Groups  
It is obvious that the only way to explain business groups in Russia is to analyze the 
main tendencies of development of Russian industrial organization since 1992. Thus the 
problem becomes very complex, taking into account the specifics of  Russian transition 
and the presence of many different and, very often, contradictory explanations of these 
specifics in the modern literature. Trying to restrict the scope of discussion, it is crucial 
to mention four aspects of industrial organization in Russia: the model of ownership and 
                                                 
1 Speaking about business groups, one can mean fairly different organizational forms. First, it 
includes the holding companies both “old” (emerged as a result of reorganization associated with 
privatization) and new (emerged as a result of a wave of mergers and takeovers, especially after 
1998). Second, it includes various types of “hybrid” organizational forms, which have become 
typical of Russian industries, especially in production of homogenous products. Third, it is some 
kind of network, both informal and formal, that is created with  state support (for example, 
officially registered financial industrial groups – FIG). Any big business in Russia typically 
includes all these types of links, and that is why there is some kind of common knowledge that the 
main participants in Russian markets are not “companies”, but “business groups”. A typical 
business group is a conglomerate, with a very complicated combination of shareholding, structural 
and personal relations. From some viewpoints business groups can be considered a type of 
strategic alliances, specific to Russian industries.  
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corporate control, the organizational structure of Russian companies, the mechanism of 
contract enforcement and the sources and  determinants of competitiveness between 
Russian companies.  
The prevailing type of ownership in the Russian economy in recent years is the 
concentrated insider ownership (Dolgopyatova, 2002; Dolgopyatova, 2003). Actually, 
even in the Soviet period, insiders (managers of the enterprises) had significant property 
rights (Nureev and Runov, 2001). In this context, privatization in most cases merely 
formalized and legalized the property rights that had already been acquired. The 
extremely high enforcement costs of contracts between outsider owners and managers in 
the transition period were an additional factor, which strengthened the positions of 
insider owners and contributed to the redistribution of formal ownership to insider 
managers. Typically the value of minority shareholding to outside owners, who have no 
additional tools to control decision-making of insider managers in Russia, was negligible 
during the last decade. The comparative advantages of insiders in Russia became clearer 
when the factors that decrease efficiency of insider control, such as competition for 
resources and product markets, have a relatively weak impact on enterprise performance. 
The legalization of insider property rights took a long time in many cases since in 
practice privatization resulted initially in dispersed ownership. The concentration of 
ownership required a long time and  in several companies has not been completed even 
today. During the transition period the non-coincidence of “formal” and “actual” 
ownerships was typical and that non-coincidence caused further complications in the 
Russian model of ownership.  
Concentrated corporate control was the cause for the specific evolution of the legal form 
of public corporations in Russia. Today many of these public corporations (open join-
stock companies) are de facto closed ones. For most of them obligations linked to their 
legal status of open JSC create more or less high but useless additional costs (Yakovlev, 
2003). In such companies, most traditional instruments of corporate governance actually 
degenerated. For instance, analysis of decision-making in joint-stock companies in the 
Ekaterinburg region (Sverdlovsk oblast) (Tkachenko, 2004) showed that the boards of 
directors function only as an appendage of the decision-making system: boards of 
directors either legalize the decision of the actual owners or do not make important 
decisions at all.  
The evolution towards “recombinant property” (Stark, 1997) became the pronounced 
tendency in the development of Russian companies organizational structure during the 
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transition period, when the decision-making and the organization of key transactions 
were taken outside  the formal boundaries of the firm. David Stark, who is the author of 
the term “recombinant property”, explained these forms by the evolutionary development 
of enterprises in the transition economy. The related concept in the modern  institutional 
economics is the change of the firm’s boundaries. In Russia various forms of 
“recombinant property” have been cited and extensively described by different authors 
(one specific form is tolling or processing arrangements, see Avdasheva, 2002). To 
define the business unit using this organizational structure the term “dispersed company” 
is sometimes used. The prevailing explanation for “recombinant property” in Russia 
were the tax avoidance or tax evasion schemes (Kuznetsov, Gorobets and Fominych, 
2002), and the specific forms of receiving income from property (Rozinsky, 2002). 
According to alternative explanations for “recombinant property”, which are rarely 
encountered, such organizational forms could be efficient in a specific context even 
when there is no tax evasion (Avdasheva, 2002). Regardless of the “main” reason for the 
use of the “recombinant property” model, there is no doubt that this model explains well 
the different characteristics of industrial organization in a transition economy, including 
corporate governance, outsiders-insiders relationships and externalization by company 
management of marketing functions from production functions).  
Concerning contract enforcement, it is necessary to stress the extreme importance of 
personal relations and personal trust as a precondition for completing any contract in 
Russia. Again, personification of economic links in the transition period was evidently 
inherited from the Soviet period. Before liberalization, the formal rules of centralized 
planning were supplemented by informal links between directors and the directorate 
(administration) on the one hand, and the Communist Party bodies and executive 
authorities on the other hand. It is possible to argue that the very system of centralized 
planning was only the outer form for a complex of informal and personified 
relationships. But, there is no doubt that links between directors played the same role in 
the Soviet economy that the networks of firms do in the market economy. After the 
break-up of the former system of central planning, and under the slow development of 
market-type coordination, the significance of personal relationships in Russian industries 
grew as never before (Kleiner, 1996). Keeping in mind the high costs of contract 
enforcement, it seems very natural that personal links and personal trust provide support 
for formal contracts.  
Finally, the determinants of the competitiveness of Russian enterprises are also important 
for our study. While incentives to innovate or just to restructure the enterprise’s activity 
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are a complicated subject, we can say that they depend on the extent to which more 
efficient market participants can increase market share and profit. Unfortunately, a 
number of authors have shown that on the one hand, restructuring of Russian enterprises 
typically has not significantly increased productivity, and on the other hand, the financial 
performance of Russian companies varies mostly because of shifts in demand and has no 
connection with any indicators of productivity (Bhaumik and Estrin, 2003). The analysis 
of case studies of the restructuring of Russian enterprises often shows that the influence 
of restructuring on the financial and overall economic performance is almost absent 
(Linz, 2000). Similar results were obtained in studies performed at the micro-level, and 
also at the level of industries: total factor productivity (TFP) decreased or stagnated in 
the export-oriented industries that demonstrated remarkable growth and improvement of 
financial performance after 1998 (Bessonova et al., 2003).  
Some researches have tried to explain why production efficiency does not matter in 
Russia. One such explanation that initiated broad discussions in Russia was presented in 
the report of the McKinsey consulting company “Unlocking economic growth in Russia” 
(McKinsey & Co., 1999). Authors of this report argued that the unequal conditions of 
competition in the broad sense (including fairly different cost of inputs and different tax 
regimes for various groups of agents) neutralized the cost advantages of more efficient 
producers almost completely. That is why the incentives to invest in order to raise 
productivity (or equivalently to decrease cost) are relatively weak. In this context the 
question of incentives to innovate (especially for the different types of innovation) at the 
level of the enterprise or the business group is left unaddressed.  
How can we explain the development of business groups in Russian industries within the 
transition economy? Initially business groups emerged because of the break-down of the 
former system of coordination, which included planning and contract enforcement. In the 
new economic conditions the boundaries of  firms (as economic items) coincide with the 
legal boundaries of the Soviet enterprise, but evidently these exogenous boundaries 
could not be efficient. Disorganization (Blanchard and Kremer, 1997) increased the 
transaction costs sharply and created incentives to restructure the firm’s boundaries. The 
typical Russian privatized enterprise could only survive by revising its “make or buy” 
decisions in the new environment after liberalization.  
In most cases, the efficient restructuring of the firm’s boundaries required both the 
elimination of old units from the organizational structure and the inclusion of new ones. 
In the early 1990s the process of eliminating the unwanted structures (including sales of 
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assets, split-offs etc.) was more active (Dolgopyatova, 1995), and the second type of 
restructuring (including takeovers and emergence of business groups) has become more 
intensive under the economic recovery since 1999 (Pappe, 2000, 2002a and 2002b).  
Besides economizing on transaction costs, business groups in Russian industries extract 
other sources of profits (Dolgopyatova, 2003). Additional coordination tools allow them 
to decrease losses in efficiency when there are bilateral monopolies. There is scope to 
escape the “double marginalization” problem in vertical relation of agents which have 
substantial market power. Horizontal mergers and alliances can create scale economies. 
The substantial inefficiencies in organization of markets in Russia during the transition 
period created the potential to capture all these gains. 
Researchers of transition economies are still puzzled by the very low rate of restructuring 
of existing firms boundaries (Murrell, 2004). Similar results – relatively stable legal 
boundaries of enterprises - were documented for Russian industries too (Lazareva, 2004). 
It is possible that the development of business groups based both on shareholding and 
tools of coordination not related to ownership instruments (Avdasheva, 2002) can 
provide at least one explanation for this paradox: the business groups can be considered 
as means for changing the actual boundaries of the firm under given boundaries of legal 
entities.  
According to many authors, extensively developed business groups, characterized by a 
specific system of coordination and contract enforcement, have come about as a result of 
inefficiency of legislation and its enforcement in transitional countries. Combined with a 
long tradition of extra-legal conflict resolution under the Soviet period, this fact increases 
the comparative advantages of different forms of networking. In this context, the 
underdevelopment of legal regulations should be offset by the development of 
personalized networks (Ledeneva, 2001). Many authors believe relational contract 
development to be the explanation for the increase in investments within business groups 
(Volchkova, 2001; Frye, 2003).  
It is quite natural that these relational contracts, especially in the first years of transition, 
were primarily associated with links inherited from Soviet times. It is also empirically 
confirmed that during the 1990s the greatest returns were extracted from networks which 
had emerged before liberalization and privatization (Moers, 2000). The development and 
use of such networks was sometimes considered as an alternative to market-oriented 
restructuring of enterprises (Gaddy and Ickes, 1998).  
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These suppositions are, however, not supported by the results of empirical research on 
contract enforcement and conflict resolution in Russia and other transition countries 
(Murrell, 2004). Russian enterprises relatively seldom rely on the help of “third parties” 
to resolve their conflicts, as opposed to mutual relationships and legal rules (Hendley, 
Ickes, Murrell and Ryterman, 1997). Similar results were also obtained in other transition 
countries, for instance, for Romanian firms (Hendley and Murrell, 2003).  
Returning to empirical studies of the evidence for the use of networks as an instrument to 
build trust between agents, even in these studies it has been demonstrated that informal 
structures within networks are imperfect substitutes for the formal ones; the use of 
informal structures reduces the decline in production. There can be no doubt, however, 
that economic growth requires more developed formal structures (Moers, 2000).  
Empirical research shows interesting evidence on the sources and causes of trust in 
relations between firms, where the level of prepayment in advance of delivery is 
considered as an indicator of trust (Raiser, Rousso and Steves, 2003). It revealed that 
“trust” as measured by the level of prepayment increased in networks which were based 
both on family relationships and friendship as well as inside business associations. At the 
same time, there has been no evidence of higher trust within holding companies. This 
evidence, among others, raises doubts about the ability of informal structural relations 
within business groups to serve as a viable alternative to the enforcement of laws 
(contracts), although this view is widely expressed by Russian observers.  
But even if membership within a business group does not provide contract enforcement 
within the group, the weakness of contract enforcement outside the group creates 
incentives for expansion of hierarchical control and emergence of business groups. The 
weak protection of legal property rights increases incentives to invest in assets under 
direct control by the investor. Investors fairly estimate the additional rights of control as 
equivalent to an increase of expected returns of the given asset. That is why the 
development of business groups replaces the imperfectly developed financial market in 
Russia. This has been demonstrated by empirical evidence since the middle of the 1990s 
(Perotti and Gelfer, 1998). This evidence can explain the rapid growth of business groups 
since 1999, especially the experience of companies in the oil and gas sector, and the 
ferrous and non-ferrous metals sectors (Dolgopyatova, 2003). In this context the 
additional inflows of funds would most likely lead to increased investments inside 
business groups, if we remember that the avenues for capital outflows have been 
restricted. As mentioned in many studies, there are more incentives to invest and a 
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correspondingly higher share of invested profits within business groups as compared 
with the economy as a whole because of better contract protection within business 
groups due to the use of relational contracts (Volchkova, 2001).  
To sum it up, there is a number of both complementary and conflicting explanations for 
the rapid development of business groups in Russian industry. At the same time, it seems 
that the existing explanations for the development of business groups contain some 
paradoxes which remain to be explained. How does the expansion of business groups co-
exist with the prevalence of insider control? If there are high transaction costs that create 
incentives to replace market control for hierarchic or hybrid-type control, why should we 
think that the cost to enforce interfirm contracts is lower? There are some reasons for 
sharing the opposite assumption: whether we must associate enforcement of interfirm 
contracts in the transition economy with an underdeveloped legal system and unsettled 
moral norms which impose very high costs. In the context of business groups 
development, the wide authority of insider owners creates a threat to the very survival of 
any business group, especially taking into account the very complicated structural and 
ownership relations within typical groups.  
From another perspective, if business groups are the heritage of the collectivist Soviet 
tradition and they rely mostly on relational contracts, how does that coincide with the 
rapidly increasing proportion of business groups based on partial shareholding, which are 
trying to re-organize themselves as more or less “classical” conglomerates? At first 
glance, informal relations can be significantly independent from the allocation of legally 
assigned property rights.  
Another set of questions is connected with industry and size specificities of organization, 
which are almost absent in Russian business groups. Why do we observe common 
features in the business groups of the biggest companies in oil and gas sectors and in 
those groups created by the fairly small firms in retailing?  
Again, why is the organizational form of business groups in Russia consistently 
reproduced in spite of instability of many business groups? If we take a look at the list of 
the biggest business groups (associated with the richest “oligarchs”) at the end of the 20th 
century (Pappe, 2000), we find that a significant part of them no longer exist and the 
existing ones have lost control over many enterprises. Nevertheless, business groups still 
exist and continue to emerge in Russian industry and make significant impact on the 
innovation strategies of the firms within the group.  
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This paper attempts to answer at least part of these questions on the nature of Russian 
business groups, the incentives for insider owners to give up part of decision rights in 
favor of business groups, the specific distribution of decision rights between insider 
manager and outsider owner within business groups. Some conclusions are drawn about 
the innovation strategies of business groups as compared with “stand alone” enterprises.  
 
 
3  Russian Business Groups in Surveys and                     
In-depth Interviews: 2001-2003 
This section is based on the results of surveys of industrial enterprises. The sample was 
developed within the research project “The Non-market Sector in the Russian Economy” 
in order to answer a broad set of questions. As for business groups, the general purpose 
was to explain the prevalence and the stability of business group as an organizational 
form in the context of prevalence of insider control and the high enforcement costs in the 
contracts between outsider owners and insider managers. In order to answer these issues 
we compared the economic performance, innovation (restructuring) strategies, and 
mechanism of decision making of the respondents within business groups and “stand 
alone” ones. 
 
3.1  Surveys and In-depth Interviews: Sample Characteristics  
Questions about the relationships between firms and business groups were put in  two 
surveys organized in 2001 and 2002 (“Survey 2001” and “Survey 2002”). The samples 
for these two surveys were not the same, but they overlapped substantially. The 
questions about business groups and innovations at the level of the firm differed slightly 
in these two surveys.  
For a part of the firms in the sample we had data from official statistical reports. In 
addition, the role of business groups in making important decisions at the firm level was 
explored through a series of in-depth interviews organized in the autumn of 2003. It is 
important to stress that the firms in the sample surveys and in-depth interviews are 
primarily medium-sized. This can be considered as an advantage of the sample, keeping 
in mind that our goal is to reveal some features of the “median” business group 
consisting of “typical” firms. Moreover, the development of big business in Russia is 
characterized in many papers.  
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The next very important feature of the sample is that it consists of firms that were 
organized in the Soviet period and later privatized in the 1990s. There are few start-up 
enterprises in in-depth interviews, but generally the scope of the research is medium-
scale privatized firms in machine building, in the light industry, and the food processing 
industry. 
According to the results of these surveys, a substantial part of Russian firms enter into 
business groups or associations of various types. In the “Survey 2001” 63% of the 431 
respondents said that they represent stand alone enterprises, 13% identified their firms as 
entering into an informal business group, 11% said they were included in a legally 
identified group which determines strategic development of their firm (as opposed to 
executive management), and 13% - as entering into a legally identified group where the 
group performs executive management at the enterprise level. In “Survey 2002” the 
distribution of answers differs slightly: 68% of the 484 respondents are stand alone 
enterprises, 15% are members of an informal group and 17% are members of a legally 
identified group. 
As one could expect, the bigger the firm is the higher is the probability that it is part of a 
business group. Industrial differences are present but they are not very significant: the 
highest proportion of enterprises united by business groups is in the machine building 
industry (a third), and the lowest proportion (about a fifth) exists in the construction 
materials industry.  
There were 30 participants of the in-depth interviews who represented enterprises and 
firms. All the respondents were CEOs of their firms: 14 were general directors, 11 were 
deputy directors. The companies were mostly established in the Soviet period and then 
privatized (60% are open JSC and 30% are closed JSC): 37% of respondents were in the 
light industry, 30% in the food industry, and 33% in the machine building industry. As 
was already mentioned, interviews were conducted in mostly medium-size companies: 
13 companies had 100 to 500 employees, 12 had 501 to 1000 employees, and only 5 had 
more than 1000 employees. The typical firm in the sample is characterized by relatively 
stable financial performance, while there were some firms in bankruptcy, including those 
which were under external management at the time of the interview. Most of the firms 
demonstrated a huge increase of output since 1998.  
Out of the total of 30 firms where interviews were conducted, 16 were part of different 
business groups, which were owned by outsider owners. Only one respondent said that 
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his enterprise entered into a business group which had no share in the ownership but 
which actually performed the functions of executive management. Several firms in the 
textile industry operate under stable processing contracts.  
Out of 26 respondents who were able to assess the degree of ownership concentration in 
the firm only two said that their shares distribution was still widely dispersed or at least 
allowed for further future concentration2. For the rest of the sample, ownership is 
definitely concentrated. In only three companies there are state shares, though in none of 
them does the state retain control rights. 
 
3.2  Competitive Advantages and Innovation Strategies of Firms        
Inside Business Groups (Survey)  
The first question was: did firms inside business groups demonstrate a greater increase in 
output during the period of recovery since 1999. Though it is impossible to answer this 
question precisely (considering significant variations in output growth for both groups of 
firms – see Table 1), on average firms inside business groups grew faster during the 
period 1999-2002 than did the “stand alone” enterprises. If some advantages did exist for 
the first group of firms, they became apparent only after 1999 but not in the period since 
1997 (Table 1). It was only in the recovery period since 1999, and not the period of 
economic decline (covered from 1997 for the sample) that the firms in business groups 
obtained some advantages which fostered increased output.  
The survey data give clear explanations about the causes for faster growth demonstrated 
by the firms which are part of business groups. These are connected with the higher 
demand that led to the higher indicators of orders from the relevant firms. Analyzing the 
answers to the survey question about the length of the firm’s production time needed to 
complete the received orders, we can see (Table 2) that among the firms in business 
groups (“Survey 2002”) the share of those whose production times were less than a 
month is three times lower in comparison with stand alone enterprises. Correspondingly, 
for the firms in business groups the share of those who have orders for a year or more is 
two times higher. For the “Survey 2001” the demand advantages for the firms in business 
                                                 
2 Some respondents spoke about ownership concentration in spite of the fact that their companies 
were organized as partnerships. We think that we can consider these estimations keeping in mind 
the clear economic sense (control rights concentration).  
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groups were even higher. Consequently, this group of respondents had higher capacity 
utilization ratios and higher estimates of economic and financial performance. 
 
Table 1.  Output and employment of enterprises inside 
              and outside business groups: 1997-2002* 
Increase of output (times) Increase of number of employees 
(times) 
 
1997-2002 1999-2002 1997-2002 1999-2002 
“Stand-alone” enterprises 243 
6.56 
(69.85) 
0.83 
244 
4.68 
(38,80) 
1.03 
272 
1.05 
(0.87) 
0.93 
284 
1.13 
(1.52) 
0.96 
Firms in “informal” 
business groups 
56 
3.11 
(7.56) 
1.14 
54 
5.40 
(22.94) 
1.24 
59 
1.27 
(1.94) 
1.05 
61 
1.60 
(3.00) 
1.08 
Firms in “formal” business 
groups 
64 
1.44 
(1.87) 
0.96 
64 
9.49 
(61.88) 
1.00 
70 
1.64 
(5.40) 
0.96 
71 
1.44 
(3.99) 
0.99 
Sample average 363 
5,13 
(57.23) 
0.90 
362 
5.64 
(41.98) 
1.06 
401 
1.18 
(2.48) 
0.94 
416 
1.25 
(2.36) 
0.97 
 
* Data in cells are number of observations, mean, (standard deviation), and median.  
 
 
 
 
Table 2.  Demand for the products of “stand-alone” enterprises and firms 
              in business groups (proportions of respondents of relevant types, %): 
              Survey 2002 (answers are for the previous year) 
Period to complete 
orders received 
“Stand-alone” 
enterprises 
Firms in 
“informal” 
business groups 
Firms in “legally 
identified” 
business groups 
Sample average 
< 1month 25.00 17.81 8.75 21.10 
1-3 months 25.32 30.14 15.00 24.30 
3-6 months 14.42 20.55 21.25 16.60 
6-12 months 28.53 17.81 37.50 28.40 
> 12 months 6.73 13.70 17.50 90 
Number of respondents 312 73 80 465 
 
 
 
 
Different groups of enterprises apply innovation (or restructuring) strategies which differ 
significantly (fig.1 and 2).  
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Among the firms within business groups the share of those that introduced new 
production facilities, changed management structure or top management, organized 
management training, introduced new accounting and planning standards, increased 
R&D and marketing expenditure and financed investment project was higher in 
comparison with the other group of respondents. At the same time, the introduction of 
new product lines and adjustment of product variety by removing products less in 
demand are less frequent in this group of firms.  
If we eliminate some actions connected with the expansion of output (for instance, 
new production facilities), we can conclude that firms within business groups apply 
fewer innovations connected with marketing (especially the adjustment of product 
variety), in comparison with other changes, such as management organization and 
changes of CEO and staff. It seems that innovation strategies of business group 
firms are more “inside-oriented” while restructuring of “stand-alone” companies is 
outwardly oriented (toward marketing and external demand). 
 
Figure 1.  Innovation strategies of enterprises in the “Survey 2001” 
               (during three years before survey), % 
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Note: *”Legally identified business groups I” – business groups which “perform only strategic management” for the
firm;  
 
“Legally identified business groups II” – business groups which “perform both strategic and operational management” 
for the firm.  
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Figure 2.  Innovation strategies of enterprises in the “Survey -2002” 
              (2001-2002), % 
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The reasons for different innovation strategies can be found in industry-specific factors, 
size of typical stand-alone and business group enterprise, and also in the ownership 
structure and corporate governance. The last point requires special attention. It is 
surprising that stand-alone enterprises and firms within business groups do not 
demonstrate remarkable differences in ownership structure, concentration, and structure 
of executive bodies. We can mention that ownership concentration is slightly higher in 
firms in legally identified business groups, but the general trends of ownership 
distribution for different groups of enterprises almost coincide (Table 3). The typical size 
of the board of directors (seven members) and representation of different groups of 
owners are almost the same. The executive director worked quite a long time both with 
this enterprise and in this position in the companies of both types.  
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Table 3.  Ownership concentration in public corporations: 1998 and 2001* 
 “Stand-
alone” 
enterprises 
Firms in 
“informal” 
business groups
Firms in “legally 
identified” business 
groups 
Sample 
average 
Share of the biggest 
shareholder in 1998 (%) 
129 
36.26 
(24,41) 
30.00 
42 
30.78 
(23.26) 
20.00 
43 
39.79 
(25.17) 
39.00 
214 
35.89 
(24.40) 
29.29 
Share of the biggest 
shareholder in 2001 (%)  
141 
40.39 
(25.58) 
34.00 
44 
39.41 
(25.06) 
38.00 
47 
43.69 
(23.29) 
48.50 
232 
40.88 
(24.82) 
38.00 
Share of three biggest 
shareholders in 1998 
(%)  
103 
46.99 
(22.81) 
45.10 
35 
48.99 
(29.42) 
45.00 
32 
55.50 
(24.93) 
52.50 
170 
48.44 
(24.63) 
46.50 
Share of three biggest 
shareholders in 2001 
(%) 
115 
54.49 
(23.97) 
54.00 
37 
58.32 
(27.61) 
59.00 
36 
64.49 
(24.27) 
67.00 
188 
56.77 
(24.85) 
55.00 
 
* Data in cells are number of observations, mean, (standard deviation), and median. 
 
 
 
 
3.3  Competitive Advantages and Incentives to Join Business         
Groups: In-depth Interviews 
Results of in-depth interviews highlight the specificity of corporate governance and 
overall decision-making at the level of firms within business groups. Respondents 
pointed out all the possible explanations for entering into business groups mentioned in 
analytical papers devoted to big business in Russia (Dolgopyatova, 2003).  
Let’s give several examples3. As we already mentioned, the firm boundaries which were 
exogenously determined in Soviet times became inefficient after liberalization. The same can 
be said about market structures: too many sellers found themselves in the market. This 
problem was most acute for firms in industries which faced tough competition from imported 
products (namely food, textiles etc.). Almost all respondents in the in-depth interview 
mentioned this.  
«Recently our market segment… changed dramatically. From 23 Russian producers only 
12 are in the market now, and only 7 of them have modernized capacities and increased 
output. It seems clear that in three-four years time only 4-5 of the biggest firms will 
remain in the industry. Our enterprise is not among the biggest and recently has become 
                                                 
3 Citations from interviews are given in italics.  
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detached from the market leaders… Enterprises like this will be captured by the market 
leaders anyway” (respondent is a deputy director general of a firm in the food processing 
industry, it employs 840 staff).  
Several respondents mentioned the possibility of cutting costs within a business group 
because of unified procurement and marketing policies. Almost all respondents insisted 
that the advantages of the “full technological cycle” within the firm were crucial in the 
Russian context. For all of them competitive strategy was to develop the value chain 
from raw materials to the supply of production and then to the final consumer. 
Respondents were not unaware of the losses caused because of weak incentives in the 
complicated system of hierarchical control, but they were absolutely certain that these 
losses are outweighed by gains from centralized decision-making at the level of business 
group. 
«It would be better for the owner to buy the firms on subsequent stages of the 
technological chain instead of any certain enterprise… He must have professional staff 
for any technological process and professionals for the whole production. Starting from 
the supply of raw materials to the sale of products to final customer… all questions must 
be solved at the top level» (respondent is an executive director of a textile company with 
300 employees).  
As an incentive to enter into a business group respondents mentioned the problems 
associated with the quality control of raw materials and reliability of supply, which are 
much easier to solve inside an integrated company. This kind of evidence confirms the 
traditional view that business groups result from high transaction costs in Russian 
markets, which have decreased very slowly in comparison with what would have been 
expected ten years ago. The prevalence of vertical as opposed to horizontal integration 
inside Russian business groups also seems to provide additional arguments for this point 
of view.  
The real surprise is that according to the results of interviews the insufficient adaptation 
of managers to a market environment is still a valid reason for the creation of business 
groups. The common tool to overcome this problem at the business level is to drive a set 
of important managerial decisions out of the firm that becomes a “production facility” 
only. Mentioned in the case of big businesses (Pappe 2002a, 2002b), this effect takes 
place in medium-size companies, too.  
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«People are used to work in the old manner; they cannot work in the new environment. 
That is why all the questions about procurement, about tariffs on processing, on 
marketing and dealing – all these questions are solved here (by new owner). Some time 
ago I tried to delegate a set of responsibilities to the level of the enterprise but the only 
thing I received was a mishmash in accounting files… So I decided that it should be 
better to do all here…” (respondent is a new (initially outside) owner / executive director 
of a textile firm with 300 employees).  
It is also surprising that the respondents representing firms consider this kind of authority 
sharing to be an advantage despite the fact that it evidently restricts the self-dependence 
of the firm. The executive managers of firms in Russian business groups – even if they 
are controlling owners, - have almost no decision rights in the field of marketing.  
«Enterprise is free from the unusual and unnecessary decisions. The holding company 
performs the functions of the Soviet Glavk (industrial planning body under socialism). 
We don’t have to care about what and how much to produce… The holding company 
supplies the raw materials, sells our products, and decides all accounting, tax and 
financial issues. Director don’t have to think about taxes, wages etc… The holding is a 
buffer that saves us from the market…» (respondent is a director general of a machine 
building enterprise with 1100 employees).  
«(The holding’s authority) is in the first place in marketing. I do not have to care any 
more to whom to sell the product and at what price» (respondent is a director general of 
a food processing enterprise with 430 employees).  
In this context, analyzing the results of interviews we again found the answer to the 
question about why the processing arrangements are so popular in Russian industries. 
The specific feature of processing (tolling) arrangements is that it drives all the important 
marketing functions out of an enterprise (Avdasheva, 2002). Among the respondents of 
this sample survey, those who operated under processing contracts were mainly found in 
the textile industry. As they mentioned, initially processing contracts were considered 
only as a temporary tool to solve the problem of a deficit of working capital. But now the 
respondents are absolutely certain that this form of organization has important 
advantages for their firms.  
“Under this scheme, under processing arrangements… there is no need for substantial 
managerial efforts… We know all the suppliers of materials for processing and they 
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know us… The question is only to sign a contract, and after that business becomes very 
simple” (respondent is a new (initially outside) owner / executive director of a textile 
firm with 300 employees).  
In the context of the question on the authority of business groups towards their member 
firms, the largest part of respondents mentioned the “unified marketing and 
technological (and of course, financial) policy” within the group. Business groups make 
decisions about product specialization, as well as the amount and directions of capital 
investments. At least in two firms in the sample for in-depth interviews business groups 
initiated large-scale restructuring, including significant changes in the variety produced 
in order to complete the “technological chain” associated with massive capital 
investments. The latter example raises very important questions: do the firms within 
business groups have better access to the market for investment funds?  
From our sample we did not find any positive dependence on availability of investments 
because of the fact that the firm belongs to a business-group. Comparing capital 
investments during the four years before the interview4 with the other characteristics of 
the firms (including the relationships with business groups), we found (as expected) that 
the decisive determinant for capital investments was the financial performance of the 
enterprise (Table 4). In turn, financial performance does not depend on whether an 
enterprise is a part of a business group or not.  
The data about the sources of the enterprise investment funds is very interesting. In 
addition to the enterprise profits, which comprise the main source of investment funds, a 
significant part of respondents (two thirds of the sample) have obtained bank credits in 
recent years. Seven respondents mentioned state support (mainly indirect incentives such 
as tax privileges and special guarantees, as in one case where there was repayment of 
50% of the interest on debt) as one source to attract investments. Funds from business 
partners (including holding companies) are also significant as a source of investment 
funds, but an interesting fact is that the possibility of using this source does not differ for 
enterprises that form a part of a business group and those that do not. From our sample, 
four respondents of the first type and three respondents of the second type mentioned this 
source of funds. Therefore, the results of interviews do not confirm the statement that 
                                                 
4 When interpreting the results of interviews it is, unfortunately, impossible to estimate the scale of 
capital investment. We tried to separate capital investments from investments in expansion of 
working capital or nonsignificant expenses for equipment, where it was possible.  
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better access to investment funds is a common consequence of entering into a business 
group. 
 
Table 4.  Financial performance, relationships with business groups 
              and capital investments (% of respondents) 
Financial performance  
Unsatisfactory Satisfactory Good 
Overall 
No 75.0 25.0 0.0 26.7 Capital investments in 
the last years  Yes 25.0 75.0 100.0 73.3 
No 50 40 66.7 46.7 Enterprise is a part of 
business group Yes 50 60 33.3 53.3 
Number of respondents 4 20 6 30 
 
 
 
Summing up, the results of interviews allow us to draw important conclusions about the 
national model of distribution of authority and responsibility between insider manager 
and outsider owner (firm and business group in our context). In spite of many authors 
who mentioned extremely high centralization of decision-making in the hands of a 
controlling owner as an important feature of Russian corporate governance, we found 
very little evidence of strong centralization of all type of decisions.  
One possible solution of this paradox may be connected with the fact that distribution of 
authority and responsibility between firms and the business group is subordinated to the 
logic of “marketing center – production facility” but not to the logic “strategic decisions 
– day-to-day management”. All the marketing and financial decisions are highly 
centralized while “production” decisions are decentralized enough. The following 
statement is typical:  
“Key decisions are made at the enterprise level, the business group developed only for 
marketing” (respondent is a director general of a machine building enterprise with 300 
employees). Very critical in this statement is the strong opinion expressed by the 
respondent that marketing decisions are of secondary importance to him.  
The examples of complete centralization of decision-making at the level of business 
groups are more rare, but also present. In all of these examples the firms, including those 
with controlling inside shareholders, function only as pure “production facilities”:  
«The holding controls all the finance, buys all the inputs for production, provides us with 
technologies, including all the documentation… We supply the final products in 
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exchange for that» (respondent is a director general of a machine building firm with 
1800 employees).  
But the typical situation is where most of the “production” decisions (technology, 
personnel, even product variety and product quality) are delegated to the level of the 
firm. Assessing this type of allocation of authority and responsibility from a more or less 
traditional point of view, one can find “excessive centralization” (financial and 
marketing decisions) and “excessive decentralization” (“production” decisions, including 
input management).  
 
3.4  Competitive Advantages of Business Groups: Contract          
Protection or Just Marketing? 
The model of relationships between enterprise and business group described above can 
be considered as a special type of “dispersed company” that was described in the first 
place in connection with tax evasion (Kuznetsov, Gorobets and Fominych, 2002), but not 
explained completely by the reasons for tax evasion. This model emerged because the 
inside managers of Russian enterprises adapted imperfectly to the new market 
environment, apparent market deals actually serve to complete the decisions made and 
enforced under hierarchical control. A similar model was described by Stark as 
“recombinant property” (Stark, 1997).  
In the model of “dispersed company”, financial and marketing decisions are driven out 
of the “production facility” that is an enterprise for the level of decision-making, which 
is legally separated from the company. We can see the same thing in the business groups 
we have analyzed. An important difference is in the roles of inside managers versus 
inside/outside owners. The development of “dispersed companies” served the interests of 
inside ownership and control, for instance, allowing inside owners to receive income 
from property that is non-related to dividends (Rozinsky, 2002)5, while in business 
groups outside owners have played a more significant role. It is important to ask, 
                                                 
5 The phenomenon of “non-dividend income from property” is essential to understand overall 
decision-making at enterprise level. The main idea is that the prevailing part of income of an 
insider top-manager is transferred from the revenue of firms affiliated with him to those that are 
suppliers of raw materials to the enterprise under consideration. This system is known as 
“participation in cost” as opposed to “participation in profits”. Evidently under this system a top-
manager has not enough incentives for cost saving, since cost saving would lead to the decrease of 
his income (Rozinsky, 2002).  
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however, in what sense can we call an owner of a business group an “outsider” owner 
with respect to the typical Russian firm which is part of a group? Despite the recent 
distribution of shares, it is the executive manager (or a group of executive managers) of 
the business group who make important decisions for the firm. In certain cases, even if 
this owner initially is an “outsider”, in the course of time he becomes a very important 
decision-maker and can be considered as an “insider” for the business group as an 
integrated business. Redistribution of shares may follow  redistribution of authority and 
responsibility, albeit relatively slowly.  
Speaking about redistribution of power in favor of business groups, we must keep in 
mind that it takes place while there is a prevalence of insider ownership in the Russian 
enterprise. So we have to ask several questions. Why does an outsider business group 
insist on redistribution of authority described above? Why do insider managers/owners 
agree with it? How does this model of decision-making influence the development of a 
national model of corporate governance?  
Because of the weakness in law enforcement, contracts between an owner and a manager 
should have the properties of an incentive contract. Among other things, they should be 
easily verifiable and should prevent opportunistic behavior. It seems that the model of 
business group organization satisfies these conditions. The manager’s assignment is 
formulated as an output program. This format requires relatively low monitoring costs, 
and also it restricts the possible opportunism of managers since their role in the apparent 
external agreement is just a technical one. On the other hand, the incentive for the insider 
manager (who is typically also a controlling shareholder) to accept such a contract is 
insured because being a “production facility only”, the firm receives more gains than 
being a stand-alone enterprise and trying to perform marketing and financial functions.  
It is natural to assume that inside manager (who is often a controlling shareholder at the 
same time) will agree to give up some of his authority only if the business group insures 
him at least the same level and source of income. One of the ways to do so is to retain as 
a main supplier the firms affiliated with the top management. To remain the “traditional” 
source of income means to remain the traditional source of income for inside managers 
from the revenues of supplying firms. But that means that there is a very restricted 
perspective for radical restructuring of enterprise activity, since top-managers are not 
interested in cost-saving.  
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The results of surveys and interviews raise a doubt about the idea that business groups 
provide better contract protection. It seems possible that the main competitive 
advantages for business groups are connected with the removal of marketing functions 
from the management of the firm level and the possibility of business groups that better 
perform these functions. In the surveys and interviews we found little evidence of “trust” 
between firms and business groups. Instead, the agents apply specific strategies to create 
incentives for the “fair behavior” of the partner.  
 
 
4  Business Groups and Innovation Strategies                 
of Russian Enterprises  
As we indicated above, firms within business groups implement innovation strategies (at 
least some of them) more often than “stand-alone” enterprises. This result remains true in 
the data of both “Survey 2001” and “Survey 2002”. At the same time, the data presented 
above do not allow us to answer the question as to the extent to which this is an effect of 
the business groups themselves, as opposed to specific circumstances connected with the  
industry, size and even region of the firm. To explore this question more precisely we 
used probit-analysis, where the endogenous variables were the different innovation 
strategies. 
For the regressions we used the data of “Survey 2002” (Table 5). Explanatory variables 
are industrial dummies (3-digit), regions where enterprises are located, size of enterprises 
(where “small” means that the number of employees is under 100, “big” means that the 
number of employees is over 500), dummies of competition with import and domestic 
producers (normalized to 1 being the toughest competition). “Orders” dummy was also 
normalized from the estimated period through which enterprises were confident about 
their orders. In several specifications we also introduced variables for the “influential 
stakeholders” of certain enterprises derived from the answer to the question “How 
frequently do you consult with (a given group of stakeholders) to make strategic 
decisions?” with answers “almost never”, “sometimes”, “often” and “almost always”. 
Here a zero value for the variable refers to the answer “never” and one refers 
correspondingly to the answer “almost always”. This group of variables was used to 
highlight the impact of different groups of stakeholders within a business group on the 
strategies of an affiliated firm and therefore to define the role of business groups in the 
development of Russian enterprises. 
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The characteristics of ownership and its redistribution are also introduced: the variable 
for state ownership – the value is zero when there are no shares belonging to the state 
and one —when there are, and the variable for a change in ownership for the biggest 
owner – the value is zero if there was no change of controlling owner in the past three 
years, and one if there was). The special variable reflecting the “lock-in” effect was 
drawn from the answer to the question “How high are the costs to change the main 
suppliers?” (where a value of one refers to the answer “It’s almost impossible to change 
suppliers” and a value of zero to the answer “It’s possible to change suppliers without 
any difficulties”). This variable reflects an important concept of “quasi-rent” and “hold-
up problem” that was very crucial for enterprises in transition due to an underdeveloped 
market infrastructure and lack of competition.  
In many papers (see, for instance, Bevan et al., 2001) it has been shown that competition 
from imported products (in contrast with competition from domestic producers) provides 
significant incentives to innovate (for almost all types of innovations). Following these 
papers, we also introduced dummies (assigning a value of zero if there is no competition 
and a value of one if there is competition) for the estimate by the respondents of 
competition from imported products and domestic competitors.  
As for business groups, the picture is mixed. On the one hand,  the firms within business 
groups (especially informal ones) have an increased probability of introducing new 
production capacities. But it is necessary to keep in mind that this effect is almost 
completely explained by the positive dependence of probability to introduce new 
production capacity on the amount of orders guaranteed and on the participation of  firm 
partners as influential stakeholders in decision-making. Firms within legally identified 
business groups have a higher probability of implementing investment projects and this 
fact can support the viewpoint (see Volchkova, 2001, Frye 2003) that investments inside 
the group are better protected. Within business groups there exists a credible threat that is 
disciplining manager (confirmed by a higher probability of change in the top 
management of firms within business groups). 
At the same time, firms within business groups have a lower probability of introducing 
new product lines and of changing their main input suppliers. In other words, firms 
within business groups are reluctant to perform several restructuring strategies. 
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Table 5.  Russian enterprises: innovation strategies and business groups 
              (probit-models), Survey 2002 
Table 5.1. – Innovation strategies: production capacity, investment projects 
                  (cell contains regression coefficient (standard deviation in parenthesis)) 
 Introduction of new production capacity 
Retirement of 
obsolete capacity 
Investment 
projects 
Small  -0.25 
(0.18) 
-0.51* 
(0.32) 
-0.31 
(0.22)
-0.47* 
(0.23)
-0.06 
(0.18) 
-0.30 
(0.19) 
0.06 
(0.19)
-0.06 
(0.19)
-0.34 
(0.36) 
-0.32 
(0.35) 
-0.14 
(0.26) 
Big 0.28* 
(0.17) 
0.06 
(0.23) 
0.23 
(0.20)
0.30 
(0.19)
0.32* 
(0.18) 
0.40* 
(0.19) 
0.30 
(0.19)
0.34* 
(0.18)
-0.12 
(0.28) 
-0.06 
(0.25) 
0.13 
(0.22) 
Competition from 
import 
0.32* 
(0.18) 
0.46* 
(0.26) 
0.46* 
(0.21)
0.38*
(0.20)
0.53** 
(0.18) 
0.50* 
(0.19) 
0.47* 
(0.19)
0.49* 
(0.19)
0.54* 
(0.27) 
0.55* 
(0.27) 
0.27 
(0.22) 
Competition from 
domestic 
producers  
0.16 
(0.17) 
0.28 
(0.24) 
0.23 
(0.20)
0.20 
(0.20)
-0.06 
(0.17) 
-0.09 
(0.17) 
-0.08 
(0.17)
-0.04 
(0.17)
0.06 
(0.27) 
-0.06 
(0.26) 
0.01 
(0.21) 
“Formal” business 
group 
0.13 
(0.21)    
0.35* 
(0.20)  
0.21 
(0.22)
0.47* 
(0.23)
1.25*** 
(0.34) 
1.12*** 
(0.32) 
0.66* 
(0.23) 
“Informal” 
business group 
0.26 
(0.21)    
0.36 
(0.22)  
0.45* 
(0.24)
0.34 
(0.22)
0.02 
(0.29) 
-0.06 
(0.28) 
0.02 
(0.24) 
Orders 0.69* 
(0.27) 
0.38 
(0.40) 
0.38 
(0.30)
0.52* 
(0.30)     
0.34 
(0.44) 
0.03 
(0.42)  
Customers are 
stakeholders  
-0.71* 
(0.39) 
-0.31 
(0.30)
-0.49 
(0.31)  
-0.86** 
(0.27)      
Suppliers are 
stakeholders  
0.14 
(0.47) 
-0.21 
(0.36)
0.26 
(0.36)  
0.36 
(0.32)      
Banks are 
stakeholders  
-0.47 
(0.39) 
-0.59* 
(0.31)
-0.62* 
(0.31)  
0.39 
(0.29)      
Partners are 
stakeholders  
0.52* 
(0.32) 
0.50* 
(0.24)
0.55* 
(0.24)  
0.10 
(0.24)   
0.94** 
(0.34) 
0.92** 
(0.32) 
0.74** 
(0.26) 
No state 
ownership         
0.64* 
(0.32)   
New owner (3 
years)  
-0.35* 
(0.21)        
-0.49* 
(0.22)  
Control of owner   0.32* (0.19)    
0.53** 
(0.17)    
0.54* 
(0.22) 
Cost of changing 
the supplier    
-0.51* 
(0.29)    
-0.55* 
(0.25)    
Industrial (3 
digits) and 
regional dummies
+ + + + + + + + + + + 
Constant  -0.34 
(0.26) 
0.50 
(0.51) 
-0.29 
(0.32)
-0.48 
(0.33)
0.00 
(0.22) 
0.16 
(0.26) 
-0.32 
(0.26)
0.32 
(0.27)
-1.79*** 
(0.49) 
-0.69* 
(0.40) 
-1.33*** 
(0.31) 
Number of 
observations 376 224 328 312 391 344 368 367 215 226 345 
Р> Chi2 
  0.141 0.02 0.230 0.065 0.156 0.131 0.167 0.171 0.186 0.04 0.446 
 
Note: * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. 
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Table 5.2. – Innovation strategies: production capacity, investment projects 
                   (cell contains regression coefficient (standard deviation in parenthesis)) 
 
Adoption of 
new 
technology 
New product 
lines 
Increase of 
R&D expenses 
Small 0.00 
(0.18) 
0.06 
(0.19) 
-0.37* 
(0.19)
-0.10 
(0.26) 
-0.33 
(0.21) 
-0.31 
(0.21) 
-0.22 
(0.23) 
-0.78* 
(0.33) 
-0.71* 
(0.33) 
Big 0.22 
(0.18) 
0.13 
(0.18) 
-0.08 
(0.17)
-0.07 
(0.22) 
-0.08 
(0.18) 
0.12 
(0.17) 
0.10 
(0.19) 
0.13 
(0.23) 
0.15 
(0.23) 
Competition from import 0.47** 
(0.18) 
0.48* 
(0.19) 
0.20 
(0.17)
0.20 
(0.22) 
0.22 
(0.18) 
0.49** 
(0.18) 
0.68** 
(0.20) 
0.14 
(0.23) 
0.06 
(0.23) 
Competition from domestic 
producers 
0.04 
(0.16) 
0.09 
(0.16) 
-0.13 
(0.17)
-0.05 
(0.21) 
-0.16 
(0.17) 
0.01 
(0.17) 
0.05 
(0.19) 
0.12 
(0.22) 
0.04 
(0.23) 
“Formal” business group 0.48* 
(0.20) 
0.40* 
(0.21) 
-0.10 
(0.21)
-0.14 
(0.28) 
-0.08 
(0.22) 
0.46* 
(0.21) 
 0.79* 
(0.27) 
0.93*** 
(0.27) 
“Informal” business group 0.32 
(0.21) 
0.32 
(0.22) 
-0.19 
(0.20)
0.26 
(0.24) 
0.13 
(0.21) 
0.26 
(0.21) 
 0.31 
(0.27) 
0.37 
(0.27) 
Orders       0.44 
(0.31) 
  
Customers are stakeholders       0.32 
(0.29) 
  
Suppliers are stakeholders       -0.66* 
(0.36) 
  
Banks are stakeholders       -0.17 
(0.32) 
  
Partners are stakeholders       0.61* 
(0.25) 
  
No state ownership    -0.41* 
(0.20) 
     
Control of owner  0.36* 
(0.17) 
     0.48* 
(0.24) 
 
Cost of changing the supplier     -0.31 
(0.25) 
   -0.82** 
(0.32) 
Industrial (3-digit) and 
regional dummies 
+ + + + + + + + + 
Constant  -0.44* 
(0.22) 
-0.69** 
(0.26) 
-0.17 
(0.23)
0.23 
(0.32) 
0.03 
(0.27) 
-0.33 
(0.22) 
-0.53* 
(0.30) 
-1.95*** 
(0.36) 
-1.20** 
(0.34) 
Number of observations 390 369 392 251 369 387 328 364 356 
Р> Chi2 0.104 0.106 0.150 0.082 0.129 0.244 0.148 0.178 0.814 
 
Note: * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. 
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Table 5.3. – Innovation strategies: organization and marketing 
                   (cell contains regression coefficient (standard deviation in parenthesis) 
 Change of input supplier  
Increase of 
marketing and 
advertising expenses 
Change of 
executive managers 
Small 0.14 
(0.20) 
0.14 
(0.22) 
0.25 
(0.28)
-0.31 
(0.21)
-0.18 
(0.31)
0.12 
(0.25) 
-0.07 
(0.29) 
-0.09 
(0.32) 
0.08 
(0.31) 
-0.06 
(0.31) 
Big -0.04 
(0.19) 
-0.06 
(0.21) 
-0.23 
(0.22)
0.12 
(0.17)
-0.08 
(0.23)
0.06 
(0.19) 
0.53* 
(0.22) 
0.67** 
(0.24) 
0.39* 
(0.23) 
0.56* 
(0.23) 
Competition from 
import 
0.06 
(0.19) 
0.19 
(0.21) 
0.09 
(0.23)
0.49** 
(0.18)
0.39* 
(0.25)
0.55** 
(0.21) 
-0.12 
(0.23) 
-0.16 
(0.26) 
-0.10 
(0.24) 
-0.21 
(0.24) 
Competition from 
domestic 
producers 
0.13 
(0.18) 
0.15 
(0.19) 
0.16 
(0.22)
0.02 
(0.16)
0.01 
(0.23)
0.06 
(0.19) 
0.19 
(0.23) 
0.08 
(0.25) 
0.20 
(0.24) 
0.16 
(0.24) 
“Formal” business 
group 
0.07 
(0.22) 
0.06 
(0.24) 
-0.26 
(0.29)
0.46* 
(0.21)
  0.62* 
(0.26) 
 0.63* 
(0.27) 
0.64* 
(0.27) 
“Informal” 
business group 
-0.13 
(0.23) 
0.16 
(0.26) 
-0.35 
(0.25)
0.26 
(0.21)
  0.36 
(0.26) 
 0.29 
(0.27) 
0.37 
(0.27) 
Orders        -0.41 
(0.42) 
  
Customers are 
stakeholders 
 0.58* 
(0.28) 
  0.39 
(0.33)
  -0.22 
(0.42) 
  
Suppliers are 
stakeholders 
 -0.08 
(0.36) 
  -0.82* 
(0.43)
  0.44 
(0.48) 
  
Banks are 
stakeholders 
 0.11 
(0.33) 
  -0.19 
(0.39)
  0.13 
(0.41) 
  
Partners are 
stakeholders 
 -0.36 
(0.26) 
  0.47 
(0.32)
0.62* 
(0.25) 
 -0.28 
(0.33) 
  
No state 
ownership 
    -0.31 
(0.26)
     
New owner (3 
years)  
  -0.44* 
(0.19)
       
Control of owner      0.62** 
(0.20) 
  0.78* 
(0.29) 
 
Cost of changing 
the supplier 
     -0.88** 
(0.29) 
   -0.63* 
(0.35) 
Industrial (3-digit) 
and regional 
dummies 
+ + + + + + + + + + 
Constant  -0.80*** 
(0.24) 
-1.18 *** 
(0.28) 
-0.36 
(0.32)
-0.33 
(0.23)
0.25 
(0.35)
-0.32 
(0.32) 
-2.00*** 
(0.31) 
-1.61*** 
(0.39) 
-2.50*** 
(0.40) 
-1.64*** 
(0.37) 
Number of 
observations 
383 339 260 387 220 325 379 323 362 356 
Р> Chi2 0.122 0.140 0.265 0.244 0.020 0.336 0.101 0.036 0.455 0.557 
 
Note: * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. 
 
 
 
Interesting results were obtained about the impact of the relationships of enterprises with 
different “influential stakeholder groups” on  innovations. According to a viewpoint that 
has recently become very popular, the participation of influential stakeholders in 
decision-making should improve the efficiency of the latter. From our survey sample, the 
control of decisions by different stakeholders has a differing influence on the probability 
of applying innovation strategies. For instance, control by partners in joint venture 
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projects increases the probability of implementing most of the analyzed innovation 
strategies (e.g. introduction of new production capacity, realization of investment 
projects, and increase of R&D investments, marketing and advertising). At the same 
time, the control of strategic decision-making by the bank decreases the probability to 
innovate. This evidence could be explained by the fact that the bank plays an important 
role for enterprises with unsatisfactory financial performance. But it is not easy to 
explain the negative influence on innovation strategies of the control by the consumer 
(decreases the probability to introduce new production capacity and to retire obsolete 
equipment) and coordination with suppliers (decreases the probability to increase 
marketing and advertising expenditure).  
It is not easy to explain the negative influence of a change in ownership on almost every 
innovation strategy, and also the absence of a positive influence of completely private 
ownership (absence of shares belonging to the state on the probability of innovation).  
Closer control of owners over the decisions of managers increases the probability to 
innovate and this can be considered as another argument in support of the viewpoint 
about the need to improve the overall system of corporate governance in Russia and to 
confront the attempts to prove the viability of a “national system of corporate 
governance” with a completely unique set of rules and norms.  
Another interesting result is that the probability of almost every type of innovation 
decreases with the difficulty the enterprise has in changing input suppliers. This result 
(surprisingly) fully coincides with the institutional theory of a lock-in effect: the 
dependence of an enterprise on the suppliers decreases the incentives to innovate. This 
factor is important for Russian enterprises: in our sample only 15% said they could 
change suppliers easily, the proportion of enterprises which believed it was nearly 
impossible to change suppliers was at least twice as high.  
 
 
5  Business Groups, Innovation strategies and       
Competitiveness of Enterprises in Transition:             
the Main Conclusions  
The influence of the described business group functioning model on the competitiveness 
of enterprises is ambiguous. On the one hand, as surveys and in-depth interviews show, 
business groups are more successful in marketing than are stand-alone firms. 
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Correspondingly, firms within business groups face higher demand and demonstrate 
better financial and overall economic performance. Inside business groups, funds are 
invested in projects which are oriented to the development of competitive product lines, 
to new forms of accounting and management, which allow them to better estimate the 
economic performance and the determinants of competitiveness and therefore to make 
more efforts for further improvements.  
On the other hand, the positive influence of business groups on the strategies of firms is 
still restricted by a number of factors. Some of them are connected with inside ownership 
which prevails in Russian industry: under inside ownership (even if it is only formal) 
redistribution of decision-making towards the parent company of the business group 
seems to be inefficient. While shares are in the hands of insider management, the 
investments of the business group in its affiliated firms will be less than optimal. 
Moreover, in many cases redistribution of shares to outsider owners is not a desirable 
solution, since in the context of extremely flawed institutional environment outsider 
owners cannot establish efficient control over insider managers without becoming an 
insider owner themselves. This will evidently restrict the prospect for business groups to 
develop to a point which allows them to support “first-hand control” of the controlling 
owner.  
It is necessary to mention again that the development of business groups in Russian 
industry represents a compromise in the face of the need for market-oriented 
restructuring and the dominance and relative stability of insider’s control and insider 
shareholding.  
Returning to competitiveness, it is necessary to emphasize that the described allocation 
of decision-making between a firm and the business group it is associated with 
demonstrates important inefficiencies. Those agents apprehend the market signals 
(business groups) which typically have restricted the ability to adopt an entirely new 
production according to these signals and do not have perfect knowledge about the 
possibilities of production to adopt. In turn, managers of enterprises, which have firm-
specific knowledge about production and can adopt it, do not perceive information about 
the market demand. This is the cause for the lower speed of adjustment of product 
variety of business group firms in comparison with stand-alone enterprises.  
The improved performance of business groups in the period  after the1999 recovery has 
been determined mostly by an increase in demand, as opposed to cost saving. There are a 
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number of evident reasons for this. Insider managers do not have incentives for cost 
saving first of all because the considerable source of income for them is “participation in 
cost” (revenues of affiliated companies). Being aware of that and being incapable of 
establishing efficient control over the firms, business groups too lacked sufficient 
incentives to invest in cost-savings. This is one explanation for the non-reliance on 
restructuring of Russian enterprises as a means of cost savings and cost savings being the 
reason for better financial performance (Bhaumik and Estrin, 2003) for the firms within 
business groups (which is a substantial part of Russian privatized firms).  
Again, the economic and financial performance of the described business groups is 
mostly determined by a change in demand for the products of firms. Under import-
substitution and economic recovery – when it is possible to increase output without any 
increase of production efficiency, - business groups demonstrated themselves to be 
successful enough. But we should keep in mind that a fall in demand could highlight all 
the weaknesses of decision-making inside the groups, which in turn would contribute to 
the decline of firms and business groups.  
In conclusion, the entire story about privatized enterprises and business groups in 
Russian industries tells us that a significant portion of market participants in Russia are 
still in the process of transition to market economy. For many of them, the transition 
takes very specific forms as described in this paper.  
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Abstract 
The paper studies evolution of stock ownership and corporate governance mechanisms in 
the Russian industrial companies and their impact on business restructuring and 
innovation activities. The study is based on original enterprises’ survey, statistical data 
and in-depth interviews with top-managers of selected companies. Empirical data for 
several years were collected and the research outputs were obtained within the project 
“Structural Changes in the Russian Industry” implemented at the Higher School of 
Economics (HSE) under the supervision of Professor E. Yassin.  
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 1  Introduction 
The second section describes empirical data used in the paper. The third one shows the 
main trends in redistribution of corporate ownership for over a decade of reforms. The 
fourth part analyzes the internal mechanisms of corporate governance: board of directors 
and replacement of executive top management. The fifth section describes the basic 
approach for evaluation of the major effects of corporate ownership and control specifics 
on business restructuring and performance. The sixth section presents a brief overview of 
known empirical research and puts forward several qualitative hypotheses. The 
conclusive seventh section brings the outputs of the analysis. We found that level of 
property concentration, and different structures of corporate ownership/corporate control 
have no effect on restructuring and business performance. The impact of directors’ 
(CEOs) turnover is weak and contradictory. The only indirect characteristic of corporate 
control – company’s participation in business groups demonstrates positive effects on 
enterprise modernization policies and business performance including positive dynamics 
of gross value added per employee. 
 
 
2  Brief Description of Empirical Base 
Our paper is characterised by a combination of several methods of analysis including 
statistical analysis of official reporting data of enterprises based on a wide and 
representative sample, study of random enterprises’ survey data based on a formalized 
questionnaire and, finally, analysis of a number of in-depth interviews with top-
managers. 
The basic representative sample covered 1288 enterprises located in 12 constituent 
territories of the Russian Federation. The enterprises were included in the observation 
programme so that the sectoral composition of the sample would correspond to the 
regional location of industrial sectors. About 800 joint stock companies (JSCs) were 
included into this sample (See brief description of Russian corporate sector in Box 1). 
Reporting data (from statistical and accounting reporting sheets) reflect  performance of 
companies during 1997-2002 including outputs, costs and profits, assets and liabilities, 
investments and other indicators of enterprise activities. 
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 Box 1.  The main legislative specifics of Russian corporate governance 
The foundations of  corporate legislation were created in Russia when Section 1 of the RF Civil 
Code (passed in October 1994, effected starting from 1995) and the Federal Law on Joint-
Stock Companies (№ 208-FZ of December 26, 1995) were adopted. This law was amended in 
1996 and 1999 and was significantly modified in 2001. The revised version of the Law was 
starting from 2002 when minor changes were made. Corporate relations are also regulated by 
security markets law and privatization legislation. 
 
Under Russian legislation, there are two main types of joint-stock companies in the economy – 
open JSC (i.e. public) and closed JSC (i.e. a type of a private company). In case of an open 
JSC the number of founders is unlimited, while the number of founders of a closed JSC may 
not exceed 50. If the number of a closed joint stock company’s shareholders exceeds 50, such 
company must be transformed into an open one within a period of one year. 
 
The main feature of closed JSC is a ban on free circulation of shares. An open JSC has a right 
to do placing of shares and issued securities of the company convertible into stock through 
both open and closed subscription. A closed joint stock company is not entitled to do placing 
of the company’s shares and convertible securities through open subscription or to offer them 
for purchasing to an unlimited number of persons through any other method. 
 
Shareholders of both open and closed JSCs have a right to alienate their shares without 
consent from other shareholders and the company. At the same time, the shareholders of a 
closed JSC intending to sell their shares to a third party are obliged to notify the rest of 
shareholders and the company thereof in writing. Here, other shareholders enjoy a privileged 
right to purchase the stock sold by closed joint stock company’s shareholders. The Charter of 
a closed JSC may also provide for a priority right for the company itself to buy out such shares 
if the company’s shareholders fail to take advantage of their priority rights. 
 
 
 
Official reports of enterprises do not allow an analysis of the factors resulting in their 
performance. Therefore, for an in-depth analysis of enterprise behaviour, statistical 
information was enhanced with top management survey data. Additionally, special 
formalized survey of the basic sample was conducted by the HSE in autumn 2002. As a 
result, 473 questionnaires were received from  enterprises with the assistance from the 
State Statistics Committee of Russia (Goskomstat). The formalized survey brought data 
on ownership and corporate governance, business restructuring and investments, 
integration and decision-making. This combination of different sources of information 
allowed the creation of a comprehensive database incorporating six years of statistical 
data and questionnaire data. A reader could see detailed description of samples and the 
database in Yassin (2004). 
All questionnaires specified regional location and sectoral association, while the rate of 
response on other questions equalled 80-98%. State-owned enterprises (federal or 
regional  property) accounted for one-fifth of the sample as a whole, with joint-stock 
companies accounting for more than two-thirds, of which 80% are open joint-stock 
companies. Every ninth enterprise was a limited liability company. 
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 The main structural parameter of the sample is its sectoral composition (Table 1). In 
comparing sectoral composition of the sample and the main set with the number of 
enterprises in Russian industry, deviations were a maximum of 3-4 percentage points. 
 
Table 1.  Sectoral distribution of enterprises under formalized survey 
The Sample 
Operating 
industrial 
enterprises Sectors 
Number of 
respondents 
Share, % Share, %* 
Fuel and energy 53 11.2 9.5 
Metallurgy 12 2.5 2.3 
Chemical and petrochemical 9 1.9 4.3 
Machinery building and metal working 133 28.1 32.4 
Forestry, paper pulp and timber  66 14.0 13.7 
Construction materials 38 8.0 6.0 
Light industry 72 15.2 11.0 
Food industry 90 19.0 16.0 
TOTAL 473 100 - 
 
Note: * Sectoral shares in the total number of industrial enterprises were calculated on the basis of data as of the end
of 2001, see (Goskomstat, 2002, pp. 20-23). 
 
 
 
 
The 2002 average employment (including dual job holders and contracted employees) 
was used to identify peer groups. In the sample as a whole, every fourth enterprise had 
up to 100 employees. The bulk of enterprises (46%) were classified as “medium-size” 
with a payroll of 101 to 500 employees, the rest of the sample being “large” (501 to 1000 
employees) or “extra large” (over 1000 employees) enterprises. 
There is a correlation between the size of enterprises and their sectoral association, with 
small enterprises being more widely represented in energy and light industry (32% and 
almost 44%, respectively). Medium-size enterprises were more widespread in 
construction materials and food industry, while enterprises employed more than 500 
persons in metallurgy and machinery building. 
The analysis of ownership and corporate control and quality of management would have 
been incomplete without the use of interviews or case-studies. In-depth interviews 
involving managers of 37 industrial enterprises from 7 Russian regions were held in 
autumn 2003 relying on the scenario developed on the results of the formalized survey. 
Interviews were focused on the  study of enterprise modernisation and factors that 
contribute or hold back positive shifts in business competitiveness in the 2000s. 
Interviews were complemented by analytical papers based on information received 
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 during visits to the enterprises and also data from web sites, regional mass media and 
other open or ’hidden’ sources. 
Interviews were held in the most widespread sectors such as machinery building, food 
and light industries (these sectors covered 60% of enterprises accounting for over 52% of 
total employment and over 30% of industrial output in Russia) and metallurgy (14% of 
industrial output and 10% of employment)1 as an example of export-oriented production. 
In selecting companies we took into account other characteristics such as a variety of 
“success stories” and “failure stories”, mandatory coverage of green-fields, and 
enterprises that underwent restructuring or bankruptcy proceedings, and also companies 
integrated into alliances or business groups. The sample included 33 JSCs, of which 23 
were open companies and 10 closed companies employing from 200 up to 100000 
employees. 
Almost one half of respondents were general (executive) directors while others were 
deputy directors supervising economic, financing and investment issues of enterprise 
operation. In a number of cases interviews involved key owners and chairmen of the 
board. Almost all respondents worked at the given enterprise for a minimum of 4-5 years.  
One should note that if the basic sample included over 800 joint-stock companies, the 
sample of surveyed enterprises consisted of about 320 companies, including 310 joint-
stock companies whose statistical data and data received through surveys were 
combined. We can use the basic sample for ownership composition studies. Research of 
restructuring activities has been carried out only in respect of those joint-stock 
companies whose CEOs were surveyed at the end of 2002. And results of in-depth 
interviews were used for qualitative explanation of observed phenomena and justification 
of hypotheses. 
 
 
3  Structure of Corporate Ownership                            
and Major Trends in Ownership Changing  
Starting from the mid-90s, a number of empirical researches carried out by the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA), the HSE, the Russian Economic Barometer (REB) and other 
institutions have focused particularly on the examination of the issues of corporate 
                                                 
1 See Goskomstat, (2002, pp. 20-31). 
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 ownership and control in Russian companies. The above research (Aukustionek et al., 
2003; Vitebsky et al., 2002; Guriev et al., 2002; Dolgopyatova, 2004; Radygin and 
Entov, 2001; and others) has revealed that intensive processes of redistribution of 
corporate ownership have been under way in Russian industry for over a decade.  
Those processes have resulted in: 
• a reduction in the participation of federal, regional and local authorities in capital 
with the continuation of the privatisation campaign; 
• a growth in participation of the company top-management in equity with a 
noticeable drop in participation of all the other employees; 
• a growth in the share of outside non-government owners against the background of 
vertical and lateral integration, and development of conglomerates as well; 
• significant increase in concentration of equity in the hands of the dominating 
shareholder (or tightly consolidated group of shareholders). 
 
Economic growth after the 1998 crisis was accompanied by intense redistribution and 
concentration of ownership, as well as a switch-over of ownership from company 
managers to outside private businesses. Consolidation of capital based on its expansion 
in the Russian economy continued (Deryabina, 2001; Pappe, 2002a). Various integrated 
business groups (not only the oligarchic groups on a nation-wide scale, which are 
constantly being mentioned in the mass media, but also regional groups and local 
groups) were formed. 
The specifics of the ’property’ institution in Russia, as it was mentioned in (Ustyuzhanina, 
2001), consists in constant changes in ownership. Such intense processes have been noted by 
many researchers. According to the data of the HSE (Dolgopyatova, 2002) and the REB 
(Kapelyushnikov, 2001), nearly 5% to 7% of joint-stock companies changed their principal 
owner on an annual basis in 90s. According to our latest survey, one out of five enterprises 
(on the average 6.6% a year) experienced radical changes in the composition of influential 
owners in a three-year period (from autumn 1999 till the end of 2002). 
The above research pointed to an insignificant role of financial investors and foreign 
shareholders in the equity composition of enterprises. Principal owners included 
employees of enterprises and outside stockholders (legal entities). It is to be underlined 
that the share of participation by the management in the capital of  JSCs is always 
underestimated. 
 538
 Structural annual survey carried out by the Goskomstat of Russia at 27,000 large and 
medium-size industrial enterprises has shown that the share of participation by 
employees and individuals in the capital declined, with a significant growth in 
participation by non-financial institutions. However, available outputs of the statistical 
survey (Table 2) are related not only to joint-stock companies, but also to other legal 
entities, while the structure of authorised capital was calculated using the size of  
authorised capital as ’weights’. So, on average, it tends to larger entities. In this case, the 
preservation of the position of authorities in the composition of equity capital is a result 
of the calculation method. 
More adequate data of the structural survey in respect of the reference sample (the 
average structure of capital is determined by calculating a mean of shares of each joint-
stock company) (Table 3) shows similar results.  
Generally, surveyed JSCs are characterised by the same lines of redistribution of 
ownership (Table 4, Column 1-3). According to data as of the end of 2002, employees 
accounted for a larger portion of stock capital followed by non-financial commercial 
institutions and individuals. The aggregate share of outside private investors exceeded 
that of employees of companies by 20 percentage points. 
Let us examine the structural characteristics of authorised capital of only those JSCs 
where one or another type of shareholder is included in the composition of owners 
(Table 4, Column 4-6). The data on the number of such JSCs clearly points to the extent 
of participation of that shareholder. Though employees as shareholders participated in 
capital more frequently than other types of owners they still accounted, on the average, 
for less then a half of the capital. Outside private owners participated in the capital of 
80% of enterprises in the sample and aggregately owned about 70% of equity. Such a 
higher extent of participation (greater than that of employees) is achieved through 
participation in the capital of non-financial commercial institutions. 
A number of surveys (Dolgopyatova, 2002; Kapelyushnikov, 2001; Kuznetsov, 2003; 
Radygin and Entov, 2001) have shown that Russian companies are characterised by a 
high degree of ownership concentration the extent of which grows from year to year. The 
index of the largest shareholders’ share in the capital of an industrial enterprise amounted 
to nearly 20% to 35% in the late 90s and early 2000s. Companies with owners with a 
controlling interest accounted for 15% to 25% of the sample. 
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 Indirect evidence from respondents (Golikova et. al., 2003) points, for instance, to the 
fact that a dominating owner can be found in at least two-thirds of open JSCs. Interviews 
which help identify the extent of affiliation between shareholders also point to the fact 
that Russian JSCs are characterised by a huge extent of property concentration. So the 33 
interviewed JSCs demonstrated an extremely high level of concentration. In fact, 25 
companies had a dominating owner with a controlling block of shares in his hands. 
Except for one company that preserved the post-privatization dispersed ownership with 
managerial control, all other JSCs had blockholders. Practically all interviewed 
companies had dominating owners controlling their activities: 20 respondents called 
external owners (legal entities or individuals) and 12 other respondents mentioned 
company directors. 
The surveyed JSCs are characterised by a high level of concentration of capital. It was 
high even in late 1998. In a three-year period, it increased by more than 5 percentage 
points (Table 5), while the gap between the mean and the median narrowed, that is, the 
dispersed portion of capital decreased.2 By 2002, two-thirds of JSCs had a blockholder; 
while over 38% of JSCs already had an owner with a controlling block of shares. 
Integration has had a great effect on the structure of corporate ownership. Property 
transformation was accompanied by various reorganizations in the corporate sector and 
creation of complicated schemes of ownership became the major mechanisms of 
integration (Pappe, 2002b). Russia became a leader in Central and Eastern Europe as 
regards mergers and acquisitions (PWC, 2002). Whereas since 1999 business groups 
have been actively expanding their presence in the economy in conditions of 
consolidation of capital, starting in 2002 they switched over to restructuring and legal 
reorganisation of establishing holding companies (Radygin, 2002). 
The high weight of non-financial commercial institutions in the equity illustrates 
property integration based on shareholding. In different surveys, this group of 
shareholders is typical of 15% to 30% of companies in the sample. Also, their share in 
that portion of the sample is estimated on average at a level of 40% to 55% of the equity 
capital.  
                                                 
2 Such a gap was also observed in other research. It proved the dispersal of shares among minority 
shareholders with a high concentration of capital by dominant owners. For instance, according to 
a survey of over 300 JSCs carried out by the HSE in 1999, it amounted to nearly 5 points in 1995 
and 1998 (Dolgopyatova, 2002). 
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 Integration plays a significant role in corporate control. Our interviews showed that 20 
entities interviewed were members of business groups or presented holding companies of 
a group. At the same time, only 4 respondents mentioned non-property forms of 
integration (market coordination or “give-and-take” or tolling contracts).  
Shareholding links support intense participation of a group in management of companies 
– members of groups including both strategic and operative issues. Also, shareholding of 
a group pushes replacement of enterprise’s top managers by a new team. New CEO may 
be the  owner of the business himself or a loyal hired manager. 
Our survey also showed that enterprises participated in amalgamation and business-
groups. Two-thirds of respondents did not consider their JSCs to be members of 
amalgamation, while other JSCs were included in one or another amalgamation (about 
15% of JSCs were members of informal groups, while over 19.5% of JSCs were 
members of legally registered amalgamations). Though the figures above do not only 
reflect property links between JSCs in these groups, interviews point to the fact that such 
links prevail. 
 
Table 2.  Structure of authorised capital of industrial enterprises 
             as of the end of the year (% of  authorised capital)* 
Shareholders or founders 1999 2002 Change in the three year period 
Authorities – the total, including 18.5 17.7 - 0.8 
- Federal authorities 10.4 9.9 - 0.5 
- Authorities of constituent entities of the RF 7.3 6.8 - 0.5 
- Local authorities 0.8 1.0 + 0.2 
Commercial non-financial institutions 41.6 65.7 + 24.1 
Financial institutions 3.2 5.3 + 2.1 
Non-commercial institutions 4.3 1.5 - 2.8 
Individuals – the total, including 20.1 9.8 - 10.3 
- employees of the enterprise 10.3 3.8 -6.5 
Total 100 100 - 
Including foreign individuals and legal 
entities** 
6.6 (40.3) 10.8 (42.8) +4.2 (+ 2.5) 
 
Note: * In respect of JSCs and limited liability companies, excluding small businesses. 
** Only enterprises with foreign participation are shown in brackets . 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the aggregate data of the structural survey, see (Goskomstat, 2002, p. 81, 98-
99); (Goskomstat, 2000, p. 72) as well as the preliminary data for 2002 provided by Goskomstat to HSE. 
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 Table 3.  Structure of authorised capital of JSCs in the reference sample 
             as of the end of the year (% of the authorised capital) 
Shareholders 1999 2002 Change in the three year period 
Authorities – the total, including 9.5 6.9 - 2.6 
   - Federal authorities 4.7 3.4 - 1.3 
   - Authorities of constituent entities of the RF 3.4 2.5 - 0.9 
   - Local authorities 1.4 1.0 - 0.4 
Non-government external investors – total, 
including 
45.6 55.2 + 9.6 
   - Commercial non-financial institutions 22.2 28.4 + 6.2 
   - Financial institutions 0.7 0.8 + 0.1 
   - Non-commercial institutions 4.2 3.3 - 0.9 
   - Individuals 18.5 22.7 + 4.2 
Employees of a particular enterprise 44.9 38.0 - 7.0 
   - Total in respect of the sample of JSCs 100 100 - 
   - Including foreign legal entities and individuals 2.9 3.6 + 0.7 
 
Source: author’s calculations based on the data of Goskomstat structural survey in respect of nearly 790 JSCs in the
reference sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.  Structure of authorised capital of surveyed JSCs 
              as of the end of the year (% of authorised capital) 
In respect of all JSCs In respect of JSCs with a listed shareholder* 
Shareholders  
1999 2002
Change in 
the 3-year 
period 
1999 2002 
Change in 
the 3- year 
period 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Authorities –the total, including  11.1 9.6 - 1.5 40.9 (77) 43.2 (65) + 2.6 
   - Federal authorities 6.4 4.5 - 1.9 37.7 (48) 36. 0 (37) - 1.7 
   - Authorities of costituent entities 
     of the RF 3.4 3.9 + 0.5 41.8 (23) 45.6 (25) + 3.8 
   - Local authorities 1.3 1.2 - 0.1 38.0 (10) 33.7 (10) - 4.3 
Non-government external investors 
– total, including 45.7 55.4 + 9.7 61.8 (210) 69.4 (234) + 7.6 
   - Commercial non-financial  
     institutions 21.6 30.0 + 8.4 44.3 (139) 53.6 (164) + 9.3 
   - Financial institutions 0.8 1.0 + 0.2 11.3 (20) 17.9 (17) + 6.6 
   - Non-commercial institutions 5.3 2.6 - 2.7 35.3 (43) 25.4 (30) - 9.9 
   - Individuals 18.0 21.8 + 3.8 31.5 (164) 34.6 (185) + 3.1 
Employees of an enterprise 43.2 35.0 - 8.2 51.1 (240) 45.3 (226) - 5.8 
   - Total in respect of the sample 
     of JSCs 100 100 100 - - - 
   - Including foreign legal entities  
     and individuals 2.8 3.4 + 0.6 38.2 (16) 32.7 (30) - 5.5 
 
Note: * The number of JSCs with contribution in the authorised capital by the listed shareholders is given in brackets. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the data of Goskomstat structural survey of nearly 300 JSCs (surveyed in 
2002). 
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 Table 5.  Indices of ownership concentration in JSCs 
End of 1998 End of 2002  
Mean Median Mean Median 
Share of the largest shareholder, %  36.4 29.4 41.8 38.2 
Share of the three largest shareholders, % 48.8 47.0 57.4 55.5 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on survey data . 
 
 
 
So, dispersed ownership of employees has become a thing of the past. It was replaced by 
a high concentrated corporate property of enterprise managers or outside investors. In 
many cases the latter represented the interests of business-groups. The status of the 
dominant owner turns an outside shareholder into ’an insider’ (in the standard meaning 
of the term, based on the notion of insider’s information), since such an owner directly 
participates in the management of the enterprise or exercises tight control over managers 
appointed by him. 
 
 
4  Major Internal Mechanisms of                           
Corporate Control in Companies 
The board of directors of a joint-stock company is a collegial body formed by the 
meeting of shareholders for taking strategic decisions and organising and monitoring the 
work of executive bodies of the JSC (see brief description of a Russian JSC’s bodies in 
Box 2). The ratio between representatives of shareholders or stakeholders in the board of 
directors describes the structure of corporate control (power structure) at the company. 
Against the background of consolidated insider ownership, the work of the board of 
directors of a large number of companies is characterised by a decrease in the number of 
directors. This phenomenon is limited only by the need to comply with the norms 
provided for by the Russian law on JSCs with the number of shareholders exceeding 
1000 or 10000). Also, representatives of insiders openly dominate in the composition of 
the board of directors, while executive management has an important role to play. 
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 Box 2.  Specifics of a Russian JSC’s governing bodies 
Under Russian corporate law, the bodies of governance in a JSC include:  
 
• general shareholders’ meeting – top body for company governance;  
• a board of directors – general body governing the company activities; 
• executive bodies of company – managing company’s current operation and reporting to 
the board and general shareholders’ meeting.  
 
Executive bodies of a company may be: a) company’s sole executive body (director, general 
director) or b) company’s sole executive body (director, general director) and company’s 
collective executive body (management board, directorate). In this case, the person who 
exercises the functions of company’s sole executive body also performs the functions of 
company’s collective executive body’s CEO; c) profit managing organization or an individual 
manager under the terms of a contract on delegating authority of the company’s sole 
executive body. 
 
The board of directors exercises general governance over company’s activities except for 
issues that are the competence of the general shareholders’ meeting. The number of board 
members must not be less than 7 members for companies with more than 1000 shareholders; 
and 9 members for JSCs with more than 10000 shareholders. 
 
Members of company’s collective executive body may not make up more than ¼ of the total 
number of board members. The chairman of the board of a JSC is elected by a majority vote 
of the total number of company’s board members if not established otherwise by the Charter. 
The person performing the functions of the sole executive body may not be elected as the 
chairman of the board. 
 
In a company with less than 50 shareholders, who are holders of voting shares, the Charter 
may provide for the functions of the board to be performed by the general shareholders’ 
meeting. 
 
 
 
In the first years after privatisation, representatives of employees usually occupied at 
least 60% to 70% of seats in the board of directors (Basargin and Perevalov, 2000). The 
quantitative analysis of the structure of the board of directors based on the outputs of 
surveys carried out by the HSE and the BEA in the late 90s (Dolgopyatova, 2004; BEA, 
2001) points to the preservation of dominant positions of employees. The leading role in 
the board of directors belongs to representatives of the management (one-third to 40% of 
seats) followed by representatives of employees (mostly the same managers) or external 
shareholders. To analyse the comparative advantages of shareholders with regard to 
power structures, let us compare the ownership structure and the composition of the 
board of directors using the ratio of representation which is determined as the share of 
representation in the board of directors per 1% of the share capital by each group of 
shareholders.3 As a rule, that ratio as regards employees is significantly more than one 
                                                 
3 The ratio was proposed in (Basargin and Perevalov, 2000, p. 124); the authors calculated it in 
respect of 43 JSCs of the Sverdlov Region in 1993-1998. 
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 (1.3-1.5), primarily due to participation by managers of corporations.4 As regards outside 
private owners, that ratio is smaller (at a level of 0.6-0.8). Partly, it reflects the limited 
abilities of minority shareholders to exercise control. As regards authorities, that ratio 
amounts to 0.8-0.9, primarily due to a more active participation by regional and local 
authorities. 
According to our survey, the average number of directors is less than seven. Also, there 
is a decrease in that number. The average number of members of the board of directors 
correlated with the size of the JSC (six persons at small JSCs to eight persons at large 
companies). Employees dominated in the board of directors, both in 1998 and three years 
later (Table 6). However, their representation gradually decreased (according to 
respondents it was due to a decrease in participation by the management). In absolute 
terms, large shareholders (individuals) were leaders among outside owners. They 
represented either new outside owners or the former management which no longer ran 
the enterprise. In relative terms, there was a rapid growth in the extent of representation 
of authorities and other directors, including the so-called independent directors. In the 
latter case, estimations by respondents should be treated cautiously. In most cases they 
do not understand the meaning of the term ’the independent director’. The highest ratio 
of representation (1.63) was observed with employees, the ratio of outside private 
investors amounted to 0.55 (the highest ratio (0.82) in that group was observed with 
large shareholders (individuals)), while that of the authorities amounted to 0.73. 
Actually, as seen from interviews, along with large shareholders and company’s 
managers other stakeholders influence to a certain extent the decision making process in 
corporations. The management of companies regards regional and local authorities and 
labour teams (in case of large enterprises) as the most influential forces. The boards of 
directors of some JSCs include representatives of labour teams from among medium 
level managers or trade-union leaders, particularly if there are still employee-
shareholders. In individual cases, those representatives can pursue a relatively 
independent policy. However, they are closely affiliated with the management. Also, as 
early as the late 90s there was a trend to include in the boards of directors representatives 
of regional and local authorities which were not shareholders of these companies 
(Dolgopyatova, 2002). Thus, the authorities ’add’ direct and legitimate methods of 
corporate control over activities of JSCs to tight administrative regulation and 
                                                 
4 Respondents may overestimate the representation of ordinary employees and the extent of their 
participation in the stock capital. At the same time, they underestimate to a great extent the share 
of managers in the capital.  
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 widespread informal relations those typical for Russian economy. The above phenomena 
should be taken into account in estimating the performance of the so-called independent 
directors. 
 
Table 6.  Aggregated composition of the board of directors 
              (% of the total number of members of the board of directors) 
Representatives of shareholders or stakeholders End of 1998 End of 2002 
Employees of the enterprise 60.3 56.0 
      - including management of the enterprise 38.5 35.4 
Large shareholders (individuals) 16.5 17.9 
Authorities (municipals, regional, federal) 5.1 6.7 
Commercial institutions, including financial institutions 12.0 12.7 
Non-commercial institutions 1.6 1.5 
Other directors, including independent directors 4.5 5.2 
Number of JSCs which supplied answers  278 294 
 
Source: author’s calculations based on survey data. 
 
 
Incidentally, in assessing the need for approval of key decisions by executive 
management with various stakeholders, large owners were rated first by respondents 
(managers). They were followed, with a significant lag, by labour teams, the enterprise’s 
business partners in joint projects and alliances and regional and local authorities. 
Enterprises had the least need to coordinate their decisions with federal authorities and 
banks rendered services to them. 
It has become clear from the interviews that boards of directors are usually formed by the 
dominant stockholders and follow their instructions. At the same time, boards of 
directors are closely related to the executive management. Large outside owners are 
often members of the top management team. To some extent, the board of directors 
performs formal organisational duties, while actual decisions are made by a narrow 
group of persons who combine the ’roles’ of a shareholder, an executive manager and a 
non-executive director. The aim of the board of directors as a monitoring mechanism of 
executive management and a protecting tool of the rights of all shareholders and 
stakeholders is not implemented today. 
Another mechanism of corporate control by shareholders of the company is turnover of 
the top management. Theoretically, it should encourage managers to be more competent 
and serve as incentives for their improved performance (Muravyev, 2003). If the CEOs 
of the surveyed JSCs held office for one month to 33 years, their average term in office 
was 8 years (Table 7). CEOs were replaced both for natural causes and for reasons 
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 justified by decisions of major shareholders. Many “new” CEOs are often appointed 
from among top managers of the enterprise; the average parameters of the record of 
service of the CEO at a particular enterprise are twice as much as the CEO’s term in 
office. 
 
Table 7.  The periods a general director (CEO) held office (number of years) 
 Number of 
JSCs Minimum Maximum Mean Median 
Record of service as a CEO 342 0.1 33.0 8.1 6.0 
Record of service of a director with a 
particular JSC 342 0.1 47.0 15.5 15.0 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on survey data.  
 
 
According to survey data, the process of replacement of CEOs was intensified in Russian 
JSCs after the 1998 crisis. In the past four years (after the 1998 financial crisis till the 
time of survey) over 40% of new CEOs took office, while in the period after completion 
of privatisation (within seven years from the second half of 1995) and during the entire 
period of reforms (over the past ten years), this number was 57% and about 70%, 
respectively. Nearly 40% out of the latter (that is, nearly 30% of CEOs in the sample) 
came from the outside. So, the major part of CEOs took office in the period of 
emergence of the market economy in Russia. 
Incidentally, our in-depth interviews show that 15 JSCs replaced a CEO after the 1998 
crisis and another 3 companies in 1997-1998. About half of the companies interviewed 
went through the change of key owners as well. New shareholders came after bankruptcy 
or captures, sometimes voluntary sale of shares took place. As a rule, replacement of the 
CEO was initiated by the dominating owners including business groups. The new CEO 
could either be an owner or a hired manager representing the owner’s interests. 
Sometimes the owner may be ready to appoint a member of the old managerial team as a 
new CEO. At the same time, there are several cases where the CEO turnover was not 
connected with the change of owners. Reasons for CEO’s exit may be supported by 
natural determinants or the personnel policy of a business group. 
As a result, insider control by dominant owners prevails at Russian industrial companies. 
They include the managers of enterprises, either representatives of the former directorial 
corps or new owners. On the one hand, such an ’insider’ type of corporate governance 
mitigates the agency problem (Stiglitz, 1999). On the other hand, it is accompanied by a 
violation of the rights of minority shareholders, the “closure” of the company to outside 
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 investors, and lack of transparency. Thus, the survey showed estimates by respondents 
(senior managers) as to the prospect of improving the transparency of their businesses 
and granting access to new investors with whom they will have to share control with. 
One out of six respondents found it hard to answer, while the aggregate of other 
respondents consisted of two nearly equal portions; one portion of respondents admitted 
that they were not prepared for such developments, while the others said they would 
sooner make public information and share control with investors. These outputs 
correlated with the availability of bank loans; the greater the problem was to receive a 
bank loan, the more prepared the respondents were to share control with a new 
shareholder. 
 
5  Effects of Ownership and Control on Modernisation:       
Analytical Approach 
Corporate ownership and control are the factors which in the static are regarded as 
internal conditions for modernisation of enterprises. To analyse their role,  groups or 
clusters (Table 8) characterised the ownership structure and corporate control 
mechanisms were formed. Comparative statistical analysis of these clusters will help 
identify the differences in business modernisation and performance indices.5
The extent of ownership concentration is measured by the index of the stake owned by 
the largest shareholder. Groups with a high, medium and low concentration of capital 
were identified on the basis of controlling interest or blocking ownership. In addition to 
this, JSCs with a high concentration of ownership and the aggregate of other companies 
were compared.  
Ownership structure by the principal shareholder was presented by groups of JSCs in which 
each type of the shareholder occupied dominant positions.6 For the purpose of grouping, 
statistical data as of the end of 2002 was used. 
                                                 
5 To identify the links between different groups or compare index values depending on the specifics 
of comparable variables, the methods of calculation of contingency tables, rank correlation and 
comparison of sample averages were used. The threshold value of significance for statistical 
correlation was set at a level of 0.05. 
6 Under this definition, the dominant shareholder is regarded as a shareholder whose share in the 
stock capital (or in the composition of the board of directors of a JSC) exceeds the share of any 
other shareholder as applied to the break-down of shareholders into three major types: employees, 
authorities and non-government outside owners. 
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 Table 8.  Groups of JSCs by ownership and corporate control indicators 
List of groups (clusters) Numbe
r of 
JSCs 
% of 
the 
sample 
1. Dominant group of owners 290 100 
1.1. Domination by employees 94 32.4 
1.2. Domination by authorities 25 8.6 
1.3. Domination by outside private investors 171 59.0 
2. Extent of ownership concentration (the largest shareholder’s stake) 232 100 
2.1. Absence of blocking ownership (the stake does not exceed 25%) 78 33.6 
2.2. Absence of controlling interest with existence of blocking ownership (the stake is 
       over 25%, but less than or equal to 50%) 64 27.6 
2.3. Existence of controlling interest (the stake exceeds 50%) 90 38.8 
3. Existence of the dominant group of shareholders in the composition of the board of
    directors 269 100 
3.1. Domination by employees 169 62.8 
3.2. Domination by authorities 11 4.1 
3.3. Domination by outside private investors 89 33.1 
4. Change of JSC’s CEO 342 100 
4.1. CEO’s record of service does not exceed 4 years 138 40.4 
4.2. CEO’s record of service is over 4 years and less than 10 years 99 28.9 
4.3. CEO’s record of service is over 10 years 105 30.7 
5. Participation in amalgamations and business-groups 338 100 
5.1. JSCs are not members of any amalgamations 224 66.3 
5.2. JSCs participated in informal or formal amalgamations 114 33.7 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on survey data.  
 
 
 
To reflect the structure of corporate control, data on the composition of the board of 
directors of companies according to the type of principal shareholders was used. Though 
employees dominated in this group, it was impossible to identify whether the company’s 
management was hired or consisted of shareholders. Taking into account the fact that the 
group of companies with domination of authorities in the ownership structure or 
composition of the board of directors was small, particular attention was paid to the 
comparison of JSCs with domination of employees or outside private owners. 
To analyse the CEO turnover, a variable reflecting the record of service of the general 
director in that position was used. The sample of JSCs is divided into groups of 
companies where CEOs were replaced either in the period following the 1998 crisis 
(’young’ CEOs), or in the period starting from the beginning of mass privatisation 
(CEOs with a record of service of more than four years and less than ten years) or even 
earlier (’old’ directors). 
The indicator of integration was the participation of the enterprise in an amalgamation or 
business group established on the basis of formal or informal relations. 
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 The comparison of the groups has revealed a weak correlation between indicators of 
ownership structures. Groups with a low and medium extent of concentration of capital 
are almost similar as regards representation of the major types of shareholders. However, 
JSCs with a high concentration of capital stand out. In JSCs with domination by outside 
owners, the extent of concentration of ownership was nearly nine percentage points 
higher than that in companies with domination by employees. 
As regards indicators of corporate control, they correlated, as expected, with the equity 
capital composition. If employees dominated in capital, they preserved the leading 
positions in boards of directors in 88% of cases. If outside owners dominated in the 
capital, they dominated in less than 43% of boards of directors, while in 54% of cases the 
domination switched over to employees. 
A certain “nonlinear” relation of the composition of the board of directors was also 
typical of JSCs with a different level of concentration of capital. With a low level of 
concentration, outside owners dominated only in 22% of enterprises, while with a 
medium and high level of concentration they dominated in 55% and 41% of enterprises, 
respectively. With domination by outside investors, the average size of a parcel of shares 
of the largest shareholder was 7 percentage points higher than that in the case of 
domination by employees. 
A more intense change of CEOs was typical of enterprises with concentrated ownership 
and domination by outside shareholders in their structure and composition of the board 
of directors. The above confirms that new outside shareholders induce a replacement of 
an enterprise’s CEO and bolster control over executive management through the board of 
directors. 
Dispersion of the extent of ownership concentration between groups of JSCs with 
“young” CEOs and “old” CEOs amounted to over 6 percentage points. In enterprises 
with domination by employees, one out of two CEOs held office for more than ten years 
and less than 23% of CEOs were replaced after the crisis. As opposed to this, with 
domination by outside private shareholders 50% of CEOs took office after the crisis, 
while less than 23% of CEOs remained in office from the early 90s.. 
Indicators of integration such as participation of company in amalgamations did not 
correlate with any of the above indices of ownership or corporate control. 
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 The major indicators of business performance are statistical indices of resource 
utilization and costs in the period 1999-2002. They are as follows: 
• labour productivity (gross value added per worker) as the most important indicator; 
• capital productivity (ratio of gross output to the value of fixed assets); 
• profitability (ratio of profit (loss) to the cost of goods, jobs and services sold). 
 
The year 1999 was selected as the reference year (the first post-crisis year of industrial 
development and growth). The comparison of groups is based on the use of the following 
two forms of indicators: 
• for comparison of different enterprises, standardised deviations of the value of 
performance indices from the industry average value (in respect of eight major branches 
of industry) were calculated as per year of the above period. In this case, average values 
of  JSC groups were compared separately with each other as per year. 
• for analysis of changes in dynamics, special parameters by the index within the period of 
the last three years (2000-2002) were considered. As regards profitability, it was the 
difference between the levels of profitability in 2002 and 1999; as regards capital 
productivity, it was the rates of growth (or decline), while in respect of labour 
productivity, the fact of its growth (or decline) in 2002, as against 1999. 
 
The past three years showed positive dynamics of the selected indicators in most JSCs. 
In the sample, on average, labour productivity increased at more than 79% of JSCs, 
while capital productivity icreased at 78% of enterprises. As regards the level of 
profitability, the results are not that positive; a growth in profitability was typical of only 
one-third of JSCs. 
In addition to the above, for estimation of the business performance, the questionnaire 
includes subjective integral estimation by respondents of the financial and economic 
situation of their enterprises. As of the time of the survey, one out of five JSCs said that 
the financial and economic state of their companies was poor, while less than one out of 
ten enterprises noted that it was sound. 
Such survey variables as certain restructuring and reforming events at the enterprise 
served as principal indicators of modernisation. In the sample of JSCs, each of the 14 
listed major measures was carried out by 13% to 76% of enterprises. Indices of 
investment activity (the volume of investments in fixed assets) allow a more 
 551
 comprehensive picture of modernisation to be drawn. Statistical indicators are formed as 
follows: 
• for the purpose of dynamics analysis of company’s investment activity, the rate of 
growth in aggregate volumes of investments in 2000-2002, as against 1999, was used; 
• for comparison of investment activity of different JSCs, a relative index of the extent of 
investment activity (the ratio of the volume of investment to the value of fixed assets) 
was used. The index was calculated as per year and compared as per group of JSCs. 
 
In general, the investment activities were rather moderate; 35% to 42% of JSCs in the 
sample did not make any investments in fixed assets. In this context, it is not only the 
fact of such investments that is important, but also the relative volumes thereof. It has 
been revealed that over 60% of JSCs within the four-year period under consideration 
(1999-2002) invested less than one-fourth of the value of their fixed assets, while more 
than 46% of JSCs made investments within a range of 10% of the value of their fixed 
assets. 
In addition, investment activities are characterised by the structure of financing. These 
indicators were found in the questionnaire. According to the survey, own capital is the 
major source of company investments (it accounted for over 80% of total investment) 
followed by bank loans (11% of investments), Russian partner-enterprises (3.7%) and 
other Russian investors (2.1%). Budget funds accounted for less than 2% of investments, 
while stock market funds, for the mere 0.3%.  
 
 
6  Effect of Ownership and Control on Business              
Restructuring and Performance: Justification                  
of the Hypotheses 
There are many empirical studies of the impact of privatisation, ownership structures and 
corporate governance features on restructuring and performance of enterprises in 
different transition countries. These studies use different indicators of business 
restructuring and/or performance indices based on accounting and survey data. Usually, 
current performance indices are used, but sometimes researchers can attract data from 
special surveys of enterprise restructuring activities. The results of different surveys 
implemented in different years are difficult to compare. Besides, as special 
comprehensive observations of many surveys have shown (Carlin, 1999; Bevan et al., 
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 1999; Djankov and Murrell, 2002), it is impossible to make exact and final conclusions 
based on a bulk of studies. 
In many empirical studies, a quantitative analysis of the correlation between enterprise 
performance and the ownership structure (share of various types of shareholders) was 
made. However, they did not produce any clear conclusions in respect of the influence 
by one or another shareholder on the company’s performance. Thus, as was shown in 
(Djankov, 1999), in 6 CIS countries (including Russia), the property of outside private or 
state investors was not correlated with enterprise restructuring. At the same time, 
property of managers was positively correlated with business performance at low or high 
levels (so the link has a U-form), and large (more then 30% of stock) foreign investors 
ownership was positively correlated with the performance. Also, a positive effect of 
foreign shareholders was captured in a study of Romanian companies (Earl and Telegdy, 
2001) as well as in the recent study of Czech companies – also in case of concentrated 
foreign property (Hanousek, Kocenda and Svejnar, 2004). Another study conducted in 
Romania, Bulgaria and Poland (Angelucci et al., 2002) could demonstrate positive 
effects of foreign ownership on business development. In the study of Romanian firms, a 
positive effect of private property in comparison with state property was revealed (Earl 
and Telegdy, 2001), but in case of the Czech Republic it is difficult to make clear 
conclusions. Thus, state companies differed with smaller profitability indices and had the 
same sales indices in comparison with private enterprises (Kocenda and Svejnar, 2002). 
Also, in a large-scale research of privatised companies in 25 transition economies the 
impact of the type of property was not observed (Carlin et al., 2001). 
In studies carried out in Russia by the BEA, the REB and other institutions, indicators of 
the positive influence of employees as owners on the efficiency of Russian companies 
(Aukutsionek and Batyaeva, 2000; Kapelushnikov, 2001; BEA, 2001; Bevan et al., 2001) 
were revealed. However, a positive correlation in a number of cases was explained by 
the endogenous factor, that is, the selection by employees of the most desirable 
enterprises in the course of privatization (BEA, 2001; Kuznetsov and Muravyev, 2001). 
Advantages of outside owners were identified in other studies (Radygin and Entov, 
2001). It seems that certain conclusions can only be made in respect of a positive 
correlation between the presence of foreign shareholders and the efficiency of the 
enterprise revealed in many researches both in Central and East-European countries and 
Russia (Kuznetsov and Muravyev, 2001; BEA, 2001; Radygin and Entov, 2001; 
Bessonova et al., 2003). 
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 There is no exact evidence of the positive effect of property concentration either. 
Attempts of econometric analysis of the effects of ownership concentration on the 
company performance in Russia and other countries did not yield clear outputs either. 
For example, Earl and Teledgy (Earl and Telegdy, 2001) have shown that ownership 
concentration was positively correlated with the performance (labor productivity) of 
Romanian companies. But in the Czech Republic it was possible to reveal positive 
impacts of dispersed property on the profitability of companies surveyed (Kocenda and 
Svejnar, 2002). In Poland it was shown that the effect of concentration on performance 
has a U-form, and competition works as a complimentary phenomenon for concentration 
in corporate governance (Grosfeld and Tressel, 2002). 
Based on the data of 400 Russian companies, a team of English scholars (Bevan, et al., 
2001) could not find correlations between business restructuring and enterprises 
performance. In some cases, a positive effect of ownership concentration was revealed 
(Radygin and Entov, 2001), while in others this was revealed as negative (Kuznetsov and 
Muravyev, 2001). In most cases, that correlation was not linear. Thus, a survey of mainly 
medium-sized industrial enterprises in the sample of the REB (Kapelushnikov, 2001) 
showed that enterprises with a medium extent of concentration were the most efficient 
(10% to 15% equity participation). According to data from Russia’s largest companies 
(Kuznetsov and Muravyev, 2001), the correlation between ownership concentration and 
profitability had, on the contrary, a U-form; it hit the minimum with equity participation 
by the largest shareholder amounting to 52%. 
Effects of integration on business restructuring and performance on the basis of 
empirical data have not been studied. It was noted by researchers that large business 
groups played an important role in investment processes and the hiring of skilled 
personnel (Dynkin and Sokolov, 2002), as well as in the structural transformation of the 
Russian economy (Deryabina, 2001). Integration was mainly necessitated by the need to 
reduce production costs and minimise transaction costs, as well as the need for 
consolidation of the market power and protection against opportunistic behaviour of 
market counterparts (Avdasheva, 2002). Integration was accompanied by such intense 
enterprise restructuring as was related both to reorganization of assets and establishment 
of a new business management system. 
The effect of the replacement of the CEO on the company’s performance was assessed 
differently. Data on 217 companies in the period 1998-1999 (Goltsman, 2000) revealed 
that the likelihood of change of the top management did not depend on the company’s 
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 performance. According to a survey carried out by the BEA (Muravyev, 2002), it was 
concluded that the likelihood of dismissal of a CEO with a poor performance record was 
higher. As noted in Muravyev (2003), the analysis of the management turnover was 
complicated due to the need to separate the effects related to such a replacement and the 
effects related to the shifts in ownership structure. 
Our interviews gave basis for preliminary comparison of ownership and control features 
with the economic state of surveyed companies. Our qualitative data demonstrated 
(Table 9) that JSCs characterised by higher ownership concentration, non-separation of 
property and control and by property of business groups had a better financial state and 
higher investment activities. At the same time, JSCs with ’old’ top-managers 
demonstrated higher investment activities without a significant difference in the financial 
state. In this case, start-up businesses run by owners and privatised enterprises that 
retained the old directors are combined in the same group. And ’de novo’ businesses 
determined better indicators of enterprise development. 
Let us formulate the major hypotheses (on the basis of interviews and outputs of various 
empirical researches) in respect of the role of ownership and mechanisms of corporate 
control in enterprise’s modernisation. 
 
Table 9.  Comparison of 33 interviewed JSCs with different features of corporate 
             control and ownership (% to a number of companies in each group) 
Financial state Investment activities 
Groups of JSCs 
Good Medium Bad High Medium Low 
Ownership concentration  
     - Higher 46 39 15 27 54 19 
     - Medium and low 17 33 50 17 50 33 
Dominant owner  
     - Top-managers 46 31 23 39 39 23 
     - External shareholders 35 40 25 15 55 25 
Integration  
     - Shareholding links 50 35 15 30 55 15 
     - No links 23 31 46 15 46 39 
Replacement of  CEO  
     - Changed after the crisis 39 39 22 22 50 28 
     - Not changed 43 36 21 29 50 21 
Total 39.5 39.5 21.0 24.2 51.5 24.2 
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 1) Ownership concentration provides the basis for the emergence of an efficient owner 
who is interested in reforming the business and the prospect of development thereof. 
The differences between new private shareholders and ’soviet-type’ CEOs who 
became key owners of their enterprises are eliminated. 
2) Integration makes it easier for enterprises to gain access to resources and market 
channels and facilitate restructuring and business development. 
3) Formal structures of ownership and corporate control do not reflect the specifics of 
internal corporate relations, so they cannot be treated as factors behind 
modernisation of  business. 
4) The turnover of the company’s CEOs is a complicated variable. It correlates closely 
with other parameters of ownership and corporate control. It includes both the 
dismissal and voluntary resignation of the CEO. In conditions of domination by a 
large shareholder, the CEO is either the owner or the secondary person in the 
business (whose situation is typical of the new CEOs). In this context, a change of 
the CEO cannot be regarded as a factor behind modernisation. In our opinion, a 
detailed analysis of a combination or separation of ownership and management 
should be taken into account in future studies. 
 
 
7  Effect of Ownership and Power Structures                  
on Business Restructuring and Performance:                 
Major Outputs 
Ownership structure: concentration of capital. Contrary to our assumptions, the clusters 
in question did not correlate with any indices of business performance. It was also 
neutral in respect of restructuring measures taken by enterprises. Separation of JSCs with 
the largest shareholder with the controlling interest did not reveal any differences in the 
performance of business, either. However, it showed that these companies were more 
active in implementation of investment projects. 
Those companies probably had better access to outside financing. JSCs with a higher 
extent of concentration of ownership used less their own capital; instead, they spent bank 
loans and funds received from Russian partners or non-government investors. If in the 
group with the owner with the controlling interest the share of their own capital 
amounted to 71% of investments (the share of banks and Russian investor-enterprises 
amounted to 14% and 11%, respectively), in the group of JSCs with a low concentration 
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 of capital it was over 86% (the share of banks and Russian investors amounted to 8% and 
less than 3%, respectively). More active borrowing by the enterprise from outside 
sources can be explained by the existence of the owner of the business; in such a 
situation the risks of non-repayment of loans become lower. Another evident explanation 
is the mitigation of “the insider’s dilemma”, since, as was shown above, domination by 
outside owners is more typical of JSCs with a high concentration of capital. 
Ownership structure: domination by the owner. The comparison of the two main groups 
of JSCs, which differ in the type of the dominant owner, did not constitute the case for 
the latter. Only a weak positive correlation was revealed between domination by insiders 
and the capital productivity over 3 years (1999, 2000, 2001) and the level of profitability 
in 2002. The group was neutral to distribution of JSCs according to investment activity 
and restructuring. In this context, there is no sufficiently convincing evidence for the fact 
that employees are efficient owners. 
Structure of power: domination by the shareholder in the board of directors. The 
comparison of the two main groups of JSCs did not show significant differences in 
business performance either. Statistical data revealed only a weak positive correlation 
between domination by employees and the level of capital productivity in 2000 and 
2001. 
Domination by outside private investors had an effect on frequencies of equipment sales 
and the managers training (such measures were taken by these companies 40-50% more 
often than by JSCs with domination by employees). 
Though investment activity was mostly the same, JSCs with domination by outside 
private owners financed 75% of their investments out of their own capital, as against 
82% of investments in case of the group with domination by employees.  
Mechanisms of corporate control: turnover of the CEO. The CEO’s term in office 
correlated weakly with the subjective estimation of the economic situation of the JSC. 
The best estimations were given by CEOs who held office for 4 to 10 years, while the 
worst estimations were given by ’young’ CEOs. It is not excluded that such a difference 
can be explained by the fact that the new generation of CEOs put forward higher 
demands. However, objective statistical data also showed a positive correlation between 
the CEO’s term in office and the level of labour productivity in respect of the gross value 
added in 2001 and 2002 and integral dynamics of that index in a three-year period. If, in 
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 the group of JSCs with ’young’ CEOs, a decrease in labour productivity in respect of the 
gross value added was observed with 29% of JSCs in the group of JSCs with ’old’ CEOs, 
it was observed in a mere 12.5% of JSCs. Also, in a period of three years the index of 
profitability positively correlated with the length of the CEO’s term in office. 
The length of CEO’s work in this position is a factor which is primarily neutral in 
relation to restructuring. A trivial significant correlation is the positive correlation 
between the existence of a ’young’ CEO and a radical change of the team of senior 
managers.  
Thus, CEOs who came to work at the enterprise before privatisation showed higher 
performance of their JSCs. To some extent, the above fact shows the higher efficiency of 
JSCs with concentrated ownership by employees (that is, ownership by managers), or it 
may also mean that managers were able to privatise more efficient enterprises. 
Integration: participation in amalgamations and business groups. This group is 
characterised by a certain correlation with enterprise performance. A positive correlation 
between participation in business groups and capital productivity and labour productivity 
(in 2001 and 2002) was revealed. So, 87% of integrated companies showed growth in 
this index in a three-year period as against 76% of autonomous JSCs. Participation by the 
company in an amalgamation correlated with the higher utilisation of industrial 
capacities by the enterprise. 
Only this group showed a close correlation with many restructuring measures (Fig.). 
There was a significant difference between enterprises affiliated with business groups 
and autonomous enterprises in respect of nine restructuring measures whose difference 
proved a positive correlation between participation in amalgamations and taking 
measures aimed at replacing obsolete equipment, putting into operation new facilities 
and introducing of new technologies and an increase in spending on R&D, marketing 
and advertising, and the training of personnel (20-40% more often). Implementation of 
an investment project, advance training of managers and change of the team of senior 
managers were undertaken 80% to 100% more often by integrated companies. 
In 2002, affiliated JSCs were more active in investments; the level of relative 
investments was 2 times higher than that of autonomous companies. Differences in 
sources of financing in the sample in question were statistically insignificant (JSCs 
belonging to groups financed 76.1% of investment out of their own capital and 13.8% of 
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 investment out of bank loans, compared with 83.0% and 9.2% in autonomous JSCs). At 
the same time, affiliated JSCs had easier access to investment loans. According to 
estimates of respondents, access to loans was easy or impossible for 29% of such JSCs in 
each case. As regards autonomous JSCs, only 16% of such companies had easy access to 
investment loans, while 44% estimated their company’s access to loans as impossible. 
Thus, integrated JSCs were more active in carrying out technical reconstruction, training 
of personnel and business restructuring related to market promotion. These companies 
can be characterised not only by an active restructuring policy, but also by a 
comprehensive nature of such policy, stronger investment policy and higher business 
performance. 
 
 
8  Concluding Remarks 
The main conclusions drawn from the outputs of empirical analysis are as follows: 
• After the 1998 crisis, intense processes of corporate ownership concentration and 
transfer of ownership from employees to outside private shareholders, and 
replacement of the senior management have taken place. Corporate ownership was 
mainly concentrated with insiders, which also included dominant outside owners. At 
the same time, executive management retained prevailing positions; it can either be 
a large owner or be affiliated with outside private owners. Insider control alone does 
not mean that ownership and control are separated or combined in the hands of the 
executive management. This topic demands further studies. Regional and local 
authorities (in some cases labour teams) are important stakeholders in corporate 
governance. 
 
• Intense vertical or lateral integration is the reality of the present-day development of 
the Russian industry. Integration stimulates the transfer of shares to outside owners 
and a change in composition of the dominant shareholders and mechanisms for 
enforcement of corporate control. 
 
• Different structures of corporate ownership and corporate control have no 
significant effect on business restructuring and performance. In this context, the 
hypothesis on the positive role of concentration of ownership was not convincingly 
proved.  
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 • Replacement of CEOs of JSCs was partly justified by redistribution of ownership 
and composition of the board of directors. The use of the above mechanism of CEOs 
turnover did not contribute to comprehensive enterprise restructuring and growth in 
their investment activity. At the same time, there was explicit evidence of the less 
efficient operation of enterprises run by new CEOs. ’Old’ CEOs probably ’took 
hold’ of the most potentially efficient enterprises. 
 
• The surveyed JSCs were characterised by low investment activity and the 
prevalence of their own funds in investment sources; the above showed the 
existence of significant barriers for business development. The specifics of 
financing investments were strongly connected with the insider type of corporate 
governance. Only one out of six respondents directly said that they were prepared to 
make their companies transparent and share control with new investors. A high 
concentration of capital or domination by outside owners in boards of directors 
contributed to a relatively greater use of outside sources of financing, mainly, bank 
loans and funds of Russian non-governmental investors. 
 
• Integration had a great effect on activities of JSCs. These phenomena had no 
correlation with the ownership structure and corporate control features. So we 
received corroboration for one of our hypotheses. Indirect characteristics of 
corporate control such as participation by the enterprise in amalgamations and 
business groups contributed to comprehensive restructuring and business 
development, growth in investment activity and improvement of the access to loans. 
As a result, the dynamics of the generated gross value added per employee was 
positive at integrated companies. 
 
• Obviously, the outputs obtained and conclusions drawn are correct to the sample 
data and indicators used. Therefore, ownership structures and composition of the 
board of directors cannot be regarded as factors behind modernisation of companies. 
It is likely that other factors and conditions have an effect on modernisation. At the 
same time, the available quantitative data inadequately reflects the actual property 
relations and internal corporate control specifics. It should also be stressed that with 
integration it is difficult to determine the actual company’s business boundaries (an 
enterprise as a legal entity vs. a firm as a business of dominating shareholders). It 
complicates the correct interpretation of statistical indices or survey data of an 
individual enterprise and can distort any precise statistical calculations or 
econometric analysis. 
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 Figure 1.  Profiles of Enterprise Restructuring Depending 
               on Participation in Amalgamations 
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 The Impact of Foreign Direct Investments 
on Export Competitiveness of Companies 
and Sectors: the Case of Baltic States  
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Abstract 
The Baltic States belong to a group of „radical reformers” who have successfully 
conducted their economic, political and social reforms. Since the early 90ties they have 
chosen the EU markets as their foreign policy orientation. This policy was mainly 
implemented through the development of  trade relations and building of a friendly 
environment for foreign investors (particularly from the EU), as well as adjustment 
process to the EU accession. Today most of the finance, telecom and a large part of 
manufacturing sector are foreign-owned. Overall, FDI has financed around one-fifth of 
fixed investments. With the relatively high importance of FDI, there has been very little 
academic research on FDI in the Baltics and their role in export specialization (with 
certain exceptions in Estonia). The paper attempts to present empirical evidence of the 
role of FDI in building competitive advantages of companies and sectors of the Baltic 
States on the EU Single Market in 1992-2003. The remainder of the paper proceeds as 
follows: Section 1 examines the sector, branch and regional structure of FDI in Baltic 
States. Section 2 represents the specialization indexes of the Baltic States in trade with 
the EU in a comparative analysis of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Section 3 analyses the 
correlation between FDI, specialization and employment in high, medium-high, medium-
low and low-tech manufacturing branches in the Baltic States. Finally, Section 4 gives 
some evidence of the contribution of foreign-owned firms to export competitiveness of 
the Baltic States to the EU markets. The paper ends with some concluding remarks and 
policy implications. 
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 1  Sector, Branch and Regional Structure                         
of FDI in Baltic States 
Small countries like the Baltic States usually attract only small amounts of FDI in 
nominal terms, which explains the fact that three Baltic countries received about 6-7 
percent of FDI inflows into CEE countries, which makes some 1.4 billion USD (2002) 
(Table 1). 
 
Table 1.  Inflows of FDI to the Baltic states in 1993 - 2002 in millions of USD 
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Baltic States 237 398 729 641 973 1799 1031 792 1407 1325 
Estonia 156 212 199 111 130 575 222 183 201 364 
Latvia 51 155 244 379 515 303 331 153 430 514 
Lithuania 30 31 72 151 328 921 478 456 776 447 
 
Source: The EU Foreign Direct Investment Yearbook 2001, Eurostat 2002; World Investment Report 2002, UNCTAD. 
 
 
 
However, this insignificant amount (in international comparison) is very important for 
the small Baltic economies, and  makes some 20-40 percent of gross fixed capital 
formation and finances a large part of the current account deficit.  
It is important to note that Estonia started to receive FDI earlier than Latvia and 
Lithuania as it was more attractive for foreign investors due to early market reforms. In 
2003, the inward FDI stock in Estonia was 70 percent of GDP, twice as high as in Latvia 
(37.4 percent) and Lithuania (34.5 percent) (Table 2). In all three Baltic countries, the 
stock of FDI (in percent of GDP) is above the world average. 
 
Table 2.  Inward FDI stock in % of GDP in 1992-2003 
Year 1992 1994 1996 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Estonia 21.0 27.0 27.8 29.4 25.4 51.5 57.2 65.9 69.0 
Lithuania 23.0 23.1 23.0 24.3 22.5 20.9 22.2 31.4 34.5 
Latvia 11.2 14.9 18.1 20.1 25.0 29.1 30.4 32.4 37.4 
 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit 2001; U. Varblane, Foreign Direct Investments in the Estonian Economy, Tartu 
2001, p. 59. 
 
 
More than half of the FDI stock in the Baltic States came from the EU. In 2003 Estonia 
attracted the highest share of direct investments from the EU – 83.44 percent, in 
comparison to Latvia - 50.9 percent and Lithuania - 56.2 percent. Moreover, the biggest 
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 part of FDI stems from the Scandinavian and Nordic countries (Sweden, Finland, 
Denmark).  
The sector distribution of FDI reflects the structure of the Baltic economies. As Table 3 
shows, service sectors – such as transport, telecommunications, business services, and 
finance – have attracted the bulk of FDI in the last years of 1995-2003, whereas in the 
earlier period 1993-1995 most of FDI went to the manufacturing sector (on average in 
Estonia – 23 percent, Latvia – 20 percent, Lithuania – 26 percent).  
 
Table 3.  Sector structure of FDI in the Baltic states in the years 
              1995 and 2002 (in %) 
Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
Sectors 
1995 2002 1995 2002 1995 2002 
Manufacturing  45.0 23.0 22.6 20.8 45.0 25.6 
Agriculture 5.0 1.6.0 0.2 0.5 4.9 0.5 
Trade 24.0 14.0 7.1 14.1 23.9 20.4 
Financial intermediation 7.0 23.0 12.8 16.1 - 19.8 
Transport and communication 11.0 19.0 31.0 17.4 18.0 18.8 
Others 8.0 17.4 26.3 32.1 8.2 14.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Source: Foreign Direct Investment 2002; U.Varblane, Foreign Direct Investment in the Estonian Economy, Tartu 2001;
Estonian Statistics 2003, Monthly No. 4 (136).  
 
 
 
 
Privatization processes, followed  by trade liberalization, have become leading factors 
attracting foreign investors (Linge, 2000). The high share of FDI related to transport, 
storage and telecommunications is specific to the region. It is due to the transit position 
of the Baltic countries - from Russia to the EU countries. Financial intermediation is 
another service sector that has attracted considerable interest of foreign investors. It 
accounts for 16-28 percent of total FDI. Tallin, the capital of Estonia, is considered to be 
the financial center of the region. In the banking sector foreign control is almost 
complete. About 90 percent of the banking assets are held by foreign subsidiaries.  
The share of manufacturing in inward FDI stock ranges from 20 percent in Latvia to 26 
percent in Lithuania. Most of the manufacturing FDI is in low-tech sectors of wood 
processing (including paper and furniture), textiles and food. These three industries 
received almost 40 percent of the manufacturing FDI in Estonia, 55 percent in Lithuania 
and 47 percent in Latvia in 2002 (Table 4). While the food industry mainly targets the 
local markets, exports of the wood processing industries are substantial (particularly for 
Latvia). The chemical industry comes second owing to an oil refinery that refines 
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 Russian oil for export (in particularly in Lithuania and Estonia). Textiles and clothing 
FDI represents about 10 percent of manufacturing FDI in all three countries. New 
greenfield investments in this sector are export oriented, especially in Lithuania and 
Estonia. 
 
Table 4.  Structure of manufacturing FDI in Baltic states in 1996 and 2002 in % 
 Estonia Lithuania Latvia 
Manufacturing branch 1996 2002 1996 2002 1996 2002 
Food, beverages and tobacco 31.0 22.6 40.9 42.4 50.9 29.9 
Textile and textile products 10.1 13.8 9.0 12.2 12.0 11.9 
Leather and leather products 0.6 - 1.4 3.5 0.1 0.04 
Wood and wood products (excluding 
furniture) 
0.5 - 0.1 0.1 12.0 17.6 
Pulp, paper, publishing and printing 6.0 16.5 4.1 4.8 0.4 0.5 
Coke, refined petroleum & nuclear fuel 5.5 - 4.4 4.1 2.0 1.5 
Chemicals and man-made fibers 17.6 9.7 14.3 3.4 0.4 0.3 
Rubber and plastics  3.0 1.1 1.1 3.9 0.9 1.0 
Basic metals and fabricated metals 16.8 - 5.3 6.9 1.8 2.5 
Electrical and computer equipment 4.2 3.3 1.2 1.3 1.0 1.8 
Optical equipment 5.7 6.2 0.8 0.9 0.3 0.6 
Transport, machinery and equipment 4.0 6.9 0.5 5.5 0.1 4.4 
Manufacturing (including furniture) 7.2 4.0 1.0 1.3 - - 
 
Source: Estonian Statistics 1999, Tallin 1999; data from The Latvian Bureau of Statistics, Riga 2003; The Lithuanian
Statistical Department, Vilnius 2003; WIIW, Nr. 286 (2002);  
 
 
 
 
Higher value added sectors of machinery, optical, electronic and transport equipment 
have a combined manufacturing FDI share of more than 14 percent in Estonia but only 7-
8 percent in Lithuania and Latvia. Some of the foreign subsidiaries in high-value-added 
manufacturing have become increasingly export oriented, like the Finish electronic 
equipment producers in Estonia. The other two countries are still lacking export-oriented 
investors in high and medium-high tech industries.  
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 2  Trade Specialization of the Baltic States Trade           
with the EU: Comparative Analysis of Estonia,               
Latvia and Lithuania 
Since 1993 the Baltic States trade with the EU progressed with remarkable speed, both in 
imports and exports values (Table 5). After trade liberalization and re-orientation, the EU 
markets (in particularly its Baltic Sea Region members) have become the target markets 
(UNCTAD, 2003). All three countries have been marked with negative trade balances 
with the EU during the observed period 1993-2003. A broadly similar picture can be 
observed in the manufacturing trade as well.  
 
Table 5.  The Baltic states trade with the EU in 1993-2002 as % GDP 
Export 1993 1995 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Estonia 43.5 54.7 48.6 55.1 62.8 68.5 69.0 64.3 70.1 
Latvia - 44.2 48.8 56.6 62.6 64.7 59.8 60.6 62.6 
Lithuania 21.0 36.4 32.5 38.0 50.1 47.9 49.4 48.4 54.0 
Import 1993 1995 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Estonia 55.3 66.0 59.2 60.2 57.8 56.1 53.2 55.4 51.3 
Latvia - 49.9 53.1 55.3 53.7 52.4 50.4 54.2 49.4 
Lithuania 23.0 37.2 44.3 47.2 46.5 43.6 42.4 46.0 43.0 
 
Source: Foreign Trade 1999; 2000; 2001. Statistical Yearbook on Candidate and South East European Countries, 
Eurostat 2002; Estonian Statistics 2003, Tallin 2003. 
 
 
 
The share of the EU in total manufacturing exports ranged from 41% in Lithuania (in 
2000) to 58% in Estonia (in 1999) (Latvia 49%). The trade deficit with the EU was 
mainly due to a rising surplus in labor- or mainstream goods, such as textiles, wood 
products and manufacturing (mainly furniture), in case of Lithuania also  coke and 
refined petroleum products. Estonia has significantly improved its export deficit in high-
tech products in relations with the EU (in 2002 compared to 1995).1 This does not 
concern the other two Baltic countries. 
The indicator of the revealed comparative advantage provides a more concise picture of 
trade specialization. The RCAs presented in Table 6 indicate that Estonia has achieved 
revealed comparative advantage in trade with the EU in: textiles, wood products and 
furniture. There was one branch where Estonia saw  a drop in the RCA index in 1995 
                                                 
1 See Hunya (2002). 
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 compared to 1992: food sector, which has developed mainly due to the inflows of FDI 
(the share of FDI amounted to 20-30% in 1995). 
 
Table 6.  Revealed comparative advantage (RCA) of Estonian manufacturing  
              trade with the EU in the years  1992, 1995, 1999, 2003 
RCA in trade with the EU  
 Year 1992 1995 1999 2003 
I Food products, beverages and tobacco 0.33 0.11 -0.40 -0.15 
II Textile and textile products 0.25 0.26 0.43 0.45 
III Leather and leather products - - - - 
IV Wood and wood products (excluding furniture) - - 2.00 1.62 
V Pulp, paper &paper products, publishing and printing 0.25 0.90 -0.43 -0.13 
VI Coke, refined petroleum products & nuclear fuel -0.24 -0.34 -1.07 -0.79 
VII Chemicals, chemical products and man-made fibers -0.29 -0.19 -0.68 -0.56 
VII
I 
Rubber and plastic products - - -0.98 -0.91 
IX Basic metals and fabricated metal products 0.10 -0.05 -0.14 -0.13 
X Electrical and optical equipment -0.75 -0.50 -0.03 -0.08 
XI Transport, machinery and equipment -0.15 -0.13 -1.01 -1.27 
XII Manufacturing (including furniture)  0.68 0.67 1.37 1.72 
 
Source: own calculations based on formula RCAj= ln [x  j /mj  : ∑xj /∑mj ], where x – export, m – import, j – selected
product group and data from Statistikaamet, Tallin 1993r.; Eesti Pank, Annual Report 1994; Foreign Trade: Lithuania, 
Latvia, Estonia 1999, 2001, 2003.  
 
 
 
Despite a significant inflow of FDI into petroleum and chemical, computer and electrical 
equipment industries these branches show no improvements in trade relations with the 
EU. In comparison to Estonian bilateral relations with Finland and Sweden (its main 
trade partners) some positive results can be observed. Starting from 1997, apart from the 
traditional branches (textiles, wood products), Estonia has been observing positive RCAs 
in electrical, communication and optical equipment trade with Finland. Similar effects 
have been noticed with Sweden since 2002.  
Lithuania’s competitive position in trade with the EU measured by RCA index improved 
as well in 1995-2003 compared to the period 1992-1995. Similarly to Estonia, there were 
few branches where Lithuania had a positive comparative advantage: textiles (the highest 
RCA among Baltic States), leather, wood, coke and refined petroleum products and 
furniture (Table 7). 
In bilateral relations with its main partners – Great Britain, Denmark - Lithuania has also 
observed RCA improvements, apart from its traditional branches - wood, textiles, refined 
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 petroleum products (with the exception of Denmark in 1997), in electrical and transport 
equipment (with the exception of Great Britain). 
 
Table 7.  Revealed comparative advantage (RCA) of Lithuanian manufacturing 
             trade with the EU in the years 1992, 1995, 1999, 2003 
RCA in trade with the EU  
 Year 1992 1995 1999 2003 
I Food products, beverages and tobacco -1.04 0.01 -0.48 -0.08 
II Textile and textile products 0.02 0.52 0.88 0.82 
III Leather and leather products 0.53 0.48 0.94 0.57 
IV Wood and wood products (excluding furniture) 0.81 2.26 2.53 2.28 
V Pulp, paper & paper products, publishing and printing -0.89 -0.63 -2.40 -2.99 
VI Coke, refined petroleum products & nuclear fuel 2.63 -0.56 0.26 3.26 
VII Chemicals, chemical products and man-made fibers 0.51 0.26 0.02 -0.41 
VIII Rubber and plastic products -0.08 -0.54 -1.31 -1.56 
IX Basic metals and fabricated metal products 1.04 -0.02 -0.53 -0.84 
X Electrical equipment -1.66 -0.34 -0.69 -0.97 
XI Optical equipment -1.34 -0.77 -1.11 -0.77 
XII Transport, machinery and equipment -0.82 -0.46 -0.87 -0.99 
XIII Manufacturing (including furniture) -0.56 0.38 0.97 1.61 
 
Source: own calculations based on formula RCAj= ln [x  j /mj  : ∑xj /∑mj ], where x – export, m – import, j – selected
product group and data from Lietuvos Statistikos Departamento, Vilnius 1993; Foreign Trade: Lithuania, Latvia, 
Estonia 1999, 2001, 2003. 
 
 
 
The RCAs for Latvia presented in Table 8 indicate that the country has achieved the 
highest comparative advantages in wood products (among Baltic States in 2003), refined 
petroleum products, basic metals, leather products and textiles. Positive RCAs have also 
been observed with Latvia’s two main EU partners – Germany and Sweden (about 40-
50% of total turnover with the EU in 2003). The advantages with Germany have been 
achieved due to growing exports of wood products and textiles. A deteriorating trade 
competitiveness can be observed in trade relations with Sweden, in particularly in 
exports of textiles, wood products and furniture, yet there have been remarkable 
improvements in trade relations with Denmark (due to exports of transport equipment). 
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 Table 8.  Revealed comparative advantage (RCA) of Latvian manufacturing 
              trade with the EU in the years 1992, 1995, 1999, 2003 
RCA in trade with the EU  
Year 1992 1995 1999 2003 
I Food products, beverages and tobacco -0.60 -0.86 -1.72 -0.99 
II Textile and textile products 2.89 0.53 1.18 0.54 
III Leather and leather products 1.2 - 0.89 0.86 
IV Wood and wood products (excluding furniture) 3.68 1.95 4.31 4.11 
V Pulp, paper products, publishing and printing -1.70 - -2.41 -2.41 
VI Coke, refined petroleum products & nuclear fuel - - 0.76 0.56 
VII Chemicals, chemical products, man-made fibers -1.69 0.34 -1.51 -2.04 
VII
I 
Rubber and plastic products -0.72 - -2.12 -1.38 
IX Basic metals and fabricated metal products 0.21 1.93 0.16 0.72 
X Electrical equipment -2.89 -1.51 -1.89 -1.96 
XI Optical equipment -1.40 - -2.12 -2.41 
XII Transport, machinery and equipment 0.21 0.66 -2.41 -3.22 
XII
I 
Manufacturing (including furniture) 2.60 1.66 1.08 0.95 
 
Source: own calculations based on formula RCAj= ln [x  j /mj  : ∑xj /∑mj ], where x – export, m – import, j – selected
product group and data from Latvian Statistical Office, Riga 1993; Foreign Trade: Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia 1999, 
2001, 2003.. 
 
 
 
The export of the Baltic States on the EU markets consists of intra-industry trade (over 
60% in 2003). This confirms that their export specialization is based on similar goods 
with relatively different quality (Table 9).  
 
Table 9.  Intra-industry trade (IIT) indexes for Baltic states with the EU (2003) 
  Estonia Lithuania Latvia 
I Food products, beverages and tobacco 0.61 0.83 0.59 
II Textile and textile products 0.84 0.74 0.95 
III Leather and leather products 0.72 0.67 0.79 
IV Wood and wood products (excluding furniture) 0.15 0.25 0.06 
V Pulp, paper & paper products, publishing and printing 0.58 0.08 0.17 
VI Coke, refined petroleum products & nuclear fuel 0.87 0.10 0.92 
VII Chemicals, chemical products and man-made fibers 0.31 0.67 0.28 
VIII Rubber and plastic products 0.44 0.78 0.16 
IX Basic metals and fabricated metal products 0.77 0.50 0.28 
X Electrical equipment 0.93 0.45 0.87 
XI Optical equipment 0.99 0.52 0.17 
XII Transport, machinery and equipment 0.36 0.04 0.08 
XIII Manufacturing (including furniture) 0.46 0.55 0.75 
 
Source: own calculations based on the formula IIT=Export j+Import j-⎜ Export j+Import j⎜/Export j+Import j, where j 
– denotes the particular product or group of commodities. The indexes values vary from 0-1 and indicate the intensity
of the intra-industry trade. Source of data: The Statistical Office of Estonia; Lithuanian Department of Statistics; 
Latvian Statistical Office. 
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 We can see that the highest IIT indexes in the Estonian trade with the EU have been in 
selected technology-driven (electrical and optical equipment), capital-intensive 
(petroleum and metals), marketing-driven (food and beverages) as well as labor-intensive 
products (textiles, leather)2. Lithuania’s intra-industry trade specialization is the most 
intensive in labor-intensive products (textiles, wood, leather) and partly capital-intensive 
products (chemicals). There was a drop in specialization indexes in refined petroleum 
products, which was caused by a decreasing import from the EU in the last years 2002-
2003. The structure of IIT indexes for Latvia looks similarly to that of the previous two 
Baltic countries. It has a dominant specialization in labor-intensive, capital-intensive 
products as well as technology-driven ones (due to increasing imports from the EU of 
electrical equipment, machinery, radio and communications equipment).  
The level of  intra-industry trade indicates the structural differences between the Baltic 
States and the EU. In 2002 the average level of this index amounted to 0.62% for 
Estonia, 0.47% for Lithuania and 0.46% for Latvia. 
 
 
3  FDI, Employment and Trade Specialization  
The regression analysis between RCAs and manufacturing FDIs in high, medium-high, 
medium-low and low-tech industries in the Baltic States revealed their positive 
correlations. The function of regression is defined as RCAt= mFDIt +nEIt + b (t - 
selected year), where EI is the employment rate in high, medium-high, medium-low and 
low-tech industries. The data covered the period 1994-2003 for the three Baltic States. 
For ease of interpretation, it was considered that the impact of independent variables 
(FDI and EI) on the dependent ones (RCA) is equal in all groups (Weresa, 2001). 
The regression model for Estonia indicates that its comparative advantages measured by 
RCA in the period t had a low dependence on FDI and employment rates. The closest to 
the desirable level was medium-low-tech industry (production of transport equipment) 
and low-tech (production of refined petroleum products, wood products and furniture). 
Relatively high correlation was observed for the high-tech industry (production of 
communications equipment). In the case of Lithuania the highest correlation was 
observed in the case of medium-high-tech industry (production of machines and 
electrical equipment), and medium-low-tech industry (production of rubber and plastics). 
                                                 
2 See Varblane (2000). 
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 The correlation in low-tech industry covers mainly textile production. There was a low 
correlation between RCA and FDI in the high-tech industry. The correlation results for 
Latvia indicate a strong dependence of RCA on FDI inflows and employment in high-
tech (production of communications equipment) and medium-high-tech industries 
(electrical machines and equipment).  
The test of significance (t-Student) confirms (with probability of error at 5 percent) the 
significance of FDI in explaining the comparative advantages in Estonia in the medium-
high-tech industry, in Lithuania in the medium-high, medium-low and low-tech 
industries and in Latvia in high-tech and medium-high-tech industries. Changes in 
employment had similar impact on RCAs in the mentioned industrial branches.  
Summing up, the analysis of regression revealed different results for each country. 
Estonia and Lithuania observed the lowest correlation among the Baltic States between 
comparative advantages, manufacturing FDIs and employment rates. However, it is 
important to note that the results of regression could differ a lot if they were based on the 
bilateral trade-investment correlation – for example on the Estonian-Finish relations.  
 
 
4  The Importance of Foreign Owned Companies             
in Developing Export Competitiveness. Role of           
Technology-transfer and Investments into R&D 
Empirical evidence from broad-based country studies suggests that FDI has a positive 
impact on economic growth, restructuring and competitiveness – both directly through 
transfer of capital and knowledge to foreign-owned companies and indirectly through 
spillovers to the domestic sector (Hunya, 2004). The data showing the share of foreign-
owned companies in output, exports and employment are not available from statistical 
offices (with the exception of Estonia). The author’s own survey on a small sample of 
108 firms acting in Baltic States (2003/2004). In Estonia there were 24 firms (foreign-
owned companies made 33 percent and domestic 67 percent), in Lithuania 50 firms 
(foreign-owned made 54 percent and domestic ones 46 percent) and in Latvia 34 firms 
(foreign owned made 44 percent and domestic ones 56 percent). Some 54 percent of 
Estonian foreign-owned firms (telecommunications and electrical equipment), 38 percent 
of Lithuanian foreign-owned firms (food, tobacco and electrical equipment) and 38 
percent of Latvian foreign-owned firms (electrical and telecommunications equipment) 
have exported their goods to the EU markets. Some 81 percent of Estonian, 100 percent 
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 of Lithuanian and 84 percent of Latvian companies have significantly improved the 
quality of their products (Table 10).  
 
Table 10.  Share of firms which introduced new products or 
                used improved technological systems of production 
Domestic firms Foreign-owned firms 
Estonia Lithuania Latvia Estonia Lithuania Latvia % companies 
 %  %  %  %  %  % 
Improved products  5 63 14 52 12 80 12 81 21 100 16 84 
Improved systems of 
production or 
technology 
3 37 18 67 9 60 9 56 18 78 15 79 
Have quality certificates 
ISO 9001 
ISO 14000 
Other 
System of quality 
control 
8 100 18 67 13 87 16 100 13 62 14 73 
 
Source: author’s own survey.  
 
 
These changes were observed in most of the foreign-owned companies (63 percent of 
Estonian, 52 percent of Lithuanian, 80 percent of Latvian). Some 56 of Estonian, 78 
percent of Lithuanian and 79 percent of Latvian foreign-owned companies received 
technological know-how from the mother companies.  
Survey showed that FDI also strengthened the host countries’ export potential by 
increasing company investments into R&D. Activities related to R&D were conducted 
by 68 percent of  foreign-owned and 63 percent of domestic Estonian companies, 69 
percent of foreign-owned and 77 percent of domestic Lithuanian companies, and 89 
percent foreign-owned and 73 percent of domestic Latvian companies. Survey showed 
that in all three countries foreign-owned companies aimed to meet the local consumers 
needs, whereas in domestic companies R&D activities aimed at new management and 
production solutions. Moreover, R&D activity in foreign-owned companies was 
concentrated mainly in the smallest (up to 50 employees) and the largest firms (more 
than 500 employees) (with the exception of Latvia). These companies have spent on 
average 4-5 percent and 3-4 percent of their total turnovers, whereas domestic companies 
have spent only 1-3 percent.  
Another survey based on a larger sample of Estonian companies (1999) proved that 
foreign-owned companies (over 50 percent of foreign capital) in low-tech and high–tech 
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 industries achieve 40-50 percent better productivity and larger exports per employee. 
Such data is, however, not available for the other two countries – Latvia and Lithuania. 
 
 
5  Concluding Remarks and Policy Implications 
In 1992-1995 major part of FDI went to manufacturing sector, while in the last years 
1995-2003 most of FDI has been directed to services. Manufacturing FDI went mainly 
into low-tech industries. FDI has reinforced the given economic structure and has not 
generated much structural change. Latvia and Lithuania with their export-oriented FDI in 
textiles, wood products and refined petroleum products are more similar to other less 
developed transition countries. Estonia has succeeded more than the other two countries 
in attracting export-oriented transnational corporations specializing in high-tech 
products.  
FDI can strengthen manufacturing and services functions for the regional market. 
However, the extent of the FDI impact on the country’s specialization depends also on 
other policies enhancing the FDI inflows, technological learning and spillover effects in 
the national companies.  
The Baltic States should continue to absorb a fair amount of international FDI flows. The 
transit role of the Baltic States for the EU and Russia should attract substantial 
international FDI inflows to the Baltics. Finally, one of the important policies affecting 
the FDI inflows into high-tech industries of the Baltic States are their long-term 
innovation and competitiveness strategies, which will facilitate further catching-up 
processes, improve their long-term export competitiveness and develop their national 
specialization in the EU markets. 
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The model of the “knowledge economy” has become a paradigmatic framework in 
Europe within which a proposal of new industrial and economic development policy can 
be designed. However, the concept of the “knowledge economy” appears as rather loose. 
In this perspective it seems useful to underline the difference between this concept and 
other related concepts, such as: 
• high tech or R&D intensive industries, 
• information and communication technologies, 
• new technologies, biotechnologies and nanotechnologies, 
• human capital and education levels, 
• knowledge intensive services, 
• intangible assets and intellectual capital. 
 
Usually, the concepts of the “knowledge economy” are used in order to indicate a 
development phase where the scientific knowledge and human resources represent the 
strategic factors. In this study, the concept of knowledge economy is identified with that 
of the “learning economy” and the analysis is focused on the link between the processes 
of learning, innovation and competitiveness. 
In a knowledge economy the competitiveness of the firms is determined by the quality of 
the products and processes, the decrease of decision, production and delivery times of 
new products, the adoption of technological and organizational innovation in production 
                                                 
* Riccardo Cappellin, University of Rome "Tor Vergata", Italy. 
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processes. It is crucial to develop the competencies and professional skills of the labour 
force, the intermediate and top managers. The factor which determines the survival and 
success of firms are increasingly less the fixed investment and the financial resources 
and more the know-how, the intangible resources and the distinctive competencies. 
This contribution aims, first of all, to illustrate the importance of medium and low 
technology products in international trade and the competition between the three world 
large economic regions. 
Secondly, it illustrates the process of innovation, knowledge creation and interactive 
learning, which characterizes national and regional innovation systems specialized in 
medium and low technology sectors, and the structural characteristics of knowledge and 
innovation networks1. 
Thirdly, it illustrates the model of multi-level governance as the most appropriate method 
for promoting the processes of systemic innovation, both in the high technology sectors 
and in the medium and low technology sectors, by facilitating the integration of the 
various actors and firms within interactive learning processes. 
In general, this contribution aims to illustrate that the processes of innovation in the 
medium and low technology sectors are different from those in the high technology 
sectors, as they are not based on high investments in R&D but rather on the importance 
of interactive learning processes, informal research activities and the development of 
tacit competencies of integration. 
It also aims to highlight that an high international competitiveness of economies 
specialized in medium technology industrial sectors requires the steering of knowledge 
and innovation networks within the national and regional innovation systems and a new 
policy making approach which may be defined as the process multi-level governance and 
is different not only from the traditional hierarchical planning approach but also from 
pure competition as in the free market model. 
                                                 
1 This section of the paper is based on the preliminary results of the project: “IKINET – 
International Knowledge  and  Innovation  Networks  for  European  integration,  cohesion  and 
enlargement”, EU Sixth Framework Programme, contract N°: CIT2-CT-2004-506242, 
http://www.economia.uniroma2.it/dei/ikinet. 
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1  The International Specialization                                    
in the Medium Technology Sectors 
According to OECD statistics the share of medium technology trade is not only more 
than half of the total trade in OECD countries, but it has also been rather stable in the last 
ten years, as the growth of high technology sectors has occurred at the expenses of low 
technology sectors and not of medium technology sectors. 
 
Table 1  Structure of OECD manufacturing trade by technology intensity 
            (share in total manufacturing trade) 
  High technology Medium-high technology 
Medium-low 
technology Low technology 
1992 19.7 38.9 16.5 24.9 
1993 20.6 38.4 16.2 24.7 
1994 20.9 38.9 15.8 24.3 
1995 21.2 39.1 16.0 23.6 
1996 21.6 39.4 15.6 23.3 
1997 22.7 39.2 15.4 22.6 
1998 23.9 39.2 14.8 22.0 
1999 25.1 39.2 14.1 21.5 
2000 26.9 38.1 14.7 20.3 
2001 26.1 38.3 14.7 20.8 
 
Source: OECD, STI Scoreboard 2003 and STAN database, May 2003. 
 
 
 
World trade may be analyzed by comparing individual countries, as the United States 
and the individual European countries, which clearly have a much minor size whether 
they are taken individually. Otherwise, it can be analyzed by considering large areas of 
economic integration. In this framework, Europe or the European Community can be 
compared to the North American economy (NAFTA). That requires subtracting the trade 
flows with the contiguous countries belonging to the same regional area. It results that 
the export from the NAFTA area (481 mld dollars) to the other world areas were in 2002 
almost the half of the European exports (940 mld dollars)2.  
On the contrary, the imports of products from both areas (respectively 981 e 933 mld.) 
were almost equal between North America and Europe. Therefore, the low value of 
exports or the low competitiveness of American productions on the international markets 
                                                 
2 See WTO (2003a). 
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are the fundamental reasons of the enormous deficit of the American trade balance, 
which increasingly appears as the most important dangerous factor of instability of the 
world economy (WTO, 2003a). 
Often it is argued that a greater specialization in the high tech sectors is crucial in order 
not to loose share of international trade. This statement is rather general and need to be 
qualified. In fact, the analysis of the period 1992-2001 indicates that the growth rate of 
international trade has been very high in various sectors with intermediate technology 
(such as electrical machinery) and even in some low technology sectors (such as other 
manufacturing products)3.  
Moreover, the flows of ICT products have increased in the most recent years (2002) to a 
much lower pace than the other industrial products. That is clearly linked to the burst of 
the dot-com speculative bubble, determined by excessive investments in the ICT sectors 
and to the increasing role in the international trade of fast growing countries, such as 
China, which are determining higher trade flows in other products, such as raw materials 
and traditional industrial products. 
The percentage of high tech sectors on total exports is an inappropriate indicator of 
innovative capability, since high values are indicated not only for Japan and US, but also 
for Mexico and Hungary, which overcome countries such as Sweden and Finland 
(OECD, 2003). 
According to OECD, manufacturing sectors can be distinguished in high, medium-high, 
medium-low and low technology sectors on the base of their average ration of R&D 
expenditure on value added. In this framework, the ICT and pharmaceutical sectors, in 
which the US specialization is strong, are among those with high technology, while 
among the medium-high technology sectors are those in which traditionally European 
countries are specialized, such electrical machinery, automobile industry and chemical 
industry (OECD, 2003). 
In this perspective, it may be useful to analyze on the base of the WTO data for the years 
2000-2002 the network of world trade flows for some categories of product, which have 
been defined according to inclusive criteria and may be classified according to an 
increasing order of technological intensity, such as: a) total trade and within it: b) 
                                                 
3 See OECD (2003). 
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manufacturing products, and within it: c) machinery and transport equipment, and within 
it: d) office and telecommunication equipments. Three areas may be considered: North 
America, which includes US and Canada, Western Europe and the rest of the World, 
which thus includes large countries such as Japan, China and the other Asian economies. 
As it is well known the US are usually considered as the most technologically advanced 
economy of the world and various scoreboards elaborated by international organizations 
define the US as the most competitive economy. Therefore, the data of world trade 
should indicate that North America has a large positive trade balance especially in the 
most advanced sector, such as the “office and telecom equipments and then in the 
following order: the machinery and transport equipment, the manufactures non 
machinery and finally also for manufactures products. 
In fact, it may be seen that North America has a deficit even in the office and telecom 
equipment sector and a greater and increasing deficit (-176) in the machinery and 
transport equipment. A slightly lower although increasing deficit (-163) appears in the 
manufactures non machinery sector and finally a very low and also decreasing deficit (-
51) in the non manufacturing sectors such as agricultural and mining products4.  
Therefore, the specialization of North America economy is greater in the sectors with 
lower technological intensity, such as agricultural and mining products and it is 
decreasing in the more advanced sectors, such as machinery and transport equipment. 
Similar indications may be derived from the analysis of the shares of individual products 
on the total exports of the individual areas and from the index of specialization in table 3 
(world equal 100). 
North America is characterized by a rather peculiar specialization. On the one hand it has 
a strong specialization in the agricultural and mining products and on the other it has a 
strong specialization in the machinery and transport equipment. Finally it had a positive 
specialization, later becoming negative, in the office and telecom equipment sector. 
Therefore the specialization in the “high tech” sectors of North America is not the result 
of an absolute strength in these sector, as it would be in the case of a supposed greater 
competitiveness in these sectors, while it is the simple statistical result of the low overall 
exports of North America. 
                                                 
4 Our elaboration on WTO (2003b). 
 585 
In fact, North America has a negative trade balance, as indicated above, both on 
machinery and transport equipment and on office and telecom equipment and on the 
other hand also the exports of other sectors are low, such as in the case of manufactures 
non machinery, which indicate a very strong negative trade balance and a very low 
specialization index. 
Therefore, the strong specialization of American export in the high technology sectors, 
on the one hand does not hinder the fact that North America has a high deficit in the high 
technology sectors and on the other hand it is due to the low value of the medium and 
low technology exports. In other terms, it is the results of an even weaker 
competitiveness of the medium and low technology sectors. 
On the contrary, the European economy is characterized by a large positive and 
increasing trade balance in the machinery and transport equipment sector and by an even 
larger balance in the manufactures non machinery sector. Similar indications may be 
derived from the observation of the export shares and of the index of specialization of 
these two sectors. On the other hand, Western Europe is characterized by a large trade 
deficit in the agricultural and mining products sectors, where North America for simple 
geographical reasons is largely favoured. 
Finally the Rest of the World, where Japan and the other Asian economies have a crucial 
role, is characterized by a positive trade balance in the office and telecom equipment 
sector and in the agricultural and mining products sectors. Similar indications may be 
derived from the analysis of the export shares of these sectors and by the index of 
specialization. 
In conclusion: 
• Western Europe is specialized in the manufactures products and in manufactures 
non machinery products, 
• North America is specialized in the agricultural and mining products sectors and in 
the machinery and transport equipment sector, 
• Rest of the World is specialized in agricultural and mining products sectors and in 
office and telecom equipment sector. 
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The specialization indexes do not change substantially in time. However, it is possible to 
observe that: 
• North America despecializes from the office and telecom equipment and the machinery 
and transport equipment 
• Western Europe despecializes from the agricultural and mining products and the office 
and telecom equipment, 
• The Rest of the World specializes even more in the office and telecom equipment sector. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.  Trade balance for products with different 
             technological intensity in three world areas 
 
Total 
merchandise 
exports 
Agriculture 
and mining Manufactures
Manufactures 
non 
machinery 
Machinery 
and transport 
equipment 
Office and 
telecom 
  2000 2002 2000 2002 2000 2002 2000 2002 2000 2002 2000 2002 
North America -347 -390 -291 -51 -289 -339 -135 -163 -154 -176 -54 -62 
Western Europe 4 109 -603 -111 125 220 75 115 50 105 -56 -65 
Rest of the World 344 281 895 162 164 119 60 49 105 71 110 107 
 
Source: WTO (2003b). 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.  Share of exports by sector on total exports 
 World North America Western Europe Rest of the World 
 2000 2001 2002 2000 2001 2002 2000 2001 2002 2000 2001 2002 
Agricultural products 8.81 9.20 9.29 10.04 10.45 10.72 9.27 9.27 9.36 7.90 8.64 8.71 
Mining products 13.85 13.17 12.56 7.19 7.51 7.16 7.74 7.25 6.89 22.14 21.29 20.11 
Manufactures 74.83 74.97 75.06 77.98 77.04 76.91 80.77 81.27 80.70 68.08 67.87 68.80 
Manufactures non 
machinery 32.96 33.88 34.58 28.46 29.17 29.76 38.66 39.16 40.08 29.42 30.47 30.81 
Machinery and transport 
equipment 41.88 41.09 40.49 49.52 47.87 47.15 42.12 42.11 40.62 38.66 37.40 37.99 
Office and telecom 
equipment 15.33 13.91 13.36 16.46 14.08 12.58 10.94 10.20 8.99 18.96 17.55 17.99 
Residual 2.50 2.66 3.09 4.79 5.00 5.21 2.21 2.21 3.05 1.87 2.19 2.38 
Total merchandise 
exports 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
Source: WTO (2003b). 
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Table 4.  Index of specialization 
 World North America Western Europe Rest of the World 
 2000 2001 2002 2000 2001 2002 2000 2001 2002 2000 2001 2002 
Agricultural products 100 100 100 114 114 115 105 101 101 90 94 94 
Minino products 100 100 100 52 57 57 56 55 55 160 162 160 
Manufactures 100 100 100 104 103 102 108 108 108 91 91 92 
Manufactures non machinery 100 100 100 86 86 86 117 116 116 89 90 89 
Machinery and transport equipment 100 100 100 118 117 116 101 102 100 92 91 94 
Office and telecom equipment 100 100 100 107 101 94 71 73 67 124 126 135 
Residual 100 100 100 192 188 169 88 83 99 75 82 77 
 
Source: WTO (2003b). 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.  Share of export on import 
Total merchandise exports  2000 2000 2000 
Share Export/import North America Western Europe Rest of the World 
North America 0  36.37  148.62  
Western Europe -26.67  0  118.46  
Rest of the World -59.78  -54.22  0  
Total export/import -41.31  -19.10  44.95  
Total merchandise exports 2002 2002 2002 
Share Export/import North America Western Europe Rest of the World 
North America 0  59.14  73.34  
Western Europe -37.16  0  -1.37  
Rest of the World -42.31  1.39  0  
Total export/import -29.19  4.26  11.79  
 
(Percent ratio Export/import ) 
Source: WTO (2003b). 
 
 
 
Therefore important factors are: 
• the strong and increasing positive trade balance in Western Europe in the 
manufactures non machinery sector, 
• the strong positive trade balance of the Rest of the World in the office and telecom 
equipment sector and the increasing specialization in this sector, 
• the fact that the large specialization of North America in the machinery and 
transport equipment sector does not hinder that North America has a large and 
increasing negative trade balance in these sectors, as also in that of the 
manufactures non machinery sector. 
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In North America the share of high technology products on total exports is large mainly 
because the production and export capacity in the medium and low technology sector is 
low, due to the relocation of these productions toward the emerging countries. 
In particular, a recent study by Business Week (2004) has analyzed about 300 
companies, for which data are available5 and are included within the roughly 700 non-
U.S. companies that are part of the Standard & Poor's Global 1200. It indicated that the 
share of R&D and capital spending, as percentage of outlays6, is larger in non US 
companies, mainly European and Japanese, than in the US companies for many and 
rather important industrial sectors, characterized by an intermediate technology, such as: 
• Autos & Components 
• Capital Goods 
• Consumer Goods 
• Food, Beverage, & Tobacco 
• Household Products 
• Materials 
 
On the contrary, this study indicates that the share of R&D and capital spending is higher 
in the US companies only in the case of a limited number of so called “high tech” 
sectors, which as it is well known have been characterized by a sharp decline of shares 
and sales value in the last few years after the “new economy” bubble, such as: 
• Drugs & Biotech 
• Semiconductors 
• Software & Services 
• Technology Hardware 
 
That demonstrates that the traditional distinction between “high tech” and “non high 
tech” sectors obscures the importance for a national economy to compete through a 
greater R&D and investment effort in many intermediate technology sectors, which play 
a major role in international trade. 
                                                 
t i
5 Fiscal years ended on or before June 30, 2004. 
6 Outlays consist of capital spending plus a broad measure of opera ing expenses, includ ng R&D.  
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Moreover, the greater importance of intermediate technology sectors in the European 
economies with respect to the US economy to a large extent explains also the different 
characteristics of the labour force in the two areas. In fact European countries indicate a 
much higher percentage of graduates in the engineering field of study on total graduates, 
of graduates in science and technology on total population and also a higher share of 
technicians on total employment. On the contrary, the greater importance of service 
activities in the US economy explains the higher share of professionals on total 
employment. 
The enormous trade balance of United States is exemplified by the fact that the 
American exports toward Western Europe and the rest of the World have a value that is 
respectively lower by 37% and 42% than the imports from these areas.  
It seems necessary to distinguish the US supremacy in the scientific field, which is 
undisputable and it is related to virtuous processes and specialized intermediaries in the 
financing of R&D institutions and activities, and on the other hand a supposed 
supremacy of the US production or industrial system in the innovation activity, since it 
can be hardly demonstrated that it is possible to be both highly innovative and little 
competitive in international markets. 
 
Table 6.  Employment in manufacturing industries for the EU, 
              Candidate countries, Japan and the US - 2000 
 
Total 
manu-
facturing 
Total 
manu-
facturing 
Total 
manu-
facturing 
High-tech 
manufacturing
Medium low-
tech 
manufacturing
Medium low-
tech 
manufacturing
Low-tech 
manufacturing 
EU-15 28482 100.00 100 9.7 27.3 25 38.1 
Italy  4821 16.93 100 7.1 23.8 27.5 41.6 
Germany 7551 26.51 100 9.4 38.3 24 28.4 
France  4027 14.14 100 13 24.6 25.1 37.3 
UK  4100 14.40 100 12.9 23.8 23.6 39.7 
Spain  2595 9.11 100 4.5 21.3 28.1 46 
Sweden  792 2.78 100 12.9 31.3 22.7 33 
US 19533 68.58 100 17.9 23.2 21.3 37.6 
Japan  12483 43.83 100 13.4 27 18.3 41.3 
 
Source: Strack (2004). 
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Table 7.  Labour force education levels and occupations 
 
Graduates in 
Science as % of 
total graduates 
(**) 
Graduates in 
Engineering 
as % of total 
graduates (**) 
Graduates in 
S&E fields of 
study as % of 
population (**)
Professionals 
on total 
employment 
(*) 
Technicians 
on total 
employmen
t 
(*) 
EU15 11.1 14.6 1.57 n.a. n.a. 
Italy 7.7 15.4 0.83 10.9 17.5 
Germany 8.9 17.0 0.93 13.0 20.5 
France 15.4 15.1 2.61 11.2 18.0 
UK 13.0 9.9 2.56 12.9 12.3 
Spain 10.5 16.3 1.84 12.5 10.5 
Sweden 10.1 21.9 1.54 17.9 19.8 
US 8.9 8.4 1.28 15.8 16.9 
Japan 2.8 19.9 1.84 10.2 5.5 
 
Source: (*) OECD (2003) and (**) and Eurostat News release (2004). 
 
 
 
A devaluation with respect to euro by more than 30% in the last two years is not 
consistent with a supposed greater innovativeness of the US productions and it seems 
rather to demonstrate the low international competitiveness of US industry. In fact, 
usually a country, which has the capability to improve the quality and the innovation 
level of its products is lead to a revaluation of its currency, being capable to ask for 
higher prices for its exports.  
Moreover, US exports have not increased notwithstanding that large devaluation and the 
rapid growth of the World economy in the last two years. That seems to indicate that the 
cause of the low international demand for the American growth is not the price, but 
rather their inadequate quality and innovation content. In particular, that support the 
thesis that the crucial factor of the US trade deficit is the very poor international 
competitiveness or even the actual lack of adequate production capacity in the 
intermediate technology sectors, since they are both the major component of US trade 
deficit and those sectors, that would have been benefited by the large dollar devaluation 
with respect to the euro. 
Finally, the 30% devaluation of US dollar has decreased by an equal amount the share of 
the US economy on the World GDP and it questions the real significance, at least in an 
international comparison, of the higher US growth rate with respect to the European 
economy, measured in the national currencies. 
 591 
Therefore, it seems unjustified to assume the US as a model of international 
competitiveness. On the contrary the factors of weakness of the US economy may 
provide useful lectures for the direction of industrial policies in Europe. 
The very low specialization in the low technology sectors, such as manufactures non 
machinery sectors, of North America seems to have been the reason of the decrease of 
the specialization and of the increase of the trade deficit in the high technology sectors, 
such as machinery and transport equipment sector and even in the office and telecom 
equipment sector.  
In fact, the medium and low technology sectors represent both the source for the 
production capabilities in the high tech sectors and the driver of the demand of the high 
tech products. A strong industrial base in the sectors which apparently are defined as low 
technology sectors, such as the manufactures non machinery sectors, represents the 
necessary condition for the development of high technology sector, such as the 
machinery and transport equipment sector. In fact, Western Europe has a strong 
specialization in the low technology sectors, such as the manufactures non machinery 
sectors and that seems to have allowed to maintain a positive and increasing trade 
balance in the high technology sectors, such as the machinery and transport equipment 
sector. 
Thus, the problem for the industrial development in Europe seems not only to consists in 
how to increase the exports of high technology sectors, but rather and especially how not 
to loose the competitiveness in the medium technology sectors. 
 
2  From Technology Transfers to                         
Interactive Learning Processes 
The concept of “knowledge economy” or of “learning economy” lead to a substantial 
change in the approaches to innovation policies. In fact, according to a traditional 
approach technology represents an additional production factor with respect to labour 
and capital. Therefore, investment in R&D represents the necessary instrument for the 
adoption of new technologies and these latter determine the growth of productivity and 
then the decrease of production costs and a greater competitiveness of firms. 
On the contrary the approach of the “knowledge economy”, the adoption of product and 
process innovation and not the diffusion of technologies is the crucial factor for the 
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competitiveness of firms and national economies. In particular, the scientific discoveries 
and the adoption of innovation by the inventors and the entrepreneurs require 
information, new knowledge and technical and organizational competencies, on the base 
of which is the development of both collective (“interactive”) and individual learning 
processes of the labour force, technician and entrepreneurs. In this new perspective, the 
problem of technological development is not solved only by the growth of R&D 
investment, but it requires an increase of the public and private expenditure in the 
continuous training of the human resources and the creation of structures (“networks” or 
“social capital”) which may facilitate the exchange of knowledge and its original 
integration, which generates innovations. 
The development in the European countries toward the model of the knowledge 
economy does not complete itself in the development of new high-tech sectors or R&D 
intensive sectors. Moreover, the R&D investment should be integrated by policies which 
deal with other crucial dimensions of the innovation process. 
In fact, the new knowledge economy is different from the development of high-tech 
industries. The perspective of the knowledge economy modifies in substantial way the 
industrial development strategies and also the prospects of technological change. In the 
traditional industrial (“fordist”) model, technologies arte mainly a product, such as in the 
case of new equipment. Therefore, firms should invest in R&D, since that activity 
generates new technologies. However, they may also choose to directly buy technology 
on the market for technologies. Technology implies a decrease of costs and an increase 
of productivity. Therefore, it solves directly the problem. On the contrary, the labour 
creates obstacles to technologies and technology is adopted in order to substitute labour. 
The ideal model is that of the totally automated plant. Therefore, technologies represent a 
“bitter medicine” which costs both directly for its purchase and also for its costs in terms 
of decrease and retraining of employment. 
On the contrary, in the model of knowledge economy the aim of the firms is not the 
adoption of technologies, but rather the adoption of product and process innovation. The 
innovation is not a good but a process. As indicated above, innovation requires 
information, new knowledge and technical and organizational competencies and these 
latter are the results of interactive learning processes, where the crucial actor is the 
human being, the innovative entrepreneur or the worker. They are not the object on 
which technology has an impact but the subject which promotes the innovation. That 
leads to the need to promote continuous learning investments at all high and low levels 
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and to promote the interaction between the various actors and firms, by creating 
networks, production clusters and intermediate institutions and in general the so called 
“social capital”.  
 
 
2.1  The Cycle of Knowledge Creation 
According to an evolutive perspective technologies is knowledge. Therefore, it is linked 
to the process of comprehension, elaboration and assimilation of information and it has a 
cognitive dimension. 
A modern industrial economy can be defined as a “complex adaptive system” (Holland, 
2002), which is similar to a cybernetic circuit performing various calculations or to a 
network of biological cells, which leave together in a relationship of symbiosis. 
The base of competitiveness and of survival in the knowledge economy is the diversity 
and the cooperation between the various nodes in the knowledge networks. In fact, a 
knowledge economy should enhance the diversity of knowledge and competencies, since 
they allow the complementarities and the cooperation. 
Technological change presents two important characteristics (Cappellin, 2003): 
• it has an interactive dimension or it is based on interactive learning processes, 
• it has a combinative character or it is based on the original connection of concepts and 
elements, which may even be already known but where previously disjoint between 
themselves.  
 
In fact, learning and innovation are collective and interactive processes, which require 
the access, interaction, integration of heterogeneous actors, capabilities and technical 
competencies and of complementary fragments of knowledge and information. 
Innovation has a systemic, organizational and often territorial nature and it implies the 
collaboration and integration of a variety of differentiated actors according to different 
forms and intensity. 
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Table 7.  The cycle of knowledge creation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 8. diffusion of the codified knowledge 
between the various firms and sectors,  
 
7. codification of tacit knowledge through 
socialization activities,  
 
 
  
6. development of collective forms of 
tacit knowledge within the 
organizations and institutions, 
  
5. development of interactive learning 
processes through the exchange of 
tacit knowledge between individuals, 
 
1. understanding and internalization of 
 
 
This has lead to an innovation model which is different form the “linear model”, based 
on the evolution from the basic research, the applied research, to innovation and 
technology transfer and which may be defined as the “systemic model” based on the 
interdependence between the development of knowledge and their application to the 
production processes and the integration between various actors. 
Knowledge is not a private good, which is rival in the consumption, neither a public 
good for which the principle of exclusion is not valid. It is the result of interactive 
learning processes between various actors. Therefore, knowledge does not exhaust itself 
in the use, while the continuous use of knowledge generates new knowledge. 
In particular, the creation of knowledge is the result of a cognitive process, which may be 
represented as a cumulative cycle made of different phases, in which the role of tacit 
knowledge is crucial. In fact, tacit knowledge insures both the comprehension of codified 
knowledge, which was imported from outside (phase 1), and the capability to combine in 
an original way codified knowledge (phase 2) as also the capability to apply the codified 
knowledge to the solution of specific problems in different localized contexts (phase 3). 
On the other hand, codified knowledge are crucial in the process of development of the 
competencies of the various individuals, in the education activities (phase 4) and thus in 
the development of tacit knowledge. 
The availability of tacit knowledge by the individual actors represents the base for the 
development of interactive learning processes which lead to the further development of 
knowledge (phase 5). This underlines the cumulative character of the process. These 
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interactive learning processes lead to the development both of individual knowledge and 
of tacit collective organizational and technological knowledge (phase 6), which 
characterizes specific groups of individuals, firms and organizations. 
The socialization of tacit knowledge within the groups, firms and organization is 
preliminary and instrumental to their codification and transformation into tacit 
knowledge (phase 7).  
Tacit knowledge can be more easily organized, maintained and diffused within the firms 
and organizations and also between the various firms and organizations (phase 8). 
Finally, the diffusion of knowledge and the transformation of local knowledge in 
diffused knowledge and their access is not sufficient whether is not accompanied by the 
development of the receptivity of the involved actors. However, the development of 
understanding capabilities requires the availability of tacit knowledge (phase 1). 
 
 
2.2  The Definition of Innovation 
According to a wide definition, innovation should include new products and services, 
major changes of production methods, incremental improvements in the processes and 
products, new approaches to marketing, new forms of distribution, change in the 
management approaches and in labour organization and changes in the competencies of 
the labour force. 
Industrial innovation often is not the result of a formal and planned research activity 
which aims to new products and services, but rather the result of an informal “search” 
activity or of a long term process of interactive learning between various actors which 
are independent one from the other and based on a creative integration of four 
components: 
a) the knowledge of one or more rather advanced technologies in a specific sector; 
b) the intelligent use of a system of various innovative equipment, software and 
intermediate product and services, which have been recently developed in other 
sectors at the national and international level; 
c) the original identification of technical problems and specific needs of potential users 
and the gradual development of new applications for specific not yet exploited 
market; 
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d) a continuous public investment in the development of technical standards, social 
norms, and organizational, financial and institutional solutions, which may facilitate 
the adoption of the considered innovation. 
 
The concept of innovation is neither limited to the adoption of individual new products 
and processes nor in the development of new products by the individual firms. It may 
consists in the development of continuous learning processes, which lead to an even 
gradual change of the organization of processes and products within the individual firms, 
and also in the systemic change of the organization of production processes, which are 
performed by various firms, which are vertically or horizontally integrated within 
specific sectors and clusters. Finally, innovation may consists not only in new products 
but also in the development of new markets, which are created by the capabilities by new 
types of products to respond in an original way to the new needs of industrial or final 
users. 
 
 
2.3  The Role of Tacit Knowledge, Informal Research Processes        
and Competencies 
The distinction between codified and tacit knowledge is of great relevance. However, 
together with this almost traditional distinction it is necessary to associate the distinction 
between the formal research activities and the informal search activities as also the 
distinction between the development of innovation/inventions and the development of 
internal competencies within the firms. 
In fact, the development of tacit knowledge, combinatorial knowledge and non 
formalized research activity based on interactive learning processes within the networks 
of firms emerge as crucial factors in promoting innovation processes especially in the 
medium and low technology sectors and in the small and medium size firms. 
In particular, as indicated in table 8, innovation process can be characterized by specific 
forms of combination between different inputs, processes and outputs (Cappellin, 
2004c). 
1) The development of interactive learning processes in the traditional sectors where 
the SMEs are dominant is characterized by: tacit knowledge, informal research 
processes and development of competencies. 
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2) the development of interactive learning process in the university institutions is 
characterized by: codified knowledge, formal research activities and development of 
competencies, which are related to the education function of universities; 
3) the development of interactive learning processes in the large firms is characterized 
by: tacit knowledge, formal research activities and development of inventions/ 
innovations; 
4) the development of interactive learning processes in the modern knowledge 
intensive services is related to: codified knowledge, informal research activities and 
development of inventions/innovations.  
 
Table 8.  The relationships between: a) types of knowledge, b) types of  
              research processes, c) development of competencies, d) invention 
              and innovation within the interactive learning processes 
University 
institutions Large firms 
Formal 
research 
University 
institutions Large firms 
Knowledge 
intensive services 
SMEs in non 
high-tech sectors
Informal 
research 
P
R
O
C
ES
S 
SMEs in non high-
tech sectors 
 
Knowledge 
intensive 
services 
Codified 
knowledge 
Tacit 
knowledge Competencies 
Invention or 
innovation 
INPUT 
INTERACTIVE 
LEARNING 
PROCESSESS 
OUTPUT 
 
 
University 
institutions 
 
 
SMEs in non 
high-tech sectors
 
 
Competencies 
 
 
Knowledge 
intensive services Large firms 
Invention or 
innovation 
O
U
TP
U
T 
  
 
Source: Cappellin (2004d). 
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Innovation policies mainly focus on the financing of only R&D activities in the 
individual firms. Firms are understood as a “black box” which organizes given factors 
and produces by choosing between given technologies. Therefore, the aim of public 
incentives is to facilitate the access to these technologies. On the contrary, firms 
represent an evolutionary system, which on the one hand adapts to the change and on the 
other generates new production combinations, through a well known “creative 
destruction” process. That requires that firms develop: 
• the strategic capabilities which are linked to the generation, identification and 
exploitation of economic opportunities: a capability which pertain to the top 
management; 
• the adaptive capabilities which are linked to the learning of previous experiences 
and to the reaction to changes, which should characterize all organization levels. 
 
That approach implies a critique to the linear and sequential model, which is focused on 
the radical technological innovation based on R&D investment. 
The innovation process has systemic characteristics and it requires the tight integration 
between high tech sectors and medium and low technology sectors. The innovation and 
productivity growth are a rather horizontal phenomenon which seems quite apart from 
the average R&D intensity of the individual sectors. More important is the relative R&D 
intensity of the firms in a given sector with respect to the competing firms in other 
countries and regions. 
Therefore, a strong and growing specialization in the so called high tech sectors can not 
represent the main objective of a national or European innovation policy. 
 
 
2.5  The Concept of Sectoral, Regional and National                
“Innovation Systems” 
The concept of “innovation system” clarifies the crucial role of the governance of the 
interaction between the main actors of innovation. It is completely different from the 
“linear” approach, which characterizes the alternative concept of “technology transfer” 
and it represents a new paradigm which is currently adopted by international 
organizations, such as the European Union and the OECD and various national 
governments and regional institutions. It is clear that a sectoral/regional/national 
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“innovation system” represents a wider and more complex concept of the research 
community or the university world or the only realm of the high tech or science based 
sectors. In particular, a national innovation system (NIS) may be represented as a matrix 
made by regional innovation systems (RIS) and of sectoral innovation systems (SIS)7. 
Interactive relationships in an innovation system are various and do not only consist in 
the buying and selling of intermediate products and services, or in financial transactions 
or in information and knowledge flows between the various firms and actors. A key role 
is played by the mobility of people and by personal relationships, the sense of common 
belonging to specific social or productive communities, which are characterized by 
specific values, norms, languages and technological standard (Cappellin, 2004b).  
A regional innovation system is made by firms tightly embedded with other firms of 
various sectors, with clients, suppliers and partners as also with centres of knowledge 
such as universities, research centres and technology transfer agencies and a set of 
governance structures such as private industrial associations, chambers of commerce, 
training and development agencies and local and national public institutions. 
 
 
2.6  The Structure and Evolution of Knowledge                            
and Innovation Networks 
In the case of small and medium size firms and of intermediate technology sectors the 
process of learning, knowledge creation and innovation is the results of a tight 
interaction between various actors and it is not only or mainly the result of the internal 
activity within the various firms, as the flows of information and know-how (“tacit 
knowledge”) is embedded in the networks of relationships between the various firms and 
local actors.  
Network forms of organization due to their flexibility and openness often prove to be 
more appropriate in order to manage the relationships between the various heterogeneous 
and complementary actors in the innovation process than the competition mechanisms 
within traditional markets or the power relationships within hierarchical structures. 
 
                                                 
7 See Chung (2002). 
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Table 9.  The network of links in a national / regional innovation system 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INDUSTRY AND SERVICES  
RESEARCH 
FINANCE  INSTITUTIONS  
  
non local firms  
 
 
local firms  
 
Source: Cappellin (2004d). 
 
 
 
Thus, the network approach may prove to be most appropriate for the organization of 
industrial and innovation policies in countries facing major restructuring problems such 
as the new accessing countries and Croatia.  
The structure of a network of firms may be represented as in the figure 9, where the 
various firms, organizations and institutions are grouped within a four specific clusters or 
sub-networks, corresponding to the four main elements of a sectoral/regional/national 
innovation system: 
• industrial and service firms, 
• research and university institutions 
• financial intermediaries, 
• local and national public institutions 
 
Some of these actors are local, while other important actors in a network may belong to 
other regions or countries and characterize the openness of the network and increase the 
diversity and the complementarities of the nodes belonging to a given network. 
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The structure of a network is characterized by: 
• nodes, which may be firms and other private and public actors, 
• links or flows, which may be material or immaterial and in an economic context are 
made by products and by production factors,  
• distance, which is not only geographical but also technological, organizational, 
cultural, institutional, distance and which determine specific obstacles or transaction 
costs in the circulation of the flows, 
• infrastructures, which reduce the distance and facilitate the circulation of the flows 
and give stability to the network and may be material or immaterial, such as norms, 
institutions and social capital. 
 
The network structure affects and is affected by the network behaviour, which is 
determined by the aims of the various nodes or actors and the agreements reached 
between these latter on common objectives. 
Network analysis allows examining various crucial dimensions of knowledge and 
innovation networks. Network analysis usually focuses on the measurement of various 
indicators which describe the form of a network. However, it could also study: 
• the homogeneity between the internal characteristics of the various nodes or their 
“distance” measured as difference in technological level and in internal 
organizational characteristics,  
• the rules regulating the reciprocal relations between the various nodes or the 
“institutions” and immaterial infrastructures which facilitate or hinder the 
relationships between the various nodes, 
• the relationships between the behaviours of the nodes and their internal 
characteristics and the rules which characterize a given network. 
 
Moreover network analysis may allow studying the evolution of the network form in 
time (Cappellin, 2003) or: 
• the changing intensity of the existing flows between any couple of nodes, 
• the creation of new linkages between nodes which were previously disconnected or 
the disappearance of some existing linkages, 
• the creation of new nodes or the disappearance of existing nodes. 
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Networks performance is related to the balance between the transaction costs between 
the nodes and the exploitation of network economies or synergy effects. In particular, the 
governance of a network aims to a flexible balance between apparently contradictory 
characteristics and processes, such as: 
• homogeneity between the various actors of the network and diversity and 
complementarities of the competencies and characteristics of the same nodes, 
• thickness of the network or tight integration between the various actors and relative 
isolation or specificity of the nodes characterized by outstanding excellence, 
• integration and cooperation between the various nodes and the preservation of clear 
distinctive competencies and roles of the various actors, to avoid forms of collusion, 
• cooperation between the various actors and existence of conflict of interests and 
complex negotiation procedures between the same actors. 
 
The experience of other countries in Europe indicates that within a network or a 
sectoral/regional/national innovation system may emerge three types of problems 
(Isaksen, 2001), such as:  
• the lack of density or of a significant number of diversified actors that would be 
necessary to promote interactive learning processes: a case which is frequent in 
economic lagging regions, 
• the fragmentation or the lack of cooperation and thrust between the various actors 
characteristics: a case that may occurs in large metropolitan regions where the 
individual actors work in different worlds not communicating each other; 
• the lock-in effects and the obstacles to accept innovation too distant from traditional 
approaches: a case that often occurs in the highly specialized regions facing 
industrial reconversion problems. 
 
2.7  International Openness as a Factor of Innovation                  
and Development  
The actual “knowledge society” is characterized by the rapid enlargement of the 
production processes both in a geographical and institutional perspective. Even local 
clusters are increasingly integrated in the regional, national, European and global 
economy. Thus, local networks are gradually extending at the international/interregional 
level. 
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While internal integration between the various local actors and institutions is a key factor 
of development, a complementary and seemingly opposite factor is the degree of 
diversity and of openness of a regional economy. Diversity and openness are crucial in 
order to avoid that the integration between local actors is not leading to lock-in effects 
and to allow the combination and synergy between actors of different regions and 
countries.  
External stimulus and collaborations are required in the process of industrial 
restructuring and to improve the international competitiveness of regional or national 
industry. Interactive learning processes should develop not only between the various 
local actors but also between these latter and external actors and innovation policy 
should remove the obstacles hindering the development of external relationships. 
In a globalized world of freely moving capital and increasingly freely moving people, 
only social capital remains tied to specific locations. Thus, the “learning economy” is 
characterized by the hyper-mobility of the information and knowledge and the local 
character of the social capital. 
Participation to international learning processes and innovation networks is affected by 
internal receptivity and by internal institutional thickness. The receptivity or absorptive 
capacity of new technologies by a firm corresponds to the quantity of external 
knowledge it is able to utilize and is related to the technological distance and to 
organizational/ institutional proximity between two economic actors. Clearly, the 
absorption capacity of a specific regional production system is related to his level of 
social capital and institutional thickness. 
Moreover an effective international transfer of codified and tacit knowledge requires a 
higher similarity of the institutional framework between the regions and countries 
involved. The existence of common values, history and traditions together with the 
international partners facilitates cooperation and the participation to interactive learning 
process at the interregional level. In fact, knowledge transfers may become not 
territorially bounded, when culture, organizational framework, social capital and 
institutions are common or harmonized. 
Thus, the connectivity between the various institutions should be a central concern of 
policies aiming to extend to an interregional and international dimension the interactive 
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learning processes and of innovation networks, actually existing within a limited local 
framework (Cappellin, 2004b). 
 
 
3  The Role of Institutions Within Networks                  
and the “Governance” of Innovation Policies 
Knowledge is channeled within networks by formal and informal institutions. While 
explicit and codified knowledge may be traded on markets, tacit knowledge 
competencies and skills can not be transferred effectively through conventional markets. 
Institutions have a key role in the governance of knowledge and innovation networks as 
they can:  
• reduce transaction and production costs,  
• increase trust among economic and social actors,  
• improve entrepreneurial capacity,  
• increase learning and relational mechanisms,  
• reinforce networks and cooperation among the actors. 
 
Thus the diffusion of knowledge and innovation creation in a specific network or 
sectoral/regional/national innovation system depends on the “institutional thickness” of 
the innovation system to be considered. Institutions have a key role in the process of 
innovation and in the generation and working of “knowledge and learning networks”. A 
wide range of institutions is required in the process of innovation. 
Regional governments are required for attracting external investments, to coordinate 
large strategic projects and to promote the birth of new firms and entrepreneurial 
capabilities. 
Local governments are required for an effective territorial planning and for the creation 
of efficient transport and logistics infrastructures. 
Local credit institutions are required for the financing of innovative projects by existing 
firms and to enhance the creation of new firms. 
Local education institutions, such as vocation training and university institutions are 
required for the identification of labour skills required by the new technologies and for 
maintaining the traditional productive skills in a given territory. 
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Labour agencies, trade unions represent specialized institutions required for an effective 
management of the local labour markets and to facilitate the interaction between the 
supply and the demand of labour, the wage negotiation procedures and the management 
of the “welfare” system. 
Chamber of commerce and industry associations are major partners in promoting a 
regional innovation system and in the identification of strengths and weakness and of 
strategic lines of competitiveness and development. 
The concept of “knowledge economy” is tightly related to those of institutions and of 
“multilevel governance”, social capital and immaterial infrastructures. Moreover, it is 
crucial to identify forms of coordination and “institution building”, which are most 
appropriate in the case of a “knowledge economy”. 
The expression “governance” is used to indicate decision making systems where the 
decisions are not taken through the traditional hierarchical processes with a public 
authority at the top (“government”), but rather through open forms of collaboration 
between a variety of public and non public actors, which may vary according to the 
policy area and the level of government to be considered. Governance operates within 
complex networks and the decision making processes include forms of horizontal and 
vertical negotiation, where the exercise of a hierarchical power is only a component and 
often not the most important.  
“Multi-level governance” defines a new mode of regulation and coordination based on 
heterarchic negotiations around interfirm networks and public private partnership. It is 
based on negotiations or strategic alliances between multiple stakeholders in order to 
secure agreed objectives which are mutually beneficial. 
Thus it is important to underline the difference between the traditional “government” 
model, based on economic planning, state intervention, and public owned firms and the 
“governance” model based on negotiation, coordination mechanisms and “intermediate 
institutions”. 
It is now widely recognized that the dirigist model (“government”) in the innovation 
policies is neither possible nor desirable, since innovation for its very nature can not be 
reduced to command ant it has a pro-active character and it is open to new discoveries. 
Innovation depends on the autonomy and active collaboration of researchers and 
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entrepreneurs, rather than on passive obedience. Incentives and negotiations, rather than 
orders seem to be the main instruments in order to promote and manage innovation. 
Within a network, the policy-maker can not adopt typical hierarchical methods, such as 
traditional planning (“government”), but it should be capable to guide or to steer 
(“governance”) the network of the various economic, social and institutional actors, in 
order to promote the flows and to orient the relationships between these latter, for 
promoting self-sustained economic development processes. 
Whether the “government” model is not appropriate to the modern innovation policies, it 
is clear that the free market approach based on the only regulation of prices and 
competition is inadequate to manage the issue of innovation. 
The speed of information flows and of decision making processes is tightly related to the 
stability of the organizational forms and it depends on the existence of a well developed 
institutional system (“social capital”) and from immaterial structures and infrastructures 
which facilitate the relationships between the various actors participating in the 
innovation process and reduce the transaction costs. In fact, the instability and the risks 
associated with the market mechanisms lead the various actors of a given innovation 
system to search a shelter in more structured organizations and in a framework of shared 
values, leading to collaborations and avoiding negative forms of competition. 
Moreover, the innovation processes are tightly connected with the division of labour, the 
specialization and integration of various production phases and labour competencies. 
This increasing labour division requires a framework, which allows connecting the 
contributions of different firms and actors. Institutions and economic policies have a 
crucial role in the development of systemic interactions between the industrial firms, the 
financial system and the training of human resources and scientific institutions and in the 
development of forms of production integration, leading to local and also global supply 
or value added chains. Therefore, a social and institutional framework is required by the 
processes through which tacit knowledge is transformed into codifies knowledge and is 
incorporated into a complex innovation. 
Knowledge circulates within networks through formal and informal institutions. While 
explicit or codified knowledge may be exchanged on technology markets, tacit 
knowledge has an asymmetric character and it is non tradable, while it requires 
allocation mechanisms which are different from the markets. Only specific organizations 
 607 
and institutions and not traditional markets are capable to insure the access to 
information and those connections which allow the exchange and the tight interaction of 
knowledge, competencies and technology transfers. These organizations may be made by 
large multinational companies, joint projects for new productions, norms and technical 
standards between the participants to a network, local networks or clusters of firms, 
forms of public-private partnership or large “network of excellence” between research 
institutions. 
Institutions reinforce the identity and reciprocal thrust and allow limiting the 
disadvantage of the asymmetric circulation of information, reduce uncertainty and the 
risks related to the unforeseeable results of innovations, increase the incentives to invest 
for medium and long term projects and support investments in specialized training, 
which may increase the receptivity to innovation by the various actors. 
The transition to the model of the knowledge economy requires the creation of new hard 
and soft infrastructures, both at the local and at the European level, which may facilitate 
the enlargement of the knowledge and innovation network in order to include also the 
economic lagging regions, sectors and firms (Cappellin, 2004a). However, the creation 
of these institutions requires appropriate investments, as networks can be considered as a 
form of capital, which requires collective economic resources for their creation and 
maintenance and without which the “social capital” would be lead to a progressive 
decay. 
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Abstract 
It is generally accepted that, following the positive avis regarding Croatia’s application 
to join the European Union, spatial dimensions of development will take on an increased 
importance. This text offers a broad introduction to the state-of-the-art of spatial 
economics in Croatia. In this context, it provides a basic overview of theories, policies 
and practices in spatial development in contemporary Croatia, setting these in an 
historical context, and outlining possibilities for the future. The paper addresses the 
complexities and spatial specificities of the Republic of Croatia in terms of geographical, 
historical, ecological, and socio-economic dimensions. The implications of this 
complexity, heterogeneity and regional diversity suggest that a plurality of approaches to 
spatial development is required.  
The paper goes on to discuss the need for a clearer triangulation between development 
theories, research and education in Croatia, and addresses the relationship between 
national and international currents. Noting the legacy of theories of development under 
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socialism, and going beyond a crude opposition between ’neo-liberal’ and ’neo-
Keynesian’ theories, the paper sets out the basis for an integrated approach to 
development management and strategic development planning, itself requiring 
innovative, multi-disciplinary, research approaches and educational processes committed 
to the creation of new, flexible, competences.  
The paper also focuses on aspects of the complex relationship between spatial 
development and good governance. The paper notes the distorting impact of a range of 
external assistance programmes and of international consultancies, and the continued 
tension between European and American approaches. Internal impediments to good 
governance are discussed in terms of their horizontal dimensions – policy confusion; the 
proliferation of institutions and strategic bodies; and tensions and inconsistencies 
between legal, political and administrative dimensions – and their vertical dimensions – 
in terms of the lack of fit between, and unsustainability of some aspects of, different tiers 
of government.  
The concluding part poses a series of open questions regarding the future relationship 
between research, policy and practice in this area. Throughout the paper, reference is 
made to work undertaken by the authors on aspects of regional and local development 
policy and practice in Croatia.  
 
 
Keywords: spatial economics, regional theory, strategic development planning, good 
governance  
JEL Classification: R1, R5  
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1  Croatia’s Specificity  
Basic Geography and History 
Croatia is special. It is situated on the cross-roads between Central Europe and the 
Mediterranean, close to the developed and densely populated European countries. It 
extends from the foothills of the Julian Alps in the north-west and the Pannonian Plain in 
the east, over the Dinara mountain range in its central region, to the Adriatic coast in the 
south. Its total area is 87,609 sq. km, 31,067 of which is territorial sea. Its coast is one of 
the most indented in the world. It totals 5,835 km. The mainland coast encompasses only 
1,777 km (30%), and the remaining 4,058 km is the coast of the islands. There are 1,246 
islands (some 45 are inhabited) making it the second largest archipelago in the 
Mediterranean.  
In 2001 at the time of the last Census there were 4,437,460 inhabitants in Croatia (78.4 
per sq. km) living in 21 counties, composed of 121 towns and 416 municipalities.1 
Population density varies across the counties – the highest is in Međimurje County 
(162.4) and the lowest in the County of Lika-Senj (10.0). The biggest population density 
is around the urban centres (Zagreb, Pula, Rijeka, Split, Osijek) which cover 
approximately 12 percent of the territory, and is home to approximately 63 percent of the 
total population.2  
Demographic trends show that until 1991 Croatia had positive natural growth. During the 
Homeland war (1991-1995) the natural growth rate was negative, and only in the short 
period 1995-1997, was the birth rate higher than the death rate. After 1997 there was a 
sharp decline in the birth rate which resulted in negative natural growth. The natural 
growth rate in 2003 in the Republic of Croatia was negative reaching -2.9 (-12,907). The 
County of Split-Dalmatia had a positive growth rate, whereas a negative growth rate was 
recorded in all other counties and in the City of Zagreb. A positive natural growth rate 
was recorded in 79 towns/municipalities. Negative growth rates were recorded in 459 
towns/municipalities and in the City of Zagreb, while 11 municipalities had a zero 
natural growth rate. The highest negative natural growth (-1,246) was recorded in the 
City of Zagreb.  
                                                 
1 The numbers grew in the meantime. Today there are 124 towns and 426 municipalities.  
2 Izvješće o stanju u prostoru Republike Hrvatske 2003. 
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Forced migration caused by the War, especially migration towards Zagreb in the period 
1991-1995, resulted in a concentration of population in the capital. According to 
estimates for 1999, 20 percent of the total population lived there. In the period 1994 - 
2003, more than 716,000 people moved from one settlement to another within the 
Republic of Croatia. The largest share of the migrating population (11.8% - 84,000 
persons) was recorded in 2003. With regard to the place of migration in the period 1994 - 
2003, migration between counties accounted for the largest part (45%). In 2003, out of 
the total of twenty counties and the City of Zagreb, six counties and the City of Zagreb 
had a positive migration balance (the number of in-migrants was larger than the number 
of out-migrants). The highest positive balance was recorded in the County of Zagreb 
(more than 2,000 persons) and the County of Istria (around 800 persons). Fourteen 
counties had a negative migration balance, the highest being in the counties of Vukovar-
Srijem (more than 1,000) and Slavonski Brod-Posavina (around 900).3
Croatia has always been a point of contact of different cultures and civilisations. Its 
regional identity is rooted both in geography and turbulent historical developments. For 
centuries the Mediterranean area was subjected to Italo-Venetian influence, while the 
Pannonian parts were subjected to influences coming from the central Ugro-Pannonian 
area. Northwestern Croatia was influenced by Germanic Central Europe. After centuries 
of difficult political struggle which culminated in the war of 1991-1995, Croatia obtained 
independence in 1991. In 1992 it became a member of the UN and in 1998 the last 
occupied parts of the country were reintegrated. War damages were immense in terms of 
population loss, as well as in terms of damage to the physical and natural environment.4  
 
Ecological Fragility 
The mixture of continental European, Alpine and Mediterranean influences in Croatia 
results in rich ecosystems. Diversified landscape, climate and unique geological features 
contribute to a diversity of regional ecosystems and species. Forests cover about 44% of 
Croatia, primarily in the mountains and in the northern lowlands. Wetlands along the 
northern rivers provide important habitat for many species, particularly migratory birds. 
Furthermore, the bays and straits of the Adriatic are home to numerous rare and 
endangered fish species. Endemic species have found their habitat in small wetlands 
                                                 
3 www.dzs.hr (Priopćenje 7.1.1 and 7.1.2). 
4 Strategija prostornog uređenja Republike Hrvatske (1997). 
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including ponds on the Adriatic coast and islands, and moors in the mountains as well. A 
rich agricultural history has contributed to biodiversity and its management. 
Understanding of karst geology and hydrology is critical for an assessment of its 
biodiversity as karst covers 54% of Croatia.5  
According to the Law on Nature Protection6 there are eight categories of nature 
protection: national park, nature park, strict nature reserve, managed nature 
reserve/wildlife sanctuary, natural monument/natural landmark, protected landscapes and 
seascapes, park forest, and park architectural monument. There are 450 protected areas in 
Croatia, covering over 10% of the country. Only 8 such areas, covering about 1.7% of 
the country, are National parks. Three national parks are on islands (Kornati, Brijuni, 
Mljet); two represent karst hydrology and morphology (Plitvice lakes, Krka); three are 
mountainous areas (Risnjak, Paklenica, Velebit). Three out of ten nature parks are 
mountainous (Medvednica, Biokovo, Velebit), one is an island nature park (Telašćica) 
and two are wetlands (Kopački rit, Lonjsko polje).  
 
Regions  
Croatian heterogeneity has led to quite a heterogeneous set of proposals as to how to 
divide the country into regions. As usual, the main obstacle is statistical data because the 
existing counties, towns and municipalities for which most of the data has been collected 
are not compatible with geographic, historical and economic regions.7 Of the possible 
categorisations, i.e. those that are based on county and municipal data, two are of 
particular significance: economic categorisation and categorisation based on 
geographical features.  
Croatian counties can be ranked according to the development index, which is based on 
four different groups of indicators: infrastructure, human resources, standard of living 
and the global efficiency of the economy. In this way the City of Zagreb, the County of 
Istria and the County of Primorje-Gorski kotar are ranked highest (ranks 1, 2 and 3). The 
                                                 
5 www.mzopu.hr (Izvještće o stanju okoliša u Republici Hrvatskoj, 2003). 
6 Narodne novine 34/94 and 72/94. 
7 The history of territorial - administrative division is also rich. However, none of numerous 
divisions in the last 60 - 70 years followed geographic, historical and economic criteria seriously. 
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County of Virovitica-Podravina, the County of Vukovar-Srijem and the County of Lika-
Senj are at the bottom of the list ranking 19, 20 and 21 respectively.8  
Categorisation based on geographic features leaves administrative boundaries behind and 
reveals three large spatial units – Central, Adriatic and Eastern Croatia. Central Croatia 
has the most developed economy, as well as infrastructure. Furthermore, it is 
characterised by a great concentration of cities of the Central European type. Adriatic 
Croatia can be divided into three different parts each one with specific development 
patterns and problems – underdeveloped hinterland, the urbanised coastal area, and 
islands with their specific development needs. The main feature of Eastern Croatia is 
agriculture-based economic structure and a well developed network of small settlements 
which provide the possibilities for more balanced spatial economic development.  
Regional differences in economic and social development are usually defined in terms of 
unemployment rate and per capita gross domestic product in a region (RGDP), and are 
aggravated by structural changes, which have social and economic consequences. 
However, analysis of regional disparities in Croatian economic and social development 
has been limited due to lack of regional statistics, so that researchers have to rely upon 
various estimates. Two sets of figures were calculated here: the contribution of each 
region i.e. county GDP (RGDP) to the total GDP of Croatia and the ratio of RGDP per 
capita to the mean national per capita GDP.  
In 2001, only three out of 21 Croatian counties had a per capita GDP above the national 
level. The per capita GDP of the City of Zagreb in 2001 was 56 percent above the 
national level, in Istria it was 21 percent above, and in the County of Primorje-Gorski 
kotar it was 31 percent above. In all the other counties estimated per capita GDP was 
below the national level. Per capita GDP varied between 67 percent of the national per 
capita GDP level in the County of Zagreb and 96 percent of the national per capita GDP 
level in the Dubrovnik-Neretva County.  
Contribution of the RGDP to the total GDP has a similar distribution. The greatest part 
of Croatian GDP was produced in the City of Zagreb (27.4 percent in 2001). The 
smallest contribution was provided by the County of Šibenik-Knin (1.0 percent). The 
contribution of RGDP to the total GDP varied between from 1.6 percent in the County 
Požega-Slavonija to 8.5 percent in the County Split-Dalmatia. 
                                                 
8 Fore more details on methodology and list of indicators refer to Izvješće o stanju u prostoru 
Republike Hrvatske (2003). 
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Table 1.  The contribution of RGDP to the total GDP, the ratio of 
              RGDP per capita to the national GDP per capita, 
              and unemployment rate by counties in 2001 
 
Contribution of 
RGDP to the total 
GDP 
RGDP per capita/national GDP 
per capita ratio 
(national GDP per capita = 100) 
Unemploymen
t rate % 
County of Zagreb 4.69 67 25.45 
County of Sisak-Moslavina 3.28 78 33.84 
County of Karlovac 2.65 83 33.59 
City of Zagreb 27.40 156 13.43 
County of Međimurje 2.30 86 20.44 
County of Krapina-Zagorje 2.54 79 21.32 
County of Varaždin 3.96 95 19.38 
County of Koprivnica-Križevci 2.55 91 23.04 
County of Brod-Posavina 2.75 69 36.29 
County of Požega-Slavonija 1.63 84 29.20 
County of Virovitica-Podravina 1.87 89 34.19 
County of Osijek-Baranja 7.18 96 31.34 
County of Vukovar-Srijem 3.23 70 41.35 
County of Bjelovar-Bilogora 2.44 81 33.79 
County of Istria 5.63 121 13.43 
County of Lika-Senj 1.00 82 29.59 
County of Primorje-Gorski 
kotar 8.99 131 18.43 
County of Dubrovnik-Neretva 2.67 96 24.04 
County of Split-Dalmatia 8.55 82 30.07 
County of Šibenik-Knin 1.83 72 37.77 
County of Zadar 2.85 78 31.42 
Total  100.00 100 23.07 
 
Source: Calculated on the basis o  Central Bureau for Statistics data. f
 
 
 
The second indicator of regional development and regional disparities is the regional 
unemployment rate. As there are no official statistics of unemployment rates at the 
county level, unemployment rates by counties also had to be estimated. The 
unemployment rate at national level in 2001 was 23 percent. At county level, there were 
some remarkable deviations from the national average. The lowest unemployment rate 
was in the City of Zagreb and the County of Istria (13.4 percent). The highest 
unemployment rates were recorded in the County of Vukovar-Srijem (41.4 percent) and 
in the County of Šibenik-Knin (37.8 percent). Regarding regional disparities, the capital 
or the capital regions usually demonstrate the lowest unemployment rates and 
respectively a higher RGDP. The counties with per capita GDP above national level also 
have lower unemployment rates (City of Zagreb, County of Istria, County of Primorje-
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Gorski kotar). On the other hand there are quite a few rural areas characterized by 
increasing unemployment and falling employment opportunities.  
 
Spatial Development Management 
In Croatia, as elsewhere in the world, the question about whether economic development 
should be managed is often put. Answers stem from neo-liberal (in its extreme, a plain 
’no’) to socialist which in its extreme leads to requirements for central control of the 
entire economic process. Discussions tend to be about the structure of the economy and 
are rarely about its regional aspect and spatial pattern in general. However, given the fact 
that economic development happens in space and that its spatial aspect is unavoidable, 
the neo-liberal perspective does not appear reliable. Suboptimal, if not heavily distorted, 
spatial distribution of population and economic activities as well as unsustainable 
(locally catastrophic) use of natural resources in the last 60 to 70 years of Croatian 
history clearly point out that there has always been a case for regional development 
management, environmental protection and urban-rural policy considerations. The 
governance of Croatian spatial economic development thus appears as a necessity.  
It is therefore quite a challenge to inquire about spatial development policies in Croatia, 
their theoretical foundations, development measures and their effects, corresponding 
institutions and organisations and whatever else constitutes a spatial development policy. 
Have policy makers ever relied on theories, has the development itself proved that the 
spatial patterns appeared as the theories propose, and so on, are questions that have to be 
answered if the governance necessary for sound spatial development is to be introduced 
in Croatia.  
 
 
2  Not Long Ago - Socialism 
Primary Accumulation 
Although the first physical plans in Croatia were produced already in the 1930s there is 
hardly any evidence of regional, urban or any other kind of spatial economic policy in 
the period between the two World Wars.9 The first Croatian post-war period appears thus 
                                                 
9 So called regulatory plans produced in the 1930s marked the beginning of more than a half a 
century long practice of producing physical plans with insufficient economic planning inputs. 
 618 
as the best point in time to start the analysis. Socialism was newly established in 
Yugoslavia and Croatia within it immediately after the Second World War. The Soviet 
(at the time Stalinist) influence was very strong particularly in economic policy. The 
basic idea and the measures that followed were rather simple: the labour surplus that 
existed in the agricultural sector had to be transferred to an industrial sector that lacked 
workers. This would allow for fast industrialisation, secure warranted rapid economic 
growth, enlarge the working class and thus improve the class structure of society. The 
way to achieve this was also simple (or looked simple on the central planners' desks) but 
painful: the compulsory purchase of agricultural products was introduced so that 
peasants had to sell food to the state at prices that were way below those obtained on the 
food market. The food was then sold in the stores that belonged to the state retail 
network. It was, of course, cheap which meant that industrial wages did not have to be 
high and that "accumulation" generated by the industrial sector could be used for further 
industrial investments. The policy did work. Deprived of the means of survival, peasants 
went to work in industry. The class structure seemed to have improved as requested and 
the annual growth rates were amongst the highest in the post war socialist countries 
(Stipetić, 1968). Foreign loans played their part too, but this was rarely mentioned in the 
Federal Planning Committee reports.  
What is of particular interest here is that this dramatic policy stands as a rare example of 
deriving policy measures almost directly from a theoretical concept. The theory was 
named the "socialist accumulation of capital", a derivative of Marx's famous concept of 
"primary accumulation". Its author Evgenij Preobraženski formulated the model in the 
Soviet Union in the 1930s10 inspired by the urge for fast development and the 
requirement to catch up with capitalism as quickly as possible.11 Yugoslav planners 
copied it in the late 1940s but, just as the Soviet planners before them, failed to consider 
its spatial aspects. The planners seemed not to care that a transfer from the agricultural to 
the industrial sector inevitably triggered a massive departure of peasants who stormed 
the “would be” industrial cities and that the requirement to have factories of large 
capacity meant that machines often had to be transported from various places and 
concentrated in urban areas. Compulsory purchase was lifted in the early 1950s and 
                                                 
10 The model was criticised by Nikolai Bukharin who proposed development of small scale labour 
intensive units evenly distributed in space. The discussion was about optimal economic structure 
and about its spatial distribution but ended with actual implementation of Preobraženski's 
proposal, which had to do mainly with the structural aspects. It simply fitted better in the 
centralised Soviet power structure. 
11 Preobraženski (1980). 
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primary accumulation was finally dropped from the socialist development agenda in the 
early 1960s. The piling up of the rural population in the cities continued, however, and 
produced congestions that characterised socialist urbanisation to the end.  
 
Provinces, Departments, Municipalities and Districts  
Paradoxically at first glance, central socialist planning was paralleled with a vast 
territorial administrative decentralisation. In 1947, the territory of Croatia was divided 
into 81 departments, 18 towns (and town districts) and 2,278 local councils. Two years 
later Croatia was re-divided into 6 provinces (Dalmatia, Bjelovar, Karlovac, Osijek, 
Rijeka and Zagreb), 89 departments, 24 towns with 9 districts, 5 towns and 2,338 local 
people's councils. The newly formed provinces were said to have represented economic-
geographical entities out of which some had homogeneous economic-political 
characteristics. Provinces were cancelled in 1951 on account of strengthening the role of 
departments' and towns' people's councils. However, the next Republic law passed in 
1952 brought a new territorial division of 58 departments, 6 towns, 60 town 
municipalities, 637 municipalities and 13 so-called "outer municipalities" i.e. territories 
which for some reason could not be included into a town municipality but represented 
economic and cultural unity with the town. 
The next division came about in 1955. Croatia now has 27 departments and 299 
municipalities, which meant getting closer to a concept of a two-level system of local 
administration. In the period of 1955-1962, the number of departments remained the 
same but the number of municipalities decreased. The next law passed in 1962 brought a 
further decrease in the number of municipalities and departments and defined 9 
departments (a later amendment reduced departments to 8), 11 municipalities and the 
Town of Zagreb. A municipality was defined as a community of interest of producers 
and consumers. Criteria taken in account were mainly of a political and an economic-
technical nature. The geographical and historical factors came second. 
The most significant changes in the territorial organisation of Croatia came with the 
cancellation of departments in 1967, which was explained by the fact that departments 
had not developed as political, economic and cultural centres. The same year the 
municipalities were enabled to merge into a community of municipalities and the 
Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Croatia of 1974 established communities of 
municipalities as an obligation. With amendments to the Constitution of 1988, this 
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obligation was transformed into an option. Finally, the Constitution of the Republic of 
Croatia, of 1990, completely ruled out any possibility of forming an association of 
municipalities (Šišinački et al., 2002).  
Obviously, a regional policy, if any, could have been formulated and implemented only 
at the central Republic level, the only one that remained the same throughout this period. 
Also, it can be seen that the territorial administrative reforms were most frequent when 
the power and development decision making was centralised most. The fact that such 
tinkering with municipalities, towns and districts could only strengthen the central 
development management, was observed early enough but the reforms went on 
providing enough grounds for doubts that the whole process had a hidden agenda in 
favour of centralisation rather than decentralisation.  
 
Theories and Policies 
Theoretically backed central planning coupled with territorial decentralisation backed 
with no theory lost momentum already in the late 1950s. The policies that followed in 
the 1960s were announced without theoretical explanations and development documents 
were produced without the usual first chapter on socialism, a transitory stage on the way 
to communism. It is thus interesting to review how western regional development 
theories fit with socialist policies after World War II. The picture is somewhat blurred 
and certainly less dramatic than the "primary accumulation" phase, because the planning 
directives of the 1940s and 1950s were replaced with measures that to a certain extent 
allowed for the introduction of the market. Since the rationale for particular measures 
was hardly ever explained to anyone and since there was no monitoring of their 
development effects, it is hard to see whether planners and decision makers ever first 
read a theoretical book and then designed a policy. It is more likely that spatial 
development came about due to the spontaneous reaction of the population and 
entrepreneurs to mainly structural economic measures. 
Čavrak (2003) mentions that spatial development corresponded to growth pole theory as 
proposed by Perroux (Perroux, 1955) because industries concentrated in a couple of 
cities and could have been considered as carriers of development in certain regions. 
There is no evidence whatsoever that the Federal Planning Committee consulted 
Perroux's writings but the actual effects would certainly have not been welcomed by 
Perroux himself. An unbalanced spatial economic structure that developed as a result of 
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the primary accumulation policy and persisted until today proved not to be resistant to 
the transition crisis in the 1990s. Such development had major negative consequences on 
the decline of output, employment and income in those regions that had a higher share of 
large industrial sites.  
n certain periods spatial development resembled the application of Rosenstein-Rodan's 
(1943) big push theory. Already in the 1960s, parts of Croatia were marked as 
underdeveloped and the transfer of savings (investments) was earmarked in the state 
budget. The criteria were economic but also political so that the results were "castles 
built in the desert" which in most cases proved unsustainable, and a constant burden for 
the state budget. In contrast to federal Croatia, the neighbouring federal Slovenia had a 
quite different spatial development as this republic put much more emphasis on balanced 
urban-rural growth. Such a development can be linked to early considerations of centre-
periphery theory, leading nowadays to a smaller urban-rural divide in Slovenia. On the 
other hand and on the other side of the Yugoslav Federation, Macedonia reminded us of 
central place theory. The main investments and social infrastructure construction were 
located in the capital city which triggered vast in-migration. In the beginning of the 
1970s half of the Macedonian population concentrated there.  
In the 1970s the distribution of funds towards backward regions became an unquestioned 
policy measure. Regional development funds were established both at the Federal level 
and at the level of the Republics. Dependent areas were evolving and gradually getting 
used to continuous external support. Even today, a major number of these localities are 
considered as areas of special state concern in Croatia reminding us, above all, of 
dependency theory. In those days large companies located in the most advanced 
Yugoslav areas performed development projects in underdeveloped parts of the country. 
Obviously, funds were actually flowing in the direction of their headquarters widening 
rather than closing the gap. 
What is also visible today in the Croatian context is the strong focus on comparative 
advantages fuelling policy debates to highlight agriculture and tourism as strategic 
futures of the country. Further, policies with the aim to strengthen the export base in 
urban areas during the 1980s were brought about by the occurrence of an economic crisis 
and the need to pay off a very high foreign debt. However, policy makers overlooked the 
fact that measures aimed at a particular economic sector usually have regional effects 
too. In a country as heterogeneous as Croatia, incentives to tourism will be felt only on 
the coast and on the islands, agricultural measures will affect only the continental parts 
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of the country, and so on. This intermingling of structural and spatial policy effects is 
illustrative here because policy makers do not need a theoretical background to see them.  
Šimunović (1992) stressed that the affiliation of political and economic sovereignty led 
to the reduction of economic criteria and created ineffective economic units copied into 
less developed areas. Another contribution to this was the function of the central fund; 
i.e. the function of the financial transaction and on this base created autonomy and 
sovereignty in investment activity in less developed areas.  
From the perspective of contemporary approaches to development, it is interesting that 
Bogunović (1984) mentioned already in the early 1980s that planning implies the 
tendency to encompass all conditions of life and work of working people, including 
equal treatment of economic, social and spatial developmental components. He also 
pointed out the importance of including the regional component into the development 
policy of the whole country and the development policy of the bearers of planning. 
Clearly, early indications of the sustainable development concept can be identified to 
have evolved at the turn into the 21st century. 
The economic planning itself became less and less significant. Five years plans were 
replaced by so called "Social plans" which dealt with the general directions in which the 
structure of the economy should be developed and how fast GDP, investments and 
employment should grow. Already in the 1970s municipal social plans were produced as 
well. They stated the targeted growth of employment and GDP in the municipality but 
rarely had any operational dimension. Towards the end of the 1980s they lost any 
significance for development management on the municipal level. They are remembered 
as probably the least implemented development documents in socialism.  
 
Physical Planning  
Regulatory plans produced in the 1930s marked the beginning of a long practice of 
physical planning in Croatia. They also marked the beginning of two planning practices: 
as opposed to economic planning which started as a firm centralised activity and 
gradually relaxed and got decentralised, physical planning gradually grew into a 
hierarchical multi-level system; physical plans have always been made at state, regional, 
municipal and sub-municipal levels. 
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Unlike social plans, physical plans were compulsory from the very beginning and there 
has always been a law about them. Once adopted, physical plans have always had a legal 
force and their preparation has always been reserved for licensed planning firms and 
institutes who have to follow a prescribed procedure. A public hearing as a form of ex 
post citizens' participation has been a part of the preparation of municipal and regional 
plans for decades. On the other hand, detailed plans that usually cover quite a small part 
of a municipality have to be in accordance with the municipal plan which in turn has to 
be consistent with higher level plans. No plan can come into force without approval from 
all higher levels. 
This hierarchical and centralised system was established already in the 1950s but due to 
frequent changes of territorial administrative division and weak institutions, a 
hierarchical monitoring and evaluation mechanism was never developed. The system 
perpetuated itself successfully. By the end of the 1980s it had been well established with 
a strong professional group of physical planners who studied at one of the five Yugoslav 
Faculties of Architecture. Unapproved construction on the outskirts of big cities and in 
the tourist areas revealed the inability of the authorities to enforce planning 
recommendations and land use regulations. Due to a lack of monitoring, the extent of 
these violations have rarely been recorded. Hardly any data on the implementation of 
physical plans has ever been gathered either. Furthermore, physical plans hardly ever 
referred to existing social plans and vice versa. It was never known whether enough 
space was reserved for the expected growth of the municipal and/or the wider regional 
economy, if there was enough space for residential housing reserved for an increase of 
the labour force, and so on. A comprehensive warranted spatial development policy that 
would cover physical and structural planning never existed under socialism. Ever 
increasing physical planning and ever decreasing structural economic planing existed 
almost independently. 
In the 1980s the situation became a little more complicated. In 1982 a regulation on 
environmental impact assessment was passed in Croatia, and a new document – the 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) - became a compulsory part of project 
documentation for particular investments. This was a pretty straightforward application 
of US legislation on Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and soon gained 
momentum. By the end of the 1980s a new profession emerged - physical planning firms 
extended their expertise (some even specialised) and started producing EISs, with some 
200 EISs produced by the end of the 1980s. This activity was never consistently 
incorporated into the physical planning system. Permits issued by authorities that take 
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care of building management can still be overruled by denials issued by authorities that 
deal with environmental protection.  
 
Education  
The educational dimension of spatial economics in socialist Croatia forms the shortest 
part of any review of spatial development governance. In the 1960s there were five 
Faculties of Economics and one course in Regional Economics. Students that happened 
to study at the Faculty of Economics in Zagreb could take it during the second academic 
year and that was all. The course was dropped from the curriculum in the 1970s. In spite 
of all the problems brought by socialist urbanisation, no courses in urban economics 
were ever offered. As for environmental economics, the Faculties of Economics in 
Rijeka and Split were the only ones to offer non-curriculum courses in the late 1980s. 
The few that were interested in the subject read the few available books or enrolled at a 
university abroad. The vicious circle which starts with no spatial economic education and 
ends with no spatial economic policy was closed already in the 1950s extending its 
undesirable effects till today.  
Towards the end of the 1980s, in the last years of socialism, self made Croatian spatial 
economists could only observe that:  
• in spite of early socialist theoretical concepts about economic development and how 
to make it faster, socialist spatial development has never been conceptualised; 
• theory free economic development management has been detached from physical 
planning which is in turn detached from environmental impact assessment; 
• regional policy, as a supposed part of the overall economic development policy, has 
been reduced to non transparent, heavily politically influenced, financial aid to 
underdeveloped regions;  
• lack of monitoring coupled with frequent changes of territorial administrative 
division has made any spatial development policy almost impossible to implement; 
and  
• there has been almost no education in the field of spatial economics whereas 
education for physical planners has been adequate but not sufficient.  
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3  Transition  
The great experiment of transition made a great virtue of the liberalisation of all possible 
sins that a socialist state could have had before (Kolodko, 2000). Combined with the 
break-away from Yugoslavia, Croatia built a strong centralist state to protect this first 
time opportunity of freedom. Centralism was additionally justified by the war that the 
country was forced into right after achieving statehood. Neo-liberal rhetoric proved more 
than useful at the time. The party in power as well as the new rapidly growing 
administration used it to justify how centralisation of the development management 
functions and privatisation of socially owned12 assets can go together. The same rhetoric 
was used to explain the complete lack of regional policy that characterised the overall 
macroeconomic management in the early 1990s. It was convincing for many: 
decentralisation of power to regions will strengthen the separatist tendencies and the 
young state will be seriously endangered. It should be added that regional development 
policy was remembered as a purely redistributive state activity linked to planning, i.e. a 
part of the socialist legacy. In this way private property and free entrepreneurship that 
were to replace socialism had much to do with a strong guardian state and nothing to do 
with funding the underdeveloped, subsidising the weak, and so forth.  
 
Counties, Towns, Municipalities  
Denial of regional policy and even of regionality as such was oddly coupled with further 
changes of the territorial administrative division. The newly formed Republic of Croatia 
inherited the division of the 1980s and had 103 municipalities and the city of Zagreb. On 
average, 46,000 inhabitants lived in the territory of one municipality ranging from 1,228 
in the municipality of the island of Lastovo to 207,147 in the municipality of the coastal 
town of Split (Hrženjak, 1993). 
The legal framework of the new system of local and regional self-government was set up 
by the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia towards the end of 1990 and a couple of 
corresponding laws13 which were passed by the end of 1992. The new legislation 
                                                 
12 The category of social ownership was never properly defined in socialist Croatia. All assets that 
had that status were brought under state ownership in 1991 and offered to buyers.  
13 The Law on the Area of Counties, Towns and Municipalities in the Republic of Croatia, the Law 
on Local Self-Government and Administration, the Law on the City of Zagreb and by passing of the 
Law on the Election of Members of Representative Bodies of the Units of Local Self-Government. 
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introduced a two-tier system of local government in the Republic of Croatia: 
municipalities and towns were units of local self-government; while counties were units 
of local self-government and government. By the end of 1992 Croatia had 21 counties, 
70 towns, 418 municipalities and 2 districts. However, the new laws allowed that 
communities i.e. parts of municipalities, groups of villages or even single villages can 
claim municipal status or even a township because of historical, economic or geographic 
reasons even if they do not meet the criteria stipulated in the laws. Consequently, the 
division of existing municipalities into two or three started right away so that already by 
1993 there were 21 counties 71 towns and 419 municipalities. In 1995, 8 new 
municipalities and 5 new towns were formed. In 2004 the Republic of Croatia consists of 
21 counties, 124 towns and 426 municipalities. 
Capital Formation  
At the same time, the first steps in redefining, restructuring and rebuilding the economy 
on healthy grounds were made. The first part of this was the establishment of a stable 
macroeconomic framework. In 1993 a quite successful stabilisation programme was 
created and partially implemented (Anušić et al., 1995). "Partially", because the second 
phase of the programme that referred to structural adjustment was somehow forgotten in 
the process. Inflation was halted - that was the first and major goal of the programme. 
However, industry collapsed and never really recovered. Foreign direct investments by-
passed Croatia and other former Yugoslav countries in a big loop primarily due to 
unstable political conditions. Macroeconomic stability was stubbornly maintained except 
for the unwarranted but unavoidable and constantly increasing growth of the balance of 
payments deficit. The State could borrow more and more funds on the international 
financial markets according to more and more favourable conditions. Financial markets 
were more or less stable, but persistently undeveloped. The banking system suffered a 
major crisis at the end of the 1990s, when a number of banks collapsed due to major 
plunders within the banking system and the economy. The part of the liberalisation 
concept was more or less fulfilled during the 1990s since liberalisation of financial 
markets and privatisation was well underway. Privatisation can not be considered 
successful, however. Tycoons bought to sell, not to maintain the production and most of 
the major industries vanished, without proper replacement.14 Today, most of the banking 
sector is in foreign ownership - Italian, Austrian and German.  
                                                 
14 More on bandit capitalism in post-socialist countries see in Sokol (2001). 
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During the 1990s the two major schools of economic and political thought were 
coexisting and influencing the Croatian development. Clearly, the neo-liberal stream was 
and still is heavily promoted by international financial institutions such as the IMF, 
World Bank and EBRD. The European Union policy makers started the unification of 
the market and the liberalisation of the movement of people, capital, goods and services. 
At the same time, the growing importance of EU structural funds and cohesion policy 
actually revealed a significant neo-Keynesian legacy. Through the importance of 
cohesion policy, regional development policy received again high attention in the 
European Union at the turn of the century. This also affected Croatian policy makers. 
Theoretical foundations for a modern regional policy (EC, 2004) evolved by changing 
development theory concepts, which moved from growth towards sustainable 
development. Spatial developmental aspects could not be avoided this time because the 
integration of economic, social and environmental dimensions into a new "triangulated" 
development concept simply could not leave aside the heterogeneity and fragility of the 
space in which development takes place. Such a paradigm shift calls for an 
interdisciplinary approach, and invites specialised, individualistic and sector-oriented 
scientists to widen their scope. 
Development Management in a New Context 
Contemporary regional development theory has been influenced by two strong streams 
of thought: on one side the neoclassical, sectoral and very analytically oriented stream; 
and on the other a new stream of integrated development thought calling for 
interdisciplinary and more qualitative approaches. As Croatia is a quite young state and 
data on the local or regional levels are either not available or unreliable, the second 
qualitative approach appears more appealing and applicable in the Croatian context. On 
the other hand, the political leadership is more attracted by quantitative research results 
as they supposedly can be transformed into political arguments more easily than 
qualitative ones.15
Provided that the path of sustainable development has indeed been taken, regional 
development management has to be considered in the new context. The triangulation of 
the development dimensions leads to a new concept of regional development planning 
                                                 
15 Most of the governments from 1991 till today revealed their centralist approach to development 
policy formation and implementation. They have been often labelled neo-liberal which does not 
necessarily imply that they were conversant with the doctrine itself. 
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and management that is integrative and holistic in nature. Through various documents 
and guidelines, the European Commission introduced the programming principle that is 
applied throughout European regions.16 Programming according to EU principles was 
piloted in Croatia as well, mainly through technical assistance projects. 
Croatian authors set a cornerstone for modern regional and local development 
management already in the early 1990s. Fröhlich (1992) has elaborated on the 
functioning of big urban agglomerations and the organisation of information systems for 
regional planning. Šverko (1995) wrote on regional development, highlighted the 
importance of its sectoral and territorial aspects and proposed a complex regional 
development management. Also by the end of the 1990s, a group of authors worked on 
the first concept for regional economic development in Croatia (Fröhlich et al., 1999). 
Significant contributions on contemporary regional development research were presented 
also by authors such as Fröhlich on “bottom-up” and “top-down” development, 
Maleković on the European Union regional policy, Filipić on decentralised 
macroeconomic management or Črnjar on the need for integrated regional planning 
(Sundać, ed., 2001). 
From recent experiences in the application of new development management approaches 
in Croatia, Dräger et al. (2003) identified some important findings. Activities such as 
programming, implementation, monitoring and evaluation, and regular revisions cannot 
be conducted successfully without techniques of development management covering the 
fields of: decision-making, motivation, communication, moderation, steering and 
organisation. The sequence of the main planning phases and management techniques is 
similar to project cycle management, but has to be considered in a broader sense. These 
findings implicitly address so-called soft management aspects. These include 
institutional, organisational and managerial aspects, finance and new public 
management, as well as networking and multi-level governance. 
Application of contemporary development theory is already visible in Croatia in the 
National Island Development Programme (Starc, 1997) and the related legislation - the 
Island act and its by-law "The regulation on the content and methodology on the 
elaboration of sustainable island development programmes".17 Constant avoidance of 
                                                 
16 The European Commission methodological working paper Vademecum for Structural Funds 
Plans and Programming Documents 2000-2006 is probably the most comprehensive reference. 
17 Narodne novine 34/1999 and 94/2002. 
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implementing this very demanding legislation can be considered as a significant finding 
in terms of Croatian institutional weaknesses and lack of administrative capacities. This 
can also be considered as a new field of research within regional development theory that 
is becoming more and more important in the Croatian research community.  
Policy Confusion 
A very interesting and much debated aspect of policy creation arose in Croatia - the 
conflict between sectoral policies and regional policy. Since a coherent regional policy 
has never existed in Croatia, sectoral policies have always dominated the Croatian 
development arena. The spatial aspect is handled through spatial planning only which 
proved to be unable to integrate physical and socio-economic aspects. Development of 
regions and localities is not considered in the contemporary development management 
context, but exclusively in terms of financial support to areas affected by war and 
undeveloped areas such as mountain, border or island areas (Đokić, Sumpor, Starc, 
2003).  
In the research community and amongst politicians18 a confusion of policy approaches 
can also be observed. One strand of policies is based on the neo-liberal perspective with 
a strong sectoral approach. Economic development is the focus of both research and 
policy, while social aspects are marginalised. Such views favour small and medium sized 
enterprises (SME) and cluster related development research and activities, while ignoring 
almost everything else. Croatia has already had a highly specialised Ministry for SMEs 
(2001-2004). The SME policy managed by this Ministry significantly interfered in 
regional and local development initiatives such as co-financing arrangements with local 
and regional self-governments for SME promotion or promotion and co-financing of 
industrial and business zones, centres, incubators. Cluster development is now promoted 
extensively (National Competitiveness Council, 2003). At the same time, it is obvious 
that Environmental policy is considered as expensive and not politically relevant, while 
Social policy is seen as residual help for the poor, marginalised and unemployed – an 
expensive and not development related burden. 
The second approach to contemporary regional development management integrates all 
the above-mentioned aspects - economic, social, spatial and environmental as well as 
                                                 
18 The two groups do overlap as economists often leave academia to take high positions in the 
government. However, there are very few examples of economists in power who managed to 
implement what they proposed in the classroom.  
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institutional development. Accordingly, the broad participation of stakeholder groups 
and citizens is the key to the identification of real problems and achievable development 
goals (Dräger et al., 2003). Regional development policy in this context is viewed 
actually not as a separate policy helping poor regions, but as a framework channelling 
existing and needed sectoral policies from above according to needs and requirements 
from below. This approach has been introduced by foreign consultants from both sides of 
the ocean that come to provide financial and technical assistance. However, the nature of 
the assistance depends on where the consultants are from and which school of thought 
they belong to. So far they brought significant improvements but also contributed to 
policy confusion.  
On the path to EU membership, Croatia will have to develop a coherent development 
policy framework in which regional policy will be an important counterpart to sectoral 
policies. These will have to be integrated into a National Development Plan, which will 
represent the basis for future national development activities and structural funds 
support. In order to set-up a coherent policy framework, Croatia will have to work on 
creating a well-functioning coordination mechanism. This mechanism will have to have 
a formal part integrated into the legislation, and an informal part also referred to as the 
open method of coordination (Ahonen, 2001) that provides actions based on common 
goals and projects. 
Supranational Actors and Regional Policy 
Following Marks, regional policy is, in many ways, “the leading edge of multi-level 
governance in which supranational, national, regional and local governments are 
enmeshed in territorially overarching policy networks” (Marks, 1993; 402-3). Since it is 
now somewhat axiomatic that ’governance’ is much more than ’government’, it is 
important to replace Marks’ notion of governments with a wider concept of ’actors’ 
including a whole range of non-governmental, non-state actors, acting independently of 
state actors or, more usually, in complex ’partnerships’ or ’contractual’ arrangements 
(Stubbs, 2003). In Croatian transition supranational and transnational actors have not 
been just neutral arbiters of ’good governance’, but key players within a complex and 
contested multi-level governance environment. These actors include, but are not limited 
to: 
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1) Global Supranational Organisations such as the United Nations and its agencies, and 
the Bretton Woods Institutions or International Financial Institutions (IFIs), namely 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. 
2) Regional Supranational Agencies including the European Commission and the 
Council of Europe, as well as more temporary arrangements such as the Stability 
Pact for South-Eastern Europe. 
3) Donor agencies of other governments (usually termed bilateral agencies) such as 
USAID for the USA, SIDA for Sweden, GTZ for Germany, DFID for the UK, and 
so on. 
4) Non-state private aid and development organisations, usually playing a role of 
implementing partners of one or more of the above, including international non-
governmental organisations and, increasingly, international private consultancy 
companies.  
 
Croatia is a somewhat specific case in terms of the story of the influence of international 
agencies and actors on regional policy, which is, perhaps, much more complex, 
contested, confusing, and radically unfinished than in other parts of Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE) as well as Southern and Eastern Europe (SEE). There are three key 
reasons for this. Firstly, most supranational agencies began their activities in Croatia 
during the war. Hence, their interventions were initially framed within a ’humanitarian’ 
rather than a ’developmental’ paradigm and were concentrated, in particular, on ’war 
affected areas’. This represents a kind of ’implicit’ regional development policy with 
somewhat distortive long-term consequences, not least in terms of unsustainable 
expectations of external cash injections. 
Secondly, many international actors tend to subsume development programmes within a 
broader democratisation discourse both in terms of support for a pluralistic development 
regime including the role of so-called ’civil society’, and an uneven pattern of support 
for different political configurations at national, regional and local levels. Thirdly, the 
rapidly shifting relationship of Croatia to EU accession and associated programmes and 
policies, necessitates a very fast learning curve. Croatia was, only very briefly, included 
in the PHARE programme and then for political reasons its membership was blocked in 
1995, following military actions. Later, the CARDS programme framed Croatia in terms 
of the Stabilisation and Association Process for the so-called countries of the Western 
Balkans. Now, with a positive avis and membership negotiations beginning in early 
2005, a very different set of imperatives prevail.  
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Over time, the European Union has become the dominant supranational actor ’steering’ 
regional development policy in Croatia, even sub-contracting UNDP as an implementing 
agency for some of the Regional Operational Plan (ROP) development. The World Bank 
and USAID remain, however, important actors, tending to focus more on local 
development at the municipal and city levels. In addition, a long term co-operation 
between GTZ and the Institute of Economics, Zagreb (EIZG) has sought to introduce a 
strategic dimension to local development planning, gaining wider acceptance over time. 
Current EU programming, attempting to learn lessons from the fragmented preparation 
for structural funds management in the new member states, is focused on institution 
building at national and county levels, with a consultancy currently funded designed to 
support a consensus on a National Regional Development Strategy (Hauser, 2003).  
A number of issues and concerns are raised by the role of international organisations in 
the governance of regional development in Croatia. It is not clear whether there is 
genuine co-ordination and complementarity of effort between these agencies or, as 
sometimes appears to be the case, more competition and confusion. This relates to the 
complexities of the interests and value-base of diverse agencies, with distinctions 
between ’neo-liberal’, ’Keynesian’ and a hybrid, technocratic, approach reproduced 
between, but also within, agencies. 
In addition, the dangers of what might best be termed the ’projectization’ of regional 
development, in terms of a race to show results, which often involves cutting corners, not 
learning lessons, and utilising informal networks of influence, ironically contributes to a 
lack of transparency in projects which they were, in fact, set up to challenge. An 
alternative approach, emphasising processes, feedback loops, mutual learning, and a 
recognition of problems and failures, to an extent found in the GTZ/EIZG project, runs 
counter to the ’success culture’ of external assistance programmes.  
A complex role in development projects is being played by ’new intermediaries’ often 
with power but no legitimacy, able to facilitate communication and action between 
levels. In addition, external actors provide opportunities for new vertical alliances in 
which certain discourses lacking national or local credibility can become favoured 
because of their amplification internationally. There are also problems caused by the 
rigid sub-contracting rules of the ’new public management’, accurately described 
recently as the ’little brother’ of neo-liberal economic ideology (Voipio, 2003, p. 360), 
which encourage a fetishism of form over content, a proliferation of agencies and 
approaches, and also contributes to competition and confusion. 
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The current emphasis on combining project-based grant aid with ’capacity building’ 
including the positioning of foreign advisors in key positions within Government 
departments can be a valuable form of policy transfer. However, tensions and mistrust 
can be created by foreign advisors earning considerably higher sums than their domestic 
advisee counterparts, but often ignorant of key domestic realities. This can be 
compounded by the multiplication of advice, advisors, projects, and capacity building 
workshops, again contributing to confusion. A further paradox is that advice tends to 
function best on a human scale, with one advisor working with a small group of senior 
civil servants in one department, but this is the least likely to have widespread impact in 
terms of a whole government, joined up, integrated response.  
More research is needed on the role of external agencies in the construction and 
implementation of regional development policy in Croatia. At this stage, it would be 
wrong to make detailed policy recommendations. Certainly, a more collaborative 
environment needs to be created in which local and national interventions are supported 
by external assistance rather than the other way round. Greater awareness of the need to 
address inevitable value dissensus, learn lessons, and strive towards a vision of Croatian 
regional development in a European context requires longer-term, more transparent, 
arrangements than currently found. 
Institution Building Frenzy 
Instead of a rational, carefully chosen, ’shaping of institutional choices’ (Dimitrova, 
2001) regarding regional and local development, it often seems as if Croatia is in the 
midst of an institution building frenzy. In terms of the concept of ’multi-level 
governance’ discussed earlier, much of this involves the diffusion of authority through 
the creation of autonomous or semi-autonomous agencies and funds which operate at 
arm’s length from central government Ministries. At first glance this ’agencification’ 
(Pollitt et al., 2001) appears to resemble that which has occurred, to varying extents and 
in varying forms, in most of the OECD countries, as part of a move to improve the 
performance of the public sector, sometimes termed ’distributed public governance’ 
(OECD, 2002) often equated with modernisation and the new public management. 
However, as Beblavý (2001) has pointed out with regard to Central and Eastern Europe, 
the pace of this reform has been much more rapid and, in addition, has tended to ignore 
the increasing criticisms, and retrenchment which has occurred regarding the model, in 
many of the Western democracies. His concern that ’agencification’ represents a quick 
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fix, short-term, sectoral solution to complex questions, often based on uncritical 
transplanting of models from other countries and cultures, certainly applies to regional 
and local development policy in Croatia. The push for the proliferation of agencies rests, 
it seems, on an alliance of external actors from key international agencies and internal 
actors, often the technocrats of the newly created agencies, frustrated by the slow pace of 
decision-making and administrative restructuring.  
Croatia’s regional development scene now resembles that of an ’institutional jungle’ 
(Hauser, 2002) with a vast array of new, and proposed new, agencies vying for position, 
influence, and mandate, alongside more ’traditional’ actors such as Ministries, counties, 
and municipalities. Recently established agencies, often with the backing of external 
actors, include: 
• Local Economic Development Agencies (LEDAs); 
• The Fund for Regional Development of the Republic of Croatia;  
• The Fund for Environmental Protection and Energy Efficiency; 
• The Fund for Development and Employment; 
• The Fund for the Reconstruction and Development of the City of Vukovar. 
 
Currently there are discussions regarding the possibility of establishing a national 
Regional Development Agency, as well as more Regional Development Agencies, 
alongside the Istrian and Međimurje development agencies, which currently exists. This 
excessive faith in institutional solutions to intractable problems appears to be 
contributing to problems of accountability, of sustainability, and of policy distortion and 
confusion, all of which have been noted by Beblavý (2001). Whether this will lead to a 
backlash as traditional structures respond to an erosion of their autonomy, as he predicts, 
remains to be seen in Croatia. 
 
Tiers of Government  
When the Croatian Government introduced its Work Programme in 2000, a huge reform 
of the public sector was announced, directed towards decentralisation. It was planned to 
stop the expansion of public administration, to introduce horizontal and vertical 
decentralisation, to provide an analysis of the effectiveness of the state administration, 
and to perform a territorial reorganization of regional and local units. Through a project 
’Decentralisation of Public Administration’ an operative execution of the planned 
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activities started in 2000 (Perko-Šeparović et al., 2003). Four years later a general 
comment can be made that initial steps in the decentralisation process have been taken 
but at the same time legal acts that supported decentralisation did not follow 
recommendations from the project. (Antić, 2002, p. 69). This notably relates to the 
documentation that had to support decentralisation: beside the Government Work Plan 
and the Project, the decentralisation process (seen as a tool to achieve specific goals) 
misses supporting documents that will secure its successful implementation. Above all, 
Croatia does not have a national spatial/regional development strategy through which the 
directions of its future regional development should be indicated. The decentralisation 
process thus started without analytical and strategic support of the administration. In 
practice, even a certain resistance was observed.  
On the local level the decentralisation process was not welcomed for several reasons: the 
local administration did not have enough human and institutional capacity and also they 
were not trained enough to meet new requirements. Deconcentration of responsibilities 
was not followed by adequate fiscal decentralisation for all local government units. The 
question that arose was: if a local government unit cannot execute its responsibilities, 
what are the mechanisms to force it to cooperate with other local government units and if 
this is not the case can the unit (i.e. a town or a municipality) go bankrupt? Both 
questions are still unanswered. 
The main issues concerning governance of local development are the following (Perko-
Šeparović et al., 2003):  
• local/regional governments do not have a clear and strong enough position in the 
overall legal infrastructure; 
• the scope of responsibilities is defined without any distinction of the size, 
population, achieved development and, financial strength;  
• a centralist orientation is still present in the territorial administrative system;  
• the monitoring process is demonstrating severe weaknesses; and 
• institutional capacity is inadequate. 
 
There is no clear division of functions among the different levels of government, because 
of non-transparent and unclear regulations that govern the area of competence of local 
units. Although there is an outlined division of the affairs of local administration 
between the state, the county, and the city/municipality, it is very difficult to say which 
level is meant to undertake a given function (Ott and Bajo, 2002b, pp. 107-122). 
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Whereby the levels of responsibility are not specified in detail and seen as such might 
cause confusion, as many of the listed tasks interrelate with tasks of other levels of 
government. At the same time, details are thoroughly defined in a broad number of 
special laws, where expenditures are assigned specifically to each relevant level of 
government, highlighting as well central government responsibilities. Financial 
relationships are so excessively complex that in most cases the financing of individual 
functions is undertaken from all three levels. 
The decentralisation process has not influenced the current system of state administration 
neither has it reduced the number of its employees. Reorganization of administration that 
took place on the regional and county level resulted in a decrease of the number of 
employees at that level. 
 
Decentralisation Promised  
In spite of the increasing number of municipalities Croatia has remained a highly 
centralised country. Two main indicators, the share of revenues of local self-government 
in gross domestic product, and the share in the total government budget revenues, clearly 
support such a statement. In 1999 the share of local budget revenues in consolidated 
revenues of the general government budget totalled 10.32%, and their share in GDP 
amounted to 5.42%. In 2000, the year before the launch of the first phase of the 
decentralisation process in Croatia, the share of local budget revenues in consolidated 
revenues of the general government budget totalled 10.93%, and their share in GDP 
amounted to 5.18%. (Jurlina-Alibegović and Šišinački, 2004).  
The attempted decentralisation of self-government competencies was accompanied by 
attempted fiscal decentralisation. In its first phase, 32 financially stronger towns and all 
the 21 counties in Croatia were assigned additional local responsibilities. The effects of 
fiscal decentralisation that was legally provided in 2001 are difficult to measure 
particularly in such a short period of time. However, from the institutional analysis 
perspective, estimates about financial strength of local self-government units (LGU) to 
manage their own development are quite discouraging. About one third of LGUs in 
Croatia can not cover current expenditures with current revenues, while basic 
responsibilities to be financed are equal for all LGUs. There is a strong dependence on 
central government transfers to provide mandatory services, or these services are not 
provided at all under the assumption that no sanctions will apply. Subsidies and grants 
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consist of approximately 8% of the total revenues of all local budgets, which leads to the 
conclusion that local self-governments are dependent on central state aid (Budak et al., 
2004). 
On the other hand the fiscal decentralisation process in Croatia brought some 
improvements. They can be observed in the following areas: division of functions and 
responsibilities, budget classification, fiscal capacity indicators, allocation of grants, 
consolidation of local governments’ budgets, accounting system, budget planning, 
national treasury system, tax reports, long-term capital planning, financial control over 
borrowing system and participation of citizens (Ott and Bajo, 2002a). In spite of that, the 
existing organisation of local and regional self-governments is not efficient in terms of 
fiscal capacity.  
 
Education  
Self made Croatian spatial economists benefited a lot in the first decade of transition. 
The inflow of theoretical, methodological and practical knowledge increased 
considerably while pilot projects lead by foreign consultants brought incoherent but 
nevertheless valuable practical experience. Membership in international science 
organisations (the European Regional Science Association, the Regional Studies 
Association, and similar) also helped. Those that tried to study spatial economics were at 
a complete loss, however. Education got worse and after a decade of transition there are 
no signs that it will improve soon. Spatial economics education is still reduced to extra 
curricular courses in environmental economics at Faculties of Economics in Rijeka and 
Split and there are no regional economics courses offered anywhere in the country. After 
decades of turmoil and highly problematic urbanisation no courses in urban economics 
are offered either. Another important discipline - institutional economics - is also missing 
from the curriculum. The latter is a clear legacy of socialism in which nothing of the kind 
was ever mentioned, let alone studied. The only exception is the University in Osijek 
where a promising postgraduate programme on “The Management of local and regional 
development” has been launched in October 2004. 
After almost a decade and a half of transition, self made Croatian spatial economists can 
only observe that transition appears as "too young a phenomenon" to be theorised about 
and that numerous modern theoretical concepts developed elsewhere have a very limited 
application. A significant though sporadic development of methodologies of managing 
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local development still faces serious institutional obstacles both at the governmental and 
self-government level. Overall economic policy has become highly dependent on foreign 
actors and remains detached from strong and almost petrified physical planning which is 
in turn still detached from EIA. They would also observe that regional policy is non 
transparent, heavily politically influenced and still reduced to financial aid to the 
underdeveloped. The lack of monitoring coupled with frequent changes of territorial 
administrative division has made any spatial development policy almost impossible to 
implement. Finally, they would note that there has been almost no education in the field 
of spatial economics whereas education for physical planners has been adequate but not 
sufficient.  
 
 
4  Concluding Remarks  
Transition amazes. The fundamental changes that it brought about were expected to erase 
the various shortcomings and inconsistencies that were embedded in the socialist system 
and its ideology. It was also timidly expected by many that civilisation achievements 
brought about by socialism will remain in whatever system was to follow it. Quite a few 
expectations revealed only wishful thinking. Quite a few were founded in the analysis of 
what was called "real socialism" i.e. the actual performance of the socialist social and 
economic system. The latter grew in 1970s and 1980s all over the socialist world and led 
to conclusions that seemed unquestionable. All shortcomings and development bottle 
necks were blamed on the lack of democracy, lack of a free market, lack of active civil 
society and individual freedom, insufficient exchange of technologies and whatever 
intellectual achievements had occurred within the capitalist world and, last but not least, 
to environmental negligence. The last years of socialism supplied evidence in favour of 
such conclusions as all socialist countries entered a crisis which seemed fundamental and 
irreparable in the context of the existing system.  
Discussions on regional policy and its ill performance in socialism were perhaps least 
frequent but they also gained momentum towards the end of socialism. In Yugoslavia 
and Croatia within it, the Federal fiscal policy was most often blamed for the suboptimal 
growth of the most developed parts of the country. Discussions about money earned in 
Croatia and spent somewhere else were quite frequent. Lack of regional policy or rather 
the wrong regional policy was explained again by lack of democracy, lack of expertise, 
the interests of ruling social strata in Yugoslav socialism, and particularly by Serbian 
hegemony over fiscal transfers.  
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Today, after more than a decade of transition, most if not all of the lamented obstacles 
have been wiped away. Democracy has been introduced, the door for "western" theories 
and methodologies has been wide open, the market has been institutionalised as well as 
private property, and the socialist ruling strata are history. Even the EU, the only goal 
that unifies all Croatian governments since 1990, favours regional policy and includes it 
in the long list of accession requirements. However, Croatia still does not have a regional 
policy, and similarities with socialist regional development management are vivid, 
almost striking.  
The discussion about troublesome regional development governance is thus reduced but 
not made easier. The question: "if not the usually suspected obstacles, than what?" has to 
be put more seriously than before and the answers, no matter how theoretical, should 
have an operational value. The common explanation that all the shortcomings are just 
leftovers of socialism that will inevitably vanish simply because there is no more 
socialism around, does not hold simply because most of the problems proved persistent. 
The reasons are much more complex and should be sought for both in socialist legacy 
and in transition practice. It should not be overlooked that new institutions and 
corresponding organisations introduced in the 1990s have been coupled with quite a few 
ex-socialist institutions and organisations that survived the tough early years of transition 
and have even reinforced their position. Another explanation that is often put forward 
deals with competence. Administrators in ministries, agencies, county and municipal 
departments and whoever else is supposed to manage regional development are often 
said to be not competent enough and definitely not up to the job. Although the transition 
years brought enough evidence about incompetence in particular cases and concerning 
particular persons, the lack of regional policy can hardly be explained by lack of 
knowledge and skills. Had there been real intentions to establish such a policy, a decade 
and a half was more than enough to acquire necessary capacity either by training or by 
relying on foreign expertise.  
The explanation that deserves much more attention deals with centralised governance 
and its relation to regional development management. The government that took power 
right after the Republic of Croatia was constituted was highly centralised which could 
have been justified by the need to preserve the young statehood and, of course, by the 
Homeland war. Already in the late 1990s all reasons for centralisation of this kind ceased 
to exist, but the centralisation tendencies remained strong and felt in most of the existing 
policies. This could be explained only by internal reasons i.e. the concern of an ever 
growing state administration to maintain its position and the interest of politicians in 
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power to maintain control of the distribution of funds earmarked for regional 
development. Such explanation sheds additional light on territorial administrative 
decentralisation as well. Quite a few communities that had won municipal status or even 
became a town in 1992 and subsequently, soon found out that decentralisation brought 
dependency on the central state budget and that one form of centralised development 
management was replaced with another, somewhat more subtle. 
What is to be done? The answer to the famous development question should be put in the 
contemporary context: define a vision, derive goals and find ways to achieve them. As 
usual, the vision seems easiest to define and creates least problems as the state of affairs 
it pictures reaches far and high enough not to interfere with current interests. Important 
nevertheless, the vision that has to be defined here has to do with top-down and bottom-
up policies and the balance between the two. Croatian regional development has hardly 
been ever managed but the measures that were aimed at certain regions were all top-
down in their design. Bottom-up efforts were initiated only recently and the balance of 
the two, necessary for efficient regional development management, has not yet been 
achieved. As local self-government is not institutionally, organisationally and financially 
ready for good governance, the central government should gradually transfer tasks and 
the power to deal with them, build local self-government capacity, help both financially 
and in terms of expertise and, not least, do all this in a non-paternalistic way. In such a 
process lack of competence, socialist leftovers and the like are clearly not the obstacles. 
The main problem is the (lack of) willingness of those who have centralised the power to 
decentralise it.  
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Abstract 
The current situation indicates that Croatia is definitely on the path towards joining the 
EU. The most visible advantage of acquiring candidate status and, later, joining the EU is 
the financial support which the EU places at the disposal of candidate and member 
countries in the form of the various funds that constitute part of its policies. 
This paper is intended to systematically describe and analyse the effects and benefits of 
different policy expenditures from various EU sources that are expected in Croatia. 
These differ depending on the various phases in the EU accession process: from the 
present situation, where the EU’s CARDS programme is active in Croatia, to the Pre-
Accession Strategy phase with its policy instruments Phare, ISPA and SAPARD and the 
corresponding expenditures, to post-accession appropriations for commitments and 
payments available to member states via the Common Agricultural Policy, the Structural 
Operations are divided between the Structural and Cohesion Funds and Internal Policies. 
It is assumed that these expenditures will, in any phase, affect general economic 
performance and overall employment patterns, and that their impact is likely to differ on 
a sectoral basis. 
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In order to provide a sound methodological foundation for studying such impacts, this 
paper offers a systematic presentation of current EU financing in Croatia, as well as of 
pre-accession and possible (estimated) post-accession funds that are expected to be 
available to Croatia, with corresponding projected expenditure items. It also provides 
sound argumentation for its estimates through a quantified description of policies and, 
where applicable, the assumptions underlying the figures presented. EU support for 
Croatia is analysed based on an analogy with the previous ten candidate countries. 
The impact analysis on basic economic variables has been performed using the I-O 
model under different scenarios concerning various projected funds inflow to Croatia, 
and depending on Croatia’s varying status at different points in time: current status, EU 
candidate status, and EU membership. The annual amounts (real and estimated) of the 
aforementioned funds have been injected into national I-O matrices so as to obtain 
estimates of the impact generated by differently defined scenarios. The scenarios 
presented in this paper illustrate maximum impacts, as they were made under the 
assumption that EU expenditures will be fully absorbed, and also exclude anticipated 
national payments towards the EU.  
The analysis has been performed in a static framework, and estimates only relative rates 
of change in output, income and employment due to newly available funds inflow and, 
consequently, increased final demand; it does not refer to absolute values. In fact, it 
measures the impacts of the described funds inflow in terms of delta change compared to 
the current situation. Therefore, only the effects of EU policy funds inflow for one year 
were estimated, and an analysis of cumulative effects was not performed.  
The fact that the latest national I-O table for Croatia used in this paper’s impact analysis 
dates from 1997, and that it was produced using the RAS method based on a direct 
requirements matrix for the year 1987, could represent a limitation in assessing precise 
values. However, for such an illustrative analysis it is sufficiently representative, and 
provides relevant results. 
 
Keywords: EU accession, EU policies, impact analysis, economic development 
JEL Classification: F15, D57, O12 
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1  Introduction 
The latest news informs us about a new candidate country for EU membership. The 
Republic of Croatia was granted the status of an official candidate for membership in the 
European Union on Friday, 18th June 2004. This has opened the possibility of using 
resources from EU Pre-Accession Funds and, subsequently, of “post-accession” EU 
financial support. It marks a historical event for the Republic of Croatia, and the date for 
beginning its membership negotiations has been fixed for early 2005.  
The paper intends to analyse the effects and benefits of EU pre-accession and post-
accession funds inflow on Croatia’s economic performance. In order to present the 
results adequately, it has been structured as follows. The introductory section gives a 
general description of EU relations with Croatia, specifically of milestones in relations 
between the EU and Croatia since the very beginning of their co-operation. The general 
characteristics of the available national I-O table, and the corresponding assumptions of 
the methodology used for analysis in this paper, are presented in the second section. 
The first step in an I-O analysis, based on the injection of pre-accession and projected 
post-accession funds into the national I-O matrix, is to identify the vectors of the 
modified final demand. EU pre- and post-accession financial support has been carefully 
examined and presented in the first part of the third section, together with an estimate of 
EU post-accession funds for Croatia. Following this, the different stages on the way 
towards the EU membership and the sectoral availability of different policy funds are 
presented in terms of the relevant scenarios. The projected funds are allocated to sectors 
of economic activity based on the objectives of each policy. In this way, an impact 
analysis for various funds may be carried out under the relevant scenarios.  
The fourth section provides the results of the impact analysis and observations as to each 
policy’s implications. These results present the impact of EU policies on Croatia’s 
economic performance, and are compared to results obtained for Slovenia and Romania 
using the same methodological approach within the REAPBALK project.  
The last section contains concluding remarks on the results and objectives of this paper.  
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1.1  EU relations with Croatia from 1991 to 2001 
As already mentioned, the current situation, in which Croatia is on a new path towards 
EU membership, represents the starting point for the analysis performed in this paper. 
Croatia is a new candidate country, and this opens new possibilities for using resources 
from EU policy funds. The following section illustrates the steps taken by the Republic 
of Croatia on its path towards EU accession, in order to provide insight into past and 
present circumstances of its relations with the EU.  
 
Milestones in relations between the EU and Croatia1
• 1997: Regional approach. The EU Council of Ministers establishes the political and 
economic conditionality for development of bilateral relations with Croatia.  
• 1999: The EU proposes a new Stabilisation and Association process (SAP) for the 
five countries of South-east Europe, including Croatia.  
• 2000: Parliamentary and presidential elections in January 2000 result in a change of 
government in Croatia, ushering in a new political climate. The EU responds as 
follows:  
¾ February: Establishment of an EU-Croatia Consultative Task Force, which 
provides Croatia with expertise and technical assistance in preparing for the 
Stabilisation and Association process.  
¾ March: Upgrading the Office of the EC Special Envoy to Croatia in Zagreb to a 
permanent Delegation of the European Commission.  
¾ 24 May: The European Commission adopts a positive feasibility report on 
opening negotiations for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA).  
¾ June: The Feira European Council announces that all the SAP countries are 
“potential candidates” for EU membership.  
¾ September: Extension of duty-free access to the EU market for Croatian 
products.  
¾ 20 November: Opening of SAA negotiations within the Zagreb Summit.  
• 2001: First year of the new CARDS programme:  
¾ 29 October 2001: Signing of the SAA, which provides for wide-ranging co-
operation, and is to guide Croatia in its gradual approach towards EU 
structures. The SAA includes establishment of a framework for political 
                                                 
1 Available at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/croatia/index.htm 
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dialogue and promotion of economic and trade relations, with prospects for 
establishing a free trade area after a transitional period of 6 years.2  
¾ At the end of 2001 the European Commission adopts a country strategy for 
Croatia, covering the period 2002-2006 and providing a framework for EC 
assistance. This assistance is to be delivered via the CARDS programme. The 
strategy paper is complementary to activities by EU member states and other 
donors.  
• 2002: An Interim Agreement covering trade and trade-related measures is concluded 
in parallel with the SAA, and enters into force on 1 March 2002. The Interim 
Committee meetings are held in April 2002 and April 2003.  
• 2003: As a further step in the development of EU-Croatia relations, Croatia submits 
an application for EU membership on 21 February 2003. On 14 April 2003 the 
GAERC Council requests that the Commission prepare an opinion on Croatia’s 
application.  
• 2004: On 18 June 2004 Croatia becomes a candidate for EU membership. 
 
 
Financial statistics from 1991 to 2001 
Between 1991 and 2000 Croatia received €367 million in EC assistance, with 65% going 
to humanitarian aid. The other major programme was refugee return. Most of the 
assistance provided to Croatia after 2000 has been implemented as part of the 
Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation (CARDS) 
Programme.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 The agreement also provides a basis for cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs, and 
identifies the acquis communautaire which Croatia will have to adopt in order to effectively 
participate in the European integration process.  
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Table 1.  1991-2001 EC assistance to Croatia – allocations 
              in millions of Euros (commitments) 
  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total 
OBNOVA* 0.10 0.30 11.70 10.30 9.00 11.50 20.34 60.00 123.24 
ECHO humanitarian aid** 204.80 38.40 21.15 14.50 6.95 6.50  292.3 
Media 0.09 0.31 0.72 1.67 0.59  3.38 
Democracy and human 
rights 
0.70 2.20 0.60 0.21 0.97 0.50 5.18 
Specific activities*** 1.00 1.42 1.81 1.00 5.23 
TOTAL 204.99 39.01 34.27 28.67 18.14 19.63 23.12 61.50 429.33 
 
Source: http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/croatia/index.htm (15.09.2004.) 
Note: * The figure from 2001 refers to CARDS first year funding. ** The figure from 1994 includes the total allocated
funds under ECHO from 1991 to 1994. *** Including Demining and Tempus 2000. 
 
                                                
 
 
 
2  General Characteristics of the Methodology             
Used in this Analysis 
In order to evaluate the impacts generated by various EU financial mechanisms and 
obtain information about their economy-wide effects, we decided to apply simulation 
using an Input-Output (I-O) model. An I-O table, which provides a detailed snapshot of 
I-O linkages within the economy, can be used to predict the consequences of any planned 
and potential changes in demand for an economy’s output.3 In this respect, it was 
deemed to be a useful tool in assessing the potential impact of external shocks to the 
economy, such as EU budgetary transfers following accession. The immediate results of 
such an analysis provide information about additional output created by increased final 
demand. The effects of the simulated policies on final demand (components of the 
“shock vectors”) are presented in Table 5.  
Once all the vectors of final demand have been estimated, the I-O model is applied to 
assess overall impacts in terms of income, employment and output produced by different 
scenarios.  
Some general characteristics of the available national I-O table and the assumptions of 
this methodology are noted before presenting the aforementioned relevant scenarios. 
 
 
3 The main virtue of the I-O model is its ability to provide multipliers indicating linkages between sectors 
of the economy. Nevertheless, these results have to be taken with caution, due to restrictive assumptions 
underlying the I-O technique (static character, linear production function, no impact of scale economies, 
no substitution, infinitely elastic supply). 
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2.1  Characteristics and Aggregation of National I-O Table                 
Used in Impact Analysis 
The national I-O table used dates from 1997, and has been derived using the RAS 
method, based on the direct requirements matrix from the year 1987. This was the last 
year when a national I-O table was calculated based on collected data and the other 
relevant information needed to construct such a table.  
 
Table 2.  Summary of characteristics of the available national I-O table 
I-O table Croatia 
Number of sectors Symmetric 60x60 
Technology assumption Industry-technology assumption 
Product-by-product 
Valuation Basic values, current prices 
Year 1997 
Intermediate flows Domestic 
 
 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, the estimated vectors of final demand are used for 
impact analysis, hence an allocation of EU funds based on sectors of economic activity is 
required. A precise sectoral allocation of EU funds across 60 sectors of economic 
activity would be difficult to perform. Therefore, since the analysis is illustrative, and for 
the sake of giving relevant and observable results, the national table was aggregated into 
15 sectors.4  
 
 
2.2  General Assumptions of the Analysis Presented                        
in the Following Section  
Before presenting the results of the analysis, its assumptions, which represent some of 
the limitations of the I-O approach, should be noted:  
 
                                                 
4 Aggregation into the fourteen sectors that are most frequently used in national statistics and a fifteenth 
sector including other sectors with a significant number of employees. These sectors are: Agriculture; 
Manufacture of Food Products; Textiles and Clothing; Wood Products; Chemical and Metal Products; 
Machinery and Motor Vehicles; Furniture; Other Manufacture; Electricity, Water and Gas; Construction; 
Trade and Hotels; Transport; Financial Services and Real Estate; Public Administration, Education and 
Health Services. 
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• the scenario analysis is static, and calculates the effects of different EU policy 
instruments on basic economic variables of the national economy, measured as delta 
change compared to the baseline scenario (current situation); 
• therefore, only the effects of inflow of funds from each EU policy instrument in 
each separate year have been measured, and calculations of cumulative effects were 
not performed; 
• the analysis does not refer to a specific year, but rather to an annual inflow of funds 
and its effects on the national economy and its current economic structure; 
• this analysis predicts the possible impact of EU funds on the national economy as 
net inflows, neglecting national co-financing and later (post-accession) contributions 
(obligatory national payments) to the EU budget. 
 
 
3  Analysed EU Policy Instruments                                
and Relevant Scenarios for Impact Analysis 
EU policy instruments can be divided first of all based on different programme periods, 
and then based on different policies referring to different objectives and priorities. This 
paper presents the amounts projected for Croatia for each programme period analysed: 
from the CARDS programme currently active in Croatia, the pre-accession instruments 
that were available to the former EU candidate (EU 10) countries, and the main 
categories of Community expenditures under different headings. 
 
3.1  EU CARDS Programme and Pre-Accession Assistance 
An impact analysis using the I-O model has been carried out based on different scenarios 
regarding the various policy instruments that will be available to Croatia in the pre-
accession period5 and the currently available CARDS funding.  
The policies considered are listed in Table 3. A description of policy instruments and a 
corresponding financial breakdown are given below.  
                                                 
5 The average annual amounts for allocation of funds to Croatia under Pre-Accession Strategy instruments 
in the period 2005-2006 were used to make these calculations. The amounts targeted for Croatia are 
available at: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2004/pdf/strategy_paper_en.pdf 
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Table 3.  Projected EU policy funds inflow at the national level 
Average annual amounts  
in millions EUR in thousands HRK 
Currently available 
CARDS 63.0 475.65 
Pre-accession 
ISPA 30.0 226.5 
Phare 80.0 604.0 
SAPARD 12.5 94.4 
TOTAL  
   - pre-accession 122.5 924.9 
TOTAL (pre-acc. + CARDS) 185.5 1,400.55 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on different documents available at http://europa.eu.int/enlargement  
EXR EUR 1 = HRK 7.55  
 
 
 
CARDS Programme 
A new programme called CARDS (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, 
Development and Stabilisation) was adopted by Council Regulation (EC) No 2666/2000 
of 5 December 2000. The programme’s wider objective is to support participation by the 
countries of the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia and 
Montenegro, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) in the Stabilisation and 
Association process (SAP).6  
Community assistance focuses on democratic stabilisation, economic and social 
development, justice and home affairs, assistance in public administration reform and 
implementation of the SAA, the environment and natural resources. 
Through the CARDS programme, the European Commission has allocated a budget of 
€189 million to Croatia for the period 2002-2004, to support the country’s efforts 
towards European integration7. Croatia received €60 million from the 2001 budget, 
which represents a more than threefold increase over previous years.  
Ongoing EU support for Croatia under the CARDS programme was included in the 
analysis, since it is still not clear whether this will be replaced by pre-accession policy 
                                                 
6 The Stabilisation and Association Process is the cornerstone of the European Union’s policy in the 
region (the Western Balkans). It seeks to promote stability within the region while also facilitating its 
closer association with the European Union. A key element of the SAP for countries that have made 
sufficient progress in terms of political and economic reform and administrative capacity is a formal 
contractual relationship with the EU, which takes the form of a stabilisation and association agreement. 
7 The CARDS 2002-2004 Multiannual Indicative Programme for Croatia is given in the Annex, Table A1. 
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instruments, or will continue to be granted to Croatia until the end of 2006. The existing 
financial framework of CARDS in Croatia has been analysed, with average three-year 
amounts used in the impact analysis. 
 
Pre-Accession Instruments8
In order to assist countries that have applied to become members of the European Union 
in carrying out the reforms required for membership and preparing themselves to benefit 
from EU funds upon accession, the EU provides financial assistance as part of its Pre-
Accession Strategy through three different programmes: SAPARD, ISPA and Phare.  
The SAPARD programme supports agricultural and rural development, and comes under 
the responsibility of the Directorate-General for Agriculture. The programme envisages 
implementation of four measures: (i) support for investments in agricultural holdings 
(33.5% of funds); (ii) support for investments in the food processing industry (38.3%); 
(iii) support for economic diversification of farms (tourism and crafts) (13.4%); and (iv) 
support for development of the rural infrastructure (13.7%). The remaining 1% of funds 
is designated for technical assistance. In the analysed scenario, 100% absorption of these 
funds is envisaged.  
The second form of pre-accession support is the ISPA programme, which deals with 
large-scale investment support in the environment and transport. This programme is 
meant to be a predecessor to the type of investments carried out by the Cohesion Fund. 
As indicated by the ISPA reports for EU 10, about 54% of total expenditures are 
designated for investments in the environmental infrastructure. Most of the remaining 
support (45%) goes to investments in the field of transport, mainly upgrading the railway 
network. 
The Phare programme applies to acceding countries and candidate countries from 
Central and Eastern Europe, and principally involves institution-building measures (with 
accompanying investments) as well as measures designed to promote economic and 
social cohesion.  
As a candidate country, Croatia should benefit from all three pre-accession financial 
instruments. Taking into account the need to adequately prepare Croatia for accession, 
                                                 
8 Total average annual amounts of pre-accession funds distributed among the former ten candidate 
countries are given in the Annex, Table A2. 
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on 6 October 2004 the Commission recommended that €105 million (€80 million for 
Phare and €25 million for ISPA) be allocated to Croatia in 2005, and €140 million in 
2006 (€80 million for Phare, €35 million for ISPA and €25 million for SAPARD).  
If we compare the amount of funds allocated to countries that were previously eligible 
for such support (the former ten candidate countries) to those recommended for Croatia, 
the latter are seen to be as expected. Bearing this in mind, the amount of pre-accession 
support could be estimated on the basis of a comparison to these ten countries. 
The allocation of funds to these countries was based on different geographical and 
economic indicators explained in several EU documents. These indicate that the 
allocation of ISPA and Phare funds is mainly based on a country’s population and GDP 
per capita. For SAPARD fund allocation, the weights used are agricultural land area, 
farming population and GDP per capita. If we use these indicators for a correlation 
between Croatia and the former ten candidate countries, we find that Slovakia is the one 
most like Croatia. Consequently, the possible amount of Phare, ISPA and SAPARD 
funds for Croatia could be estimated by means of a correlation with Slovakia9.  
The weights that could be used for projecting Phare and ISPA funds inflow are the 
average annual amounts of these funds per capita in Slovakia, while for SAPARD they 
are the average annual amounts allocated via this instrument per one hectare of 
agricultural land in Slovakia. Annual budgets could also be estimated, assuming that the 
EU’s annual budget for these funds is flexible and can vary in small ranges, and that 
Croatia, as a candidate country, has a status equal to that of the ten former candidate 
countries.  
The results of projections of these funds under the aforementioned assumptions are as 
follows. For ISPA, funds inflow amounted to €38 million per year, which is 20% larger than 
the recommended average two-year amount of €30 million. As the annual budget for ISPA 
was 1.040 billion Euros, and the annual amounts for candidate countries depended on the 
number of projects signed per country and the European Commission’s estimate of eligible 
value, the total annual amount of the ISPA budget for candidate countries varied over a three-
year period (2000-2003). Therefore, it has been assumed that variations of the projected 
figures could be expected based on changes in the annual ISPA budget.  
                                                 
9 See Grčić, Mrnjavac and Petković (2004, pp. 10-11). 
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The resulting average annual allocation of projected Phare funds is €54 million. The 
recommended average annual amount for a two-year period is €80 million. These figures 
differ by 32%, the recommended amount being larger probably because of Croatia’s 
need for accelerated progress towards membership and economic and social cohesion, as 
well as institution-building.  
SAPARD funding is projected at €8.7 million per year, based on the total area of 
agricultural land. As the share of agricultural employment and agriculture in the GDP 
using these indicators for projecting SAPARD funds is two times higher for Croatia, it is 
normal to expect the amount to be even higher. This is confirmed by the recommended 
annual allocation amount of €12.5 million for a two-year period. 
This example of comparison with Slovakia’s pre-accession fund availability yields an 
annual total of €100 million for Croatia, while the recommended amount is €105 million 
for 2005 and €140 million for 2006, for an average annual amount of €122.5 million. 
According to the estimate of inflows of funds presented and analysed here, it is logical to 
project post-accession funds on the basis explained in this section.  
 
3.2  Financial Framework for EU - EU Funding  
Following accession, new EU countries are entitled to various community funds. Most 
EU funding is not paid directly by the European Commission, but rather via the national 
and regional authorities of the member states. This is the case for payments under the 
Common Agricultural Policy as well as most payments under structural policy financial 
instruments (European Regional Development Fund - ERDF, European Social Fund - 
ESF, European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund - EAGGF and Financial 
Instrument for Fisheries Guidance - FIFG), which, in money terms, make up the great 
bulk of EU funding.  
The main categories of Community expenditures are divided into headings; each of these 
headings carries an amount of appropriations and payment commitments for each year 
(see Table 4, which gives estimates of these expenditures for Croatia).  
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Table 4.  Estimated annual EU expenditures in Croatia 
SOURCE in millions EUR in thousands HRK 
EAGGF- Market measures 39.41 297,519.1 
EAGGF- Compensatory Direct Aids 65.25 492,603.5 
EAGGF - Rural development 83.43 629,896.5 
Total heading 1 188.09 1,420,019.1 
Structural Funds 170.42 1,286,701.2 
Cohesion Fund 45.52 343,691.1 
Total heading 2 215.94 1,630,392.3 
TOTAL 404.03 3,050,411.4 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data available from  
http:europa.eu.int/comm/budget/pdf/financial rwk/copenhagen_package/webtablesEN.pdf  f
                                                
EXR EUR 1 = HRK 7.55  
 
 
 
For the analysis given in this paper, the 2004-2006 EU programming period was taken as 
the benchmark for projections of Community expenditures to Croatia.10 Post-accession 
funds are projected using the same weights presented in the previous section for 
illustrative estimates of pre-accession funds. The average two-year (2005 and 2006) 
amount of EU budgetary resources for Slovakia was taken into consideration, with 
average annual amounts for Croatia being projected using the population ratio between 
Croatia and Slovakia.  
The corresponding EU budget appropriations for payments under internal policies 
(heading 3) and the projected annual amount of EAGGF market measure expenditures 
were not included in this impact analysis.  
As regards Structural Funds, EU assistance concentrates on a limited number of 
priorities and measures. The first priority is designated for ’promotion of the productive 
sector and competitiveness’, and is to be delivered via five measures financed by the 
ERDF: (i) innovative environment; (ii) promoting the development of tourist 
destinations; (iii) improving the enterprise support environment; (iv) economic 
infrastructure; and (v) public services related to development of the economic 
infrastructure.  
The second priority deals with ’knowledge, human resource development and 
employment’, and will be delivered via four measures financed by the ESF: (i) 
 
10 The Financial Framework for Enlargement 2005-2006 - Indicative allocation of payment 
appropriations: Copenhagen Package, used as the basis for projections, is given in the Annex, Table 
A4.
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developing and promoting active labour market policies; (ii) facilitating social inclusion; 
(iii) lifelong learning; and (iv) fostering entrepreneurship and adaptability. 
The third priority is given to ’restructuring agriculture, forestry and fisheries’. It will be 
delivered via five measures financed from the Guidance section of the EAGGF and two 
measures financed from the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG). The 
EAGGF Guidance-assisted measures foreseen are: (i) improving processing and 
marketing of agricultural products; (ii) investments in agricultural holdings; (iii) 
diversification of agricultural activities and activities close to agriculture; (iv) 
investments in forests to improve the economic and ecological value of forests and (v) 
marketing of quality agricultural and food products. The FIFG-assisted measures 
foreseen are: (i) modernisation of existing fishing vessels and small-scale coastal 
fisheries and (ii) development of aquaculture, processing and marketing. 
It is envisaged (from EU 10 Country Reports) that 55% of total public expenditures will 
be related to ERDF measures, with allocations to ESF, EAGGF Guidance, and FIFG 
measures amounting to 30%, 14%, and 1% of total public expenditures, respectively. 
These shares have been taken into consideration when estimating their effect on various 
sectors in terms of changing the final demand vector. The total amount of structural 
funds for Croatia is estimated to be €170.42 million. 
Activities eligible for support from the Cohesion Fund are defined within an overall 
development strategy for transport and environment. The amount for which Croatia 
could be eligible, as estimated in this paper, is €45.52 million. This strategy provides 
coherent and integrated information about planned investments in the transport and 
environment sectors, and defines participation by the Cohesion Fund in these 
investments. Total expenditures from the Cohesion Fund attribute 50% to transport and 
50% to environmental projects. The bulk of expenditures from the Cohesion Fund in the 
field of transport pertains to railways (62%), whereas investments in motorways and 
ports amount to 32% and 5%, respectively. Environmental investments from the 
Cohesion Fund pertain to waste management (49%) and water management (51%).  
The EAGGF can be divided into three main components: direct payments, market 
interventions and guarantee-type rural development measures. The total estimated 
amount for Croatia under this heading is calculated at €188.09 million. 
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Direct payments are treated in the scenarios in a simplified way. It was decided that the 
analysis would simulate the two extreme options of fully decoupled payments (all direct 
payments go to household incomes in agriculture) and fully coupled payments (all 
payments go to investments in agriculture). These two extreme cases provide a 
framework which reveals the differing effects of coupled and decoupled payments. 
Compared with previous reforms of the CAP, the introduction of decoupled payments11 
implies a radical change of instruments and a fundamental change in the institutional 
framework governing EU agriculture.12 
Market interventions are also part of the EAGGF - Guarantees. These measures are 
about to be implemented within the framework of the Common Markets Organisation 
(CMO).  
Certain rural development measures, i.e. the ’CAP Accompanying Measures’, are 
allocated under the EAGGF - Guarantees / Rural Development heading. Considerable 
funds available for the implementation of these measures are allocated via the following: 
(i) compensatory allowances for farming in Less Favoured Areas – LFA; (ii) agro-
environmental measures; (iii) early retirement schemes; and (iv) adaptation of farms to 
EU standards. 
 
 
The Definition of Relevant Scenarios 
The impact analysis starts with scenarios, which allow us to investigate the additional, or 
marginal, effect of each of the different scenarios and accession components. The 
scenarios represent one point in time and one special situation regarding fund 
availability, and the results derived by the I-O model show the separate impact of each 
such scenario on the current economic structure captured in the I-O table. 
                                                 
11 The CAP reform adopted by EU farm ministers on 26 June 2003 completely changed the way the EU 
supports its farm sector. Coupled direct payments were mainly oriented towards supporting agricultural 
production, and were strongly linked with the programme benefit and the decision on production volume 
i.e. market conditions. They have been replaced by the new CAP (decoupled direct payments), which is 
geared towards consumers and taxpayers, while giving EU farmers the freedom to produce what the 
market wants. Theoretically, decoupled payments do not change market returns and, therefore, do not 
favour investments in farming relative to off-farm investments. However, if farmers are facing financial 
stress or credit constraints, payments may stimulate investments which would not otherwise materialise, 
by providing farmers with the necessary liquidity or collateral. 
12 The data on CAP reform may be found at: 
 http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/capreform/index_en.htm  
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The scenarios performed in this analysis of the effects on economic development are as 
follows: 
Scenario 1 - CARDS 
- represents the current situation and includes only the inflow of CARDS funds; 
 
Scenario 2 - pre-accession assistance 
- takes the amount of pre-accession funds inflow into the impact analysis; 
 
Scenario 2a - Scen. 1 + Scen. 2  
- an alternative to Scenarios 1 and 2, including the cumulative use of pre-accession funds and 
currently allocated CARDS funds13; 
 
Scenario 3 - “partial absorption” of funds 
- this scenario assumes EU accession but a lower level of absorption of funds (in comparison 
to Scenario 4). Pre-accession support is omitted from this scenario since a country (region) 
cannot be eligible for support from both pre-accession and full-membership-related policy 
instruments.  
 
The assumed absorption levels are:  
 
EAGGF - Guarantees: 0.85 direct payments - assumed to be fully coupled, 0.7 rural 
development (Guarantees); Structural Funds: 0.5 EAGGF Guidance, 0.5 ERDF, 0.5 ESF;  
Cohesion Fund: 0.5.  
 
Scenario 3a  
- a variant of scenario 3 which assumes that direct payments are fully decoupled, and therefore 
the total amount is transferred towards the final demand of households; 
 
Scenario 4 - “full absorption” on accession  
- this is the most optimistic scenario, stemming from the assumption that all available funds 
will be absorbed by the country. This scenario does not take pre-accession funds into 
consideration, and the impact analysis refers to the effect of “post-accession” funds inflow on 
the current baseline situation. The direct payments are considered to be fully coupled; 
 
                                                 
13 By financing support to Croatia from pre-accession aid, the corresponding appropriations originally 
foreseen under the CARDS programme for 2005 and 2006 can be removed, but there are still ongoing 
projects under CARDS from previous years (2002, 2003 and 2004) that will be used during the 
programming period 2005-2006.  
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Scenario 4a  
- this is a version of scenario 4, with the assumption that direct payments are fully decoupled. 
 
 
3.3.1  Sectoral Allocation of Funds Under Each Defined Scenario                    - 
Increase of Final Demand 
By now it has been made clear that when the output multiplier vector is calculated, the 
overall change in production due to a one-unit variation in the final demand can be 
quantified. In spite of restrictive assumptions, the I-O analysis represents an effective 
tool to quantify the impact on output and, by extension, on income and employment 
resulting from a change in final demand relative to a given sector. Therefore, for further 
analysis we require vectors of final demand. For each scenario the total change in final 
demand was calculated; the next step was the distribution of different EU expenditure 
typologies among sectors represented within the national I-O table.  
Each policy instrument was allocated to the specific sectors towards which they are 
primarily oriented according to the main fund objectives (see Section 3.2). Concerning 
policy support to investments (i.e. structural funds), it was necessary to identify the 
sector’s policy priorities and measures addressed to them. Then, using specific ratios 
from the EU’s sectoral allocations for each instrument, the distribution of funds among 
sectors was completed.  
When direct payments were considered, it was necessary to distinguish decoupled from 
coupled direct payments. In the first case, it was assumed that farmers would spend 
income buying goods and services or investing in other sectors. The simplest solution for 
allocating direct payments employed in this paper was to suppose that farmers would 
spend all their money buying goods and services. In the second case, it was supposed 
that all income would be spent on investment in the agricultural sector.  
The estimated sectoral increase of final demand due to projected EU funds inflow is 
presented in Table 5 according to the relevant scenarios, while the distribution of funds 
among sectors per each policy instrument analysed is given in the Annex, Tables A5 - 
A6. 
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Table 5.  Projections of the change in final demand 
              - specific scenarios for Croatia ()FD) 
Sectors Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 
2a 
Scenario 
3 
Scenario 
3a 
Scenario 4 Scenario 4a 
1 Agriculture 0.00 3,208.75 3,208.75 150,773 135,799 199,827.4 182,210.5 
2 Manufacture of Food 
Products 0.00 0.00 0.00 93,433 90,749 127,188.6 124,030.1 
3 Textiles and Clothing 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 13,471 0.00 15,848.7 
4 Wood Products 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 0.00 0.00 
5 Chemical and Metal 
Products 0.00 0.00 0.00 70,541 60,587 85,579.8 73,868.4 
6 Machinery and Motor 
Vehicles 0.00 30,195.28 30,195.28 117,656 94,847 153,748.7 126,914.6 
7 Furniture 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 12,890 0.00 15,164.9 
8 Other Manufacture 59,125.0 1,495.84 60,620.84 117,656 59,204 153,748.7 84,982.4 
9 Electricity, Water and Gas 24,250.0 0.00 24,250.00 25,781 42,908 38,964.1 59,113.8 
10 Construction 105,000.0 162,183.44 267,183.44 678,355 636,483 1,196,247.6 1,146,987.3 
11 Trade and Hotels 18,750.0 0.00 18,750.00 4,066 27,368 8,132.0 35,545.8 
12 Transport 0.00 101,925.00 101,925.00 132,639 117,211 235,439.9 217,288.4 
13 Financial Services and 
Real Estate 0.00 21,866.69 21,866.69 156,278 199,481 302,477.4 353,304.9 
14 Public Administration, 
Education and Health 
Services 
265,375.0 604,000.00 869,375.00 127,659 132,054 251,538.1 256,709.5 
15 Other 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 51,785 0.00 60,923.0 
TOTAL 472,500 924,875 1,397,375 1,674,837 1,674,837 2,752,892 2,752,892 
 
Notes: In thousands HRK. 
EXR EUR 1 = HRK 7.55  
 
 
 
 
4  Results of the Impact Analysis 
4.1  Effects on National Output Level 
The most straightforward output of a scenario analysis with the I-O model is change in 
gross output by sectors. The main results representing change in gross output as a 
percentage of total effects for the main sectoral aggregates (agriculture, industry, 
services) are presented in Figure 1.14  
This illustrates well the results in terms of the sectoral structure of total output change 
per each defined scenario. 
The results suggest that in the pre-accession period an output increase will occur in the 
services sector. This is due to projected inflow of funds under the CARDS and Phare 
programmes and the objectives which these cover. 
                                                 
14 More detailed results, i.e. change in gross output in absolute terms and the percentage of total effects 
for the main sectoral aggregates, are presented in the Annex, Table A7. 
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Figure 1.  Change in gross output as a percentage of total effects 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on EU funds inflow defined in scenarios (see Annex, table A7). 
 
 
 
After this period, possible accession brings a change in the structure of effects. A 
significant drop compared to pre-accession period occurs in terms of effects on services. 
The share of services in terms of the change in gross output decreases to half its initial 
value. The post-accession period shows an increase in the share of industrial output, with 
construction showing a similar share in industry’s total output change. The highest 
change is in the share of agricultural output, which increases from zero to eight 
percentage points. 
Besides an absolute increase of output compared to the year of the available I-O table, 
the model provides insight into relative changes in aggregate output. Results for the main 
sectoral aggregates are presented in Table 6, whereas more detailed results are presented 
in the Annex, Table A8. 
 
Table 6.  Simulation results: percentage changes in total output 
              by policy scenarios 
Sector Scenario 
1 
Scenario 
2 
Scenario 
2a Scenario 3
Scenario 
3a 
Scenario 
4 Scenario 4a 
Agriculture 0.00% 0.02% 0.02% 1.10% 1.00% 1.46% 1.34% 
Industry 0.23% 0.24% 0.47% 1.35% 1.25% 2.18% 2.07% 
of which construction 0.86% 1.33% 2.19% 5.56% 5.22% 9.81% 9.40% 
Services 0.47% 1.23% 1.70% 0.76% 0.86% 1.43% 1.55% 
Other 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.19% 0.00% 0.23% 
TOTAL 0.26% 0.50% 0.76% 0.97% 0.97% 1.61% 1.61% 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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As expected given the relatively limited change in final demand caused by the CARDS 
and ISPA, SAPARD and PHARE programmes, no considerable economic impacts were 
detected as a consequence of the pre-accession programmes co-financed by the EU 
(Scenarios 1, 2 and 2a). This resulted even under the unrealistic assumption of a 100% 
absorption of available funds. As a matter of fact, only the construction sector exhibited 
a significant (0.86% and 1.33%) increase of gross output (mainly due to large-scale 
infrastructure investment projects that would be supported by ISPA). The highest 
increase was shown by the service sector, due to the higher amount of funds allocated to 
such sectors, especially public administration, education and health services. The 
conclusion drawn from the results of these three vectors of output change is that the 
sectors with an important influence on overall economic performance are Public 
Administration, Education and Health Services; Construction; Transport; Electricity, 
Water and Gas; and Other Manufacture. 
Taking into account a pessimistic assessment of the expected absorption capacity of 
various funds (Scenario 3), the projected increase in aggregate output is 0.97%. 
Performance by agriculture and industry is projected to surpass the aggregate output 
increase (1.10% and 1.35% respectively).  
The results of post-accession inflow of funds with a full absorption level (Scenarios 4 
and 4a) show an almost double increase in total output compared to partial absorption of 
funds. The highest increase is again anticipated to come from the construction sector, 
whose output is projected to grow by 9.81% as a consequence of EU public 
expenditures. Most of this is due to infrastructure investments supported by the Cohesion 
Fund.  
If the direct payments concerned are fully decoupled (Scenario 3a and Scenario 4a), the 
results indicate that levels of total output increases are the same, but that they differ in 
terms of sector. Only the service sector exhibits a slightly higher output increase in 
Scenario 3a, while the others show a somewhat decreased output change. The situation in 
Scenario 4a is somewhat different. An increase is seen in service sectors compared to 
Scenario 4 with coupled direct payments. 
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4.2  Employment and Income Effects 
Besides the impacts of the analysed budgetary transfers on output growth, this research 
was also extended towards an assessment of employment and income dynamics.  
The reasoning behind this approach is based on the assumption that a change in output 
automatically also implies a change in labour input and, thus, in income. Since labour 
productivity may differ among various sectors, it may be expected that changes in labour 
input will behave correspondingly. However, this assessment contains some highly 
restrictive assumptions, such as no technical progress (implying constant labour 
productivity) and infinite elasticity of the labour supply; the reported results should 
therefore be regarded with great caution. 
The projected effects on income and employment are presented in Table 7 in both 
absolute and percentage terms of change from the initial situation. Detailed sectoral 
percentage changes of income and employment are presented in the Annex, Tables A9-
A10.  
 
Table 7.  Effects of new FD on income and employment change 
TOTAL Effects  Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 
2a 
Scenario 3 Scenario 3a Scenario 4 Scenario 
4a 
Employment by 
persons 4,065.86 8,009.56 12,075.43 10,024.38 9,958.99 17,028.00 16,951.06 
in % 0.41% 0.81% 1.22% 1.01% 1.01% 1.72% 1.71% 
Income in 
thousands HRK 290,485.52 464,376.44 908,612.44 542,647.36 556,457.16 936,549.80 952,796.62 
in % 0.46% 0.99% 1.45% 0.87% 0.89% 1.49% 1.52% 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
 
Average yearly inflows of pre-accession funds into the national economy generate 
increases in employment of 0.81% and in income of 0.99%, while the inflow of funds 
under Scenario 2a generates an increase in employment of 1.22% and in income of 
1.48%. This shows that increased employment is actually accompanied by a slightly 
higher increase in income during this period. 
Under the post-accession scenarios, these changes show a different pattern. The increase 
in employment is followed by an increase in income which is, however, somewhat 
lower, i.e. the reverse of the situation in the pre-accession period. 
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4.2.1  Comparisons of Impact Effects Between Croatia, Slovenia and Romania 
The results presented in the previous section can be compared to results in other 
countries involved in the aforementioned REAPBALK project. These comparisons have 
been made between only two different periods (scenarios), namely, one referring to pre-
accession inflow of funds, and the other to full absorption of EU funds inflow, and 
pertain to the change of output in these countries.  
 
Table 8.  Simulation results of impacts on output levels 
              in Croatia, Romania and Slovenia 
Pre-accession assistance Post-accession - coupled direct payments 
Sector 
Croatia Romania Slovenia Croatia Romania Slovenia 
Agriculture 0.02% 0.79% 0.11% 1.46% 11.61% 2.21% 
Industry 0.24% 0.99% 0.43% 2.18% 5.22% 1.59% 
of which 
construction 1.33% 43.05% 1.99% 9.81% 27.77% 5.97% 
Services 1.23% 1.50% 0.10% 1.43% 9.28% 1.69% 
Other 0.00%   0.00%  0.00% 
TOTAL 0.50% 1.10% 0.28% 1.61% 7.01% 1.65% 
 
Source: Impact Analysis of Different Scenarios, Deliverable no.12a of REAPBALK research project. 
 
 
The results in Table 8 reveal that the influence on output change in Slovenia for the pre-
accession period is almost two times lower than in Croatia. The higher output increase 
generated in Romania was expected due to the high level of annual inflow of funds from 
SAPARD and ISPA.  
The post-accession period shows the same indices. Slovenia and Croatia show nearly the 
same increase in aggregate output change, while Romania shows a five times higher 
increase in total output compared to its initial one. This is understandable if we compare 
the relative annual amounts that Romania receives from EU funds to those available for 
Croatia and Slovenia.  
The amounts allocated to these countries before and after accession follow the same 
distribution pattern. Figure 2 shows that the amounts of funds available to Croatia and 
Slovenia represent nearly the same proportion of their GDP, despite the fact that Croatia 
has a 50% lower GDP p.c. At the same time, this financial support constitutes a large 
share of the Romanian GDP, and therefore the expected impacts are much stronger. The 
explanation for such a difference lies in the fact that GDP is not the only indicator used 
for fund allocations. 
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Figure 2.  Percentage shares of EU funds per national GDP 
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
4.3  Distribution Effects on Economic Variables                              
by Policy Instrument  
In order to estimate the magnitude of effects and their distribution among economic 
sectors, we have estimated the impact of individual financial mechanisms separately. 
This is especially useful in order to check the multiplicative effects of individual 
commonly financed policies. 
 
4.3.1  Distribution Effects of Pre-Accession Inflow of Funds  
This section indicates what change of economic sector output can be expected as the 
result of a change in FD in total economy (new plan of FD) due to an individual financial 
mechanism under the Pre-Accession Strategy.  
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Figure 3.  Distribution effects on economic sector output 
                by four separate groups of EU public expenditure (in %) 
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The effects of pre-accession funds on sectoral output level vary according to different 
policy instruments. The CARDS programme has the highest impact on the change of 
output. In terms of sector, this is the period in which services exhibit the highest output 
increase, due especially to CARDS and PHARE funds. 
SAPARD funds, which are mainly oriented towards agriculture, impact the increased 
agricultural output level, but are too small to have a substantial influence on the total 
level of output increase. Their intensity is even higher in the industry and service sectors 
than in agriculture, reflecting SAPARD’s objective of developing the rural infrastructure. 
The intensity of ISPA effects is highest in the industry sector, where construction shows 
the most benefits of the output increase.  
 
4.3.2  Distribution Effects of EU Funds Inflow 
Following accession, Structural Fund expenditures show the strongest impact on 
increased total national output. Nevertheless, the magnitude of impacts on the overall 
output increase appears to be fairly similar for both CAP expenditures and Structural 
Funds (see Figure 4). 
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Figure 4.  Distribution effects on economic sector output 
              by three separate groups of EU public expenditure (in %) 
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
 
However, there is a significant difference with regard to the sectors targeted by these two 
sources of EU expenditure. Structural expenditures bring the biggest impacts on output 
growth in the construction sector, while agriculture exhibits only a minor output 
increase, the agricultural output increase being induced mainly by CAP expenditures.  
Considering the overall magnitude of output increase impacts due to Cohesion Fund 
inflows, the service sector appears to have the most favourable effects of expenditures 
under this instrument. However, industry also exhibits favourable effects due to 
Cohesion Funds, with construction showing the highest increase. 
 
 
4.4  Policy Implications - Remarks on the Potential Effect                
of European Funds Inflow on the National Economy 
Following completion of this study, some policy implications of individual mechanisms 
are noticeable. 
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CARDS and Phare have similar objectives (institution-building and acquis-related 
investment) and thus a similar influence on the output increase is expectable. 
ISPA provides financial support for investment in the areas of the environment and 
transport, in order to speed up acceding countries’ compliance with European legislation 
in force in these two sectors, and brings the most favourable effects to the construction 
sector.  
SAPARD aims to support efforts made by candidate countries to prepare for 
participation in the Common Agricultural Policy and the Single Market. This involves 
two major and explicit operational objectives: 
• to help solve priority and specific problems in agriculture and rural development, 
• to contribute towards implementation of the acquis communautaire (the entire body 
of Community legislation) concerning CAP and other agricultural priorities. 
 
Therefore, its impact should not be noticeable only in the agricultural sector. The results 
show that it extends to effects on the industry and service sectors as well, especially 
because of the aforementioned SAPARD operational objectives. 
The study of post-accession funds underlines the fact that operations oriented towards 
structural changes have the highest potential impact on the overall output increase. The 
analysis of CAP effects shows that investments in agriculture have to be made in 
correlation with investments in infrastructure and new technologies in productive sectors. 
Cohesion funding has a minor influence on industry output compared to structural funds, 
and exhibits the lowest distribution effects. 
 
 
5  Conclusions  
This paper has attempted to quantify the effects of EU funds on the national economy 
using an Input–Output methodology. Provided that the national I-O table has been 
estimated accurately enough, the theoretically implausible assumptions of this model are, 
in many respects, overshadowed by its empirical realism and simplicity. With this in 
mind, we can claim that this approach to modelling policy expenditures channelled into 
the economy through the final demand vector does indeed yield approximately true 
values for increases in sectoral output and employment. It cannot be argued that such an 
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inflow of funds into the economy, allowing for an appropriate level of absorption, results 
in positive multiplicative effects. Nor can it be argued that the effects of EU funds 
measured by an I-O methodology would indeed have roughly the same static impacts on 
certain sectors as those shown by our analysis. 
In this respect, the I-O methodology and its results bring useful and valuable insights into 
the beneficial pattern of policy expenditures across various sectors of the national 
economy. Funds targeted at achieving greater economic convergence have been 
earmarked mainly for infrastructure. Considerable funds have been allocated to 
agriculture and, to a much lesser extent, to business support and investment in human 
capital. In other words, particularly high public investments are being channelled into 
labour-intensive sectors (construction, agriculture) which are characterised by relatively 
low labour productivity. A simulation of this expenditure through the methodological 
framework of an I-O model reveals that impacts are then allocated throughout sectors 
more equally.  
The results suggest that the funds analysed here can make a significant contribution 
towards the national economy’s overall output increase following accession, whereas this 
cannot be said of pre-accession funds. In this respect, the significance of pre-accession 
funds can be assessed primarily in terms of preparing implementation structures for the 
successful absorption of funds. Nevertheless, the favourable post-accession effects 
should also be regarded with some caution. Following accession, the structure of the 
national budget will change (limited public expenditures, ’transfer’ of existing public 
investments and policies to the Community level). This can lead to somewhat less 
favourable impacts than those revealed by the model’s results. Taking into account the 
strict convergence criteria that new member countries must comply with in order to enter 
the Euro Zone, the problem of successful absorption of EU funding can be additionally 
adversely affected by the need to provide adequate national funding.  
Another comparative analysis (Section 4.2.1) of EU fund impacts on three different 
countries leads to the conclusion that EU post-accession funding has more favourable 
effects on output and employment dynamics in less developed countries. The reason for 
this lies in the great amount of funds targeted at countries characterised by a substantial 
need for fulfilment of acquis requirements and for financial support to help them towards 
greater European integration. In the case of Croatia, the analysis shows that funds for 
which Croatia could be eligible based on its level of development and the structure of its 
economy would not significantly change its level of development and its pace on the 
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path towards EU integration. The absorption capacity of the Croatian economy could 
additionally reduce these effects, and consequently they should be taken with caution. 
Additional analysis regarding the magnitude and distribution of the effects of various 
sources of EU public expenditures (Section 4.3) also brings some curious results with a 
certain relevance to policy. This holds especially true in the case of agricultural 
expenditures, where the results (expectedly) show a relatively low impact on the overall 
output increase, but reveal, on the other hand, that only about 1-1.5% of this increase is 
attributable to agriculture. However, the high multiplicative effects of agricultural 
expenditures serve as a significant corrective to popular opinion about the low 
redistributive effects of agricultural expenditures.  
It may be said that more substantial effects on economic development can be expected 
from changes in the economic structure which the I-O method is unable to estimate. 
Although the I-O approach can generate some imprecise results, the illustrative emphasis 
on the results in this paper can provide us with a descriptive basis for the future planning 
of development strategies.  
We should recall EC President Romano Prodi’s statement that “the pace of further 
movement of the Western Balkans countries towards the EU lies in their own hands, and 
will depend on each country’s performance in implementing reforms, thus respecting the 
criteria set by the Copenhagen European Council of 1993 and the Stabilisation and 
Association Process conditionality”. To make the achievement of full membership 
possible, it is imperative to develop an EU integration programme which would treat 
accession not only as a goal, but also as a means of carrying out all necessary reforms in 
the interest of Croatia’s citizens.15
                                                 
15 This approach is adopted in the annual National Programmes for the Integration of the Republic 
of Croatia into the European Union (NPPEU), which serve as a the central management tool for 
directing the Government’s activities in the area of European integration, and represent a 
framework for combining annual planning, establishing short-term goals and monitoring the 
integration process in various sectors, in line with a strategic approach based on Croatia’s 
obligations and its own capacities and national interests. 
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Annex 
 
Table A1.  Croatia multi-annual indicative programme for 2002 – 2004 
Annual allocations 
(€ million) 
Total 
allocations Priority Programme 
2002 2003 2004 2002-2004 
1.1. Return of refugees and internally displaced persons 14.0 15.0 13.0 42.0 
1. Democratic Stabilisation 
1.2. Civil society 2.0 2.0 2.0 6.0 
2.1. Trade 3.0 2.5 2.0 7.5 
2.2. Investment climate 9.0 6.15 8.5 23.65 
2. Economic and Social 
    Development 
2.3. Social cohesion (including Tempus) 6.0 8.85 6.0 20.85 
3.1. Modernisation of justice 4.0 4.0 4.0 12.0 
3.2. Policing and organised crime 2.0 3.0 3.0 8.0 3. Justice and Home Affairs 
3.3. Integrated border management  
       (Regional funding) 4.0 5.0 14.0 23.0 
4.1. Public administration reform 6.0 6.0 6.5 18.5 
4.2. National, regional and local development 2.0 3.0 3.0 8.0 
4. Administrative Capacity  
    Building 
4.3. Public finance 4.0 2.8 3.0 9.8 
5. Environment and Natural Resources 3.0 3.7 3.0 9.7 
TOTAL 59.0 62.0 68.0 189.0 
 
Source: http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/projects/cards/pdf/croatia_strategy_paper.pdf; 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/projects/cards/financial_en.htm  
 
 
 
Table A2.  Total average annual amounts of the pre-accession funds 
                (by country in million Euros) 
COUNTRY PHARE ISPA SAPARD 
Slovenia 28.73 15.600 6.3 
Bulgaria  136.57 104.000 52.1 
Romania 260.07 311.7 171.0 
Hungary 99.83 88.400 38.1 
Slovakia 65.87 46.800 18.3 
Czech Republic 82.40 70.200 22.1 
Estonia 31.23 28.600 12.1 
Latvia 35.57 41.600 21.9 
Lithuania 74.00 52.000 29.8 
Poland 409.93 348.400 168.7 
TOTAL 1224.2 1107.3 540.4 
 
Source: Countries’ General Annual Reports on Pre-Accession assistance; authors’ calculations of average annual 
amounts.  
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Table A3[g3].  EU 10 and Croatia - population, GDP and area 
COUNTRY Population in million GDP in billions (current US$) GDP p.c. in PPS US$ Area 
 2001 2002 2001 2002 2002 2003 Surface (in sq. km) 
Agricultural 
(in 
hectares) 
Slovenia 2 2 18.8 21.1 17.762 18.624 20.250 486.000 
Bulgaria  7.9 7.9 13.6 15.6 6.366 6.639 110.910 5,498.000 
Romania 22.4 22.4 39.7 44.4 6.976 6.842 238.391 14,874.000 
Hungary 10.1 10.2 51.8 65.8 12.728 13.369 93.030 5,853.000 
Slovakia 5.4 5.4 20.5 23.7 12.314 12.172 49.036 2,444.000 
Czech Republic 10.2 10.2 57.2 69.6 15.300 15.200 79.000 4,282.000 
Estonia 1.4 1.4 5.5 6.4 10.900 10.740 45.227 986.000 
Latvia 2.4 2.4 7.7 8.4 8.300 8.450 64.600 2,540.000 
Lithuania 3.5 3.5 11.9 13.8 8.400 8.108 65.301 3,489.000 
Poland 38.6 38.6 183 187.7 9.500 9.530 312.685 18,397.000 
Croatia 4.4 4.4 19.5 22.4 8.118 8.860 56.542 1,162.612 
 
Source: State Statistical Bureau, EUROSTAT, Country profile table available at: 
http://www.worldbank.org/data/countrydata/countrydata.html  
 
 
 
 
Table A4.  Financial framework for enlargement 2005-2006 - Indicative  
                allocation of payment appropriations COPENHAGEN PACKAGE 
 Slovakia 
2004-2006 
Total EU 10 
2005 
Total EU 10 
2006 
Total 
(2 years) 
1. Agriculture     
1a. - Common Agricultural policy     
        Market measures 97.3 857.9 857.9 1,715.8 
        Compensatory Direct Aids 161.1 1,464.4 1,464.4 2,928.8 
        Total 1a. 258.5 2,322.4 2,322.4 4,644.8 
        1b. Rural development 206.0 1,772.7 1,772.7 3,545.4 
Total heading 1 464.5 4,095.0 4,095.0 8,190.0 
2. Structural allocations after capping 0.0    
         Structural Fund 420.8 2,924.9 2,924.9 5,849.8 
         Cohesion Fund 112.4 1,081.0 1,081.0 2,162.0 
Total heading 2 533.2 4,005.8 4,005.8 8,011.6 
3. Internal policies 0.0    
         Existing policies 77.9 708.2 708.2 1,416.4 
         Nuclear safety 30.0 105.7 105.7 211.4 
         Institution building 11.7 89.7 89.7 179.4 
         Schengen 31.8 270.6 270.6 541.2 
Total heading 3 181.5 1,174.1 1,174.1 2,348.2 
Total Appropriations for Payments  1,179.6 9,.274.9 9,274.9 18,549.8 
 
Source: European Commission 2003a: Financial framework for enlargement 2004-2006 - Indicative allocation of 
Commitment and payment appropriations - COPENHAGEN PACKAGE; available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/budget/pdf/financialfrwk/copenhagen_package/webtablesEN.pdf  
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Table A5.  Sectoral allocation of the pre-accession and CARDS funds in Croatia 
Sectors CARDS SAPARD ISPA PHARE 
Agriculture 0.00 3,208.75 0.00 0.00 
Manufacture of Food Products 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Textiles and Clothing 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Wood Products 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Chemical and Metal Products 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Machinery and Motor Vehicles 0.00 30,195.28 0.00 0.00 
Furniture 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Other Manufacture 59,125.00 1,495.84 0.00 0.00 
Electricity, Water and Gas 24,250.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Construction 105,000.00 37,608.44 124,575.00 0.00 
Trade and Hotels 18,750.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Transport 0.00 0.00 101,925.00 0.00 
Financial Services and Real Estate 0.00 21,866.69 0.00 0.00 
Public Administration, Education and Health Services 265,375.00 0.00 0.00 604,000.00 
Other 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
TOTAL 472,500.00 94,375.00 226,500.00 604,000.00 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
 
Table A6.  Sectoral allocation of the EU funds on accession in Croatia 
Sectors 
EAGGF 
guarantee 
DP coupled
EAGGF 
guarantee 
DP 
decoupled 
EAGGF 
Guidance ERDF ESF 
Cohesion 
Fund 
Agriculture 180,407.3 162,790.3 19,420.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Manufacture of Food Products 112,250.0 109,091.5 14,938.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Textiles and Clothing 0.0 15,848.7 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Wood Products 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Chemical and Metal Products 83,339.0 71,627.6 2,240.79 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Machinery and Motor Vehicles 130,015.5 103,181.4 7,469.30 16,263.90 0.00 0.00 
Furniture 0.0 15,164.9 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Other Manufacture 130,015.5 61,249.2 7,469.30 16,263.9 0.00 0.00 
Electricity, Water and Gas 31,494.8 51,644.5 7,469.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Construction 364,208.6 314,948.3 74,693.00 585,500.5 0.00 171,845.6 
Trade and Hotels 0.0 27,413.9 0.00 8,131.95 0.00 0.00 
Transport 56,125.0 37,973.5 7,469.30 0,00 0.00 171,845.6 
Financial Services and Real Estate 25,195.9 76,023.3 5,975.44 187,034.9 84,271.21 0.00 
Public Administration, Education and 
Health Services 9,448.4 14,619.9 2,240.79 0,00 239,848.8 0.00 
Other 0.0 60,923.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
TOTAL 1,122,500.0 1,122,500.0 149,386.0 813,195.2 324,120.0 343,691.1 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table A7.  Simulation results: total effects of the EU expenditures 
                on the gross output in Croatia 
Sector Unit Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 2a Scenario 3 Scenario 3a Scenario 4 Scenario 4a 
Agriculture thous
. HRK 0.00 5,642.18 5,642.18 265,115.60 238,785.07 351,371.10 320,394.01 
  % 0.00% 0.33% 0.22% 8.11% 7.30% 6.47% 5.89% 
Industry thous
. HRK 375,501.84 401,013.37 776,515.21 2,212,369.40 2,050,060.09 3,586,187.47 3,395,235.34 
  % 43.13% 23.69% 30.29% 67.70% 62.65% 66.00% 62.43% 
of which     
Constructio
n 
thous
. HRK 232,324.74 358,849.76 591,174.50 1,500,938.64 1,408,293.51 2,646,837.40 2,537,843.13 
 % 61.87% 89.49% 76.13% 67.84% 68.70% 73.81% 74.75% 
Services thous
. HRK 495,082.32 1,286,062.40 1,781,144.72 790,284.37 896,187.71 1,495,740.68 1,620,332.85 
  % 56.87% 75.98% 69.49% 24.18% 27.39% 27.53% 29.79% 
Other thous
. HRK 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 87,131.65 0.00 102,507.82 
  % 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.66% 0.00% 1.88% 
TOTAL thous
. HRK 870,584.15 1,692,717.95 2,563,302.10 3,267,769.37 3,272,164.52 5,433,299.25 5,438,470.01 
  % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
 
Table A8.  The impact of the new FD on output level 
               in national economy by sectors 
Sectors Scenario 1 
Scenario 
2 
Scenario 
2a 
Scenario 
3 
Scenario 
3a 
Scenario 
4 
Scenario 
4a 
1 Agriculture 0.00% 0.02% 0.02% 1.10% 1.00% 1.46% 1.34% 
2 Manufacture of Food Products 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.93% 0.90% 1.27% 1.23% 
3 Textiles and Clothing 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.20% 0.00% 0.24% 
4 Wood Products 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
5 Chemical and Metal Products 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.29% 0.25% 0.36% 0.31% 
6 Machinery and Motor Vehicles 0.00% 0.10% 0.10% 0.41% 0.33% 0.53% 0.44% 
7 Furniture 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.44% 0.00% 0.52% 
8 Other Manufacture 0.84% 0.02% 0.86% 1.68% 0.84% 2.19% 1.21% 
9 Electricity, Water and Gas 0.74% 0.00% 0.74% 0.79% 1.32% 1.20% 1.81% 
10 Construction 0.86% 1.33% 2.19% 5.56% 5.22% 9.81% 9.40% 
11 Trade and Hotels 0.11% 0.00% 0.11% 0.02% 0.15% 0.05% 0.20% 
12 Transport 0.00% 1.41% 1.41% 1.84% 1.62% 3.26% 3.01% 
13 Financial Services and Real Estate 0.00% 0.20% 0.20% 1.44% 1.83% 2.78% 3.25% 
14 Public Administration, Education & Health Services 1.32% 3.01% 4.33% 0.64% 0.66% 1.25% 1.28% 
15 Other 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.19% 0.00% 0.23% 
TOTAL 0.26% 0.50% 0.76% 0.97% 0.97% 1.61% 1.61% 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table A9.  The impacts of the new final demand on the national income 
Sectors Scenario 1 
Scenario 
2 
Scenario 
2a 
Scenario 
3 
Scenario 
3a 
Scenario 
4 
Scenario 
4a 
1 Agriculture 0.00% 0.04% 0.04% 2.04% 1.84% 2.70% 2.46% 
2 Manufacture of Food Products 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.89% 0.86% 1.21% 1.18% 
3 Textiles and Clothing 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.22% 0.00% 0.26% 
4 Wood Products 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
5 Chemical and Metal Products 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.32% 0.27% 0.39% 0.33% 
6 Machinery and Motor Vehicles 0.00% 0.12% 0.12% 0.48% 0.39% 0.63% 0.52% 
7 Furniture 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.50% 0.00% 0.59% 
8 Other Manufacture 1.12% 0.03% 1.15% 2.22% 1.12% 2.91% 1.61% 
9 Electricity, Water and Gas 0.73% 0.00% 0.73% 0.78% 1.30% 1.18% 1.79% 
10 Construction 0.92% 1.43% 2.35% 5.97% 5.60% 10.53% 10.09% 
11 Trade and Hotels 0.09% 0.00% 0.09% 0.02% 0.13% 0.04% 0.17% 
12 Transport 0.00% 1.37% 1.37% 1.79% 1.58% 3.17% 2.93% 
13 Financial Services and Real Estate 0.00% 0.20% 0.20% 1.44% 1.83% 2.78% 3.25% 
14 Public Administration, Education & Health Services 1.32% 3.01% 4.33% 0.64% 0.66% 1.25% 1.28% 
15 Other 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.18% 0.00% 0.21% 
TOTAL 0.46% 0.99% 1.46% 0.87% 0.89% 1.49% 1.52% 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
 
 
Table A10.  The impacts of the new final demand on the national employment 
Sectors Scenario 1 
Scenario 
2 
Scenario 
2a 
Scenario 
3 
Scenario 
3a 
Scenario 
4 
Scenario 
4a 
1 Agriculture 0.00% 0.03% 0.03% 1.42% 1.27% 1.88% 1.71% 
2 Manufacture of Food Products 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.97% 0.94% 1.32% 1.29% 
3 Textiles and Clothing 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.20% 0.00% 0.24% 
4 Wood Products 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
5 Chemical and Metal Products 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.40% 0.34% 0.48% 0.41% 
6 Machinery and Motor Vehicles 0.00% 0.21% 0.21% 0.84% 0.67% 1.09% 0.90% 
7 Furniture 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.48% 0.00% 0.56% 
8 Other Manufacture 0.86% 0.02% 0.88% 1.71% 0.86% 2.23% 1.23% 
9 Electricity, Water and Gas 0.69% 0.00% 0.69% 0.73% 1.22% 1.10% 1.68% 
10 Construction 0.91% 1.41% 2.32% 5.90% 5.53% 10.40% 9.97% 
11 Trade and Hotels 0.08% 0.00% 0.08% 0.02% 0.12% 0.03% 0.15% 
12 Transport 0.00% 1.13% 1.13% 1.48% 1.30% 2.62% 2.42% 
13 Financial Services and Real Estate 0.00% 0.20% 0.20% 1.44% 1.83% 2.78% 3.25% 
14 Public Administration, Education & Health Services 1.32% 3.01% 4.33% 0.64% 0.66% 1.25% 1.28% 
15 Other 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.28% 0.00% 0.33% 
TOTAL 0.41% 0.81% 1.22% 1.01% 1.01% 1.72% 1.71% 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table A11.  Annual funds in Croatia, Slovenia and Romania in million euros 
Pre-accession assistance SOURCE 
Croatia Romania Slovenia 
SAPARD 12.5 171.0 11.45 
ISPA 30 311.7 42.03 
TOTAL 42.5 482.7 53.48 
 After accession - coupled direct payments 
Structural Funds 170.42 1,327.00 100.62 
Cohesion Fund 45.52 664.00 52.45 
EAAGF direct payments 65.25 294.00 96.68 
EAAGF rural development 83.43 808.0 94.05 
TOTAL 364.62 3,093 343.8 
 
Source: Impact Analysis of Different Scenarios, Deliverable no.12a of REAPBALK research project; authors’ 
calculations based on Relevant National and Regional Scenarios, the Deliverable no 11 of REAPBALK research.  
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1  Introduction 
The history of the debate concerning the impacts of the monetary policy on the economy 
is certainly very long. Views diverge even about the transmission process in individual 
industrialized nations, the subject of decades of theoretical and empirical research; the 
process in developing countries is even more uncertain. As more central banks of Central 
and Eastern Europe (CEE) move towards inflation targeting and prepare themselves for 
the entrance in the European Monetary Union (EMU), the knowledge of monetary policy 
transmission mechanisms becomes crucial for the appropriate design and implementation 
of the monetary policy. 
The aim of this poster is to summarize the particular issues differentiating the analysis of 
monetary transmission in Central and Eastern Europe from the same analytical 
framework applied to developed economies. By doing so, the poster identifies specific 
aspects and questions regarding monetary transmission mechanisms that are relatively 
unexplored and need to be addressed in order to enhance the transmission process. 
The poster starts with the categorization of channels of monetary transmission. Than the 
poster describes the transition economies framework in greater detail. A special 
paragraph is dedicated to alternative views in monetary transmission. Finally, the poster 
explains the differences between the existing analytical framework applied to developed 
economies and economies in transition by emphasizing important stylized facts and their 
particular influence on each transmission channel. 
 
 
2  Monetary Transmission Channels 
There are many categorizations of monetary transmission channels in the existing 
literature. Each channel that is specified in this poster has been subject to extensive 
academic debate. In this poster the approach given by De Bondt (De Bondt, 2000) is 
followed. 
This categorization divides monetary transmission mechanism into five different 
channels as illustrated in Figure 1 presented in the poster. For the sake of simplicity, 
Figure 1 ignores the feedback mechanisms from real economy to monetary policy, the 
fact that different channels of transmission can be closely interrelated and the fact that 
different countries have a different mix of channels. 
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The first monetary transmission channel is called direct monetary transmission. An 
increase in money supply results in surplus of cash balances and over time in an 
expansion in aggregate spending. Direct transmission could also be viewed as a part of 
real balances effect which connects the monetary with the commodity sector (Handa, 
2000). 
The second group of monetary transmission channels consists of interest rate channels. 
The monetary authorities are able to directly control official interest rates, determining 
the money market rates, which in return affect aggregate spending by increasing or 
decreasing investment and consumption expenditures. Lower interest rates lead to lower 
cost of capital, especially important for investment decisions. Substitution effect favors 
current consumption over savings if interest rates decline while income effect affects 
disposable income and thus spending trough the influence of interest rates on net wealth. 
The first two channels have been thoroughly discussed in the literature over the years 
and their exact specification differs between different schools of economic thought. 
Apart from the changes in money and interest rates, monetary policy decisions are 
transmitted into the real sector via asset price channels where asset prices are divided 
into exchange rate, equity (stock and bond) prices and real estate prices. Exchange rate 
channel during a monetary expansion leads to a decrease of domestic interest rates 
(relative to the foreign ones) followed by currency depreciation. This causes a rise in net 
exports and hence output. Tobin’s q and wealth effects are important for other asset 
prices channels. Tobin’s q is defined as market value of the firm divided by the 
replacement cost of capital. Expansive monetary policy can raise the equity price, 
making Tobin’s q of firms higher and cost of new capital relatively cheaper and thus 
boosting investment spending. The framework of Tobin’s q can also be applied 
straightforwardly to other assets such as land and houses. The wealth effect implies that 
changes in monetary policy stance can affect the above mentioned asset prices, thus 
raising wealth of economic agents holding specific assets, which will in turn increase 
spending possibilities. 
Relatively more recent channel discussed in the literature is called the credit channel. It 
focuses on financial market imperfections, namely asymmetric information phenomena, 
as an essential factor of propagation and amplification of initial monetary policy shocks. 
Frictions on credit markets create imperfect substitutability between different sources of 
financing. The coast spread between self-financing and credit, called the external finance 
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premium (EFP), reflects the cost due to financial imperfections. The higher the EFP, the 
lower the investment and consumption spending. 
Bank lending channel supposes that monetary tightening which drains deposits from the 
banking system has a direct effect on banks loan supply. Apart from being forced to cut 
their loans supply, banks generally increase their lending rate which in turn raises EFP 
and slashes output. Increase in lending rates is a way in which banks try to compensate 
for borrowers inclination to exhibit stronger adverse selection and moral hazard behavior 
during monetary contraction. Balance sheet channel looks at credit channel of monetary 
transmission from a borrowers’ perspective. Monetary policy expansion for example, 
strengthens borrowers’ net worth by a rise in equity, house and land prices or by a rise in 
firms’ cash flow caused by a decline in nominal interest rates. EFP declines at this point 
because higher net worth reduces opportunistic behavior by borrowers so that banks are 
willing to lower lending rates, thus affecting aggregate spending decisions. 
The fifth and the last monetary transmission channel distinguished relates to expectations 
and uncertainty. The impact of monetary policy depends on the extent to which they 
have been anticipated by economic agents. Unanticipated changes will have relatively 
strong effects. Monetary authorities’ control over monetary conditions is determined by 
their ability to influence market expectations, and in particular, inflationary expectations. 
The formation of expectations crucially depends on policy credibility, which takes a long 
time to build. 
 
 
3  Monetary Transmission in Transition Countries;          
the Basic Framework 
From the break-up of communist block in early 1990s until the present, Central and 
Eastern Europe countries have undergone a full spectrum of monetary policy setups, 
including different nominal anchors and balances between rules and discretion that have 
been introduced across the region. This was done in the specific transition environment 
characterized with many structural changes along with the building of market economy 
institutions, the creation of two-tier banking system, gradual adoption of prudential 
standards and turbulent political processes. So when we place categorization of 
transmission mechanisms of monetary policy described above in a transitional context, 
the uncertainty about how this context will affect transmission process increases, while 
conclusions drown from comparing industrialized with CEE countries have to be taken 
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with much caution. The transitional framework differs so much that some of the channels 
specified in Figure 1 presented in the poster are probably still precluded from existence. 
Following this line of discussion the logical question follows: Are monetary transmission 
channels the same for industrialized and transition economies and if no, how different 
are they? Is the standard transmission mechanism analysis able to give satisfying 
answers that can be used as guidelines for effective conduct of monetary policy in 
transition economies and what are some of the special conditions shared across the 
region that could undermine or prevent effective monetary policy transmission? The 
following section of this poster will try to address theese issues. 
 
 
4  Treatment of the Money Supply Variable 
The debate on how exactly money affects the economy is as old as the history of 
economic thought. Without getting into complexities of the issue, I will address only 
small part of academic discussion that revolves around the issue of endogeneity of 
money. The mainstream economics tries to investigate the effects of money on the 
economy partially trough the analysis of monetary transmission channels, whereby 
taking Figure 1 or some similar categorization of monetary transmission channels as 
granted. Under existing monetary transmission mechanism theory, supply of money is 
thus considered exogenous, under direct control of central bank and the posited arrow of 
causation goes from central banks’ induced changes in the money base, to changes in 
intermediate variables such as interest rates, credit or exchange rate to changes in prices, 
output, employment or wages. Even the name “monetary transmission mechanisms” 
seem to reflect the exogenous money supply (Moore, 2001; Dow, 1996). This theoretical 
approach is the result of an even more fundamental issue: neoclassical omission to 
integrate money in a satisfactory way into general equilibrium analysis. The comparative 
statics applied to general equilibrium system starts the analysis with real exchange 
economy into which money is introduced as separable variable (Dow, 1996). One of the 
propositions brought in order to reexamine this linear, one-way transmission process is 
that the supply of money could be endogenously credit driven or that they can depend 
much upon the way we treat investment and savings functions, instead of being 
exogenous (Moore, 2001).  
Since, virtually every analysis on monetary transmission conducted so far in CEE, 
including Croatia, was exercised according to neoclassical methodology, resulting with 
little or ambiguous proof of existence of any effective channel of monetary transmission, 
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having methodological alternatives in this case could be useful, by providing additional 
methods to answer many unanswered questions. 
Claiming (as in case of many studies done in CEE) that as we move trough time and 
business cycles, the robustness of models will increase, provides no real comfort, since 
the same methodology cannot often provide a clear answer in developed economies 
where shortness of time series is not an issue. 
 
 
5  The Causes of Differences in Monetary Transmission     
Between Developed and Transition Economies 
Some authors like Ganev et al. (Ganev et al., 2002) claim that after more than a decade 
of reforms, the environment in which monetary policy was conducted was far from even 
approximating neoclassical conditions. So with respect to formal analysis of monetary 
transmission in CEE countries two important observations need to be emphasized. 
The first is that some specific constraints may render traditional policy tools applied in 
CEE less effective than a neoclassical environment would suggest. During transition, the 
institutions which are important for monetary transmission are underdeveloped by 
definition, while processes like budgetary deficits, the collapse of the financial system, 
euroization, and inflationary expectations linked to exchange rate movements could 
hamper the transmission process if they were at times dominant. 
The second observation is that transition is a very dynamic phenomenon, subject to 
constant qualitative changes resulting in structural breaks in the time series, making 
available data unreliable. This occurrence could in turn undermine the efficiency of 
analysis conducted under any methodological approach, not just the neoclassical one. 
In the next section, the poster discusses in greater detail some factors that might 
influence the monetary transmission process. 
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5.1  Euroisation, Currency and Asset Substitution 
Available empirical evidence implies that the both currency substitution and unofficial 
euroisation in CEE countries are rather high (Feige, 2002; Aarle and Budina, 1995; 
Piontkivsky, 2003).  
The higher the level of currency substitution in a country, the less effective the 
traditional set of monetary policy tools at the disposal of respective central bank. Actions 
of the monetary authorities pertaining to money market interest rates, reserve 
requirements and refinancing may in turn have negligible effect on inflation and output 
in comparison with the actions aimed at influencing the behavior of agents with the 
respect to currency structure of their assets.  
Asset substitution phenomenon can drastically affect the real estate price if the exchange 
rate were to change, thus resulting in uncontrolled shocks to asset channel of monetary 
transmission. 
Broader phenomenon encompassing both currency and asset substitution is known as 
euroisation. Unofficial euroisation is important phenomenon for most of the CEE 
countries; with the highest in Croatia, followed by Romania, Ukraine and Russia 
(Billmeier and Bonato, 2002; Piontkivsky, 2003). 
The transmission process mechanism in a eurised system will depend not only on the 
substitutability between domestic and Euro assets, but also on substitutability between 
domestic Euro and foreign Euro assets, considered as less than perfect in transition 
economies due to the higher risk associated with uncertainty. The lower the substitution 
between domestic Euro and foreign Euro assets, the less the monetary transmission 
channel will resemble that of a non-eurised economy and monetary transmission process 
will therefore have less predictable and effective results (BIS Policy Papers, 1998). 
Besides affecting the efficacy and predictability of the monetary transmission process, 
high level of euroisation can determine the choice of a monetary target (Piontkivsky, 
2003), thus limiting the decision freedom of central bank and can also as has happened in 
the Croatian case, create balance sheet mismatches and credit quality shocks (Kraft, 
2002) and domestic demand shocks (BIS Policy Paper, 1998). Also, when domestic 
residents are net debtors to the rest of the world, as is the case in many emerging 
countries, a large appreciation of exchange rate may lead to improved balance-sheet 
positions that could give rise to expansion of domestic demand which is larger than the 
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relative price effect of appreciation that would tend to reduce domestic demand for 
relatively more expensive domestic goods (BIS Policy papers, 1998). 
 
5.1.1  Effects on Monetary Transmission Channels 
Given the relatively high levels of unofficial euroisation in CEE economies one would 
expect a great exchange rate pass-trough on prices. However, previous studies have not 
shown such a relationship (Darvas, 2001). Studies focusing on determining whether 
exchange channel could affect real sector variables trough monetary transmission 
channels still need to be done. 
Considering Croatia's record of extensive level of euroisation (Croatian economy is the 
most euroised economy amongst CEE countries), one could expect an even greater 
exchange rate pass-trough on prices and output. Especially since the estimates obtained 
from study done by Friege (Freige, 2002) show higher level of both currency substitution 
and unofficial euroisation for Croatia than for Argentina (country known for its chronic 
lack of confidence in monetary authorities) which originated before Croatia attained its 
monetary independence.  
However, existing studies (Kraft, 2002; Billmeier and Bonato, 2002) show no evidence 
of exchange rate pass-trough on consumer prices and only a small exchange rate pass-
trough on producer price, thus implying an ineffective exchange rate channel in Croatia.  
Finally, sudden Kuna depreciation would worsen banks leverage ratios if positions are 
held unheadged, and would also raise the level of credit defaults due to the foreign 
currency indexation of extended credit and pronounced moral hazard and adverse 
selection problems, which the banks would offset by raising lending rates and credit 
supply cut, thus affecting aggregate spending and output trough credit channel of 
monetary transmission.  
Overall, there has been very little interest in academia to investigate euroisation in 
greater detail, currency and asset substitution phenomenon and especially how they can 
affect monetary transmission process and even alter its results. 
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5.2  Inflation and Inflation Expectations 
Many emerging countries suffered or are still suffering from high inflation. In many 
cases, when experiencing high and variable inflation, exchange rate changes were 
viewed as a signal of future price movements, thus linking exchange rate movements 
with inflationary expectation trough indexation of wages, rents and prices. In such a 
potentially volatile environment, even minor changes in monetary policy stance that 
would affect exchange rate might in turn produce real effects that are opposite to those 
conventionally expected by monetary authorities. A loosening in monetary policy trough 
exchange rate depreciation, if it prompts concerns of a new surge in inflation, may lead 
to sharp increases in prices, all but the very short-term interest rates, decline in equity 
prices and hence output reduction. So in these countries loosening of monetary policy, 
followed by mutually-reinforcing surges in inflation expectations and exchange rate 
depreciation can have contractionary effect, not expansionary, which would seem more 
logical on first sight (BIS Policy Papers, 1998; Lang and Krznar, 2004). Not only can 
these situations produce aggregate demand shocks, they might also result in significant 
aggregate supply shocks. For example, a loosening of the monetary policy trough or 
followed by depreciation of the exchange rate can result in supply-side shock trough an 
increase in domestic currency import costs and hence induce firms to raise their domestic 
producer prices even in absence of any expansion of aggregate demand. On the other 
hand, wages and prices could move even before movements in import costs find their 
way trough the cost structure, affecting aggregate demand and finally output. Obviously, 
inflation expectations have to be kept in mind while deciding on monetary policy 
actions. 
 
 
5.2.1  Effects on Monetary Transmission Channels 
Firstly, when inflation is high and variable, the level of real interest rates becomes very 
uncertain, thus diminishing the importance of interest rate channel in monetary 
transmission mechanism. Also, if inflation expectations are high and volatile, it might be 
difficult to identify which part of interest rate reflects the real interest rate (thus affecting 
interest rate channel) and which part is the inflation risk premium. Furthermore, in a 
highly inflationary environment, the maturity of financial instruments shrinks and long-
term, non-indexed assets disappear. In this context, asset prices channels of monetary 
transmission become much less important. Thirdly, both reductions in banks deposits and 
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desire by banks to match asset-liabilities maturity, severely restricts the role of credit 
channel in financing consumption and investments. 
While examining inflationary expectations one must remember that every country is a 
separate case. Most of the CEE countries have successfully managed to stabilize 
inflation. Those who moved to inflationary targeting are probably managing to eliminate 
inflationary expectations from the minds of economic agents. Those who experienced 
high inflation in the past and are still trying to regain the credibility of central banks 
policies by choosing a nominal exchange rate anchor or target some other monetary 
variable probably might have latent expectations still in place. The exact timing of the 
transition from latter to former is still not clear (BIS Policy Paper, 1998). Inflationary 
expectations, working trough expectations channel can have a drastic impact on certainty 
of monetary transmission of the country in question. Giving general definitions and 
conclusions about expectations channel of monetary policy transmission is an ungrateful 
task, since every country has its own, somewhat specific, expectations models according 
to which economic agents base their behavior on. That could also explain why academic 
research in this field is very scarce. 
 
 
5.3  Financial Market Development 
One of the single biggest challenges for CEE countries is the development of financial 
markets. Vast academic research that has been done in this area often highlights 
significant differences between industrialized countries financial markets as opposed to 
transition countries (Piontkovsky, 2003). Financial and real estate market responses to 
monetary policy are likely to be particularly uncertain in emerging markets economies, 
where financial markets tend to be shallower and less competitive. Shallow financial 
markets result in higher transaction costs and bid-ask spreads, thus making the cost of 
debt and equity for the firms significantly higher. In addition, small group of players can 
often move the market. Market participants may have less experience in pricing assets 
correctly and less access to timely and accurate information on firms seeking financing 
(BIS Policy Papers, 1998). Lack of transparency in transition economies which are bank 
oriented might especially hurt bank lending relationships, since borrowing is very 
difficult to monitor in such a context. The resulting moral hazard and adverse selection 
behaviors give rise to financial accelerator mechanism, that in theory runs trough the 
credit channel of monetary transmission (Bernanke, 1995) which can in turn cause 
 694 
asymmetric effects of monetary policy transmission over the business cycle and across 
different groups of lenders and borrowers. 
 
5.3.1  Effects on Monetary Transmission Channels 
Underdeveloped financial market of a country reduces the degree of freedom that its 
central bank has at its disposal. In that case, monetary authorities cannot than use asset 
price channels (wealth channel and Tobins q effect) which assume economies 
accustomed to direct capital financing, because in transition economies this channel is 
still precluded from existence. Since firms generally borrow from banks, not from 
financial markets, while households do not typically invest their savings in financial 
market instruments, monetary impulses can not be transferred to prices or real variables 
trough asset prices channel. On the other hand, credit channels in transition economies 
should, following this line of reasoning, be amplified because asymmetric information 
phenomenon is probably more pronounced and harder to control. Financial sector 
structural problems can have strong influence on the interest rate levels in the economy, 
with Croatia as a perfect example (Lang and Krznar, 2004). Not only do interest rate 
deformations prevent us from knowing much about monetary policy stance, but also such 
deformations preclude interest channels of monetary transmission from working at all. 
Ganev et al. (2002) also point out that in situations where financial market is illiquid, 
constant large deficits (often run by governments in emerging economies) could in turn 
result in interest rate hikes that would leave monetary authorities with no real control 
over interest rate pass-trough on private investments. 
BIS study concludes that even if the channels of monetary transmission are stable and 
well understood, the great volatility of financial market conjoined with macroeconomic 
performance volatility may loosen the linkage between monetary policy impulses and 
future economic outcomes. 
 
 
6  Conclusion 
Emerging market specificities greatly condition the analysis of monetary transmission 
mechanism process. The differences between industrialized economies and emerging 
economies are at times so great that the same monetary policy actions can result in 
completely different economic outcomes. Constant changes in the economic structure 
and greater macroeconomic volatility make the mix of transmission channels changeable 
 695 
and uncertain, while specific condition that exist in emerging economies greatly affect 
the workings of the individual channels. 
Therefore, it is clear that any dogmatism concerning how monetary policy works would 
be misplaced. The channels of monetary transmission continue to evolve, in case of 
transition economies, in unexpected ways. Policy-makers need to keep alert to these 
changes, while researchers should continue their line of inquiry in the direction of many 
complex factors influencing the effectiveness of monetary policy transmission. 
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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to apply and test the concept of minimal mean variance 
models to Croatian market. The minimum mean variance models are one of the core 
ideas behind modern portfolio theory. These types of models are based on a trade-off 
between risk and return. We are going to apply and test the model using data for Croatian 
securities. The idea is to form a sensible portfolio using theoretical postulates of 
minimum mean variance portfolio models. Furthermore, we are going o compare the 
returns on our portfolio with the market returns. Than we will conclude weather it is 
possible and sensible to apply this model on small market with short history, as is the 
case with the Croatian market. The stocks that will be taken into consideration will be 
chosen according to liquidity criteria. So, we are not including stocks that are traded 
irregularly, but stocks that have some liquidity and transparency. 
 
 
Keywords: capital market, portfolio, risk, return 
JEL Classification: C29, G11 
                                                 
* Tanja Broz, The Institute of Economics, Zagreb, Croatia. 
** Tomislav Ridzak, Intercapital securities Ltd., Croatia. 
 699 
1  Theory Behind the Calculations 
Efficient frontier was first discovered by Harry Markowitz in Portfolio selection 
(Markovitz, 1952). The portfolios on an efficient frontier have certain special properties. 
For a given level of return, the portfolio on the efficient frontier has the lowest possible 
risk. And vice versa, for a given level of risk portfolio on efficient frontier has the 
highest possible return. 
 
Figure 1.  Efficient frontier 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Markovitz (1952) adapted by the authors. 
 
 
 
The efficient frontier can be found using algorithms used by Elton and Gruber (Elton and 
Gruber, 1995). We are not going to rewrite them here, but just state their basic 
theoretical postulates. 
In the simplest case, where there is no constrain on short sales or risk-less lending and 
borrowing the idea is to maximize the function: 
    =              , subject to the constraint                 ,  θ σ P F =
n
i
xP RR − =∑ i 1
1
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Where:  RP is average return on portfolio 
 RF is risk free rate 
 σP is portfolio’s variance 
 xi weight of asset i in portfolio 
RRx Pi
n
i
i =∑=1and  
 
By maximizing the function for varying      we can trace out the entire frontier. If we do 
not allow short sales, but still allow risk-less lending and borrowing, there is one 
additional constraint: 
RF
xi ≥ 0  for all i. 
Our goal for this research is to make optimal risky portfolio from Croatian stocks and to 
see whether it performed better than market portfolio (we used CROBEX index as 
market portfolio). Croatian market is very small compared to the developed markets, so 
it is interesting to see how the portfolio theory applies to Croatia. 
 
 
2  Stocks Selection Process 
We chose the most liquid 18 stocks from both Zagreb and Varaždin Stock Exchange. 
Due to the Law on public firms, introduced in 2003, companies that have more than 100 
shareholders or more than 30 million kuna were forced to list their stocks on the stock 
exchange. For this reason, some companies that were very interesting to investors 
became listed. The interest for these stocks can be seen from their trading volumes as 
well as from rise in stock prices. However, this event also constrained our research 
because our time series became rather short. Since some of the companies that we chose 
became listed only in the first half of 2003 we had to take all stock prices from that 
period in order to calculate correlation and covariance matrix. Still, we had to leave out 
the stock with the second highest turnover in first half of 2004 - Adris stock - due to 
short time that this stock has been listed on the Zagreb Stock Exchange. Also we had to 
leave out Varaždinska bank, because this bank was merged with Zagrebačka bank and its 
stocks stopped trading on the stock exchanges (1 stock of Zagrebačka bank was 
exchanged with 8 stocks of Varaždinska bank), Kerametal because there was only one 
transaction in the first half of 2004 and due to that transaction Kerametal ended in the 
first ten most traded stocks. Similar to this stock was Maraska, which had only a few big 
transactions on the Varaždin Stock Exchange. As an approximation of market portfolio 
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in Croatia we used CROBEX index (the official index of Zagreb Stock Exchange 
stocks), which we used to compare with our calculated optimal portfolio.  
 
Table 1.  Stocks from Zagreb and Varaždin stock exchange that we used 
Name of the company Ticker 
Croatia osiguranje CROS-R-A 
Elka ELKA-R-A 
Končar KOEI-R-A 
Kraš KRAS-R-A 
Privredna banka Zagreb PBZ-R-A 
Plava laguna PLAG-R-A 
Pliva PLVA-R-A 
Podravka PODR-R-A 
Zagrebačka banka ZABA-R-A 
Sunčani Hvar SUNH-R-A 
Karlovačka banka KABA-R-A 
Rivijera Poreč RIVP-R-A 
Istraturist ISTT-R-A 
Proficio PRFC-R-A 
Dom holding KORF-R-A 
Slavonski ZIF SLPF-R-A 
SN Holding SNHO-R-A 
Ericsson Nikola Tesla ERNT-R-A 
 
 
 
 
3  Calculation 
The data used was for the 16 months from which we calculated average monthly returns, 
standard deviations, and correlation and covariance matrixes. We took end of the month 
stock prices from March 2003 until June 2004. In order to get optimal portfolio we 
needed to chose risk free assets and therefore we chose 3 month Treasury bill from the 
end of June 2004, which was then 3,95 percent.  
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Graph 1.  Return versus standard deviation for historical data of 18 stocks 
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Next step was finding weights of stocks in optimal portfolio from historical data. Using 
Mathematica 5.0 we calculated weights for unconstrained optimal portfolio, but since in 
unconstrained optimal portfolio it is allowed to short sell and long buy stocks, and in 
Croatia it is not possible to short sell stocks, we decided to use only constrained optimal 
portfolio in our analysis. We used Excel spreadsheets for this constrained portfolio 
optimatisation. Optimal weights that we calculated did not pay attention on a discrete 
number of stocks, so these portfolio weights would serve best for investment funds.  
Table 2.  Weights of stocks in the constrained optimal portfolio 
Ticker Weight 
CROS-R-A 14.5% 
ELKA-R-A 15.2% 
KOEI-R-A 0.9% 
KRAS-R-A 1.2% 
PBZ-R-A 6.0% 
PLAG-R-A 12.7% 
PLVA-R-A 2.4% 
PODR-R-A 3.2% 
ZABA-R-A 0.3% 
SUNH-R-A 1.4% 
KABA-R-A 0.2% 
SNHO-R-A 12.4% 
KORF-R-A 0.3% 
PRFC-R-A 1.1% 
ERNT-R-A 6.6% 
SLPF-R-A 12.5% 
RIVP-R-A 8.8% 
ISTT-R-A 0.0% 
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Average monthly return for optimal portfolio was 3.58 percent and standard deviation 
3.94 percent (one point at the efficient frontier, with risk free rate of 3.95 percent). 
CROBEX had a lower average monthly return of 0.6 percent and slightly lower standard 
deviation of 3.25 percent. After that, we calculated the price of a single portfolio unit 
from the beginning of the period (March 31 2003) until the end of the period (June 31 
2004) and we found out that price of our portfolio unit in the beginning of period was 
490.5 HRK and in the end was 795.1 HRK, which translates to 62.1 percent increase in 
16 months. Meanwhile, CROBEX increased by 8.5 percent.  
 
Table 3.  Prices of constrained optimal portfolio 
              and CROBEX index (historic data) 
Date Price of the optimal portfolio unit at the end of each month CROBEX 
31.3.2003 490.5 1056.3 
30.4.2003 499.2 1120.3 
30.5.2003 720.9 1147.3 
30.6.2003 650.6 1161.2 
31.7.2003 693.3 1137.3 
29.8.2003 732.4 1169.1 
30.9.2003 642.7 1093.2 
31.10.2003 691.8 1141.4 
28.11.2003 761.9 1187.6 
31.12.2003 784.8 1185.1 
30.1.2004 800.0 1197.6 
27.2.2004 800.7 1177.3 
31.3.2004 747.0 1160.8 
30.4.2004 768.6 1175.5 
31.5.2004 747.5 1136.5 
30.6.2004 795.1 1146.5 
Overall return 62.1% 8.5% 
 
 
 
After calculating the data for historic period in order to find out which portfolio to ’buy’, 
we moved on to see ’future’ performance. Since the time period was so short, we left 
only two months to track performance of portfolio in the ’future’. We assumed that we 
bought our portfolio on July 1 2004 and we tracked the performance of portfolio on a 
daily basis until August 31 2004. Average daily return in this period was 0.39 percent, 
while CROBEX’s average daily return was 0.11 in the same period. Standard deviation 
was 1.04 and 0.82 percent, respectively. The price of one unit of our optimal portfolio at 
the beginning of period was 796.2 (July 1 2004) and in the end (August 31 2004) was 
846.4, which is a 6.3 percent increase in this two month period or 44.3 annualized. 
CROBEX increased in the same period by 4.7 percent or 31.7 annualized.  
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Changes in portfolio prices and CROBEX can be seen on Graph 1. 
Graph 2.  Prices of single portfolio unit and CROBEX transformed in base indices 
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Table 4.  Prices of constrained optimal portfolio 
             and CROBEX index (‘future’ data) 
Date Price of single portfolio unit CROBEX 
1.7.04 796.2 1171.6 
2.7.04 800.5 1175.8 
5.7.04 798.4 1168.8 
6.7.04 799.6 1159.9 
7.7.04 771.3 1154.9 
8.7.04 767.6 1152.2 
9.7.04 793.1 1153.0 
12.7.04 804.1 1156.3 
13.7.04 812.2 1170.1 
14.7.04 814.6 1172.6 
15.7.04 809.0 1170.0 
16.7.04 793.8 1156.2 
19.7.04 794.0 1166.2 
20.7.04 813.8 1157.8 
21.7.04 813.1 1160.9 
22.7.04 811.5 1158.5 
23.7.04 808.2 1178.5 
26.7.04 815.7 1164.3 
27.7.04 816.0 1178.5 
28.7.04 816.9 1176.4 
29.7.04 817.7 1182.9 
30.7.04 828.6 1187.6 
2.8.04 794.7 1171.7 
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3.8.04 800.4 1180.8 
4.8.04 816.5 1196.4 
6.8.04 809.1 1185.0 
9.8.04 809.4 1176.3 
10.8.04 811.2 1178.0 
11.8.04 824.3 1194.1 
12.8.04 830.8 1202.6 
13.8.04 824.8 1182.8 
16.8.04 826.3 1182.1 
17.8.04 824.6 1179.5 
18.8.04 820.4 1179.1 
19.8.04 818.1 1184.7 
20.8.04 835.3 1190.0 
23.8.04 823.4 1193.3 
24.8.04 833.0 1192.4 
25.8.04 833.3 1196.3 
26.8.04 828.0 1199.4 
27.8.04 825.8 1194.8 
30.8.04 843.6 1217.4 
31.8.04 846.4 1226.7 
Overall return 6.3% 4.7% 
 
 
 
As can be seen, our optimal portfolio had higher return than market portfolio. But, as 
return is not the only measure of portfolio performance we used the Sharpe measure. We 
got 0.37 for optimal portfolio and 0.13 for CROBEX, which shows that our portfolio 
performed better in this two month period than the market average (the optimal portfolio 
has higher risk premium return per unit of total risk than CROBEX).  
 
 
4  Conclusion 
The idea behind this work was to use well-known theory and to apply it on data for 
Croatian stocks. 
Since we had only 16 monthly data, for the reasons explained in the text, it is 
questionable weather this model is applicable to Croatia. In our opinion this is too short 
of a time series to bring about any valid conclusions. Nonetheless, while we were 
working on this paper we developed a sound understanding of theory behind the 
Markowitz’s portfolio selection process, and learned how to use it on real data. For the 
purpose of this work we managed to develop a Mathematica program for unconstrained 
case, but for the constrained case we had to use Excel’s solver function. In the future we 
will try to find the way to solve constrained optimization problem with Mathematica and 
compare it with Excel results. 
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 Well-being and EU Integration 
 
Dávid Takács*
 
For some time in the economic literature well-being is more and more often used instead 
of welfare. While welfare refers primarily to material issues, well-being is a more 
complex approach to measure an individual’s quality of life. The paper’s main goal is to 
estimate the consequences of Hungary’s EU accession in terms of people’s subjective 
well-being. In the absence of up to date data I could only rely on objectively measurable 
economic indicators, changes in every-day life circumstances and expectations about 
integration in the analysis. On the other hand, I intended to provide an insight into the 
field of the so-called economics of happiness. I refer to the development of utility theory 
that is closely connected with welfare economics or more precisely its shift toward the 
economics of well-being. 
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 1  Introduction 
May 1, 2004 saw Hungary and nine other accession countries joining the European 
Union, which means that one of the major objectives of Hungarian politics and nation 
after the change of the system havs been fulfilled. In their every-day life people tend to 
talk and speculate about the consequences of the membership. Some are looking forward 
to it rather optimistically while others express their doubts. So what kind of changes are 
we going to encounter? Do these changes make us better off? What kind of difficulties 
are we going to have to cope with? Such questions are very up to date nowadays. In this 
paper I am focusing on perhaps the most important question that people might ask: does 
integration make us happier or not? I consider this question from the point of view of  
economics. According to this, happiness is an economic term and can be (or at least its 
factors can be) measured usefully. This specific field of economics – the well-being 
studies or the economics of happiness – is debated and developing rapidly. There are no 
clear-cut conceptions of happiness or methods of measuring it and new scientific 
achievements come to light very often. Nevertheless, a distinction must be made between 
two approaches to happiness. One tries to measure happiness by objective criteria while 
the other is totally based on subjective self-reports of individuals. In this paper I am 
presenting the two different conceptions on the example of accession in the course of a 
comparative analysis. The focus of this work remains in Hungary. Because of the small 
distance in time there are very few data that could be used for evaluation. Therefore most 
of my assumptions are based on expectations. 
 
 
2  Welfare vs. Well-being 
The most robust finding of the well-being research is that while the national income of 
the developed countries in the last fifty years increased rapidly the overall life 
satisfaction of people did not change at all. 
These and similar facts moved scholars to develop new concepts other than just 
considering economic indicators to asses people’s quality of life. One of the most 
important new approaches of that kind is the concept of subjective well-being (SWB). 
Measurement of SWB is based on retrospective self-reports of the subjects about their 
entire life or a longer period of their life. As Diener points out: subjective well-being 
(SWB) refers to how people evaluate their lives, and includes variables such as life 
satisfaction and marital satisfaction, lack of depression and anxiety, and positive moods 
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 and emotions (Diener, Suh, and Oishi, 1997). There are three important hallmarks of 
SWB: 1. it covers the entire range of well-being from agony to ecstasy. 2. SWB is 
defined in terms of the internal experience of the respondent. 3. SWB focuses on longer-
term states, not just momentary moods. SWB is a wide-spread method of estimating the 
quality of human life, statistics of SWB have been made for decades. SWB serves as a 
proxy for assessing individual utility (experienced utility, see later). In the next sections 
we take a look at the same question from the utility theory perspective. 
 
Figure 1.  US gross national product (GNP) and mean life satisfaction 
               from 1947 to 1998 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Diener and Seligman (2004). 
 
 
Figure 2.  Satisfaction with life and income per capita in Germany 
                between 1973 and 1998 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Eurobarometer, Penn World Tables and OECD. 
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 3  Theoretical Framework 
The central theme of this paper is happiness. Considering happiness from the 
economist’s point of view, utility is the basic term to think of. Taking utility in a broader 
sense, as utility is attached not just to a concrete event but to a certain period of an 
individual’s life, we come to subjective well-being. Other social studies have played a 
significant role in developing the concept of subjective well-being. The latter can be 
measured by standard surveys: the subjects give subjective evaluations according to 
questions like: to what extent are you satisfied with a certain event that extends over time 
or a period of your life? 
Some psychological results urged Kahneman and Tversky to come up with a new 
concept of subjective well-being: the so called objective happiness. They argued that the 
above mentioned concept of well-being was based on a memory or it was measured by a 
memory-based method. This also means that evaluation is always made retrospectively. 
For this concept of measuring happiness they used the term “remembered utility”. 
Instead of that Kahneman et al. introduced a method that is based on real time measures 
which they called a “moment-based approach”. This led to the concept of experienced 
utility. With the extension of the latter they came to the so-called objective happiness. 
A very important finding of Kahneman et al. is that the values of  remembered utility 
measured by a memory-based method and the values of experienced utility measured by 
a moment based method very often do not coincide with each other. They provided an 
exact evidence for that by means of a number of clinical experiments. The reason for 
such  deviation is that the human mind applies such heuristics that are able to distort the 
subjects’ retrospective evaluation of a particular event to be evaluated. According to the 
preceding, it is possible that when comparing two different periods (sequences) of 
pleasure and pain the first one may prove to be worse in terms of experienced utility 
measured moment by moment, but at the same time this first event is preferred according 
to a memory-based method because of its greater remembered utility. Thus a situation 
that is ranked better objectively can be ranked behind subjectively (or vice versa). This 
paradox – identified by Kahneman et al. – urged them to develop a concept of objective 
happiness in order to evaluate longer periods of time by a moment-based method. This 
much more objective way of measuring utility could be used instead of or besides the 
conventional concept of subjective well-being. 
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 That leads to the phenomenon of the so-called treadmill effects. One of the most 
interesting findings of the well-being research is that life circumstances – which can be 
measured more or less objectively – make only a small contribution to the variance of an 
individual’s happiness. Inherited personal characteristics and psychological traces play a 
much more decisive role in the subjective well-being. This also means that people tend to 
attach a great effect on utility to significant changes in their life circumstances but this 
change in utility is diminishing after a period of adjustment, which is the essence of 
treadmill effects. Formerly the term “hedonic treadmill” was used. According to that, the 
adaptation level of an individual follows the change in life conditions. Simply put, 
people get used to the new conditions. Opposed to that, Kahneman et al. have introduced 
the term satisfaction treadmill where an improvement of life circumstances is followed 
by an increase of the aspiration level of the individual. So after a period of time the 
experienced utility of an event that has a higher objectively measured value is falling 
back to a normal level of utility. 
To observe treadmill effects,  an event is needed that has a great effect on people’s lives 
or at least is expected to have such a great effect. In such a situation the human mind 
works according to the so-called snapshot model. That means that one mentally creates a 
representative moment and estimates its utility. This utility is then projected to every 
moment of the event or to a longer period of time. In most cases the moment of change 
stands for the representative moment (the snapshot) which is crucial in estimating the 
global utility of the event or a longer period of time. Such an event can be winning the 
lottery, moving to another place or joining the European Union. 
In this paper the EU integration is regarded as a “snapshot”, as an event of outmost 
importance. On the one hand, there is no question that accession is a huge event in our 
nation’s history. But on the other hand, doubts arise as to whether May 1 can be used as 
a representative moment. One of the reasons for these doubts is that people might think 
that integration affects the country on the social level rather than on the individual one. 
This can be accepted to some extent because most of the consequences actually occur on 
the social level (like harmonizing law and standards, participating in the EU decision 
making process, common policies etc.) and people are not directly affected by them. But 
on the one hand, there are consequences that have a direct effect on particular groups of 
individuals. Let us think of e.g. passing the border more easily, people involved in 
foreign trade who do not have to pay customs duty or entrepreneurs selling EU flags. On 
the other hand, there are social or macroeconomic consequences that affect people 
directly as well. Free trade within the Union affects prices, as a member of a greater 
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 economic integration our national economy encounters a number of consequences which 
sooner or later affect people’s economic situation. Thus it can be stated that accession is 
affecting people’s lives both indirectly and directly. Another reason for doubts is that 
expectations of Hungarians towards the EU are rather ambivalent. It has to be 
emphasized that  expectations are not unanimously positive. Generally people anticipate 
favorable changes in the long term but there are fears as well in people’s mind 
concerning job security,prices, etc. To sum up, there is no doubt about the great 
significance of accession, and therefore it can be examined as a good example of a 
potential satisfaction treadmill and also as a good example to demonstrate the above 
mentioned paradox of the well-being studies, i.e. the fact that objectively and 
subjectively measured values of subjective well-being do not always coincide. 
Considering the methodology of the well-being studies, it must be stated that the above 
mentioned objective happiness is only a theoretical category and not a concise approach 
that can be measured in practice. Nevertheless, testing of the basic principle – deviation 
of objective and subjective measures – can be realized. Another problem is that 
observing treadmill effects takes time: years or at least months. Macroeconomic and 
subjective well-being statistics concerning the period after May 1 are not yet available. 
Despite these problems, the comparison of objective facts that influence subjective well-
being and scientific expectations, economic forecasts about these with subjective 
expectations about well-being after accession can be made without harming the essence 
of that particular well-being paradox. 
 
 
4  Aassessment of Well-being: An Objective Approach 
According to the conception of my paper, well-being has two sides. First there are the 
objective factors which determine an individual’s well-being, but there is also the other 
side, the subjective one which “overrules” the objective side. Thus a certain combination 
of objective factors can be evaluated differently by different individuals. 
Let us take a look at the objective factors. First of all the country’s macroeconomic 
indicators should be considered. Hungary’s leading statistical agency (KSH – Hungarian 
Central Statistical Office) has just released its latest study about the country’s economic 
situation in the first quarter of 2004. The report is enthusiastic. The GDP in the first 
quarter of this year was 4.2 per cent higher than in the same period 2003. This result goes 
significantly beyond the most optimistic expectations as well. Moreover, what is also 
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 very important is that this economic boost is not consumption based but is due to 
expansion of investments and export. Certain points need to be emphasized. This kind of 
growth seems sustainable because it is based on investment and export. This is also 
supported by the fact that road construction has also increased, which gives reason for 
optimism because one of the most important factors of economic development in the 
1990s was the motorway construction. Both  exports and investment has increased by 19 
per cent. 
Only a modest increase can be registered in terms of domestic consumption. Another 
very important fact – which has a more obvious effect on well-being – is that real wages 
have also kept growing. The first quarter of this year has also seen a 20 per cent increase 
of investments in the economic sector concerning real estate and flat building, which is 
of similar importance as the preceding. Unemployment has decreased except among the 
group of young people between 15-24 years of age. In connection with the above 
mentioned, it has to be stressed that investments in the field of social insurance have also 
increased. 
Finally the question of prices has to be considered. The reason why prices were left 
behind is that the inflation statistics for May are already available. Consumer prices were 
7.6 per cent higher in May than a year earlier and almost 1 per cent (0.9) higher than in 
April, which has been this year’s inflation peak so far (experts anticipate decreasing 
inflation in the next period). The reasons for that peak are independent from EU 
integration. The two main factors are the increasing prices of  oil and  seasonal foods. 
With respect to prices it has to be noted that this has been one of the most sensitive 
issues in connection with the economic consequences of  accession. A significant fear of 
increasing prices due to  integration was noticeable (see later) among citizens. After May 
1, price changes can be seen in  food markets. The price of imported branded spirits has 
unambiguously decreased because of  abolishment of the serious custom duties. Also, the 
prices of milk, cheese, flour and cooking-oil have declined as a consequence of the EU 
accession because of cheaper import products. 
Another very interesting finding concerning inflation after accession has to be 
highlighted. It is almost like a self-fulfilling prophecy. As people expect prices to go up 
they tend to buy all the necessary goods earlier. The expanded consumer demand causes 
inflation. As a result prices do really increase. 
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 Taking into consideration further consequences that can be evaluated objectively, we 
come to the extended mobility of labour. Despite the restrictions of a number of older 
EU member-countries, Hungarian citizens find it easier to take a job in the EU. 
According to the Employment Office in Hungary which deals with EU issues, about 40-
60 people request information about working in the EU every day, while there are 22,000 
vacant jobs in the older member countries (18,000 in Great Britain), primarily for truck 
drivers, cooks, butchers and people involved in the health service. 
Hungary, like other joining countries, has  access to  EU funds. According to the National 
Development Agency, more than 100 tenders have already been completed successfully. 
Apart from economic consequences, other factors have to be taken into account as well. 
A truly pragmatic matter is the passing of the border. As usual there are always two sides 
of the coin. The spokesman of the border guards said that passing the EU border is 
becoming quicker and easier. But difficulties do appear, at least in the short term, if 
drivers take the wrong lane - they have to get used to the new order. On the other hand, 
crossing the non-EU borders takes more time and inconveniece as a result of preparing 
for the Schengen system that will be introduced there later. 
A much more sublime matter is that Hungary can take part in the EU decision making 
process. From May 1 our representatives can vote in the EU Council and as a result of 
the EU Parliament elections in June Hungary can delegate 24 members to the European 
Parliament. 
After a brief survey of the objective factors of well-being of Hungarians after accession, 
we may conclude that there is no need for anticipating any significant change that would 
make us worse off or at least there are no signs of such negative tendencies yet. 
Consequently, an improvement of the subjective well-being of people living in Hungary 
is to be expected in the future. 
 
 
5  Assessment of Well-being: A Subjective Approach 
In the following we take a look at the subjective factors of  well-being of Hungarian 
citizens: how they evaluate subjectively their own situation after EU accession. As 
mentioned earlier, the latest Hungarian subjective well-being surveys are not yet 
available. Nevertheless, subjective expectations about EU membership can be detected 
according to the results of the recent public opinion surveys. 
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 In this respect – the subjective one – the picture is a bit more ambiguous, as will be see 
later on. The general attitude of Hungarians towards their EU membership is positive in 
absolute terms and relative to the other joining countries as well: 
• 45 per cent think that EU membership is a good thing, 32 per cent are neutral and 15 
per cent thinks it is a bad thing. 
Source: Gallup Market Research Company 
 
The situation changes a bit if we take into account the global expectations of Hungarians 
about the country’s economy after accession. 
• 15 per cent of Hungarians think that the country’s economic situation will improve 
in the next 12 months, 31 per cent think that it will not change significantly and 47 
per cent expects a worsening. 
Source: Gallup Market Research Company 
 
Seeing these results, the above mentioned ambiguity becomes obvious: people generally 
think of the EU integration as a positive thing, but this is not really reflected in the 
economic expectations. This is very interesting knowing that the expected economic 
conditions play a decisive role in judging the consequences of the EU accession or any 
other event. Let us therefore take a look at a detailed analysis of economic expectations. 
Negative expectations have been recorded concerning prices. According to recent public 
opinion surveys (March 2004), 72 per cent of Hungarians anticipated that prices would 
increase after accession. Nevertheless, the trend is positive because the same figure was 
77 per cent six months earlier and 86 per cent a year earlier. 
 
Table 1.  Do you agree that prices will rise after accession? 
             Percentage of answers that agree 
 March 2003 October 2003 March 2004 
Rise of prices 86 77 72 
 
Source: GfK Market Research Institute. 
 
 
 
Concerning unemployment, 28 per cent anticipate better conditions for job security. The 
statistics are similar in terms of the percentage of people expecting growing 
unemployment. The figure is about 50 per cent and it has been stable over time. 
Hungarians are also pessimistic about the standard of living: only 28 per cent think that it 
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 will be better (with similar questions, the figures of different research companies range 
from 22 to 28 per cent). That is all about the pessimistic economic expectations. 
As opposed to the preceding, 63 per cent think that economy will grow faster after 
accession. Moreover, for the following question the index of positive opinion is 155 
(maximum 200): During the five years following the accession of your country to the 
EU, do you expect your own economic situation to improve or deteriorate? 
A direct effect of the accession – a rather positive one – can be observed in connection 
with the consumer confidence index, which is increasing after two years of deterioration. 
 
Table 2. 
Time of survey Consumer’s confidence index 
June 2002  197 
October 2002  192 
December 2002  183 
March 2003  175 
June 2003  171 
September 2003  155 
December 2003  146 
March 2004  172 
 
Source: GfK Market Research Institute. 
 
 
 
Concerning some characteristics of Hungarian expectations about the accession, it can be 
stated that younger generation is generally more optimistic, which is not a great surprise. 
Another remarkable feature of this issue is that people of higher qualifications have more 
optimistic expectations about the Union. This can be clearly seen in the table below: 
 
Table 3.  Distribution of opinions about EU membership in Hungary by level 
             of education. Index of positive opinions (maximum is 200) 
Question 8 years of 
Elementary or 
less 
Vocational 
school 
GCSE / High 
school 
diploma 
College, 
university 
National 
average 
During the five years following the 
accession of your country to the EU 
within a year, do you expect your own 
economic situation to improve or 
deteriorate? 
142 155 161 176 155 
 
Source: GfK Market Research Institute. 
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 The results to be shown next may resolve – at least to some extent – the above mentioned 
ambiguity about the accession. Surveying the general assessment of the integration, 
researchers found an interesting continuum of expectations ranging from neutral to rather 
optimistic. People think that integration is advantageous for the country as a whole. They 
think it is less advantageous for their settlement (town, village or region). People are the 
most pessimistic with regard to the consequences for themselves and their family. So 
optimism observed on the social level is deteriorating more and more on the individual 
level. That is why, in my opinion,  the expectations of Hungarians are quite ambiguous.  
 
Figure 3.  The assessment of the EU accession 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 For the country  For the settlement  For their own selves
Advantegous  Disadvantegous  Don’t know
 
Source: Gallup Market Research Institute 
 
 
 
6  Summary 
In the paper I have surveyed the most important factors that are very likely to influence 
the  subjective well-being of Hungarians after accession to the European Union. I applied 
two approaches in order to detect those factors. First I considered the consequences that 
can be measured objectively. I highlighted the macroeconomic indicators, but some non-
economic factors have been dealt with as well. In that respect the picture is rather 
positive. 
After that I took a look at what people anticipate subjectively. As a result, I realized that 
Hungarian expectations about the accession are rather ambiguous. There are positive 
tendencies which – in my opinion – are due to the positive development of objective 
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 factors. But there are also negative tendencies which may be signs of the traditional 
pessimism of Hungarians, but also of a treadmill effect in the future. 
An indirect evidence of a treadmill effect is clearly observable. As the table below 
shows, the countries that wish to join the EU but are not able to do so yet have very high 
confidence indices, while others that have already achieved this goal have become used 
to it and – as a consequence of a plausible treadmill effect – have lower indices. 
 
Table 4.  Indices of Confidence in the European Union 
              in the surveyed countries; percentage 
Country Percentage 
Turkey 153 
Romania 142 
Hungary 132 
Cyprus 130 
Bulgaria 126 
Lithuania 116 
Estonia 118 
Poland 115 
Croatia 115 
Malta 114 
Latvia 113 
Slovenia 105 
Czech Republic 98 
Slovakia 97 
 
Source: GfK Market Research Institute. 
 
 
 
For a further analysis with more detailed and up-to-date data we have to wait until the 
consequences will have become more obvious and people will have adapted to the 
changes. So time will tell. 
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in Croatia 
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Abstract 
High foreign participation in the banking sector and the increasing level of balance of 
payments deficit characterize the Croatian economy. This paper examines the 
relationship between bank ownership and balance of payments in Croatia. The market 
structure of the banking sector has undergone significant changes in many countries over 
the past ten years. These changes are consequences of a number of factors and processes 
such as financial deregulation, the establishment of the European Monetary Union and 
globalization which started in the 1980s, and to which banks have to adapt. The change 
of bank ownership structure from state ownership to foreign-bank ownership is 
particularly important in Croatia. Between 1996 and 2003, the share of assets held by 
foreign banks increased drastically. In 2003 more than 90 percent of the banking sector’s 
total assets were foreign-owned. At the same time, balance of payment deficit was 
steadily increasing. During this time, Croatia has had a consistent current account deficit 
largely reflecting the balance of goods account due to the increasing imports, especially 
consumers’ products. In this poster presentation we try to answer the question whether 
bank ownership structure in Croatia might have an impact on the balance of payments.  
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1  Introduction 
The Croatian banking system is characterised by a high degree of foreign ownership. The 
wave of foreign bank entry is a characteristic of all transition countries with the dynamic 
of this change being the only difference, but overall all of the countries in transition were 
faced with similar problems. In most of the transition countries, banks were 
predominantly state owned towards the end of the 1980s. The banks in question were 
large state owned banks that approved loans to specific sectors of state interest. The 
loans in question were primarily loans given to state firms that were unable to pay their 
debts, so the losses of the banks accumulated. Since the state determined the loan 
seekers, banks were not in the position to assess risks, so a fair amount of the credits 
would not be returned and the state would eventually write them off. Firms were the 
main sector credited by banks, while the population and products accumulated savings 
and services that were not used in developing that particular sector1. Since a number of 
banks in that period began to fail, it became essential that banks were market-oriented, 
restructured and transferred to private ownership. Liberalisation of the banking system 
began in 1993 in Croatia with the adoption of the Act on Banks and Savings banks.  
The main purpose of this paper is to point out the connection between the consolidated 
balance of banks and the balance of payments2 and to provide guidelines for the analysis 
on the connection between banks in Croatia and the current account deficit. The focus of 
the analysis will lie in the influence of foreign banks on the current account deficit 
because there is a large disproportion between large banks, most of which are foreign 
owned and small banks. This paper will not look at whether the situation would be 
different if the largest banks remained domestically owned, as is the case in Slovenia but 
rather the situation in which 91 percent of the assets of the banking system are in foreign 
ownership. This paper only analyses the influence of banks on the income account of 
balance of payments. On the other hand, there will be some points made about the 
possible impact of the banks on the current account deficit through goods accounts.  
                                                 
1 See Keren, M. and Ofer, G. (2002). 
2 The balance of payments of the Republic of Croatia is composed in accordance with the 
methodology recommended by the International Monetary Fund (International Monetary Fund: 
Balance of Payments Manual, fifth edition, 1993) in national currency (HRK) and in US dollars 
(USD). It is composed of two accounts; accounts of current transactions (which is composed of 
four accounts: goods, services, income and current transfers) and capital transaction accounts 
(which is composed of the following accounts: direct investments, portfolio investments and other 
investments). 
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The paper consists of five chapters. A chapter on the changes in the structure of bank 
ownership and the analysis of consolidated balance of banks follows the first 
introductory chapter. An analysis of the current account balance of payments is made in 
the third chapter. In the fourth chapter, the connection between the consolidated balance 
of banks in Croatia and the current account balance of payments is described and 
attempts are made to estimate if and to what measure Croatian banks contribute to the 
balance of payments deficit increase through the income account. In this part of the 
paper, banks' commitments toward foreign banks and non-residents will be especially 
analysed, in other words foreign liabilities of banks as a statement that has an influence 
on the balance of payments. This will be followed by a conclusion and recommendations 
for further research.  
 
 
2  The Banking System of Croatia  
The first foreign bank entered the market in 1994. Foreign banks achieved a higher 
growth of shares in total assets in 1998 and 1999. The portion of assets of domestic 
owned banks in total assets of the banking system fell from 78.4 percent in 1996 to 3.5 
percent in 2003.3 By the end of 2003, almost 91 percent of the banking system's assets 
were foreign owned.  
Data from the consolidated balance of banks at the end of 2003 indicate that banks 
accumulate 25.6 percent of total assets from non-residents (21.2 percent at the end of 
2002). 
From graph 1 it is evident that from 1997 onward, the Croatian banks were using a 
significant amount of funds from foreign sources but that percentage drastically 
decreased in 1997. The reason for that was the decrease of foreign liabilities, i.e. the 
decrease in the amount of loans accepted by foreign banks in mid 1997. The structure of 
banks' foreign liabilities was dominated by foreign liabilities in foreign currency and 
77.35 percent of foreign liabilities comprised of the banks' commitments towards foreign 
banks. The share of foreign liabilities in the banking system's total liabilities statement 
oscillated significantly between 1994 and 2003. 
                                                 
3 Changes such as the conversion of some banks to savings banks during 2001 influenced that 
increase in the assets of domestic owned banks, but not a significant change of its share in the 
assets.  
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Graph 1.  Share of banks' foreign liabilities in total liabilities 
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Source: Croatian National Bank. 
 
 
 
In 2002 indebtedness to foreign sources began to increase drastically and Croatian banks 
started using significant funds from foreign sources (mostly loans from foreign banks). 
Since some data is lacking due to non-reporting of relevant data by banks for this 
analysis in their annual reports, an estimation of the share of foreign banks’ liabilities in 
the total liabilities of the banking system was made. An estimation of the movement of 
the share of foreign liabilities of foreign banks in the total liabilities was made on the 
assumption that the foreign banks’ share in particular segments of liabilities was 
estimated on the basis of the foreign banks’ share in the total assets of the banking 
system. Since the share of foreign owned banks' assets was growing during the observed 
time period, it is expected that the share of foreign liabilities of foreign banks in the total 
liabilities will tend to grow.  
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3  Analysis of the Current Account Balance                        
of Payments in the Republic of Croatia                         
from 1994 to 2003  
During the last nine years Croatia has recorded a continued deficit in current account 
transactions. The deficit is a result of the exchange of goods of Croatia with foreign 
countries. In the observed period the exchange balance was positive only in 1994. The 
surplus in 1994 was a result of the decrease in domestic demand during the war. The 
largest recorded current account transactions deficit was in 1997, 2002 and 2003 (see 
graph 2). 
 
Graph 2.  Current transactions balance, as a percent of GDP 
               and foreign banks, in percent of total asset 
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Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Croatian National Bank.  
 
 
 
In the observed period between 1994 and 2003, the annual growth rates of imports were 
higher than growth rates of exports (in almost all of the years). Besides the constant 
deficit on the goods account, was a constant deficit recorded on the income account4. In 
1998, a significant deficit increase has been recorded (compared with the deficit growth 
rate achieved during the period between 1995 and 1998). 
                                                 
4 The income account includes data from the foreign payments statistics on compensation of 
employees, payments on the basis of interest, income from foreign direct and portfolio investment 
ect., see Croatian National Bank: Annual Reports Statistics. 
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In the 1997, the current account deficit reached its peak of USD 2.3bn or almost 12 
percent of GDP. This was the biggest current account deficit ever recorded. In the next 
three years it decreased mainly due to a modest decline of imports, as a result of a 
downward trend in consumption (partially due to the decreasing credit expansion), 
banking crisis, restrictive measures of monetary policy and external factors, such as 
Asian and Russian crises. Besides these factors, several foreign policy events5 were 
behind positive movements of Croatian exports. In 2000 the deficit was decreased by 
HRK 11.3bn or by USD 1.9bn. With share of 2.4 percent of GDP it was the lowest in the 
whole period in question. However, it should be pointed out that deficit would have been 
even smaller had Croatia registered deterioration of its income account from 1998, 
mainly caused by increased interest payments on external debt, which had been growing 
since 1996. Income deficit amounted to USD 406.7 million in 2000, which represents a 
rise of about USD 287 million since 1997. 
In the following years further deterioration of the current account were recorded. In the 
year 2002 it peaked at USD 1.92bn (HRK 5.28bn) or 8.5 percent GDP, and parallel to 
increases in the merchandise trade deficit that reached USD 5.2bn. One of the factors 
that contributed to this movement was the greater demand for goods (and consequently 
imports) and credit expansion, as well as increasing level of foreign debt. After 2002, 
resources for the financing of demand for commercial banks credits had been found in 
foreign sources. This situation motivated the Croatian National Bank to take some 
restrictive measures in order to slow down the expansion of foreign debt, which was 
registered in the capital account and which became a significant source of financing for 
the current account deficit. 
Similar movements continued in 2003 and resulted in a record merchandise trade deficit 
of USD 7.9 billion, and the current account deficit of USD 2.04 billion (HRK 53.25 
billion) or 7.2 percent of GDP. Besides the negative impact of a negative balance in 
goods account, a surplus of expenditures over revenues recorded in the current account 
was also strongly affected by the growth in net outflows from the income account, which 
almost entirely resulted from increased expenditures incurred on the basis of reinvested 
profit from equity investments.  
                                                 
5 EU lifted quantitative restrictions on certain Croatian exports, the Stability Pact and accession to 
the WTO. 
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Data relating to last year show that a strong growth in goods imports, which marked the 
year 2002, was not curbed. A rise in banks’ loans together with an increased credit 
activity of the leasing companies helped to maintain the purchasing power of the 
Croatian citizens at a relatively high level.6
 
4  The Impact of Foreign Banks on the                    
Current Account Balance of Payments 
In 1995, the deficit of the balance of payments goods account was compensated with the 
surplus of services and current transfers accounts. Since 1995 until the present, a surplus 
on these accounts was not enough to cover the deficit on the goods account. Therefore, 
financing of the continuous current account deficit is covered with capital and financial 
transactions, that is, with the inflow of direct foreign investments and indebtness of all 
sectors abroad. In the observed time period Croatia therefore became a net capital 
importer due to total domestic savings being lower than total investments. 
Namely, in 1995, after the war, Croatian economy began its recovery with the decrease 
in domestic consumption and surplus of balance of payments current account. This also 
resulted in the GDP growth due to domestic demand, consumption and investment. 
During 1995 and 1996, a source of finance became the non-indebted capital (from 
official sources and repatriated foreign savings of citizens, that is, foreign currency 
payments). 
In the 1997 and 1998 current accounts deficit was mainly financed with the borrowings 
from non-residents of all sectors. Favourable judgement of the Croatian credit worthiness 
by international institutions contributed to this and made it possible for Croatia to access 
international sources under favourable conditions. In 1998, foreign direct investments 
became a main source of financing for the current account deficit. Between 1999 and 
2001, net direct investments completely covered the current account deficit, mainly 
because of the increase of investment in the banking sector and telecommunications. 
Capital revenue coupled with restructuring and bank privatisation caused the increase in 
deposits. All of this accelerated the credit expansion. Untenable expansion of private 
consumption and investments in the years when the highest level of current account 
deficit was recorded (in the year 1997, 2002 and 2003) was financed with a strong credit 
growth and rise in public consumption. After a few years of having a high deficit levels 
                                                 
6 See Croatian National Bank, Annual Report 2003. 
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and strong increase in external debt, the Croatian National Bank undertook restrictive 
measures. These measures resulted in a decrease of the current account deficit. In all 
three observed years (1997, 2002 and 2003) high deficit growth was recorded on the item 
consumer goods in the merchandise trade. In addition, the growing domestic demand 
was accompanied by inadequate and insufficient production of certain goods. 
In the 2002 net direct investments decreased significantly compared to previous years. 
This is in part a result of lower income (lack of privatisation of big companies), and in 
part a result of higher expenditures (domestic investments abroad). In the same year, the 
current account deficit was partly financed by other investments. Other investments 
reached a higher level than the total amount of direct investments7. Share of borrowing 
from non-residents in other investments was very high, especially on item deposits from 
physical and legal entities in Croatian banks. The reason for such a high level of these 
deposits is the higher interest rates level in Croatian banks than in other countries, where 
the headquarters of these banks are situated. Within the other mentioned investments, 
international indebtness played an important role as well as deposits of non-residents in 
Croatian banks because of the higher interest rates in Croatia than in the countries where 
the banks’ owners are situated. 
Graph 3  Current account deficit financing 
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Source: Croatian National Bank, Croatian Bureau of Statistics. 
                                                 
7 Other investments were in 2002 1.83 bn USD or 13.6 bn HRK higher than net direct investments. 
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To ascertain the impact of foreign banks on the balance of payment current account 
deficit, three main bank data are considered - foreign banks' aggregate profit after taxes, 
interest payments on debt and data from consolidated bank accounts (table 1).  
 
Table 1.  Foreign banks contributions to balance of payments current account 
 
Foreign 
banks' 
aggregate 
net profit 
Net 
assets/liabilities 
to non-residents, 
only foreign 
banks 
Interest 
payments on 
debt 
Total 
payments 
on debt 
Total 
surplus/deficit of 
balance of 
payments current 
account 
Foreign banks 
contributions to 
deficit of 
balance of 
payments 
current account 
 HRK, mln HRK, mln HRK, mln HRK, mln HRK, mln percent 
1994 0.00 6.05 0.44 0.44 5,735.60 0.00 
1995 -9.75 11.71 0.89 0.89 -6,266.00 0.01 
1996 12.74 -0.81 0.00 12.74 -4,671.20 0.27 
1997 121.44 -95.37 0.00 121.44 -15,184.90 0.80 
1998 112.52 227.73 10.03 122.55 -9,239.20 1.33 
1999 496.61 1,918.82 70.68 567.29 -9,953.00 5.70 
2000 1,587.71 -1,598.44 0.00 1,587.71 -3,894.00 40.77 
2001 759.75 -9,780.35 0.00 759.75 -6,052.70 12.55 
2002 1,874.34 8,155.66 325.61 2,199.95 -15,676.60 14.03 
2003 2,290.37 13,239.73 375.68 2,666.05 -13,320.30 20.01 
 
Source: author's calculation based on the figures from Financial agency and Croatian national bank. 
 
 
 
In this part of the article, the main assumption is that foreign banks take all their net 
profit (profit after taxes) out of the country. As a consequence, the profit together with 
interest payment on debt results in a negative influence on balance of payments. Net 
profits figures are incomplete because the data about operating banks in Croatia vary 
according to different sources. In the article we used data from the Financial agency 
because data from the Croatian National Bank on individual banks is not available and 
relevant. The next item used in the analysis is the difference between foreign assets and 
liabilities (variation between claims on non-residents and liabilities to non-residents). 
Due to the unavailability of data on individual banks in the Croatian National Bank, this 
data needs to be estimated. Data about the total amount of a bank’s credits can be found 
in the bank’s balance sheet, but amount of credit received from non-residents cannot be 
calculated. Therefore, the estimation is made with the assumption that the share of the 
foreign banks in every item of the banks' accounts liabilities is estimated by the share of 
foreign banks in total assets of banking system. The third factor included in the analysis 
is interest paid by foreign banks on borrowing from non-residents. Annual Euribor is 
used as the referent interest rate, but increased for 0.5 percent annually, which is used as 
an estimated extra interest rate that Croatian banks pay because of their credit rating. The 
 731 
total payment on debt item is calculated as the sum of aggregate net profit and interest 
payments. At the end of the analysis we calculated the total contribution of foreign banks 
to the balance of payments current account deficit.  
From the data shown in table 1, it is noticeable that the contribution of the factors 
included in analysis of the balance of payments current account deficit is high after the 
year 2000. The highest level of foreign bank contribution was reached in 2000 when 
foreign banks for the first time achieved high net profit levels. Until 1995, contribution 
of foreign banks to the balance of payments current account deficit was near zero. Up 
until that year, only one foreign bank was active in Croatia and in 1995 that foreign bank 
suffered losses. Shareholders of that foreign bank financed the loss, not the government. 
Therefore the banks’ losses did not contribute to the current account balance deficit 
payments. High level of net profit had a negative influence on the current account 
balance deficit payments in the year 2002 and 2003. At the end of 2003 total contribution 
of foreign banks through income account amounted to 20.29 percent of current account 
balance deficit payments. 
 
 
5  Conclusion and Recommendations                            
for Further Research 
Similarly to other transition countries, Croatia was and still is on its way toward a 
market-oriented economy. During that period it was important that banks were oriented 
towards the market, restructured and transferred to private ownership. In recent years, 
judging by the share of capital assets, it is clear that the Croatian banking system is 
predominantly foreign owned. Parallel to the expansion of foreign banks on the domestic 
market another matter of debate is the current account balance deficit. The aim of this 
paper was drawing a connection between the two. The largest contributor to the deficit in 
question (based on indicators and hypotheses) is the point when foreign banks achieved a 
high level of profit for the first time in 2000. However, it is noticeable that banks 
indirectly contributed to the expansion of the current account deficit. The structural 
problems on the supply side, low savings and favourable interest rates enabled credit 
expansion of banks. This raises the question of whether domestic banks would act the 
same way. Considering the fact that a bank is above all a profit institution, they would.  
It should not be ignored that apart from the mentioned contributor to the current account 
balance deficit, there are other contributors that have not been observed such as 
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repatriated profit and indebting of registered banks that have a negative and positive 
influence on the banks' balance of payments. One of the most negative aspects 
mentioned is the high growth of bank crediting in Croatia. The amounts of approved 
loans to an individual sector are the incentives to growth of personal consumption and 
investment and in the Croatian case, to imports as well. The fact remains that until 
foreign banks entered, the Croatian market for consumer loans was undeveloped; 
accessibility to capital for investing into the economy increased and that crediting growth 
is the most frequent way of achieving expansion of banks and their market share. Loans 
to firms dominate the loan structure from 1994 to 2003, but in 2003 the sector changed 
and for the first time the population had more loans granted than firms8.  
Therefore, it can be concluded that from the time of entry of foreign banks into Croatia 
until the present when they are still strengthening their marketing positions, the main 
agitator for achieving a larger market share through crediting is increasing population 
crediting. This is linked to the growth of personal consumption and imports into Croatia. 
The analysis of the population loan structure shown confirms the thesis that banks in 
Croatia initiate personal consumption of the population through crediting. 11.2 percent of 
total loans in the first trimester of 2003 were credits for automobiles, therefore, imported 
goods. The remaining loans (48.1 percent of total loans), that are the most important 
statement, consist mostly of unspecified loans that influence consumption. All of this 
contributes to the deficit growth of the current account balance.  
Continuing the current account deficit entails a capital inflow the balance of payments 
capital account, but these inflows have to be maintained through current income account 
that grows larger each year. Even though foreign owners of banks have opted for 
reinvesting profit in Croatia until now, it can be expected that in the future there will be a 
repatriation of profit, which will influence the current transaction account even more. 
These conclusions raise the question of long-term sustainability of this situation; the 
solution lies in higher savings, improving and restructuring the supply side of the 
Croatian economy and directing new funds into profitable investments.  
                                                 
8 During all the period, credits to the population have bigger growth rates than credits to the 
enterprises. In 2003 the first mentioned rose by 21.7percent yoy while the credits to the enterprises 
rose by 2.13percent. 
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Abstract 
This paper explores the importance of the value chain concept by analysing profit and 
cost centres in a selected wood manufacturing company in Croatia. First, we performed a 
SWOT analysis of Croatian wood industry with a brief overview of financial reporting 
practice. Then, a model is constructed by applying the basic principles of IAS accounting 
postulates on segment reporting and joint venture. It suggests financial reporting form 
that could facilitate value added tracking within the wood manufacturing company and 
the industry as a whole.  
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1  Introduction 
Wood cluster issue, though very popular among policy makers in Croatia, has remained a 
rather fashionable topic instead of being a tool for the reorganisation, reconstruction and 
competitiveness enhancement of the wood manufacturing industry. Cluster is a type of 
industrial organisation that implies a strong partnership between policy makers and 
manufacturers. It is designed to overcome problems and meet the market criteria of 
competitiveness. Although the cluster as a model has been applied successfully in several 
European countries such as Finland, Sweden, Italy, Austria, Slovenia, its ever-lasting 
idea of partnership has been exploited in Latin American economies and other states as 
well. 
Research papers that examine the role of cluster have been rather rare in Croatia. 
Nevertheless, there are initiatives for cluster creation in some sectors, particularly in 
struggling wood manufacturing industry whose share in GDP is now a meagre 1,5%1. 
This paper starts with a brief SWOT analysis of Croatian wood manufacturing and 
proceeds with an insight into current financial reporting practice. However, the aim of 
the paper goes beyond generally accepted financial reporting practice through exploring 
the role of financial reporting in value added chain, and positive multiplication effects it 
could generate not only for wood industry but Croatian industry as a whole. 
 
 
2  Data and Methods 
The data used here includes both annual financial statements and physical data of 
Croatian wood manufacturer, which remains anonymous for the purpose of this 
research2. 
The hypothesis we formulate is as follows: financial reports in Croatia are outdated and 
without information on production process and value added products of the company. As 
such, they, in our opinion, cannot serve as a sound basis for neither financial reporting 
nor decision making within the wood cluster. Therefore we tried to combine physical and 
financial data in the model constructed in order to propose a possible move to activity-
based accounting practice. 
                                                 
1Industrijska strategija, www.vlada.hr/Download/2003/10/09/pog15.pdf, pp. 7-8. 
2 We are grateful to the company’s staff for providing us with the information we requested. 
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3  SWOT Analysis and Current Financial                
Reporting Practice Overview 
Problems and perspectives of the Croatian wood industry are mainly pinpointed in the 
analysis of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (Table 1).  
 
Table 1.  SWOT analysis of Croatian wood industry 
STRENGTHS 
Valuable hardwood species 
FSC certification of forests 
81.5% forests in state ownership 
Strengthening of the road network and key port of Rijeka in proximity 
Traditionally good reputation of Croatian wood and some wooden products 
WEAKNESESS 
Obsolete technology 
No permanent training of workers to acquaint them with new technology 
Lack of working and investment capital for R&D 
Bureaucratic procedures and unfavourable loan terms 
Strong dependence on suppliers and thus vulnerability to FX rate changes 
Low income and low motivation of forest industry workers 
High transport costs 
Excess capacity of saw mills as opposed to capacities in later phases of production 
Unattractive and no space-friendly design of final products 
Uninformative financial statements and lack of good financial reports presentation 
Lack of promotional activities 
High re-export of Croatian prime round wood 
Inadequate and old-fashioned legislation 
Lack of organised long-term reforestation policy 
OPPORTUNITIES 
Flexible order-oriented production for construction and publishing industry, shipbuilding, tourism and agriculture 
Strong demand for high quality wooden products in Asia, Western Europe and the USA 
Horizontal and vertical integration within the industry 
Strengthening industrial partnerships by timely and more detailed financial records presentation 
Organised supply market in partnership with the state 
Full capacity utilisation by jointly organised import of insufficient raw materials 
Rural areas development and employment growth 
Regular market analysis and value added creation commensurate with consumer needs and fashion trends 
Better cooperation with R&D institutions 
Sustainable and domestic production-friendly forest management establishment 
THREATS 
Ever-changing public strategies for forest management 
Rural depopulation 
Demand increase for tropical wood species 
Lack of confidence in public policies 
Inadequate training programmes 
Acid rains and pests endangering forest treasure, particularly softwood 
 
 
 
Starting with the common statement that “the chain is as strong as its weakest part” we 
aim to propose the change of financial reports preparation for each cluster member to 
facilitate the value added monitoring within the wood cluster. Before moving on to 
activity-based financial reporting, that is to be proposed, a brief explanation of current 
financial reporting practice in Croatia is given, with focus on some of its key drawbacks. 
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The existing domestic financial reporting is based on International Accounting Standards 
and The Accounting Law3. Accordingly, the companies are obliged to present their 
financial records once a year in an officially set form, which varies depending upon the 
size of the company. The information is grouped under broad asset, liability, cost and 
revenue categories that contain only lump sums and do not separate the activities that 
generate value added from those that tend to lose it. This is especially true when SME 
sector is concerned. 
The fact that it often takes a couple of months for financial statements to be published 
makes the financial records worthless in terms of useful information for any purpose but 
tax considerations. Consequently, the majority of financial statement users end up 
without worthy information. This particularly holds true for business partners who have 
difficulty in spotting business allies or products of a special interest.  
The company whose internal organisation and financial reports we examined for the 
analysis in this paper is a middle-size wood manufacturer, with parquetry as a main 
production line and oak parquet as principal value added product. The most recent 
income statement of the Company (Table 2) is, at the same time, the sample of current 
income statement presentation practice. 
Our comment on such a form of income statement is summarised as follows: 
• Geographically divided sales serve as the basis for segment reporting; yet they do 
not provide insight into the core value added business activities.  
• Such a reduced form of financial statements for SMEs gives only the rough idea of 
whether the company achieved gain or loss in the reporting period.  
• Additionally, the fact that such reports have to be presented just once a year and 
only occasionally audited, puts further a doubt into their relevance and reliability. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia, No. 53/91, 33/92 www.nn.hr 
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Table 2.  Income statement of the selected wood manufacturer in Croatia 
No. Description 2001 2002 2003 
1 Operating revenues 22,204,458 24,375,145 22,611,489 
1.1 Revenues from product sale in the country 12,761,782 13,284,341 10,184,310 
1.2 Revenues from product sale abroad 9,113,676 9,280,931 9,975,416 
1.3 Revenues from goods sale in the country 0 28,042 7,628 
1.4 Revenues from goods sale abroad 0 1,764,529 2,033,605 
1.5 Other revenues 329,000 17,302 410,530 
2 Operating expenses 20,977,809 23,044,299 21,604,304 
2.1 Change in inventory value -2,034,476 873,998 510,612 
2.2 Cost of raw materials 12,605,920 11,275,312 9,312,551 
2.3 Cost of goods sold 1,296,142 1,601,957 1,875,297 
2.4 Services and other expenses 1,182,380 1,609,235 1,387,950 
2.5 Labour cost 5,198,346 5,040,405 5,169,637 
2.6 Depreciation 1,068,219 967,083 1,091,772 
2.7 Administrative and general costs 1,661,278 1,676,309 2,256,485 
3 Financial revenues 504,572 126,201 120,225 
4 Financial expenses 1,332,019 1,412,283 1,231,388 
5 Extraordinary revenues 325,575 140,112 430,205 
6 Extraordinary expenses 289,082 44,702 33,169 
7 Total revenues (1+3+5) 23,034,605 24,641,458 23,161,919 
8 Total expenses (2+4+6) 22,598,910 24,501,284 22,868,861 
9 Income (loss) before tax 435,695 140,174 293,058 
10 Income tax (20%) 87,139 28,035 58,612 
11 Other taxes than income tax 0 0 0 
12 Net gain (loss) 348,556 112,139 234,446 
13 Dividend 0 0 0 
14 Retained earnings 348,556 112,139 234,446 
15 Number of employees 98 94 93 
 
 
 
 
4  Model Description 
Following the principle that physical data cannot be separated from financial data in the 
production company, we aim to combine information at hand in our lengthened model of 
the income statement (Table 3). 
Table 3 presents the potential income statement model for a specific cluster member. The 
selected company is already internally organised into profit and cost centres with Sales 
as both profit and cost centre, and Production and Management and Administration 
departments as pure cost centres. However, to obtain the desired information on value 
added products, the Sales centre is further divided into smaller organisational units. 
Conceptually, the basic principles of segment reporting are applied, as prescribed in the 
International Accounting Standard (here on IAS) No.14, with business segment, e.g. 
products according to production phases, as the primary one, and the geographical 
segment, e.g. domestic and foreign sales, as the secondary one (see column I, table 3). 
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According to IAS 14, a segment is reportable if a majority of its revenue is earned from 
sales to external customers, and if its revenue is 10 per cent or more of total revenue; or 
if its result (either profit or loss, whichever is the greater in absolute amount) is 10 per 
cent or more of the combined result of all segments. Moreover, the total revenue 
attributed to reportable segments must be at least 75 per cent of the total consolidated 
revenue. If it is less than 75 per cent, additional segments are identified as reportable 
segments until at least 75 per cent of total revenue is included in reportable segments4.  
Table 3 follows the pattern of functional income statement presentation as shown by 
column I, except that all revenues and costs are split between profit/cost centre Sales and 
cost centres Production and Management and Administration. The mark N/A within the 
table stands instead of the data that are not available, while the hyphen marks the fields 
that should not be fulfilled or that cannot be calculated, e.g. m2 and m3 sales quantities 
in column XII. 
Columns II to XI and column XIII represent the production workflow according to 
production phases, e.g. sawn timber, sawn-mill elements and parquetry. This analytics 
combines the inventory categories from the balance sheet (not included in the paper), in 
both physical and financial terms, with the income statement items such as cost of goods 
sold (row 34). 
Although the table looks somewhat confusing at the first sight, the text on the grey 
background relies on pure income statement items whereas the text on the white 
background enables the tracking of the physical and financial flow of production, from 
the raw materials entering the production process through their transformation into the 
final product backlogs at the end of each production phase. 
Due to the lack of data at hand it is assumed that there are no starting inventories of raw 
materials at the beginning of the first production phase, e.g. sawn timber (see column II, 
rows 3, 6). The second assumption is that the company itself produced sufficient quantity 
of final products that are to be sold in the next period or used as the starting inventories 
for the next production phase as shown in column XIII. 
                                                 
4 Web Summaries IAS 14: Segment Reporting, 
http://www.iasb.org/uploaded_files/ documents/8_63_ias14-sum.pdf. 
5 Web Summaries IAS 31, http://www.iasb.org/uploaded_files/documents/8_63_ias31-sum.pdf. 
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The total quantity in column XIII, e.g. row 3, reduced by starting raw materials inventory 
for the second production phase, e.g. column II, row 10, equals the total finished 
products inventory at the end of the second production phase or at the beginning of the 
next production phase, as evidenced by column IX, row 10. Columns XVI and XVII are 
deliberately included for the monitoring of total capacity utilisation during the normal 
working hours of the factory. The excess capacity utilisation reveals the possible 
problems in the supply chain; the same being one of main problems in the Croatian wood 
manufacturing industry. 
For easier analysis of the physical workflow, numbers are included in percentages, 
whereas financial data are given for easier cost evidence. The foreign and domestic 
market sales are taken into account only in columns XII, XIV and XV. When the 
products are sold, the cost of raw materials used for their production should be 
transferred into cost of goods sold as can be seen in the row 34. Yet the category of 
production costs is much broader as it includes not only the cost of goods sold, but also 
the R&D expense, depreciation expense of production capacities, labour cost, overheads 
as well as services such as maintenance of production capacities. 
After the costs for Sales and Management and Administration division as well as 
financial revenues and expenses, the emphasis is put on the income from continuing 
operations as it is the category that is the most meaningful, as far as regular production, 
sales and administration activities are concerned. 
In such a model of income statement, financial data are not only combined with physical 
but they also set the sound basis for decision making in both real and financial terms. Not 
only the sales profitability in both domestic and foreign market is measured revealing 
which products obtain the most value added, but also the degree of product finalisation, 
the capacity utilisation, the inventory management process and consequently the demand 
for end-product types. Moreover, this model might also be a controlling instrument for 
products of low finalisation grade export. 
The model benefits are even more expanded on an aggregate level. Simple consolidation 
of the income statements for all cluster members, with the physical and financial data of 
all production phases in the industry, gives the opportunity to the State as a key supplier 
and partner in the wood value chain to introduce the legal and practical measures either 
targeted to some subdivisions of the wood industry or to the industry as a whole. 
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The role of partnership is stressed further as a platform for various SMEs integration in 
the same or different phases of production. This way of financial presentation, especially 
if provided on a frequent basis, enables the business-networking concept, commonly 
known as joint ventures, to take place. Joint ventures can be classified as jointly 
controlled operations, jointly controlled assets and jointly controlled entities. As 
prescribed by IAS No. 31, a venturer recognises its interest in a jointly controlled 
operation by recognising in its financial statements on a proportional basis the assets that 
it controls, its share of liabilities or expenses incurred jointly, and any income from the 
sale or use of its share of the joint output5. By adding the joint venture entities in the 
income statement consolidation on the aggregate level, some significant errors in 
aggregate accounting and statistics can be omitted. Needles to say, a venturer 
discontinues proportionate consolidation from the date that it ceases to have joint control 
over a jointly controlled entity. 
Thanks to temporary performance capabilities of IT technology, more complicated 
financial reporting is more time-friendly oriented. There are numerous studies that 
address the need for timely information by addressing the issue of quarterly, semi-annual 
and annual reporting, but this paper is focused exclusively on decision-making benefit. 
Growing number of companies are introducing the concept of quarterly reporting even 
though they are not obliged to, to stress their role in the industry and gain investors' 
confidence. Despite the fact that most Croatian wood manufacturers are not listed on the 
stock exchange or are not regularly traded, e.g. only 7 companies are listed on the Zagreb 
Stock Exchange6 and 14 companies at the Varaždin Stock Exchange7, the more frequent 
financial reporting would be highly beneficial for mutual confidence establishment 
between the State and manufacturers in the wood cluster. 
 
 
                                                 
6 http://www.zse.hr/quotation.php?sessionId=-1 
7 http://www.vse.hr/kotacije/popis 
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5  Conclusion 
In this paper we address the importance of having more informative, detailed and 
updated financial reporting within Croatian wood industry cluster. We set the hypothesis 
that financial papers in Croatia do not provide enough information on production process 
and value added products in a certain company. Therefore, we tried to combine physical 
and financial data of a Croatian wood manufacturer and construct a model that may serve 
as a proposal for members of Croatian wood industry cluster to move to activity-based 
accounting practice. 
The findings of this paper should be thought of as a preliminary contribution to the issue 
of the importance of the value chain financial reporting. It is of a high importance to 
point out that this paper’s attention was not to conduct pre and post experiment and show 
the result, yet to propose a model that could possibly be implemented in wood industry 
value chain financial reporting. The model introduced confirmed our hypothesis and 
therefore represents a path to more informative and updated financial reports and 
provides potential associates with clearer picture of profits and costs in the wood 
manufacturing chain. Pre-experiment and post-experiment can serve as an extension of 
this paper for future research.  
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